

LIFE OF GENERAL SHERMAN

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GENERAL WM. T. SHERMAN. (1883).

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THE LIFE OF

GENERAL

William T. Sherman

BY

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Introductory.

THE last of the great military figures in the strife for the preservation of the American Union passed away with General William Tecumseh Sherman. Death withheld its hand till he grew ripe in years, and came into the full enjoyment of the honors he so hardly won and so richly deserved. The illustrious soldier had time to cultivate the arts of peace, to gauge the nation he had helped to save, and in turn, to be measured by the standards of patriotic citizenship and ennobled manhood.

As soldier or citizen his is a unique figure. It stands out in history as one of a mighty group of generals whom the wars of half a century, and on two continents, called into prominence and crowned with laurels. It stands also as one of that lesser group of martial heroes whom the blandishments of political life and civil occupation could not swerve, and whose later ambitions found their gratification in philosophic contemplation and liberal devotion of matured energy to the ends of enlightened citizenship.

Many, indeed most, of the great leaders of the Union army came into prominence slowly. They were evolutions of their time, survivals, so to speak, of the ordeals which quickly consumed a host of the best favored and most promising. Sherman was a matured man when the echoes of Sumpter startled the nation. He was past forty. He had not distinguished himself as a military cadet at West Point. Hating the desultory life of a recruiting officer, he burned for action and distinction on the fields of Mexico,

but had the misfortune to be consigned to the wastes of Lower California—an enemy's country, but far removed from the roar of cannon and scenes of strife. Dissatisfied with the hum-drum existence of the remote camp, he tasted of the speculative excitement incident to the discovery of gold on the Pacific coast. The taste was bitter. At last he drifted into the tame life of a military professor in a Southern college. Here he subsisted for a brief time, unmarked by the world, unmeasured by events.

Only when the great rebellion burst upon the country did the rolling stone settle. The dissatisfied, unrooted man then found a place and mission. Let it stand to his everlasting credit that, despite his environment, he obeyed the spirit of loyalty, and threw his future in with that of his country. He understood the situation from the very first—understood better than most men of his time, so well indeed as to invite derision for his counsels, and subject himself to the charge of illusory statements and unbalanced judgment. Piqued at this, yet firm in his conviction, and thoroughly fixed in his devotion, he practically devoted himself, and fell in with the fortunes of one who seemed to grasp the Western situation, and who awakened the country with the capture of Fort Donaldson. The genius which proved too commanding to escape question, was yet not too proud to co-operate with that of another, on the lines which both sanctioned. The man, the officer, sunk himself in his cause. Duty was paramount to distinction. Shiloh must be fought, Memphis must fall, the Yazoo must be threaded, Vicksburg must surrender, the grand march must be made to Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge must close a two years' chapter of blood, before the discredited genius of the Cumberland Army, or the insane commander at Paducah, comes out into the clear sunlight of distinction,

and stands "right face" with the great chieftains of his time.

In all places, thus far, Sherman had proven true; at all points, able. He had been brave where others shrank; prompt, where others dallied; obedient, where others murmured. He could grasp and endure; organize and effect. Time and service had come to his vindication. Plan and victory had established his genius. Grant trusted him implicitly. Lincoln and the authorities looked to him as the one best fitted to shape and fight the future campaigns of the West, and to co-operate with the armies of the Potomac and the East. The soldiers grew to love him, and they fought with confidence under his lead. The nation sounded his praise, and looked for victory where he floated the flag of his battalions and raised his voice in command.

Under these auspices he launched his greatest campaign, a campaign largely of his own creation, and for which he was to be wholly responsible, and, therefore, one in which he was rightfully independent as to details. It was boldly conceived and admirably executed. It lasted for a year, and was unmarred by defeat or unsullied by retreat. It was a campaign in which fully 60,000 men were to be kept active, in which innumerable obstacles were to be surmounted, in which a powerful enemy had ever to be faced, and in which long lines of supplies had to be maintained and new bases of operations constantly formed. By and by, as theories invited and results warranted, it was to be a campaign of dash and sweep, a grand rush through an enemy's country, a daring effort to reach a distant coast in the rear of hostile lines. And further it was to be a campaign of co-operation, a union of the Western and Eastern armies, whose position and number should effectually prevent either the relief or escape of the confederate forces then hemmed within the Peters-

burg lines. The fall of Atlanta, the triumphal "March to the Sea" the invasion of the Carolinas, the surrender of Johnston's army, the consummation of all things as designed and mapped, render this campaign one of the most notable in history. Its results thrilled the entire country. It will never cease to be a study among military men. It gave to Sherman a permanent rank among the world's great generals, and fixed his name forever in the memory of a grateful people.

After victory had become final and the Union of States assured, the conquering army passed in grand review before its generals in Washington. Sherman could not help exclaiming, "It is the most magnificent army in existence." In this just and proud recognition of the organized energies which had saved the country there is also that which contributes glowingly to the characters of those who gave these energies shape and direction. Sherman could see his will in the faces of his veterans, and detect his discipline in their tread. In their magnificent numbers and triumphant air, he could read the story of his perfect vindication, and confidently point to history to note, that he, almost alone, had gauged the magnitude of the struggle from the start, that he was not unwise when he implored an early call for troops in the beginning, that he was not insane when he protested against the small size of the first levies and refused to risk the lives of a handful of new recruits in a country thickly studded with armed men and fortified places. All his predictions had been fulfilled to the letter; every demand he had made for men and supplies had been met thrice over before he was permitted to stand in his place and witness the triumphal procession from the bivouac to the hearthstone.

We associate with Grant the impression of resistless force. with Sheridan the sudden energy that sweeps all barries,

Sherman was the professional and practical soldier. He mapped his campaigns after the manner of Von Moltke. He studied topography, knew roads, mastered the details of a campaign in advance, as no other general did. It was said of him that if the maps of the continent were lost, he could reproduce them county by county. From rifle pit to forti fication, he knew the art of defence, and no formation, manouvre or march in assault or attack escaped his attention. The reports of his campaign teem with reasons for this or that move, and show on every page his pride in the work of a soldier, who is both made and born.

It was supreme command of the art of war that placed Sherman among the greatest of generals. His retreats were as masterly as his advances. The former, as at Vicksburg, and the latter, as in the Atlanta campaign, are models. His "March to the Sea" added a new chapter to military science, and settled the possibility of invasion with an army as its own base. Many generals fought great battles successfully and executed long and intricate campaigns favorably, but no one combined to the same extent the factors which constituted a military situation and worked a military problem with greater ease and certainty. The difficult operations which led to Atlanta, would have been impossible in the hands of almost any one except Sherman, and they became possible with him only by reason of the care bestowed on their preparation and that quickness of perception and nicety of movement which enabled him to divine the plans of his opponent and to thwart his intentions in time.

It is a pleasure to make history of these things for the benefit of mankind. It is even more of a pleasure to record the fact that this great soldier deepened the love, pride and devotion of his countrymen through twenty-five years of peace. He quit the battle-field crowned with its highest

honors, and his devotion to the noble ideals of a soldier's life saved him from all civic temptations. The people's regard for him passed into love, and their regret at his death was as profound as their gratitude for his steadfast and unselfish devotion to the cause of Liberty and Union.

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CHAPTER I.

PARENTAGE, BIRTH, EDUCATION.

The Sherman family from which William Tecumseh Sherman sprang was of English descent. In the records of the British Museum there is an account of the Sherman's of Laxley, in the county of Suffolk, dating as far back as 1616. There was another branch of the family in Dedham, Essex county. The first Sherman whose name is found recorded in this country was Edmond, who, with his three sons, Edmond, Samuel and John, were at Boston before 1636. In the "History of Ancient Woodbury, Connecticut," it is stated that Samuel Sherman, the Rev. John Sherman and Captain John, his first cousin, arrived from Dedham in 1634. This Captain John was the ancester of Roger Sherman, the signer of the Declaration of Independence. The Ohio Shermans trace their descent from Samuel Sherman and his brother John, the clergyman, a Presbyterian of the most strict type.

Taylor Sherman, of Norwalk, Conn., was, at the beginning of the present century, one of the strongest jurists of that State, and occupied a foremost place in its courts. In 1805 he went to Ohio as a commissioner to settle some boundary disputes and bought some real estate in Sherman Township, Huron County. He returned to Connecticut, however, and died there in 1815. His wife was Elizabeth Stoddart, a decendant of Anthony Stoddart, who came to Boston from England in 1639. They had a son, Charles Robert Sherman, who was born at Norwalk, became a lawyer of prominence there, and married Mary Hoyt of the same town.

When James Monroe became President in 1817 he made Lawyer Charles R. Sherman, of Norwalk, Conn., a Collector of Internal Revenue. Two of his deputies robbed the Government and involved him in financial embarrassment from which he never recovered. In the hope of bettering his condition he went west in 1821, leaving his wife behind him in Connecticut. A year later he sent for her, and under the escort of some friends and neighbors she traveled on horseback over the Alleghenies, holding her infant child on a pillow in front of her. The new home was in Lancaster, O. Mr. Sherman in a short time won great prominence as an able, eloquent and judicious advocate. His reputation soon extended over the entire State, and his practice was very large and fairly remunerative. In 1823 when he was only thirty-five years of age, the Legislature of Ohio elected him a Judge of the Supreme Court. Admirably fitted for the bench, his written opinions prove that he possessed a fine legal mind. His manner was kind and considerate and to know him was to be his friend. The salary attached to the office was barely sufficient to support himself and his large family, so that when he suddenly died at Lebanon, O., June 24, 1829, in the noon of his fame, and at the age of forty-one, those dependent on him were almost totally unprovided for.

In this emergency the relatives and friends of her husband came to the assistance of the widow and her eleven children. Two of them were adopted by an aunt. John, the present Senator and ex-Secretary of the Treasury, went to live with an uncle, and Thomas Ewing, who had then been United States Senator and Secretary of the Treasury, took William Tecumseh into his family and educated him as one of his own children. The story of the adoption is interesting. Mr. Ewing, who was not only a warm friend

but also a distant relative of Judge Sherman, drove across the country to the Sherman home as soon as he heard of the death. He knew the family was large, that they were very poor, and he resolved to take one of the children until the fortunes of the house grew brighter. Mrs. Sherman was unable to decide which one of the little ones to surrender. After a tearful consultation she and her eldest daughter accompanied Mr. Ewing out of doors where the boys were romping on the grass.

"Well," said Mr. Ewing, "which one of 'em shall I take? They all look alike to me."

The distressed mother was still unable to decide, when the daughter, snatching up one of them in her arms and holding him out, said. "Well, Mr. Ewing, if you must take one, take 'Cump,' because he is the smartest."

"All right, then, 'Cump' it is." said Mr. Ewing, taking the child in his arms and placing him in his carriage. Mr. Ewing took him to his family, and, says General Sherman in his "Memoirs," "ever after treated me as his own son." "Cump" was then nine years of age, having been born in Lancaster, February 8, 1820. His father knew and admired the Indian Chief Tecumseh, which accounts for his middle name.


Young Sherman was sent to the Lancaster Academy by his benefactor. It was the best educational establishment in the place, as good a school in fact as any in Ohio at that time. He studied all the ordinary branches, including Latin, Greek, and French. The years passed on, and one day a note came from Senator Ewing, who was in Washington, notifying him to prepare for the Military Academy at West Point. Previous to this, however, Sherman was allowed in 1834 to work during that Fall and the following Spring as rodman for a surveyor who was making surveys

for a canal to connect with the great Ohio one at Carroll, eight miles above Lancaster. He was paid a silver half dollar for each day's actual work, and this was the first money he earned.

During the Autumn and Spring of 1835-36 he worked hard studying mathematics and French, the chief requisites for admission to West Point. The letter of appointment came early in 1836 from the Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett. He at once made the journey to Washington to see Mr. Ewing. A week was spent at the Capital. General Jackson was then at the height of his power, and General Sherman has left it on record how he spent an hour looking through the wooden railings which then ran around the White House at "Old Hickory," as he walked up and down inside. In less than thirty years his own fame as a soldier was destined to surpass that of the hero of New Orleans.

The start for the Academy was made, and on June 12 he stepped on board the Steamer Cornelius Vanderbilt, at New York, and finished the last stage of his journey.

He joined the class of 1836 and went through the regular course of four years, graduating in June, 1840, number six in a class of forty-three. The class originally was more than one hundred. "At the Academy," says the General, "I was not considered a good soldier, for at no time was I selected for any office, but remained a private throughout the whole four years. Then, as now, neatness in dress and form, with a strict conformity to the rules, were the qualifications required for office, and I suppose I was found not to excel in any of these. In studies I always held a respectable reputation with the professors, and generally ranked among the best, especially in drawing, chemistry, mathematics and natural philosophy. My average demerits, per



AT WEST POINT.

annum, were about one hundred and fifty, which reduced my final class standing from number four to number six."

As a cadet he was an earnest, high-spirited, honorable and out-spoken youth, deeply impressed, according to one of his early letters, with the grave responsibility attached to "serving the country." And just here we obtain a side light on the formation of his independence of character. While at West Point he was the constant correspondent of Mr. Ewing's daughter, Ellen, whom he subsequently married. The campaign of General Harrison for the Presidency was in progress. Mr. Ewing was a leader of the Whig party, and young Sherman was a Democrat. "His friends," wrote the cadet to Miss Ewing, "have thought proper to envelop General Harrison's name with log cabins, hard cider, gingerbread and such humbugging, the plain object of which is to deceive and mislead his ignorant and prejudiced, though honest, fellow-citizens." Not long before graduating he wrote to Miss Ewing: Your father wishes me to graduate in the engineer corps. This I can't do. Next, to resign and become a civil engineer. But I propose and intend to go in the infantry, be stationed in the Far West out of reach of civilization, and to remain there as long as possible."

But destiny had different plans marked out for him. After graduation and the usual three months furlough, he was commissioned second lieutenant in the Third Artillery and ordered to report the following September at Governor's Island in the harbor of New York. There he was placed in command of a company of recruits preparing for service in Florida. In less than a month the company, with three other ones was ordered to Savannah, Ga. They embarked in a sailing vessel to that port where they were transferred to a small steamer and taken to St. Augustine,

Florida. General Taylor was then in command in Florida, with headquarters at Tampa Bay. The Third Artillery, Sherman's regiment, occupied the posts along the Atlantic coast from St. Augustine to Key Biscayne, his own company being stationed at Fort Pierce, on the Indian River He was detached from the company of recruits and joined his own command. In November preparations were begun for active operations against the Indians, the object being to catch the scattered bands of Seminoles then on the Peninsula and send them to join their tribe in the newly established Indian Territory. The life was not without its perils. The Indians did not want to leave, and frequently offered resistance with disastrous consequences to themselves as well as to the military. In November, 1841, Sherman received his first promotion, being made the First Lieutenant of Company G. He left Fort Pierce and joined his new command at St. Augustine. Shortly afterwards he was placed in command of a detachment of twenty men at Picolata, on the St. John's River. He remained there only a few months, having been ordered on duty which took him to Pensacola. Thence he was sent to Fort Morgan, Mobile Point. He was now quartermaster and commissary. The following June found him in Fort Moultrie, the regiment having been changed from the Gulf posts to those on the Atlantic. "We remained at Fort Moultrie," says General Sherman, "nearly five years, until the Mexican war scattered us forever. Our life there was of strict garrison duty, with plenty of leisure for hunting and social entertainment. We soon formed many and most pleasant acquaintances in the city of Charleston, and it so happened that many of the families resided at Sullivan's Island in the Summer season, where we could reciprocate the hospitalities extended to us in the Winter." This life was interrupted by a brief leave

of absence in 1843, which he spent in Ohio and in visiting some of the principal Southern cities. In this year he began the study of law, not with a view to practice but as a recreation.

An order came from the War Department at Washington in January, 1844, which, curiously enough, took him through the country over which he was in after years to sweep at the head of a conquering army on one of the most famous expeditions in all military history—the "march to the sea." It was a detail to assist Col. Churchill, the Inspector-General of the Army, in taking depositions in Upper Georgia and Alabama concerning certain losses by volunteers in Florida of horses and equipments by reason of the failure of the United States to provide sufficient forage and for which Congress had made an appropriation. The order directed him to go to Marietta, where Churchill was conducting the investigation. It was all over in two months, when Sherman rode South on horseback by way of Rome, Altoona, Marietta, Atlanta, Madison and Augusta, Ga. "Thus, by a mere accident," says Sherman, in the "Memoirs," "I was enabled to traverse on horseback the very ground where, in after years, I had to conduct vast armies and fight great battles. That the knowledge thus acquired was of infinite use to me and consequently to the Government, I have always felt and stated." In the Winter of 1844, his right shoulder was dislocated by the fall of his horse while hunting deer on the Cooper River. He suffered severely, and spent a short leave of absence which was allowed him in the North. He was back in Fort Moultrie by March, 1845. Congress had about this time passed a joint resolution providing for the annexation of Texas, then an independant republic, and the Army and the country looked for an immediate war with Mexico. Gen-

eral Taylor was already at Corpus Christi, where he was collecting an army. The work of recruiting was going on and excitement was spreading. The martial spirit was abroad, and Sherman, like all young army officers, was anxious to join his fortunes with those who were hastening to the field. His companions were going out from about him. Each gap in his coterie, each break in his mess, but increased his desire to enter the activities which invasion of hostile territory promised.

CHAPTER II.

EARLY MILITARY LIFE.

The spring of 1846 found Sherman a first lieutenant of Company G., Third Artillery, at Fort Moultrie, S. C. Robert Anderson, who held the fort at the outbreak of the Rebellion, was Captain of the Company. One other company of the Artillery (Bragg's) with George H. Thomas, John F. Reynolds and Frank Thomas had gone the previous year to Corpus Christi, Texas, to join the forces of General Taylor, preparatory to the invasion of Mexico.

Sherman was ordered to report at Governor's Island, N. Y., for recruiting service. He left Ft. Moultrie in April, 1846, and reported to Colonel Mason, First Dragoons, on May 1st. Immediately he was assigned to the Pittsburgh recruiting station. Once installed there he opened a second recruiting station at Zanesville, O. Though the duty was irksome, the situation was pleasant for he was contiguous to his home at Lancaster, O.; and could often visit his friends.

In May he heard of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca De La Palma, fought May 8th and 9th, and felt such a longing to be with his comrades who were actually fighting, that he wrote to Washington, asking to be considered an applicant for active service. The response being too tardy he started without authority, and with twenty-five recruits for Cincinnati, where he turned them over to the commanding officer at Newport Barracks. He then reported to Colonel Fanning, superintendent of the Western Recruiting

station at Cincinnati, who gave him a good round cursing for leaving his Pittsburgh post without orders and ordered him back.

He reached Pittsburgh by stage in June, stopping at his Lancaster home on the way, and there found an order from Washington relieving him from recruiting service, and assigning him to Company F, 3d Artillery, then under orders for California. He immediately took stage for Cumberland, Md., and cars thence to New York, whence his company was to sail by transport for California.

The company comprised 113 men and officers, in command of Captain Tompkins. It boarded the store-ship Lexington, abreast of Fort Columbus, and sailed July 14, 1846, for the Pacific, via Cape Horn. The long voyage was without incident, other than the daily drill of the men. In sixty days the vessel reached Rio Janerio, where it remained a week. In October the vessel rounded Cape Horn, and in sixty days from Rio, entered the harbor of Valparaiso, where the vessel was re-supplied. It sailed thence in November for Monterey, California, then Mexican soil, but already taken possession of by our navy, and by troops under General Fremont. Kearney was then *en route* thither overland, and Stevenson was to follow by sea with a regiment of volunteers.

Monterey Bay was reached in January, 1847, and the news was such as to lead the Company to expect something exciting from the start. Kearney had arrived, and already had a vigorous skirmish, the fleet under Commodore Stockton was down the coast toward San Diego, and the whole country swarmed with guerrillas. Sherman was commissary and quarter-master, and had plenty to do to land the Company and quarter it in a block house upon a hill west of the town. But as soon as this work was over and they were all comfort-

able, there came a longing for some of the excitement which had been promised. It did not come. Mexico was not fighting her cause on that ground. She had enough to do nearer her capital. So they all agreed that they were doomed to a life of monotony, except as it could be relieved by camp sports, hunting game, which was plenty, and visiting the historic spots.

The situation was made somewhat interesting by a conflict of authority between General Kearney, Colonel Fremont and Commodore Stockton, and it came to be a jocular query among the younger officers, "Who the devil is governor of California?" It was finally decided in favor of Kearney, who appeared at the head of new detachments. Soon after, Sherman was relieved of the duty of quartermaster and commissary, and reverted to his place as a company officer.

In May, 1847, he was asked by Kearney to go with him on the Lexington as aide, to Los Angeles. Before sailing, Commodore Biddle arrived from China, and as supreme naval commander on the Pacific, entrusted Sherman with orders for all naval officers, then in land service, to report at once to him (Biddle) at Monterey. He executed these orders faithfully. Fremont was at Los Angeles, and had not yet recognized Kearney's authority. Sherman was requested to visit him and was instrumental in bringing him and Kearney together for an understanding.

Kearney was preparing to return to the United States, overland, and had arranged for an escort composed of a battalion of Mormons, whose term of service would soon expire. He placed Sherman in charge of his escort with orders to march it to Monterey. He reached his destination in fifteen days, having had a fine chance to view and study the country. By the end of May, Kearney departed overland

for the States, leaving Colonel Mason in command, who selected Sherman as his adjutant-general. Fremont left with Kearney, so that Mason and Sherman held the fate of California in their hands.

The situation was one of absolute repose, and the young officers and their forces repined their lot, especially when they read of the activities nearer the Mexican capital, and of the honors that attended them. Sherman, however, found occasional opportunity for the exercise of his administrative ability. He visited Sonoma for the purpose of settling a difficulty between rival alcaldes, and on his way took in Yerba Buena, now the site of San Francisco, where he was solicited to buy lots at sixteen dollars apiece. He regarded the place as utterly God-forsaken, and refused investment at a song, which in a short while was worth millions. He arrested Nash, one of the rival alcaldes, took him back to Monterey, and, having acquainted him with the situation as it was likely to be, secured for him an honorable dismissal on the condition that he would no longer assume authority under Mexican auspices.

The capture of Mazatlan and Guaymas by the naval forces, and the sending of a few companies of land forces to hold Lower California, comprised all the important movements of 1847 and the early part of 1848. Halleck had been made Secretary of State by Col. Mason, and now occured something of a civic nature which was more stupendous than military power, and further reaching in its results than forcible conquest. This was the discovery of gold in California. Sherman was present with Governor Mason, in the Spring of 1848, when two Americans came in with a letter from Capt. Sutter, at Coloma, stating that he was erecting a saw-mill there, and asking

for protection in his titles. They showed something in a paper which was pronounced by all to be placer gold. It had been taken from Sutter's mill-race. As the land yet belonged to Mexico, no guarantee of his title could be given, but as the spot was forty miles from any large settlement, Gov. Mason gave the assurance that the improvement would hardly be disturbed.

Just then the quicksilver agitation was spreading, and Sherman was kept busy helping the Governor to settle disputed claims to mines fabled for wealth, and located in all imaginary directions and positions. But during the summer of 1848, fabulous stories began to come of the gold finds near Sutter's saw-mill. The cry of gold! gold! rang everywhere. The soldiers began to desert to take their chances with the miners. The population of entire towns and sections might have been seen stringing past in wagons on their way to the gold-fields. Gov. Mason determined to inspect the scene of so much wealth, and dispatched Sherman on a tour of inspection, with four soldiers and an outfit of servants and pack-mules. He made his way over the usual route to Yerba Buena, crossed to Saucelito, packed and rode to San Rafael Mission, passed through Bodega, Sonoma and Puta to the Sacramento River. Sutter's settlement and fort was but a few miles from the river, and when it was reached he found him a veritable monarch of all he surveyed. He had great plenty of herds, and the valleys beyond were teeming with adventurers, locating claims, mining, washing, and wrangling for supremacy. His saw-mill at Coloma was forty miles beyond the fort, and thither Sherman hastened. The story he learned was that Marshall, the architect of Sutter's saw-mill, had started the machinery of the mill and found that the tail-race

would not carry off the water fast enough. All hands, Marshall included, went to work to remove obstructions in the tail-race. His eye was attracted by particles of yellow matter. He secured about an ounce and decided it was gold. He took it to Sutter, who gave Marshall to understand that he thought him crazy, sent him back to the mill with orders to keep the matter secret, but at the same time dispatched his messengers to Gov. Mason to see about the confirmation of his titles.

Sherman found that in July, 1848, the Mormons, at Mormon Island, were the most numerous pioneers in the gold regions, and the most industrious and successful. They had been in that section before as soldiers, and therefore it was like a return to a section with which they were acquainted. The whole region skirting the American River was filled with mining camps, and the greatest activity prevailed. But the greatest activity was that of the imagination, and tales of fabulous discoveries and marvelous wealth were on the tongues of every one they met.

After making the tour of the mining section, and ascertaining that gold actually existed, the party returned to Sutter's Fort, and back to Yerba Buena, which by this time was throwing off its old Spanish name, and fast coming into prominence as San Francisco, a place on more lips throughout the civilized world than any other, and soon to be one of the wildest speculative centres on the globe. By easy marches Sherman reached Monterey, where dispatches informed him that the Mexican War was over, and that the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo was under way. It was well that this was the case, for such was the intensity of the gold fever at that juncture, that no officer could have kept an army of volunteers on duty.

Even the regulars deserted in numbers from Col. Mason's command, and there were times when a body servant could not be had for five prices in gold.

In September, 1848, official news of the treaty with Mexico reached Gov. Mason, and he immediately mustered out all his volunteers, leaving in California only a company of artillery at Monterey, and one of dragoons at Los Angeles. All the thought and energy of the country were turned toward the mines, and during the Fall of 1848, Col. Mason, Sherman, and a few others, made a visit to the Sonora region, which was then dividing honors with the Mormon Island and Coloma section. These visits were the basis of a report to the Government, and Sherman prepared the report with great care. Lieut. Loeser was deputed to carry the report and specimens of gold to Washington. The President made the report the subject of a special message to Congress, and thus gave official sanction to what had before been conjectural. This report and message laid the ground work of that phenomenal migration and mighty spirit of adventure which characterized the following year, and rendered the name of "forty-niner" historic.

Even Sherman himself could not escape the speculative fever of the hour, for we find him back again at Coloma, in the Winter of 1848, and a partner in a store, out of which he cleared fifteen hundred dollars in a short time. One of his companions on this trip, Warner, surveyed the site of Sacramento, and the city came into existence by magic.

California was now one of the most active fields on the continent. It became the policy of the Government to centre there a sufficient body of troops for protection, and they came by sea and land. The headquarters at Monterey became the scene of many official gatherings, and life was pleasant through the latter part of the winter of 1848–49.

The arrival of the steamer California, in March, 1849, was the beginning of a new epoch on the Pacific coast. It brought a rare coterie of new officers, and gave those who were dissatisfied with their fortunes a chance to change them. Sherman tendered to General Smith, who had just arrived, his resignation of Adjutant-General of the Department of California, determined to take advantage of one of the many offers of employment and partnership which had been made him. But Smith would not have it so, because, as a new commander, the experience of Sherman would be invaluable to him. Sherman therefore went to San Francisco with General Persifer F. Smith, and became a part of his military family. He parted regretfully with Col. Mason, whom he regarded as a man of sterling honor, and proof against the seductions and intrigues of the place and time.

The condition of General Smith and his staff became pitiable soon after their arrival in San Francisco. Soldiers and servants deserted, and it was with difficulty that a single meal a day could be provided. The rains were heavy and the mud fearful. There were no safe streets and no sidewalks. Gambling was a pastime. All sorts of houses were being thrown together, and rents were such as that an army officer could not touch them. But for Sherman's fifteen hundred dollars, made in the little Coloma store, he would have starved.

In April, 1849, the mail steamer Oregon arrived from Panama. This was the beginning of something like regular steamship communication with the Isthmus, and the Panama route to California grew in favor. By the Oregon came the commission of naval officers who were to select the site of the future navy yard of the Pacific. They selected Mare Island, which is now the stronghold on the Pacific. As it was manifest that army officers could not live in San Fran-

cisco on their small pay, General Smith transferred his headquarters back to Monterey, whither Sherman went. This change would cheapen living and promote health, but it would necessitate long lines of travel. For these Sherman prepared by improvising a swift-footed train of horses and mules.

Desertions grew so frequent at the garrison that the officers decided an example would have to be set before the men. One day's tally alone showed the departure of twenty-eight men for the diggings. They had not only deserted, but had walked off with well-stored knapsacks, and in defiant mood. That night Sherman and seven other officers started in pursuit, and succeeded in capturing and returning twenty-four of the offenders. This checked desertion for a little while, but it seemed as if nothing but death itself could stay the terrible gold fever, which not only justified desertion from the army and navy, but from creed, politics, morals and all business principles.

Major Joseph Hooker now came from the East, and took Sherman's place as Adjutant-General of the Pacific Division. Sherman then became one of General Smith's regular aides. Headquarters were changed to Sonoma. There was but little to do, and many of the officers took advantage of their leisure to patch out their salaries with business ventures. Sherman took a contract to survey Colonel Stevenson's projected city, the "New York of the Pacific," at and about Benicia. His share in this work netted him five hundred dollars in cash and fifteen town lots, which last he sold for five hundred dollars. He next surveyed a ranche for Mr. Hartwell, in the Sacramento Valley. His pay for this was in land, out of which he realized about three thousand dollars. This he invested in Sacramento lots, and again turned a handsome profit. His leave of absence had now expired,

and he returned to camp at Sonoma, to witness the inpouring of pioneers and adventurers from all parts of the world, and the establishment of a regular line of steamers from San Francisco to Sacramento. While the country was filling up with miners, it was also bearing a crop of politicians who were intriguing for power in what was now a prospective State. The preliminary elections were duly held, and a Convention to frame a Constitution met at Monterey. General Smith sent Sherman down to watch the proceedings. He found the Convention harmonious, except as to the question of slavery. But the majority in favor of freedom was so large that the clause excluding slavery was quickly adopted. The first Legislature of the new State convened in San José, in October, 1849, and elected Fremont and Gwin as U. S. Senators.

On Sherman's return to Monterey he was sent by General Smith to Sacramento, to instruct his engineers to push their surveys of the Sierra Nevadas, to ascertain the practicability of passing through them by rail, a subject which then elicited great interest. This body of engineers, under Warner, was afterwards massacred by the Indians. During all the Fall of 1849 General Smith kept his officers busy organizing and sending out relief expeditions for adventurers who had given out and gotten belated in their weary marches across plains and over mountains. He then took a trip to Oregon to complete his observations and reports on the Pacific coast, and while he was gone Sherman spent most of his time in San Francisco.

About Christmas Smith sent important dispatches from Oregon to San Francisco, with orders to Sherman to deliver them in person to General Winfield Scott, in New York City. This was a welcome mission for Sherman, who had long desired just such an opportunity to go East. He paid

his passage from San Francisco on the steamer Oregon, but went by land to Monterey, to visit friends and adjust matters for a long absence. He boarded the steamer at San Diego, and found many friends on board, among them General Fremont and family, and Senator Gwin. He arrived in New York in the latter part of January, 1850, and promptly delivered his dispatches to General Scott, with whom he dined.

In a few days General Scott ordered Sherman to proceed to Washington with the Pacific dispatches, and lay them before the Secretary of War (Crawford). This he did, and was questioned closely by the Secretary as to the resources and politics of the new State. He then visited President Taylor, at the White House, and made the acquaintance of many of the prominent Government officials, stopping the while at the home of Mr. Ewing, who was Secretary of the Interior.

Sherman had now completed his mission to the East, and he asked for and obtained a six months' leave of absence from duty. He first visited his mother at Mansfield, Ohio, and then returned to Washington, where he married Miss Ewing, daughter of Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Interior. The marriage took place on May 1st, 1850, and was a distinguished affair, being attended by the President and his Cabinet, Senators, Representatives, Army and Navy officers, and others in high authority. His wedding tour extended for two months, and by July 1st he was back in Washington, to find political feeling, already running high over the question of slavery in the newly conquered Mexican territory, and intensely excited over the sudden death of the President, which occurred on July 9th. By request of the Adjutant-General of the Army he attended President Taylor's funeral in the capacity of aide. He witnessed the

Cabinet revolution brought about by change of Presidents, the retiracy of his father-in-law, Mr. Ewing, from the Interior Department, and his return to Washington as Senator from Ohio, in place of Mr. Corwin. He was also present at the heated debates in the Senate between the friends and opponents of slavery extension, and over Henry Clay's "Omnibus Bill."

By the close of July, Mr. Ewing had given up his house in Washington, and Sherman escorted his family to their Lancaster home. His name was now borne on the rolls of Company C, Bragg's Third Artillery, stationed at St. Louis. Pending the passage of a bill in Congress, authorizing the addition of four Captains to the Commissary Department, of which he expected to be one, he started for St. Louis in September, and reported at Jefferson barracks for duty. Here he received word that the pending bill had passed and that it provided for his promotion to the post of Captain. His commission bore date Sept. 27, 1850, and he immediately went on duty, sending for his wife, and taking permanent quarters at a hotel. From this time we must date Sherman's interest in St. Louis, for he became a purchaser of lots, some of which he held throughout his life.

He passed 1851 and part of 1852 in St Louis, and in the Spring of the latter year was sent to Fort Leavenworth on a cattle inspecting tour. He returned by steamboat to St. Louis, where he remained during the Summer of 1852, though his family was absent at Lancaster. In the Fall he was ordered to New Orleans to take charge of the badly managed Commissariat there, and relieve it from the suspicion of corruption. By changing the methods of purchasing supplies from secret solicitation to bids in open market, he soon broke up the corrupt practices which had brought odium on his predecessor and on the Department.

His family, now consisting of his wife and two children, arrived in New Orleans about Christmas, 1852, and he furnished a house for them. Almost at the same time he was visited by Major Turner, and shown articles of co-partnership for the founding of a bank in California, in which his own name was mentioned as a partner, and in which flattering inducements as to independent salary for active service were held out. Sherman was pleased with the overtures and prospects, and asked for a six-months' leave of absence, in order to go to California and examine matters for himself. In February 1853, he sent his family to Ohio, sold his furniture and lease, accounted for the public property and records, and started for California by the Nicaraugua route. On this voyage his vessel was wrecked on the California coast. The passengers were all gotten ashore safely. Sherman and a party started up the coast for aid. They secured a lumber laden schooner, but it too was wrecked and the lives of all on board were in danger till rescued by a passing craft.

Sherman found San Francisco in the midst of terrible speculative inflation. Values of every kind were out of all reason, and money was being made and lost with bewildering rapidity. He found the bank of Lucas, Turner & Co., in which he had been offered a place and partnership, already a fact, and fully in the speculative swim. Its main house was at St, Louis. After looking over the ground, he and Turner agreed that business might be securely done on a cash capital of $200,000 and a credit of $50,000 in New York, To secure this, Sherman started back to New York, where he arrived in July 1853. He then visited St. Louis, taking in his Lancaster home, and made satisfactory arrangements with Mr. Lucas, the senior member of the firm. He returned to Ohio, laid his plans before his friends, and upon their approval, he sent his resignation as Captain in the

Army to the Adjutant-General, to take effect September 6 1853.

The acceptance of this resignation ended Sherman's early army career. He had not seen battles, but had been one of the most active of officers. He had not enjoyed rapid nor high promotion, but he accumulated a fund of experience which was to prove invaluable in the near future.

As a private citizen he engaged passage for himself and family, for San Francisco, and sailed on September 20, 1853, reaching their destination in safety on October 15. Sherman immediately turned in as banker, and soon found that the glowing profit of three per cent a month on loans was eaten up by expenses, and that the glamor of the situation was attenuated moonshine. The deposits were such an uncertain factor—in the millions to-day, in the hundreds tomorrow—that they could not be calculated upon for any business transactions, covering even the shortest periods. He was dissapointed at the revelation, but being in for it, was forced to float with the tide toward the catastrophe which impended.

A new bank building was erected, substantial, but on an unfortunate site, as the city drifted away from it. Sherman worked hard. Business was brisk. Losses by loans were frequent. Securities were so fluctuating, that business differed nothing from gambling. At length the large house of Page, Bacon & Co. failed (Feb. 22, 1855). This was the signal for a general run and crash. Bank after bank failed and the run on Sherman's bank was only met after great difficulty. Its survival of the wreck gave it a strong place among the institutions at the Golden Gate.

About this time Sherman was commissioned an officer in the State militia. It was the dangerous period during which the "Vigilantes" held control of court and city, and

administered justice in their own prompt and brutal way. Their conflict with the State authorities was direct and Sherman could see no way to secure order except with the help of the Federal forces. This he failed to secure, in a direct form, yet the moral effect of his efforts was such as to finally induce the mob element to fall back into the usual currents of order and peace.

Affairs in San Francisco grew from bad to worse. Real estate depreciated; first-class securities could not be had. Rates of loans increased. Overwork and asthma drove Sherman into nervousness and despondency. The reasons for starting the bank of Lucas, Turner & Co. had ceased to exist. Sherman wrote Lucas at St. Louis, to the effect that he could use his money to better advantage in the East than on the Pacific. The reply was that Sherman should adjust the affairs of the bank and close its doors. He settled everything up as well as he could, and on May 1, 1857, the house of Lucas, Turner & Co., as it existed in San Francisco, became extinct.



CHAPTER III.

A COLLEGE PROFESSOR.

After the banking firm of Lucas Turner and Co., closed out its business in San Francisco, Sherman left, with his family, for the East, May 1st, 1857, by way of the Isthmus of Panama. On their arrival in New York, they started for Lancaster, Ohio, where the family remained, he going on to St. Louis, to consult with the firm about starting a branch house in New York, of which he was to have control. This office was opened, July 21, 1857. Business prospered till the panic in the latter part of that year, when the firm of Lucas & Co., suspended.

Sherman closed up the New York business, and started again for St. Louis, where he aided the suspended firm in the conversion of its securities and payment of its creditors. The firm came out whole, and its senior member proved to be one of Sherman's most steadfast friends. He entrusted him with the duty of selling the California real estate of the firm and settling up its affairs on the Pacific. This required another visit thither, and he sailed for San Francisco, via Panama, on January 5, 1858, leaving his family at Lancaster, Ohio.

By July 3d, he had made all the collections he could, and returned East, to find himself practically out of employment, and with a wife and four children to maintain. His friends made many kind offers of help, but he preferred to be as independent as possible. Two of his brothers-in-law, Hugh, and T. E. Ewing, Jr., had established themselves in the law business in Leavenworth, Kansas, where their father

owned large tracts of land. The father offered him the management of the lands, and the brothers offered him an equal partnership in their law firm. He accepted, and the law firm of Sherman and Ewing was duly announced, on Main Street Leavenworth. Sherman had read but a few of the elementary law books, and did not pretend to be a lawyer, but his partners were able jurists, and he felt that while they could manage all the business in the courts, he could attend to collections, agencies, and such branches as his banking experience had qualified him for. He was compelled, however to take out a license as a lawyer, and when he inquired what examination he would have to go through, was told by the judge that he would be admitted on the ground of general intelligence.

The business of the law firm flourished, and one of its most lucrative cases fell right into General Sherman's line. He was employed by Major Van Vliet to go to Fort Riley, to superintend repairs on the military road. He traveled the whole 136 miles in an ambulance, made the necessary contracts for cuttings and bridges, and returned safely to receive a fair compensation for his labor and risks.

His family joined him in November. In the following year, January, 1859, the firm was enlarged by the admission of Daniel McCook, and became Sherman, Ewing and McCook. Though business grew, it was hardly equal to the support of three persons, who had family and style to keep, and Sherman kept looking about him for something more certain and profitable. An opportunity came in the shape of an offer from Hon. Thomas Ewing, to open a farm on his lands west of Leavenworth. This he accepted, and by Summer he had erected farm buildings and cleared and fenced quite a handsome tract. But there was soon an end to this, and he, with perhaps a secret longing for his old occupation, applied

to the War Department for employment as an army paymaster, or something akin to that duty.

In response to this, he was notified that a military college was about to be founded in Louisiana, and that the position of superintendent would be open. He applied for this and was selected, through the influence of Generals Buell and Graham. He immediately closed business as a Leavenworth lawyer, and returned with his family to Lancaster, O. In the Autumn of 1859 he went to Baton Rouge, La., to consult about his new position, and thence to Alexandria to compare notes with General Graham. At his house all the details of the college were arranged, and the site being near to Alexandria, Sherman found himself in full authority. His position was that of Superintendent and Professor of Engineering. He called about him a corps of Professors, and proceeded to put the college in operation on scientific and military principles. The institution was opened for pupils on January 1, 1860, under the name of the "Louisiana Seminary of Learning and Military Academy." There were sixty cadets present. The salary of the professors was low. Much State legislation was needed to put the institution on a paying basis. Sherman found himself under suspicion on account of the prominence of his brother, John, then a candidate for Speaker of the National House of Representatives, and who was bitterly denounced in the South as an abolitionist. But despite these difficulties he secured the necessary legislation, got a full quota of arms from Secretary of War, Floyd, and wound up the first term of the institution with success.

Having spent the Summer vacation at Lancaster with his family, he returned to the college in the Fall to find all its old pupils back and some 130 new applicants. Everything looked prosperous save that the coming political storm

hung heavy in the horizon of the future. The presidential nominations had been made, the elections would occur in November, and excitement was already running high. On all sides he heard that the election of Mr. Lincoln would imperil the Union. Sherman kept aloof from the excitement, thinking that the storm might blow over. But the election of Lincoln came about. He had hard work to keep his cadets to their recitations. The political leaders everywhere talked of secession as a fixed fact, and there was nothing that so impressed Sherman with their sincerity as that they could not honorably retreat from their own often repeated threats. Though avoiding controversy with these excited people, his personal views were not unknown. He looked on secession as both treason and war, and made it understood that under no conditions would the North and West ever permit the Mississippi river to pass from their control.

On December 20, 1860, South Carolina took her step of secession, followed soon by Mississippi. Delegations swarmed into Louisiana, to influence her Governor, legislature and people to follow the lead of South Carolina. A bold front would scare the Government into submission and avoid war. Buchanan met their importunities with his message announcing the doctrine that the government was not endowed with constitutional power to coerce a state. This announcement, at a time when its only effect could be to encourage secession, shook Sherman's faith in Republican institutions. He says he began to think that European commentators on Republicanism were right, and that our Union was truly only the rope of sand they had predicted. But in this we detect the patriotic resolution to make it stronger if need be, to make it over afresh and re-annoint it anew with the blood

of its citizens, should secession throw down its gauntlet and tempt to armed trial.

He had hope that the patriots of Louisiana would be strong enough to stem the tide in the convention called for January 8, 1861. They were numerous enough in the state to prevent the fatal step of secession, but they were not organized, and it became apparent to all that they were helpless in the convention and in the presence of the shrewd politicians who had pre-arranged the result, and who were working from the National Capital.

Their concert of action appalled Sherman. Before the convention acted on the ordinance of secession, before Louisiana's two senators resigned their seats, the Governor of the state had ordered the seizure of the forts on the Mississippi, and of the United States Arsenal at Baton Rouge. This latter act deeply and bitterly impressed Sherman, not only on account of its illegality, but as showing the depth and intensity of the design to force war.

Moreover, he was driven into the humiliating position of an accessory after the fact, for the arms taken from the arsenal were distributed to certain strong points, and one consignment of several thousand stand of muskets was sent to Sherman, at Alexandria, with the request that he receive and account for them. To be made a receiver of stolen goods in this peremptory way, and those goods the property of the United States, at whose expense he had been educated, in whose service he had so lately been and which he had sworn to support, was too much for him. He therefore wrote the following to the Governor.

LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY OF LEARNING AND MILITARY ACADEMY, January 18, 1861.

GOVERNOR THOMAS O. MOORE, Baton Rouge, La.

Sir:—As I occupy a quasi-military position under the laws of the State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of this seminary was inserted in marble over the main door: "By the liberality of the General Government of the United States. The Union —*Esto Perpetua.*"

Recent events foreshadow a great change and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word.

In that event, I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war belonging to the State, or advise me what disposition to make of them.

And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors, I beg of you to take immediate steps to relieve me as Superintendent, the moment the State determines to secede, for on no earthly account will I do any act or think any thought hostile to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States.

With great respect, I am your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Superintendent.

On the next day he sent a letter to the President of the Board of Supervisors stating that he had completed his accounts to date, and settled all the bills; that he disapproved of the seizure of Government property in the

State; that he could not longer retain his position with honor; that he was already a large loser pecuniarily by reason of failure to pay his full salary: that the sooner he got away the better; that he asked for the influence of the Board in behalf of Major Smith as his successor.

Letters of regret at his proposed step came from several sources. The Board of Supervisors expressed the loss the Institution would meet with in a resolution, which was full of praise of his management. Louisiana passed the ordinance of secession on January 26 or 27, 1861, and Sherman's resignation became final. It was given out in Southern circles that he had breached hospitality by deserting them. But this effusiveness vanishes in the light of the preceding pages, and it is plain that he retired from a delicate position, with the instincts of a chieftain and all the honors of a patriot. His accounts were fully audited and squared, he discharged every obligation, honorary and business, and on February 20, 1861, he went to New Orleans, on his way to cast his lot in with those who sought to preserve the union of the States Two days before he left Alexandria, such had been the concert and such the rapidity of action, Jefferson Davis and Alexander Stephens had been inaugurated as President and Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy. He was therefore in New Orleans under the new Confederacy, and a stranger to the institutions he was soon to uphold with the skill and energy of a Napoleon. He saw no flag afloat but the pelican banner, heard no voice but that of secession, and felt as much in a foreign country, as if he had been walking the streets of London, or basking under the suns of South Africa. He heard of war, and saw enlistments going on. The United States of America was as much a foreign country as Kamtschatka or Otaheiti.

He bade farewell to this anomalous scene on February 25th, 1861, and embarked for his native land, taking the railroad by way of Cairo and Cincinnati for Lancaster, Ohio. His seminary was wrecked and dispersed by the war, and its professors were scattered to take service in the Confederate armies, all except one, and to meet the respective fates Providence had in store for them.

When Sherman turned northward he had no idea of what his own future would be. Situated as he had been and seeing that the crisis had been precipitated by those whom he designated and hated, as politicians, he naturally thought that identical influences were at work, and similarly responsible, in the North. Therefore he looked to civic rather than militarv employment, and was more disposed to seek the help of some of the members of his old banking firm in St. Louis, than such aid as his father in-law or his brother John might, by virtue of their standing and influence, give. He was astounded with the shading of sentiment as he moved northward. Everywhere in the South the feeling was fiery, and the situation one of active preparation. In the border states he heard of nothing, except that if Mr. Lincoln dared to coerce the seceding states, the border states would surely join them and make it impossible for the Government to bring them to terms. In the northern states, Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, through which he passed, all was apathy, and not the least sign of excitement or preparation. It looked to him as though the Southern idea that a first-class scare was all that was necessary to secure independence, and that a slightest amount of blood letting might have to be thrown in as a suggestion of earnestness, was not so far wrong after all.

On reaching Lancaster, he found a letter from his

brother John to hasten to Washington; also one from his friend Turner in St. Louis, offering the presidency of the Fifth Street Railway, in that city, at a salary of $2,500. This last meant a living, and he accepted it promptly, yet he went to Washington in obedience to his brother's request. He reached Washington on March 10th, 1861, to find Mr Lincoln inaugurated, his brother a senator, and Major Andrews under orders to defend Fort Sumpter to the last. He saw no signs of military preparation, and heard no talk of war except from Southern Senators and Representatives, who were daily thundering their threats against the Government, and daily resigning to join their fortunes with the Confederacy.

Senator Sherman took him to see Mr. Lincoln. He introduced him as his brother, Col. Sherman, just from Louisiana, and full of information of the Southern situation, which he would be glad to impart. Lincoln seemed delighted, and asked how they were getting on down there. Sherman answered "that they were getting on swimmingly, but preparing for war." Lincoln exclaimed, "O, well! I guess we'll be able to keep house." Sherman was silenced. He went out, blessing his brother and politicians in general, and giving them to understand that they had gotten the country in a fix, and might get it out in their own way. As for himself, he was going to St. Louis to make an honest living for his family.

Off he went, gathering his family and effects at Lancaster, and arriving in his St. Louis home on April 1st, 1861. He duly entered on the duties of railway president, and found them not uncongenial. But the air was full of "war and rumors of war." All about him was treason, and the grand plot seemed to be how to force the

border states into recognition of the Confederacy. The pelican flag hung publicly in conspicuous places, and a recruiting camp was in active operation within the city limits. On the Union side were head-quarters which were a rendezvous for "Home Guards," under command of Frank Blair, who seemed to be general in charge of everything appertaining to Missouri.

Sherman tried, at first, to keep out of the current, and talked with very few. But the bombardment of Sumpter was announced on April 12th, and all knew that war had come. Instantly, as Jeff Davis had calculated, Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Tennessee followed South Carolina with secession ordinances, and conventions were called in Kentucky and Missouri.

Prior to this, April 6th, Sherman had been asked by Postmaster General Montgomery Blair if he would accept the Chief Clerkship in the War Department, as a step to the Assistant Secretaryship. He wrote, declining, and giving as a reason that he had just entered a position, which would support his family, had rented a house, and incurred other obligations, and did not feel at liberty to change. This reply caused some uneasiness among his friends, lest he might prove doubtful in his loyalty. A few days after he was sent for by General Frank Blair who offered him the position held by Brigadier General Harney, whom the Government mistrusted. This he also declined.

Finding that these declinations for purely business reasons were becoming annoying to his friends, and a source of suspicion as to his political status, he wrote the Secretary of War as follows:

OFFICE OF ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO.
May 8th, 1861.

HON. S. CAMERON, Sec'y of War,

Dear Sir: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for three months, because I cannot throw my family on the cold charity of the world. But for the three years call made by the President, an officer can prepare his command, and do good service.

I will not volunteer as a soldier, because, rightfully or wrongfully, I feel unwilling to take a mere private's place and, having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place.

Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render the most service. Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Whether in response to this, or by independent volition of the War Department, Sherman could not tell, but on May 14th, 1861, he was honored with a commission as Colonel of the Thirtieth Regular Infantry. With it came a request to hasten to Washington. He hastened thither to find that the Government was rising to meet a serious occasion. The call for 75,000 volunteers had been made, and President Lincoln, on his own authority, had authorized the regular army to be increased by ten new regiments of infantry. He took the oath of office, was furnished with a roster of officers for his yet incomplete regiment, reported to General Scott, and asked for leave of absence to repair to Jefferson barracks, St. Louis, to raise

a regiment of his own. Scott would not hear to this, and ordered him to report to his headquarters in person for inspection duty

Satisfied that he could not then return to St. Louis, he ordered his family to go to their Lancaster home and sent his resignation as President of the railway company. Thus, two months ended his career as a railway magnate, and he was back on the lines for which he was best fitted by education and instinct.

CHAPTER IV.

AT BULL RUN.

It was in May, 1861, that Sherman received notice from his brother John, to the effect that he had been appointed a Colonel of the Thirteenth Regular Infantry. He was then at St. Louis, and the notice contained the request that he should hasten to Washington. After reaching the Capital, he expected to enter at once on the work of recruiting and instructing, but was instead assigned to inspection duty by Lieutenant General Winfield Scott. This was June 20, 1861. The scare about the safety of the Capital had passed, and quite a large force of regulars and volunteers had been collected in and about the city.

General Mansfield commanded the troops in the city. General McDowell commanded beyond the Potomac, his troops extending from Alexandria to above Georgetown. General Patterson was crossing the Potomac from Hagerstown with an army of Pennsylvania troops. Colonel Sherman visited the latter army at Hagerstown, and returned to Washington with his brother John, who was an aide de camp under Patterson, but who had resigned in order to attend the session of Congress, which had been called to meet on July 4th, 1861. Colonel Sherman was now a profound student of the military and political situation. He found a vast majority of the army officers imbued with the idea that the war was to be a short one, an idea he did not share. He gloried in the pluck of President Lincoln, who recognized in his message of July 4th, that civil war was a solemn

fact, and that his call for 400,000 men and $400,000,000 was justified by events. He found the army in and about Washington composed of good material, but piebald in dress, loaded with arms and accoutrements of every pattern, and lacking discipline. They were brave men but not soldiers. All this his quick military eye took in.

On this date, the Confederates had two armies in front of Washington, one at Manassas under Beauregard, with its advance at Fairfax Court House; the other at Winchester under Joe Johnston, with its advance at Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry. The tone of the Congress, the people and the soldiers was impatient, and General Scott was forced to hasten preparations for a forward move, by the "On to Richmond" cry. In the organization of McDowell's army, Col, Hunter was assigned to the command of the Second Division, and Sherman took command of Hunter's former brigade, composed of five regiments in position about Fort Corcoran, and opposite Georgetown. He assumed command on June 30th, 1861, and set about preparing his command for the general advance. His brigade was the Third of the First Division, which division was under General Tyler. Sherman selected for the field the 13th New York, Colonel Quimby; the 69th New York, Colonel Corcoran; the 79th New York, Colonel Cameron and the 2d Wisconsin, Colonel Peck. His first review of these regiments impressed him with their strength and bravery, and he congratulated himself in having one of the best brigades, at the start, in the army. Ayres battery of the Fifth Regular Artillery was also attached to his brigade. His remaining regiment, the 29th, New York, Colonel Bennett, was left in charge of the forts and camps during an absence which most counted on as likely to be brief. The great trouble with all these regiments, and for that matter the entire volunteer army, was

that they were enlisted for only ninety days, and were too anxious to close the war in that time.

The grand advance began about July 15th, 1861. Tyler marched his division to Centreville, Sherman's brigade marching third in line. The march was an annoying one to a man of Sherman's skill and discipline. He could not prevent straggling and those breaches of order incident to raw recruits, try however hard he might. But his experience was simply that of every trained officer in that moving throng of volunteers. The entire army converged at Centreville. On the 18th, Tyler sent his 4th Brigade, (Richardson's) to reconnoitre Blackburn Ford across Bull Run. He found it strongly guarded, and was soon in the midst of a sharp battle. Sherman was ordered to send Ayre's Battery to Richardson's relief, which he did. Immediately a second order came from Tyler for Sherman to advance his entire brigade. He double-quicked it for three miles, and arrived in time to relieve Richardson's Brigade, which had been worsted at the ford, and was retiring. Tyler was present in person, and he ordered Sherman to hold the ground till Richardson could straighten up his confused lines. For half an hour he held his men in line under a vigorous artillery fire, and thus Tyler marched his division back to Centreville in comparative good order. The reconnoisance developed the fact that the enemy were in strong force beyond Bull Run, and had no idea of leaving their naturally strong position without a battle.

After two days and nights in camp, General McDowell began (July 21st) the forward movement which brought on the celebrated battle of Bull Run, the first, the best planned, but the worst fought of the War. Of this battle General Sherman afterwards said:—"Our men had been

told so often at home that all they had to do was to make a bold stand and the rebels would run; and nearly all of us for the first time then heard the sound of cannon and muskets in anger, and saw the bloody scenes common to all battles, with which we were soon to be so familiar. We had good organization, good men, but no cohesion, nor real discipline, no respect for authority, no real knowledge of war. Both armies were fairly defeated and, which ever stood fast, the other would have run. Though the North was overwhelmed with mortification and shame, the South really had not much to boast of, for in the three or four hours of fighting, their organization was so broken up that they did not and could not follow our army, when it was known to be in a state of disgraceful and causeless flight. It is easy to criticize a battle after it is over, but all now admit that none others, equally raw in war, could have done better than we did at Bull Run; and the lesson of that battle should not be lost on a people like ours."

When McDowell's forward movement began (July 21st, 1861) Tyler's First Division started from its Centreville camp at 2 A.M, and marched by brigades to the enemy's front, near the stone bridge across Bull Run. Sherman deployed his brigade (the Third) along the timber to the right of the Warrenton road. Observing the enemy on the opposite side of the stone bridge, he ordered Captain Ayres to move his battery to the right and open fire on the mass.

His smooth-bore guns proved ineffective, and Sherman sent for the two rifled guns which Tyler had borrowed at an earlier hour. He also swung his 69th N. Y. Regiment to the extreme right of his brigade. He remained in this position, till a heavy musketry fire on the opposite side

of Bull Run showed that Hunter's columns had crossed and were hotly engaged. Other divisions of the army had also crossed, and the musketry and artillery fire had become general. The Confederates retreated before the Union forces till about noon, when they seemed to come to a stand. Sherman now received orders from Tyler to cross his entire brigade, and support Hunter. He did so promptly, and ascended the bluffs on the opposite side. But in doing so he cut himself from his artillery, which found the run impassable. Sherman advanced cautiously, and effected a junction with Hunter's Division, his 69th being almost continuously under fire. He threw his brigade into position, in the rear of Porter's, and sought out General Hunter, who had been engaged in fierce conflict and was wounded. Hunter ordered him to join his forces in the pursuit of the enemy, who were falling back.

Placing Quimby's regiment of rifles in front, and directing his other regiments to follow in line, he advanced and opened fire on the enemy, who had come to a stand on favorable ground. He continued this advance amid a sharp fire, and succeeded in driving the enemy back to a point where Rickett's battery had been cut to pieces but a short while before. Here he came within range of the enemy's artillery, and was soon forced to change his direction by the right flank, in order to protect his men. All of his left was being swept by a severe artillery and musketry fire, and all the Union regiments there were being driven out with great losses. Sherman protected his own men for a time by holding to a deep roadway, but when his Wisconsin Second found itself fully abreast of the enemy, he ordered it out by the left flank and began an open attack. This regiment moved

slowly up the hill in the face of a heavy fire which it returned with spirit. On gaining the summit the fire of the enemy became so intense as to throw the regiment into confusion, and it retreated to the base of the hill, where it was re-formed for a second advance. It fought over the same ground even more valiantly than before, but was again repulsed at the summit. Sherman now sent in his 69th N. Y., and Colonel Cameron led it up the hill and in a magnificent charge over the summit. But he found the ground swept by musketry, from a row of pines, and by artillery from an advantageous position. He rallied his men several times under this concentrated fire, but they finally broke and sought the cover which the base of the hill afforded. All this time Quimby's Regiment was similarly striving for the crest of another ridge a little to the left, and with no better success.

It was getting more and more difficult to hold the men in line. Their losses had been heavy, they were unused to the fire of artillery and small arms, Colonel Cameron had been killed, and many other officers, the wounded were being carried thickly back, or were making their own painful way, to the hospitals in the rear, stragglers were multiplying each one with some tale of dissatisfaction. Sherman succeeded in re-forming and holding all his shattered regiments, but it was manifest that they could not be urged into the offensive again, even if they could be made to stand on the defensive.

He ordered Colonel Corcoran back to the top of the ridge, where the brigade had been formed in the morning, and instructed him to hold it till the remaining regiments could fall back to him. It so happened that General McDowell was present in person on this ridge, and he

united his efforts with Corcoran's to allay panic and assure the men. The Confederates were now making use of their cavalry, and they appeared in force on the very ground Sherman's brigade had striven to hold. He therefore threw his lines into the form of an irregular square, and in this shape fell back toward the fording of Bull Run they had crossed in the morning. There were no orders to retreat, but for an hour the men had been disorderly, unmanageable and in spontaneous backward motion. Lines that could be maintained were thin. The roads were streaming with men bent upon reaching Centreville or even Washington.

As soon as Sherman saw his irregular square in motion, he rode to the fording to see that Ayres had his battery in place on the other side to cover his crossing. But the battery was not there. He pushed on to Centreville, where he met McDowell, who gave him to understand that he would rally his broken forces at Centreville and make a stand. But at nine o'clock at night he received orders from Tyler that he should continue the retreat to Washington. Then it was that the retreat became most disorderly. The men of different regiments became mixed up and indifferent to all orders. Night seemed to inspire additional terrors. It was noon next day when Sherman reached the Potomac to find the men crossing by aqueduct and ferries into Washington. He increased the river guard and ordered all to be stopped who attempted to cross. The men soon began to inquire for their commands and camps, and to seek them out. By and by order began to reign, and the army took organized shape once more.

Sherman's losses were very heavy. He reported them as follows:—

REGIMENTS	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TOTAL
Ayre's Battery.....	6	3	...	9
N. Y. 13th.....	11	27	20	58
" 69th.....	38	59	95	192
" 79th.....	32	51	115	198
Wisconsin 2d.....	24	68	63	152
	111	205	293	609

In generalizing on this battle, Sherman makes it known that in supporting Hunter, his forces were victorious and jubilant. His brigade actually passed by Hunter's division, and followed the lead of Heintzelman's Division which was well in advance on the road toward Manassas Junction. There came a crossing of a small stream, and the ascent of a long hill on whose top the actual battle was going on. Here his regiments came into action. The enemy had been driven to the cover of a pine woods on his left front, and it was against this he hurled his regiments successively, only to see them driven back with loss and confusion. He felt that the woods could prove only a temporary refuge for the enemy, and that their broken forces could not be rallied permanently in such a place. He reformed his regiments with a view to another charge, and without any idea that the whole army was in retreat, till admonished of the fact by the appearance of Syke's regulars, formed in hollow square to resist cavalry. Then he found that his brigade was almost alone, and it was then that he ordered Corcoran to throw it into shape for defense against cavalry.

By July 25th, 1861, Sherman had his men well posted and comfortable in and about Fort Corcoran, and ready for any defence they might be called upon to make.

There was much controversy about the term of enlistment, and severe measures had at this time to be resorted to. On the 26th his camp was visited by President Lincoln and Mr. Seward, who were on a tour of inspection of the army. Noticing that Mr. Lincoln desired to say something to encourage the men, he asked him to please discourage all noisy demonstrations, and reminded him that the time for hurrahing had passed with Bull Run, and that what was needed most now was cool, thoughtful, hard-fighting soldiers. Then in the midst of the camp, Mr. Lincoln made a very excellent and assuring speech, and when the men broke into cheers, he curbed them with the dry remark:—"Don't cheer boys? I confess I rather like it myself, but Colonel Sherman here says it is not military, and I guess we had better defer to his opinion." Both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward complimented Sherman for the discipline and cleanliness they observed in his camp, and assured him that their visit thereto had given them more pleasure than any event since the disastrous battle.

The officers now came in for a share of fear and trembling. McDowell was busy substituting the ninety day regiments with those which had enlisted for three years McClellan had been summoned from the West, and was making daily changes in the commands. Each officer felt that his turn might come next, not knowing how much he might have contributed to the Bull Run defeat. But at this juncture, relief came to Sherman in the shape of an announcement from the War Department, to the effect that he, among others, had been promoted to be a Brigadier General of Volunteers.

The new regiments were coming in very fast and several of them were assigned to Sherman's command. He

began a system of drills, all of which were new to him, but which he deemed necessary; for he saw a long, hard war ahead and thought the best place to begin was right in the alphabet of the latest and best approved tactics. He also began the construction of two new forts farther out and overlooking Fort Corcoran.

Thus, the early part of August, 1861, passed, and McClellan's ideal army of 100,000 men and one hundred batteries was fast assuming shape, not under his immediate direction, for he had his headquarters in Washington, but under the direction of those who were permitted to retain old commands or those assigned to new ones.

CHAPTER V

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

About the middle of August, 1861, Brigadier-General Sherman was called into consultation at Willard's Hotel, with General Robert Anderson, who announced that affairs in Kentucky had reached a crisis, that the Legislature was in session and would declare the State for the Union, if properly backed by the Federal Government, and that he, Anderson, had been offered the command of the Department of the Cumberland, embracing Kentucky and Tennessee, with the privilege of selecting his own Brigadiers. He indicated that Sherman should be his right hand man and that the remaining three might be Thomas, Buell and Burnside. The idea suited Sherman. He wished to go West, and was perfectly willing to go under Anderson, in whose company he had been a lieutenant, at Fort Moultrie, in 1843–46.

They called on President Lincoln, and the result of the interview was an order assigning General Anderson to the command of the Department of the Cumberland, with Sherman and Thomas as his brigadiers. The order was dated August 24th, 1861. In a few days he was relieved of his command of the Third Brigade in the Army of the Potomac by General Fitz-John Porter, and immediately started for Cincinnati. There he met General Anderson (September 2d) and several prominent citizens, and the situation in Kentucky and Tennessee was discussed.

General Nelson had a Union camp at Dick Robinson,

below Nicholasville, and General Rosseau one at Jeffersonville, opposite Louisville. The State Legislature of Kentucky was in session and ready to take action as soon as General Anderson was ready. But the Confederates were already on the march from Nashville with a force commanded by Sidney Johnson and Buckner, and from the Cumberland Gap with a force under Crittenden and Zollicoffer. Anderson saw he was not strong enough to compete with these forces. He therefore sent Sherman to confer with the Governors of Indiana and Illinois as to measures for help. He was also sent to St. Louis to confer with General Fremont, toward whose command all the new regiments of infantry, cavalry and artillery were tending. While Sherman was upon this mission Anderson and Thomas initiated the Department of the Cumberland at Louisville.

Sherman found his mission a difficult one. Governor Morton was raising and equipping men very fast, but they were deflected, as fast as ready, to the command of either McClellan or Fremont. Governor Yates had promised his men to Fremont. At St. Louis he found Fremont so bent on the invasion of Missouri and a descent of the Mississippi that he could get no promises of help from him. Hastening back to Louisville he found that the Legislature of Kentucky had precipitated the question of its adhesion to the Union, and thus given the signal for military action. Anderson was all unprepared for it, whereas Sidney Johnston instantly occupied and fortified Bowling Green, and sent a division in advance toward Louisville. Zollicoffer advanced to Somerset. Excitement in Louisville was intense. Pillow and Polk were in strong force in Columbus. The rebel families of Louisville were in high glee, and expected Buckner to capture the city at any moment.

All the tooops at Anderson's disposal were embraced in Rousseau's Legion and a few Home Guards, the former encamped at Jeffersonville. He ordered Sherman to cross the river to Jeffersonville, taking all the Home Guards he could find along, and with Rousseau's force, march to Muldraugh's Hill and secure it before Buckner came. Within an hour after reaching Rousseau's camp Sherman had 1000 men under way by rail to Lebanon Junction, and thence on foot to Muldraugh's Hill, site of the old State "Camp of Instruction." This he fortified, and very soon his force was increased by two new regiments, which Anderson had forwarded to him.

He soon found that Buckner had not crossed Green River on his way north, as had been reported, and that Sidney Johnston was fortifying Bowling Green, preparatory to a systematic conquest of Kentucky. Anderson kept sending out his fresh troops, and by October 1st, Sherman had with him the equivalent of two brigades, which he was fast drilling and organizing. On October 5th, Sherman went to Louisville to find Anderson broken down by worry and work, and on the eve of resigning. On October 8th, he did resign, and Sherman assumed command, as senior officer in the department, though it was against his wishes, and contrary to the agreement with the President, that he should be asked to serve only in a subordinate capacity in the West. However, he received the assurance that General Buell, whose arrival from California was expected, would soon relieve him of the command.

Sherman saw that a forward movement that Fall would be impracticable, and that the best thing to do would be to collect men and materials at Camp Dick Robinson where Thomas was in command, and at Elizabethtown, to which post he sent General McCook. He completed a working

staff, and thus relieved himself of the labor which had crushed Anderson, and was telling on him. Yet he could not free his mind of dread lest Johnston, who was a noted soldier, might fall on either of his camps, and then walk into Louisville. Further, he felt chagrined to see the new levies diverted toward McClellan at Washington, and Fremont at St. Louis, and Kentucky practically neglected.

In October, General Cameron, Secretary of War, stopped at Louisville on his way east from St. Louis, and Sherman, determined to have a plain talk with him about the situation. He explained to him that all the new volunteers were sent either to Washington or St. Louis; that his two camps under Thomas and McCook were too weak for defence, and were only a temptation to Johnson to attack them; that all his forces combined would not warrant taking the offensive; and that Louisville was, at that very moment, practically at Johnston's mercy. He showed further, that the young men of Kentucky were openly enlisting in the Confederate armies, and that the older men, instead of being Unionists, were of the "let-us-alone" type. And further, that instead of 40,000 Springfield muskets promised by the government to General Anderson, it had sent but 10,000 Belgian muskets, which had been refused by the Governors of Ohio and Pennsylvania.

As a result of this conversation, Adjutant-General Thomas, who accompanied Secretary Cameron, wrote, on the spot, an order to send Negley's Pennsylvania Brigade, then at Pittsburg, direct to Louisville, and another one deflecting two regiments thither, which were *en route* to St. Louis. Sherman then mapped for the Secretary and his companions the military situation as he saw it. He showed that McClellan was on the left of a grand army of invasion, with a breadth of country, equal to one hundred miles,

before him, yet he had 100,000 men; that Fremont was on the right with a country of about equal breadth to protect or invade, yet he had 60,000 men; and that he, Sherman, held the center of the grand army, with a country in front over 300 miles wide, yet he had only 18,000 men. He argued that fully 60,000 men were necessary for defensive purposes alone, and that no offensive movement could be entirely successful with less than 200,000 men.

After this interview, satisfactory in an official sense, but but so astounding in its revelations to the gang of idiots who accompanied Secretary Cameron in the guise of reporters and newspaper correspondents, General Sherman began to suffer the penalty of plain speech and exceptional prescience. He was written up as impracticable, visionary, crazy, even, and his situation was rendered well-nigh unbearable.

On October 22d General Negley's Brigade arrived, and was sent at once to Camp Nolin, to which place the Elizabethtown camp had been advanced. The two other regiments which had heen deflected, also arrived and were posted at Elizabethtown and Lebanon Junction. On the same date he wrote to Adjutant-General Thomas, giving him an official review of the Kentucky situation, and, urging the importance of sending additional force to the Cumberland Army.

On November 1st, 1861, General McClellan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Union armies. He called for a report from Sherman, which was promptly forwarded. It showed that McCook's command at Camp Nolin comprised four brigades, and was confronted by Buckner, South of Green River, with a superior force. General Thomas was at Camp Dick Robinson with a smaller force, and General Nelson was East of Paris and directing his attention

to the Confederate forces in the Big Sandy Valley. The report concluded with the acknowledgment that the forces were too wide apart for effective co-operative work, and with the suggestion that they be greatly strengthened, but he says:—"I am told that my estimate of troops for this line, *viz.*, 200,000, has been construed to my prejudice, and I therefore leave it to the future."

Though the future abundantly vindicated Sherman's position, as he had boldly and unhesitatingly announced it at this critical juncture in his own and the nation's career, and though it might well be left so as a matter of history, yet it is a matter of pride to narrate that General Wood, after the war, subscribed to General Sherman's statement of the interview between him and Secretary Cameron in the following language:—

"General Sherman said that the information in his possession indicated an intention, on the part of the rebels, of a grand advance toward the Ohio River. He further expressed the opinion that, if such an advance should be made, and not checked, the rebel force would be swollen by at least 20,000 recruits from the disloyalists of Kentucky. His lowest computation of the organized rebel soldiers then in Kentucky fixed the strength at about 35,000. Add 20,000 for reinforcements gained in Kentucky, to say nothing of troops withdrawn from other rebel States, and the effective rebel force in the State, at a low estimate, would be 55,000 men.

"Sherman explained in a forcible way, how largely the difficulties of suppressing the rebellion would be increased, if the rebels should be allowed to plant themselves firmly and with strong fortifications, at points commanding the Ohio River. It would be easy for them to carry the war thence into the Northern States.

"To resist an advance of the rebels, Sherman said he did not have, at that time, over 14,000 effective men, and their disposition was more for the purpose of checking the separate advances of the rebel columns, and encouraging the raising of troops among loyal Kentuckians, than of withstanding an advance of such forces as might have been combined against him in a single week.

"All that General Sherman had said thus far applied to the defensive situation. He then turned to the offensive sides, and assumed that the Government had taken on itself the business of suppressing the rebellion. Waxing eloquent, he said the rebellion could never be put down, the authority of the Government asserted, and the Union of States declared perpetual, by maintaining a defensive. To accomplish these ends, it was absolutely necessary that the Government should adopt, and maintain to the end, an offensive.

"In order to expel the rebels from Kentucky, 60,000 soldiers were declared to be necessary. Before the rebels were expelled from Kentucky, many more than 60,000 were sent into the State. Ascending from the question of the political and military situation in Kentucky, and forecasting in his sagacious intellect the grand and daring operations which, three years afterwards, he realized in a campaign without parallel in modern times, he expressed the opinion that, in order to carry the war to the gulf, and destroy all armed opposition to the government in the Mississippi valley, at least 200,000 troops would be required."

Sherman's views were fully indorsed at the time by Guthrie and others equally well informed, and it came about almost to the letter as he had predicted.

About the middle of November, 1861, General Buell arrived at Louisville and relieved General Sherman of the



GENERAL ANDERSON.

command of the Cumberland Department. This relief was welcome, and at Sherman's own request. He was ordered to report for duty to General Halleck, who had succeeded to the command in the Missouri Department, with headquarters at St. Louis. Halleck received him kindly and on November 23d, sent him to Sedalia and Jefferson City to inspect the troops and report their condition. He bore orders to assume command should an emergency arise to warrant it. He found the forces in pitiable plight. Steele's regiments were scattered about Sedalia. Pope was at Otterville, twenty miles away, and with no concert between him and Steele. Threatening both, were Price's rebel forces, at Osceola and Warsaw. He advised Halleck at once to put his men in one camp at La Mina River and form them into brigades and divisions, and on his own responsibility issued preliminary orders to that effect. This was construed as another evidence of insanity by the officious newspaper correspondents, and Halleck, who was sensitive to these kid-gloved warriors who had never seen a battle and knew no more of war than a suckling babe, telegraphed that the position should not be disturbed till further orders.

On November 28th, he returned to St. Louis, very much depressed at the repeated attacks on him in the newspapers, but rejoiced to find that his wife had come on from Lancaster to see him. The newspaper attacks had grown so outrageous that he resolved to escape them by a brief retiracy and rest. Being mid-winter, and operations being off for a season, he asked for a twenty days' leave of absence, in order to take his wife home and find escape from the newspaper fusilade.

The papers of the day had the army officers at a decided disadvantage. They could not explain nor reply. The utmost they could do was to maintain silence and suffer,

with the hope that time would come to their vindication. It may be that Sherman felt too keenly the arrows aimed at him, and that he should have rested his case solely on what he knew to be a sentiment far above that which found daily parade in sensational newspaper columns—such, for instance, as this found in a reply by Halleck to one of his despondent letters:—

St. Louis, Dec. 18, 1861.

Dear General:—"I should have answered yours of 12th inst. sooner. The newspaper attacks are certainly shameless and scandalous, but I cannot agree with you that they have us in their power, 'to destroy us as they please.' I get my share of abuse, but it does not disturb me. Your movement of troops in Missouri was not countermanded by me because I thought it unwise, but because I was not then ready for it. I had better information of Price's purposes than you, and I did not apprehend an attack by him. I intended to concentrate the troops on the line you proposed, but I wished the movement delayed till I could determine a better position. After I got Colonel McPherson's report, I made precisely the location you had ordered. I was desirous at the time not to prevent the movement of Price by any movement on our part, hoping he would move to Lexington, but finding he had determined to remain at Osceola for some time, I made the movement you proposed. As you could not know my plans, you and others may have misconstrued my reason for countermanding your orders. I hope to see you well enough for duty soon.

"Yours truly,

"H. W. Halleck."

Halleck wrote several letters to prominent persons relative to Sherman, all of which were calculated to disabuse them

of impressions falsely engendered by the newspaper correspondents. He explained to McClellan that he had given Sherman a twenty days' leave of absence because he had been sorely taxed, and was so nervously depressed as to render a short rest necessary. He wrote to W. W. Ewing, explaining the whole situation, and asserting his entire confidence in his ability, and praising him for his constancy to duty.

When Sherman returned to St. Louis, after his leave of absence, he found Halleck on the eve of moving his forces. One of his armies, under Grant, was to go up the Tennessee, and was then at Paducah. The other, under Curtis, was to move in the direction of Springfield, Mo., and was then at Rolla. Sherman was ordered to take Curtis's place in command of the Camp of Instruction, at Benton Barracks, north of St. Louis. He was to have every company and regiment of his command ready for movement at a moment's warning, and was to notify all concerned that when marching orders were received, no excuse for delay would be accepted.

He found in camp about a dozen regiments of infantry and cavalry, which he placed in first class order. Then he established telegraphic communication with Halleck, and obeyed his orders to the letter. It was mid-winter, but Halleck was pushing things for an early Spring start, and was securing for St. Louis a reign of order it had not known for months. What the first movement should be became a study. It was seen that the Confederate line stretched from Bowling Green to Columbus, and that its centre corresponded very nearly with that of the Tennessee River. It was determined that the place to break it was in the centre. Therefore, Grant was destined to pioneer that move, which was so brilliantly successful, and so productive of rich military results. He moved up the Tennessee, about February

1st, 1862, in conjunction with Com. Foote's Gunboats, and on February 6th, Fort Henry was captured. Grant pitched directly across to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, and invested it. The gunboats came around in due time from the Tennessee, and with their help, Buckner was forced to surrender his army of over 12,000 men. This was war in earnest, and victory worth counting on. These victories inspired the whole country. They were the first substantial ones of the war, and their value could not be estimated. They pierced the Confederate centre, and forced a falling back of the wings, for a hundred miles or more.

On February 13th, 1862, Sherman received orders from Halleck, to turn over his command at Benton Barracks to General Strong, and to proceed at once to the command at Paducah. General Hurlburt was to accompany him. On the same day, he started for Paducah, knowing that Halleck designed to push operations on the Tennessee with unusual vigor. On the 15th, he received the following from Halleck: "Send General Grant everything you can spare from Paducah and Smithfield; also General Hurlbut. Bowling Green has been evacuated entirely.

"H. W. HALLECK,
"Major-General."

It was simultaneous with the arrival of this despatch that Sherman received word of the Fall of Donelson, and it was, he says, "as if a heavy weight had been raised from our breasts, we were so thankful for such a series of fruitful victories." The Confederate's left fell back to Island No. 10, and their right did not even stop at Nashville, toward which Buell was now tending. The centre took for its base the Memphis & Charleston R. R.



COMMODORE FOOTE.

CHAPTER VI.

AT SHILOH.

In February, 1862, the situation in the Department of Mississippi was this:—Halleck was in command at St. Louis; Buell was under him, in command of the army of the Ohio, in Kentucky; Grant commanded the army of the Tennessee, at Forts Henry and Donalson; Curtis commanded in Missouri. His chief of staff, Cullum, was posted at Cairo, and Sherman had just been assigned to the command at Paducah.

Fort Donaldson had surrendered to Grant on February 16; there were many wounded and prisoners to care for; the important operations up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers were in progress; communication between St. Louis and Donelson was difficult. The fall of Donelson forced the retreat of the Confederates from Bowling Green, and Buell was pursuing to and through Nashville. Every day, under Grant's energy, the armies of Halleck were getting further away from him. Yet it was a spendid sweep, manifest to all, and was bound to redeem a belt of country 200 miles deep, and extending from the Mississippi to the Alleghenies.

Sherman's position at Paducah became most important, first to Halleck as a centre of information, and second to Grant as a base of supplies; it was a source of satisfaction to Grant to have such a man in such a place at such a time. Sherman was kept busy, sending boats of supplies and troops to Halleck, to Grant, to Buell, and co-operating with them

with all his skill and energy. At the same time he was receiving raw recruits, and busily organizing a division for himself, his object being to take the field as soon as circumstances would permit.

At this juncture Halleck and Grant were wide apart as to method. Grant had swung to Buell's aid at Nashville whereas Halleck would have confined him to the line of the Tennessee. But Grant had not really left the line of the Tennessee; he had only made sure of the fall of Nashville, and the establishment of a line, which left nothing to be added except what could be gained at Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh) and thence to the Mississippi by way of Corinth He knew far better what he was about than did Halleck.

By March 10th, Sherman had completed the formation of his division and was in receipt of orders from Halleck to embark at Paducah, and steam to Ft. Henry. He started with four brigades composed of splendid Western material. The First, Colonel Hicks, embraced the Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, and Morton's Indiana Battery; the Second, Colonel Stuart, embraces the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Seventy-fifth Ohio, and Fifty-fourth Ohio; the Third, Colonel Hildebrand, comprised the Seventy-first Ohio, Fifty-seventh Ohio, and Fifty-third Ohio; the Fourth, Colonel Buckland, comprised the Seventy-second Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and Seventieth Ohio. The water was high, and the steamers reached Fort Henry in time, and Sherman reported his arrival to General C. F. Smith, who ordered him to rendezvous a few miles above the Fort. On March 13th General Smith, himself, arrived at the rendezvous with a large fleet of boats, carrying the divisions of Hurlbut, Lew Wallace and himself, his own being in command of General W. H. L. Wallace.

As soon as General Smith arrived he sent for Sherman

and ordered him to push on, under escort of two gun-boats, and land below Eastport, then to make a break for the Memphis & Charleston R. R., at some point between Tuscambia and Corinth. It was the last formal order Sherman ever received from Smith, for the latter died on April 25, 1862. Under this order Sherman steamed up the Tennessee, following the two gun-boats, till he unmasked the Confederate batteries at Eastport and Chickasaw. He then dropped back to the mouth of Yellow River, from which a road ran out to Burnsville, the site of the repair shops of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Here he disembarked and made a strike for Burnsville, his cavalry being well in advance, with the intention of burning the repair shops. When six miles out with his artillery and infantry he met the calvary returning with word that the streams had become impassable owing to the heavy rains. Fearing lest his communication with the boats would be cut off by overflow of the river bottoms he returned, dragging his artillery under water over the low lands near the river. Embarking he dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where he found Hurlbut's Division in boats. Leaving his command there, he steamed down to Savannah to confer with Smith. From him he received personal instructions to disembark his own and Hurlbut's Divisions at Pittsburg Landing and take a position well out in the country, so as to admit of the landing of the rest of the army. On March 16th, a reconnoitering force under Sherman disembarked at Pittsburg Landing, marched ten miles out toward Corinth to Pea Ridge where they encamped temporarily. On the 18th this was followed by Hurlbut's Division which took position at the forks of the Corinth and Hamburg roads, one and a half miles out. On the 19th, Sherman disembarked his entire division, and encamped it three miles out, covering the roads to Purdy and Corinth

and the Lick Creek fording. In a few days the other divisions came up. Prentiss encamped on Sherman's left, McClernand and Wallace took position in the rear. Wallace held the road on the north side of Snake Creek, running from Crump's Landing out to Purdy. Though Sherman and Colonel McPherson, of Halleck's Staff, had reconnoitered the ground well in advance and had ascertained that the Confederates were rapidly concentrating at Corinth, he was responsible only for his own division, Smith being in chief command with his headquarters back at Savannah. Still, Sherman kept all the roads to his front well picketed, acquainted himself thoroughly with the topography of the country, and gathered all the information he could as to the intention of the enemy, all of which information was to the effect that concentration was rapidly going on at Corinth, and that an attack was intended. He labored at a disadvantage as to news from his rear, on account of Smith's illness.

Grant, who had now satisfactorily explained to Halleck his reasons for visiting Nashville after the fall of Donelson, was, on March 17th, restored to his command of all the Tennessee River troops, and came at once to Savannah to relieve Smith, who was suffering from what proved to be his mortal illness. After this, matters took a new turn in the rear, but Sherman thought that the front of the army should have been better fortified. Still he felt that such a thing might have rendered the raw recruits more timid, might have spread the opinion that there was no intention to advance. Besides, all looked upon the position as naturally a strong one, two and one-half miles wide, with Snake Creek on the right, or North; a confluent, Owl Creek on the right front, and Lick Creek on the left. At a later period of the war, such a position could have been made impregnable in a single night.

From April 1st to April 4th it was made evident to Sherman by the daring approaches of the enemy's cavalry, that a movement from Corinth was under way. On the 4th a reconnoissance showed that the enemy's infantry were distant less than five miles. He informed Grant of his discovery. Doubtless the other division commanders on the front, conveyed similar information,

The general situation was this:—Buell had been ordered from Nashville to Grant's support at Pittsburg Landing, and was then on his way. The Confederates had centered at Corinth under Johnston, and were anxious to attack Grant before Buell's arrival. Hence their haste, and hence Grant's desire to simply hold till the promised junction of forces came about.

On Saturday, April 5th, 1862, the enemy's cavalry were again very bold and harrassed Sherman's entire front. On Sunday, the 6th, the morning opened with rapid picket firing. Sherman and his staff rode out along the lines, and when about four hundred yards in advance of Appler's Regiment they were fired upon from a ravine to the left, and one of his orderlies was killed. Instantly, the whole Confederate line of battle seemed to put in an appearance at the front, driving in pickets and advance guard.

Sherman had left his men under orders to be ready, and now came word to fall into line. His ground was favorable, and he had a fair idea of the enemy's probable points of attack. To Waterhouse, who commanded the battery which guarded the ravine of Owl Creek, he said, "reserve your fire till the rebels have crossed the ravine and begun the ascent." He sent word to McClernand to support his left; to Prentiss that the enemy were in full force in his front; to Hurlbut, asking him to support Prentiss. By 7 A. M., he had his division all under arms and in line of battle, and not a

moment too soon, for it was the real beginning of the eventful battle of Shiloh, in which Sherman's part was to be most conspicuous, and in which he was to win the plaudits of his Commander, the government and the country.

Taking for granted that his part of this fierce contest, is all that will concern a reader of his life, we follow him through those two days of anxiety and carnage, which embraced the time of the battle.

His First Brigade, Hick's, and Morton's Battery was on his extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy Road, over Owl Creek.

His Second Brigade, Stuart's, was on his extreme left, guarding the ford over Lick Creek.

His Third Brigade, Hildebrand's, was on the left of the Corinth Road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting house

His Fourth Brigade, Buckland's, was on the right of the Corinth Road, its left resting on Shiloh meeting house.

Taylor's Battery was posted at Shiloh, and Waterhouse's on a ridge to the left. Eight companies of cavalry were posted to the left and rear of Shiloh meeting house, which Sherman regarded as the centre of his position.

At 8 A. M., the glistening of bayonets in the woods to the left and beyond Owl Creek, told him that the enemy designed a determined attack on his entire line. Appler's Regiment was on the left flank of the first line of battle, and he was ordered to hold his ground at all hazzards. McClernand had promptly sent three regiments of his division to the support of Waterhouse's battery. The battle opened by a battery in the woods to the front, throwing shells into Sherman's camp. Both of Sherman's batteries promptly responded. Then heavy columns of Confederate infantry were seen surging to the left across Appler's front, and other columns advancing directly upon Sherman's front. He

opened artillery and infantry fire along his whole line, and the battle became general. Still other columns of infantry kept pushing obliquely along his left, and therefore bearing down on Prentiss' division. Sherman detected in this an intention of the enemy to pass his left flank and fall upon Prentiss and McClernand, whose line of camps were two miles back from the Tennessee, and almost parallel with it. Soon the sound of musketry and artillery burst upon his ears to confirm his judgment of the situaation. Prentiss was attacked about 9 A. M., and from the receding nature of the sounds, was evidently falling back. Just then Appler's Regiment broke under a heavy fire and fell back in disorder, followed by Mungen's, and the enemy were pressing hard on Waterhouse's Battery, which was then exposed. The three regiments, sent to guard it, held their ground for some time, but were finally driven back with heavy loss, and three guns of the battery fell into the enemy's hands.


Sherman had thus to witness the turning of his left, and at the same time stand up under a determined attack and galling fire along his entire front. But he deemed Shiloh so important that he held to it and renewed orders to stand fast by it. It was held to tenaciously for an hour and until the enemy had gotten artillery in position, in the rear of his left. A change then became necessary. Appler's and Mungen's Regiments of Hildebrand's Brigade had fled to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was in disorder. Sherman, therefore, ordered Taylor's battery to fall back from Shiloh to the junction of the Purdy and Hamburg road, and the two brigades resting on Shiloh meeting house, to fall back and adopt those roads as their new line. Riding across the angle, Sherman met Behr's battery and ordered it to come into action by the right. Captain Behr was instantly killed,

and as he fell his battery broke and fled, leaving five of their guns behind.

The enemy pressed so hard upon the new position that the battery fell into their hands, and to form the lines designed was impossible. Only Hildebrand himself remained on the field, of his entire brigade. McDowell's and Buckland's Brigades were piloted back by Sherman's aides till they united with McClernand's right. Thus Sherman's camp and original line was completely abandoned, and the day had gone disastrously with him, but no more so than with the other commands which were engaged.

The enemy were now attacking McClernand's entire front with the greatest fury. Sherman pressed McDowell's Brigade against the enemy's left flank, and thus relieved McClernand's right. The enemy were forced back and Sherman determined to hold on by ordering his men to the cover of trees, fallen timber and the wooded valley on his right. He held to this position for four hours, sometimes advancing a little and sometimes receding. In this effort he was in perfect concert with McClernand, who regarded the position as vital. Grant came on the spot to view it, and two Iowa regiments were ordered to help Sherman hold it, but they could not be brought to face the terrific fire which centered there.

By 4 P.M. it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river. But knowing that Lew Wallace was hastening from Crump's Landing with reinforcements, both Sherman and McClernand deemed it opportune to form a new line, with its right covering a bridge which Wallace had to cross. This was a most difficult task with tired and disordered troops, but it was accomplished, in the face of a determined cavalry charge by the enemy which was handsomely repulsed, and under cover of a magnificent charge by



IRON CLAD RIVER GUN BOAT.

part of McClernand's forces, sustained by the fire of two batteries, which played havoc with the enemy, crowded into a narrow ravine. In his new position Sherman had a clear field of 200 yards before him, and was content to keep the enemy at that distance for the rest of the day. His command was now of a decidedly mixed character. Hildebrand was there, but his brigade was not. McDowell had been wounded, and his regiments were not in line. Buckland's Brigade was there entire. Many other regiments and fractions, whose officers had maintained an organization, came into the line and fought with Sherman's Division during the rest of the battle.

Buell had arrived on the scene during the day. In the evening he and Grant came to Sherman's bivouac and Grant informed him that Wallace had come up and had formed on his right. He also said that the last assault made by the Confederates in the ravine near the river, had been repelled by Webster's heavy battery, and that he was convinced the battle was over for the day. That night it rained hard, but Sherman's men were in good spirits and ready to redeem on Monday what they had lost on Sunday.

At daylight on Monday morning Sherman received orders from Grant to march out and capture his original camps. He despatched his aides to bring up all of his men they could find and especially the brigade of Stuart, which had become detached from its command the day before. At the appointed time, all that remained of his original division, together with the fragments that had been attached to it, were pushed briskly forward, and occupied the ground from which it had been driven the afternoon before, on McClernand's right. Here they attracted the fire of a battery located on McDowell's former headquarters and were compelled to halt. Grant's orders to advance had been general,

and Sherman felt that all the divisions were in motion. He also knew that Buell's army had been thrown along the line of the Corinth road, and he expected to hear guns announcing his advance with his fresh troops. At 10 A. M. the sound came. It was loud and steady. It indicated victorious advance for it gradually came nearer. This was enough to satisfy Sherman. He knew that Wallace was on his right, with a fresh and well ordered division. He knew that if McClernand had moved at all under Grant's order he would be where he was the day before, and that he (Sherman) had to keep touch with his right. So, leading the head of his column, he formed line of battle, facing South, with Buckland's Brigade directly across the ridge and Stuart's on his right in the woods. He advanced steadily and slowly in the face of a withering fire of musketry and artillery. There was grim determination in the face of every officer and soldier. Nothing short of an earthquake could have disturbed the dogged resolution of his troops at that moment. They seemed to feel that the moment had arrived, when a day's disasters must be redeemed. They found their general everywhere in their midst, imparting his spirit, and sustaining his command with the deliberation of one born to control a crisis.

Taylor, who had been off for ammunition, came rushing in with a broken battery of three guns. These Sherman quickly threw into position with orders to advance by hand firing. Under cover of their fire, he advanced till he reached the crossing of the Corinth road with McClernand's lines. Here he met Buell's well ordered forces, sight of which encouraged his own men. He saw one of Buell's regiments enter a thicket behind which the enemy were posted in force beheld one of the fiercest musketry fires he ever witnessed, and saw the regiment emerge in line as true as when it en-

tered. This point was only 500 yards east of Shiloh meeting-house. It was evident that the struggle of the day was to centre there, though southward the enemy could be seen forming. These McClernand quickly dispatched with the aid of three guns of Wood's Battery sent him by Sherman. Just then two guns of McAllister's twenty-four pound howetizers arrived and Sherman placed them where they did excellent execution.

It was now 2 P.M. Two batteries of the enemy at Shiloh were showering shot upon the wood from which Buell's Regiment had been driven. But McCook threw his whole brigade in that direction. It deployed beautifully and entered the wood. Sherman threw Smith's Brigade (formerly Stuart's) in upon his right, and Buckland's in upon Stuart's right, and ordered all to advance with McCook's right, which proved to be Rousseau's Kentucky Brigade. Sherman meanwhile personally superintended the fire of the two twenty-four pounders, which soon silenced the enemy's guns to the left and finally the batteries at Shiloh meeting-house.

Rousseau's Brigade kept McCook's right to the front with a steady sweep, Sherman's troops keeping even with it, and by 4 P.M. they all came out on Sherman's original line, with the enemy in full retreat. He ordered his men to occupy their original camps, which they did with the gracious feeling of conquerors, after a test such as soldiers are seldom put to. Many times during the sanguinary advance the ammunition gave out, but Grant was in command and supplies kept constantly coming from the rear. He had overlooked no detail of the conflict, but had anticipated the spot and moment where and when men and material would be needed. Many times Sherman held his men in place with empty cartridge boxes, knowing that a supply would be on hand at the earliest possible moment. And it always came.

Sherman gave to Rousseau the greatest credit for his plucky push into the woods, and against, as it turned out, the very centre of the Confederate columns, commanded by Bouregard, and supported by Bragg's, Polk's and Breckenridge's Divisions—Johnston having been, supposably, killed on the day before. It must be remembered that Sherman's troops in this great battle were all new, having received their muskets for the first time in Paducah. None of them had ever seen fire, or heavy columns bearing down upon them as on the first day of the battle. He could not expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops. They knew nothing of the value of combination and organization When panic-stricken, their impulse was to get away. His brigade officers were cool men and Hildebrand fought it out alone, while Buckland held his men well in hand all the time. Stuart, who was detached, had really to fight his battle alone on Sunday, and was wounded. McDowell was unfortunately thrown from his horse and incapacitated, but he held his men with courageous ability. All of the fragments of commands which attached themselves to Sherman on Sunday evening fought with courage and constancy on Monday. His list of casualties was as follows:

Officers killed,	16
" wounded,	45
" missing,	6
Soldiers killed,	302
" wounded,	1,230
" "	435
Total for division,	2,034

Seven guns were captured for the seven which had been lost on Sunday. When the men regained their camps on Monday they were too fatigued to follow up their victory,



BATTLE OF SHILOH.

but on the following day they tracked the enemy for six miles, finding abandoned camps and hospitals in all of which were wounded and dead. The roads were strewn with abandoned wagons, ambulances and limber boxes, which evidences of confusion showed a hasty retreat.

Thus ended the battle of Shiloh, one of the most desperate of the war, and one which was least understood. The newspaper correspondents were running wild when it occurred. They wrote Grant up as drunk. They pictured it as a surprise. They saved the day with Buell. They indulged in idiotic speculation and unsupported statements till the country was surfeited with their twaddle and sensationalism. To give each man his honored place in a great and successful battle, to write fairly of defeat and victory, to weigh situations and compare results, to deliberate at all and report truth, was not a part of their mission, or if so, no part of their intentions. To their charge that Grant was drunk Lincoln well said, "I wish some of the other officers in command could find some of his whiskey." The fact is the correspondents were in the condition they imagined Grant to be in.

Sherman suspected Buell of catering to this sensationalism, because he did not like his inquiries and his mistrust of the situation on Sunday evening when he came to visit him, and when he ostentatiously announced that he was on hand with three divisions of 18,000 men. Sherman gently reminded him that with such an augmentation of force there ought to be no difficulty in sweeping the field on the morrow, for that he himself could fully count on as many men, with the assistance of McClernand, Prentiss, and Wallace, while he did not doubt that the enemy had suffered in an equal ratio with the Union troops.

Grant refused to respond to the many low attacks made upon him. Sherman could not brook such unfairness and he responded in his own energetic style through the newspapers. It took only two of his letters to open the eyes of the North to the situation, and establish the participants in the places they will occupy in deliberately written history.

It was a battle fought with five divisions, on its first day, Sherman's, McClernand's, Prentiss', Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wallace's. It was a battle fought without intrenchments, and on the theory that Buell's arrival would be the signal for an offensive move on Corinth. It was fought against a force of 45,000 men, led by Johnston, one of the most skillful of generals, who sacrificed his life on the battle field. It was fought without General Lew Wallace's Division, which came in the evening from beyond Snake Creek. It was fought without Buell, who had crossed but a few of his men over the Tennessee on Sunday. The second day's battle was one of hard fighting, but sure victory. It was a Grant battle in every sense of the word—"move early. The one who moves first is sure to win." Buell co-operated handsomely. Joint armies won. Joint honors were due. History will see to this. Nothing could eclipse the magnitude of the victory. Ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine of the enemy had been placed *hors du combat.* The Union loss was 12,217, of which number 2,167 belonged to Buell's Army. It was a battle which could not be gaged by counts of dead and wounded. Following Donelson it was something. Preceding Corinth it was stupendous. It placed Corinth within Union grasp. It broke the second Confederate line 200 miles south of its first. It made infinite conquest in a southerly direction possible. No newspaper correspondent could see this, nor any one without the military instinct. It was for the future to unfold. Slowly but surely

the curtain lifted, and the importance of Shiloh began to dawn.

It is no exaltation of Sherman to say that he bore the brunt of this hard fight. He had the front and the post of honor. He held with the utmost tenacity every point he could. He supported wherever help was needed and whenever he could spare a man. He retreated with all the order mortal could preserve. He kept ranks in line which would have defied any other control. Grant gave to him the greatest praise and freely conceded that the result of the victory was largely due to his bravery and skill. Horse after horse had fallen under him; he had received more than one wound. What wonder that he should resent every malignant attempt to disparage the honors he had won and the importance of the victory!

Owing to the many aspersions on Grant and his officers, in fighting the battle of Shiloh, by irresponsible newspaper correspondents, who knew more in a minute than any trained General could expect to achieve in a lifetime, General Sherman, knowing Grant's reticence and indifferentism, had threatened to "take up the cudgel." Here is how he acquitted himself, without creating an opportunity, but taking advantage of one which arose in a natural way and in the line of army publications. The time is July, 1865.

TO EDITOR OF UNITED STATES SERVICE MAGAZINE,

DEAR SIR: In the June number of the United States Service Magazine, I find a brief sketch of Lieuteant-General U. S. Grant, in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error, which General Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to correct. To General Beull's noble, able and gallant conduct, you attribute the fact that the disaster

on April 6th, at Pittsburgh Landing was retrieved and made the victory of the following day. As General Taylor is said in his later days to have doubted whether he was at the battle of Buena Vista at all, on account of the many things having transpired there, according to the historians, which he did not see, so I begin to doubt whether I was at the battle of Pittsburgh Landing, of modern description. But I was at the battles of April 6th and 7th, 1862. General Grant visited my division in person about ten A. M., when the battle raged fiercest. I was then on the right. After some general conversation, he remarked that I was doing right in stubbornly opposing the progress of the enemy, and, in answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, told me he had anticipated their want, and given order accordingly; he then said his presence was more needed over at the left. About two P. M., of the 6th, the enemy materially slackened his attack on me, and about four P. M., I deliberately made a new line behind McArthur's drill-field, placing batteries on chosen ground, repelling easily a cavalry attack, and watching the cautious approach of the enemy's infantry, that never dislodged me there. I selected that line in advance of a bridge across Snake Creek, by which we had all day been expecting the approach of Lewis Wallace's Division from Crump's Landing. About five P. M., before the sun set, General Grant came up again to me, and after hearing my report of matters, explained to me the situation of affairs on the left, which were not as favorable; still, the enemy had failed to reach the landing of the boats. We agreed that the enemy had expended the furore of his attack, and we estimated our loss, and approximated our then strength including Lewis Wallace's fresh division, expected each minute. He then ordered me to get all things ready, and, at daylight the next day to assume the offensive.

That was before General Buell had arrived, but he was known to be near at hand. General Buell's troops took no essential part in the first day's fight, and Grant's army, though collected together hastily, green as militia, some regiments arriving without cartridges even, and nearly all hearing then the sound of battle for the first time, had withstood and repelled the first day's terrific onset of a superior enemy, well commanded and well handled. I know I had orders from General Grant to assume the offensive before I knew General Buell was on the west side of the Tennessee. I think General Buell, Colonel Fry, and others of General Buell's staff rode up to where I was about sunset, just as General Grant was leaving me. General Buell asked me many questions, and got of me a small map, which I had made for my own use, and told me that by daylight, he could have eighteen thousand fresh men, which I knew would settle the matter.

I understood Grant's forces were to advance on the right of the Corinth road, and Buell's on the left; and accordingly, at daylight, I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the battle had been most severe, and then waited till near noon for Buell's troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced and recovered all the ground we had ever held. I know that, with the exception of one or two severe struggles, the fighting of April 7th was easy as compared with that of April 6th.

I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question anything done by General Buell and his army, and know that approaching our field of battle from the rear, he encountered the sickening crowd of laggards and fugitives that excited his contempt, and that of his army, who never gave full credit to those in the front line, who did fight hard, and who

had, at 4 P.M., checked the enemy, and were preparing the next day to assume the offensive. I remember the fact the better from General Grant's anecdote of his at Donelson battle, which he told me then for the first time—that, at a certain period of the battle he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, to advance on the enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the enemy surrendered. At 4 P. M. of April 6th, he thought the appearance the same, and he judged, with Lewis Wallace's fresh division and such of our startled troops as had recovered their equilibrium, he would be justified in dropping the defensive and assuming the offensive in the morning. And, I repeat, I received such orders before I knew General Buell's troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad Buell was there because I knew his troops were older than ours, and better systematized and drilled, and his arrival made that certain, which before was uncertain. I have heard this question much discussed, and must say, that the officers of Buell's army dwelt too much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave to us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weakened as we were by the absence of Buell's army, long expected, of Lewis Wallace's Division, only four miles off, and of the fugitives from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the time. At the same time, our army of the Tennessee have indulged in severe criticisms at the slow approach of that army which knew the danger that threatened us from the concentrated armies of Johnston, Beauregard and Bragg, that lay at Corinth. In a war like this, where opportunities for personal prowess are as plenty as blackberries, to those who seek them at the front, all such criminations should be frowned down; and were it not for the military character of your journal, I would not venture

to offer a correction to a very popular error.

I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct a another very common mistake, in attributing to General Grant the selection of that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran soldier, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division to disembark there, and strike for the Charleston Railroad. This order was subsequently modified, by his ordering Hurlbut's Division to disembark there, and mine higher up the Tennessee, at the mouth of Yellow Creek, to strike the railroad at Burnsville. But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, when General Smith ordered me in person also to disembark at Pittsburg Landing, and take post well out, so as to make plenty of room, with Snake and Lick Creeks the flanks of a camp for the grand army of invasion.

It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and it was well chosen. On any other we surely would have been overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake Creeks forced the enemy to confine his movement to a direct front attack, which new troops are better qualified to resist than where the flanks are exposed to a real or chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that army were arranged in that camp by General Smith's order, my division forming, as it were, the outlying picket, whilst McClernand's and Prentiss' were the real line of battle, with W. H. L. Wallace in support of the right wing, and Hurlbut of the left; Lewis Wallace Division being detached. All these subordinate dispositions were made by the order of General Smith, before General Grant, succeeded him to the command of all the forces up the Tennessee, headquarters at Savannah. If there were any error in putting that army on the west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not General Grant's; but there was

no mistake. It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as we were, we could fight as well as they.

Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual for me; but of course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I happen to be a witness to certain truths which are now beginning to pass out of memory, and form what is called history.

I also take great pleasure in adding, that nearly all of the new troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure, have more than redeemed their good name; among them, that very regiment which first broke, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appen. Under another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every campaign and expedition of mine since, is with me now, and can march, and bivouac, and fight as well as the the best regiment in this or any army. Its reputation now is equal to that of any from the State of Ohio.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

CHAPTER VII.

MEMPHIS AND BEYOND.

While Grant and Smith were making sure ground for the "Army of the Tennessee" on the line of the Tennessee River, Pope was moving down the Mississippi against Island No. 10 and New Madrid. Pope's army was power, fully supported by the gunboat fleet under Admiral Foote. On the date of the battle of Shiloh, Pope and Foote were bombarding Island No. 10 and the batteries on the Kentucky shore opposite; Pope, having run his steamers to the Easts hore, captured a large part of the Confederate forces near Tiptonville.

Halleck still remained at St. Louis, and seemed dazed with the successes of his Generals. Instead of following up the triumphs on the line of the Mississippi, he ordered Pope around and up the Tennessee, and following him, took command of the Tennessee operations in person. Foote's gunboat fleet descended the Mississippi till brought to a stand at Fort Pillow, 50 miles above Memphis. It was at this juncture that Farragut entered the mouth of the Mississippi and prepared to co-operate with Butler for the reduction of Forts Jackson and Philip, and the capture of New Orleans.

Shiloh had been fough t on April 6 and 7. On the 8th the enemy cleared the front of the Union army, leaving behind killed, wounded and much property. The close of the battle had left the Army of the Tennessee on the right of the line and the Army of the Ohio on the left, but neither

Grant nor Buell seemed to exercise command, both being busy in repairing damages. All the subordinate officers were wholly engrossed with collecting stragglers, burying dead and caring for the wounded. After this came the re-organization of existing forces. Sherman consolidated his four brigades into three, the First under General M. L. Smith, the Second under Colonel John A. McDowell, the Third under General J. W. Denver. While thus re-organized and ready for an advance, he was promoted to the rank of Major General of Volunteers, a merited compliment, after the hard fought field of Shiloh.

In a few days Halleck arrived by boat and assumed personal command. He came full of the prejudices which had been inspired by worthless newspaper correspondents against Grant, and in a few days issued an order re-organizing the entire army. Buell's army was given the centre; Pope's army, then arriving, was given the left; the right was composed of Sherman's division, Hurlbut's division, and two others made up of fragments of Prentiss' and Smith's commands. General Thomas was taken from Buell's command and placed in command of this newly formed right. The two divisions of Wallace and McClernand were placed in reserve under McClernand. Grant was practically ignored, though he still retained his staff and an escort of one small company of Illinois cavalry. For a month he remained thus ostracised, during which time he visited Sherman often, not to complain, yet unable to conceal his indignation at the insult heaped upon him.

Sherman was now immediately under Thomas, a classmate of his at West Point, and a chum of the old army. The enemy had stopped at and fortified Cornith, 30 miles distant from Shiloh. They had received large re-inforce-

ments and were under command of Beauregard, who had succeeded Johnston, killed at Shiloh. The Union army had also received Buell's and Pope's armies, and was even stronger that its adversary. Supplies were plenty by way of the river. Toward the end of April everything seemed ready for a move on Corinth. Sherman's division held the extreme right, and marched by way of the White House and across Lick Creek, thence by the main road to Elams. The Prudy road was then taken to Corinth, his skirmishers all the while holding the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. The marches were provokingly tardy, being governed by those of the centre, which was seemingly digging its way forward. Halleck's excessive caution and irritating tardiness became a theme of satirical mirth in the army and of wide, though subdued criticism. His orders were express to fortify every camp at night, whether an enemy had been sighted or not.

Sherman's part of the army made its tedious advance without opposition, till it neared Corinth. When within two miles of the place, two of his brigades came into contact with the enemy, and the result was a sharp engagement, which forced his opponents further toward the fortifications. On the 27th he was ordered by Halleck to make a strong demonstration on Corinth, and to call for the nearest divisions to assist. A brief reconnoitre developed the enemy in strong position on a hill. Calling on Hurlbut and McClernand to each send a brigade to his assistance, he formed a line of battle and charged on the position, carrying it in fine style, and occupying the ridge, which overlooked the fortifications of Corinth. The Confederates had been surprised and soon returned, but quickly fled again when they received a well concentrated fire. Both Grant and Thomas were present during this engagement, and expressed their

pleasure at the way the plans had been laid and the troops behaved.

Shiloh had been won on April 6th and 7th. Corinth was some thirty miles from Shiloh. It was now May 29th. Verily the army had dug its way along. But its investment of the place was now complete, and it was ready to dig its way in. Halleck's divisions were all in touch. On that night the confusion within the town seemed to be unusual. On the morning of the 30th the earth shook with a series of explosions and clouds of smoke rose above the town. Sherman telegraphed to Halleck's headquarters asking him if he knew the cause. Halleck replied with an order to feel the enemy and see if he was still in his front. Sherman pushed forward two regiments from each of his three brigades and followed with his entire division. He found all the Confederate parapets abandoned. He drove straight for the town with his whole force, and found it evacuated The evacuation had gone on all night, and the rear guard had set fire to the magazine at daylight. He dispatched Smith's brigade after the retreating columns. It pursued to the Tuscambia River, where it found the bridge burned. He pushed his other brigades to a point south of the town and halted there to await the arrival of Thomas.

Halleck had ordered all his columns to move coincident with Sherman's, and they entered the town simultaneously from different directions. But Beauregard had made a swift and sure retreat, and had reached Tupelo, without serious molestation except from Pope's cavalry. After the situation had been made out by Halleck, Sherman was ordered back to his camp of the day before. Though Halleck's progress had been slow and uneventful, the time expended was not necessarily wasted. It had brought him to the coveted line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and

to its intersection with the Mobile and Ohio railroad. It had placed him in a position whence he could move in any direction. It had given opportunity for the men to become acquainted with service and for commanders to learn their men. His caution was such as to introduce every kind of field and camp preparation. The result was discipline and organized control, and even confidence amid jovial criticism.

Sherman gave him great credit for acquirement and capacity, and believed he really would have taken advantage of his pivotal situation and great strength of disciplined numbers by a movement directly on Vicksburg or Mobile if he had not been overruled from Washington. The occupation of Corinth, instead of inuring to any immediate advantage, was a signal for the dispersion of his magnificent army. Pope's army was distributed among other commands, and he was sent East. Thomas went back to his old command in the army of the Ohio. Buell was ordered to march to Chattanooga along the line of the Memphis and Charleston railroad. McClernand was sent toward Memphis. McPherson was given charge of the northern connections, with orders to open railway connection between Columbus and Corinth. Hurlbut and Sherman were sent north to Chewalla. Even Grant with his little guard, and smarting under the slights of the last month, was going to leave on a thirty days' absence, and would have done so but for Sherman, who compared his (Grant's) humiliation to his own at Louisville and Paducah, and out of which he had come at Shiloh. He advised him to hold on and trust to a turn in events. Grant changed his mind and held on. The result was what the country demanded, a hero equal to a large and complex situation.

Sherman was at Chewalla but a short time when he was

ordered to Grand Junction, fifty miles west of Corinth, to repair the railroad thence to Memphis, which had been evacuated, after Corinth had fallen into Halleck's hands, and on the appearance of McClernand's forces before it, co-operated with by the fleet of gunboats under Admiral Davis, who had succeeded Foote. Farragut had captured New Orleans, and had come up the Mississippi as far as the fortifications of Vicksburg.

The Confederates were rapidly strengthening their armies by conscription. Bragg succeeded Beauregard in the western command, as being a better organizer and disciplinarian. His first test was to outmanœuvre Buell in his march to Chattanooga and force him clear back to Louisville. During the latter part of June and first half of July, Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions held Grand Junction, and the neighboring railroad towns, and were kept busy rebuilding railroads and fighting off Confederate cavalry. On July 17th, 1862, Halleck was assigned to the command of all the armies, superseding McClellan. This left Grant supreme in his old jurisdiction, the District of Tennessee, but with a greatly reduced force, and one hardly equal to the task of keeping his line of supplies open back to Columbus.

On the very day of Halleck's promotion, July 17th, Sherman sent two brigades to Holly Springs, so as to better protect the railroads. On the 23d, Grant paid him a visit at Lafayette, on his way to Memphis to take command of the District of Tennessee. From this date on, Sherman received his orders from Grant, and continued to do so till the end of the war; but before this Sherman had received Halleck's order to occupy Memphis, which he did. The occupancy of Memphis stretched the Union lines to such tension that Grant's army was on the defensive all the while. It had the greatest difficulty in keeping communications

open, and in holding the various points stretching all the way from Memphis to Tuscambia, while Buell's long line which aimed for Chattanooga, was entirely flanked by Bragg and finally doubled up and forced back to the Ohio. Van Dorn and Price had been brought from the west side of the Mississippi to the east, and were supported by Armstrong and Forrest with powerful cavalry forces. Their joint armies aggregated 40,000 men, centered about Holly Springs, and therefore in position to cut the road at Grand Junction, and thus sever the connection between Corinth and Memphis.

Memphis was secure under Sherman, but Grant, at Corinth, could but watch the enemy and be on continual guard. He spent eight weeks at Corinth, fortifying, and holding to his strategic triangle, whose corners were Corinth, Bolivar and Jackson. The military situation all over the country was gloomy. The Armies of the Potomac had met with reverses. Bragg was threatening the States north of the Ohio. Grant had been drawn upon for forces to help Buell, till even defence became most arduous and dangerous.

On September 13th, Price swung round to Grant's left and seized Iuka. Van Dorn was known to be marching directly on Corinth at the same time. Grant determined to beat Price, and march back to Corinth, before Van Dorn could arrive. He sent Ord's (formerly McClernand's) division and Rosecrans' command in haste to Iuka, twenty-three miles distant, with orders to attack. These two commands got detached, and Price fell on Rosecrans near Iuka, and defeated him with a loss of 760 men and a battery, but finding that Ord was at hand, he retreated and rejoined Van Dorn. Grant now put Ord in command at Bolivar, and Rosecrans at Corinth, taking up his own headquarters at Jackson, so as to better communicate with all points of his

command, and sending to Sherman to order Hurlbut's division out to Brownsville and Bolivar. Grant's army now stood: A small reserve at Jackson; Sherman's division at Memphis, 6,000 men; Ord and Hurlbut at Bolivar, 10,000 men; Rosecrans at Corinth, three divisions, 20,000; out posts, 10,000. He had to guard a front of 150 miles. Van Dorn had full 40,000 men, and superior cavalry, ready to move anywhere. On October 1st, Grant regarded his position as most precarious and so telegraphed Halleck.

Sherman had made Memphis very strong, and could afford to make bold infantry and cavalry dashes toward Holly Springs, and even as far as the Cold Water. On October 2nd, Van Dorn appeared before Corinth with his entire army, moving on it from the northwest. The object was to cut Rosecrans off from all reinforcements. But Grant ordered Hurlbut and Ord to hurry down from Bolivar and attack Van Dorn's flank and rear. Van Dorn invested Corinth on the 3rd, driving Rosecrans within his fortifications, and on the 4th he made a furious attack upon this key to northern Mississippi and western Tennessee, which met with a bloody repulse, their loss being 1,400 killed and 2,225 prisoners. On their retreat they were struck by Ord and Hurlbut and their disaster was rendered final. Sherman estimated their entire loss at 6,000 killed, wounded and prisoners, Ord pursued the enemy with vigor, and at the Hatchie River caught up to them, capturing a battery and several hundred prisoners, and forcing them to make a wide detour in order to reach Holly Springs. Grant was as much displeased at Rosecrans, for his failure to pursue Van Dorn from Corinth, as he had been for his failure to beat Price at Iuka.

These two battles, Iuka and Corinth, relieved Grant's command of all immediate danger and recalled the atten-

tion of the Government again to this important field of operations. They in a measure retrieved the disasters in the East. Says Sherman: "The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great. It was indeed a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in west Tennessee. From the timid defensive we were at once enabled to assume the bold offensive. In Memphis I could see its effects upon the citizens, and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained a death blow. But the rebel government was then at its maximum strength. Van Dorn was reinforced, and soon General Pemberton arrived and assumed command, adopting for his line the Tallahatchie River, with his advance on the Cold Water, and detachments as far forward as Grand Junction and Hernando." Grant was also reinforced with new regiments, some of which were sent to Sherman at Memphis for drill and organization into brigades.

Though Grant did not receive all the credit that was due for these achievements, his fame was on the rise again, and his genius was ready for a new departure. In the latter part of October he broached to Halleck the importance of an offensive movement into Mississippi, with a view to the capture of Vicksburg.

When Sherman reached Memphis in July, 1862, he found business at a stand still. Stores, churches, schools were closed and the citizens hostile. He ordered all this changed and encouraged a brisk trade with the Mississippi boats, so that commercial activity was soon restored, and the cotton trade alone became immense. He had his difficulties about slaves, cotton ownership, and local government, which he settled according to his interpretation of the laws which should prevail amid arms. A sample of

his method of dealing with an abusive and treasonable press is apropos.

"HEADQUARTERS, Memphis, July 24, 1862.

"Samuel Sawyer, Esq.,

"Editor Union Appeal, Memphis.

"Dear Sir:—It is well I should come to an understanding at once with the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered to command; which means to control for the interest, welfare and glory of the *whole* Government of the United States.

"Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal. Thus, though you meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you make more than a dozen mistakes as to fact, which I need not correct, as I do not desire my biography to be written till after I am dead. It is enough for the world to know that I am a soldier, bound to obey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country and to venerate its constitution; and that when discretion is given me, I shall exercise it wisely, and account to my superiors.

"I regard your article headed "City Council, General Sherman and Colonel Slack," as highly indiscreet. Of course no person who can jeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much less exercise public authority; but I must take time and be satisfied that injustice be not done.

"If the parties named be the men you describe the fact should not be published, to put them on their guard and thus encourage their escape. The evidence should be carefully collected, authenticated and placed in my hands. But your statement of facts is entirely qualified in my mind and loses its force by your negligence of the very simple facts within your reach as to myself.

"I will attend to the judge, mayor, aldermen and police-

men all in good time. Use your influence to re-establish system, order, government. You may rest easy that no military commander is going to neglect internal safety or to guard against external danger; but to do right requires time and more patience than I possess. If I find the press of Memphis actuated by high principles and sole devotion to the country, I will be their best friend; but if I find it personal, abusive, dealing in inuendos and hints, looking to their own selfish aggrandizement and fame, then they had better look out, for I regard such persons as greater enemies to their country and mankind than the men who from a mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets and fight us about as hard as we care about.

"Yours,
"W. T. SHERMAN,
"Major General."

During Sherman's stay at Memphis he erected Fort Pickering, enforced drill and discipline, reorganized his division into six brigades:—Smith's First, McDowell's Second, Denver's Third, Stuart's Fourth, Buckland's Fifth and Lauman's Sixth. These were formed into three minor divisions of two brigades each, and became Smith's First Division, Denver's Second Division and Lauman's Third. He had these in the best possible order and fancied that no officer in the army could turn out so handsome and well drilled a division.

Halleck had not responded to Grant's proposition to take the offensive, so he considered silence as the equivalent of consent and mapped his southerly campaign against Pemberton, from Grand Junction. On November 15th he telegraphed Sherman to meet him in Columbus, Kentucky. At that meeting he explained to Sherman his proposed movement against Pemberton, then entrenched on the Tal-

lahatchie. He would move from Grand Junction on Abbeville and Holly Springs. McPherson would move from Corinth and aim to join him at Holly Springs. Sherman was to leave in Memphis a proper garrison, and march his main force to the line of the Tallahatchie so as to come in on his right. He gave it out that his object was to capture Vicksburg and open the Mississippi. In this move, he was at liberty to call on Curtis for co-operation. Curtis commanded in the Department of Arkansas. Sherman suggested that if Curtis were to dispatch a force from Helena toward Grenada and thus threaten Pemberton's rear, it might assist the proposed attack in front. Grant ordered Sherman to make an order to this effect, and in pursuance of it Hovey's command was sent from Helena toward Charleston on the Tallahatchie.

The reader ought now to understand the line of the Mississippi River. The Confederates early seized the important positions on this river. Columbus, Fort Pillow, Island No. 10, Vicksburg and Port Hudson were all strongly fortified. Columbus, Fort Pillow and Island No. 10, fell in the spring of 1862, but Vicksburg, situated at a remarkable bend and on high bluffs, was maintained and was regarded as impregnable—the "Gibraltar of America." After the capture of New Orleans in June, 1862, Farragut's fleet and William's army moved up the Mississippi River, 530 miles, to Vicksburg. The fleet bombarded the town without effect, but part of the fleet succeeded in running by the batteries. The troops did not attack, but were occupied several weeks in cutting a canal across the peninsula opposite the town. The proposition was to make a new channel for the river and leave Vicksburg an inland town. Heat, disease and high water killed off the men so fast and the work presented such insuperable obstacles, that the pro-

ject was abandoned, and Vicksburg still remained to control the "Father of Waters." It was therefore essential that it should fall. Toward Vicksburg every energy was turned. Its fall would let the waters of the great highway run unvexed to the sea.

The conclusion of Grant's interview with Sherman was, as already stated, that his movement had for its ultimate object the capture of Vicksburg. In pursuance of orders Sherman moved from Memphis on November 24th, 1862, leaving Hurlbut in command of the city with five regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry and one battery of artillery. Sherman marched with his three small divisions, by different roads, till the Tallahatchie's was approached. All the rest of Grant's columns had moved on time, and by the 29th Grant's cavalry had crossed the Tallahatchie and his headquarters were at Holly Springs. Sherman was up, and would cross the river at Wyatt. He had communicated with Grant, by means of his cavalry, at Holly Springs.

Sherman reached Wyatt on December 2nd, without opposition, and there learned that Pemberton's army had fallen back to the Yalabusha, near Grenada. This evacuation of the Tallahatchie fortifications was due to the exaggerated reports respecting Hovey's command, which had promptly appeared on Pemberton's rear and threatened his communications. Grant pushed directly to Oxford in pursuit. Sherman had to build a bridge at Wyatt which took two days, but by November 5th, his whole command was at College Hill, ten miles from Oxford, and he was in communication with Grant.

Pemberton was now at Grenada. Grant's cavalry were at Coffeeville, eighteen miles north. His entire force was at Oxford, twenty-eight miles north. This was December 5th. He feared to lengthen his line of communication, and

wrote Halleck that he thought it practicable to send General Sherman to move the Memphis and Helena forces to the south of the Yazoo and thus secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Pending an answer from Halleck, he sent for Sherman and they talked over the situation. Grant told him that large reinforcements would reach Memphis soon; that Porter would aid with his entire gunboat fleet; that Helena could supply a full division of troops; and he believed that he (Sherman) could make a point somewhere on the Yazoo and capture Vicksburg. If Pemberton should retreat south, Grant would follow him up and finally join Sherman near or, perhaps, within Vicksburg.

After this talk, Grant dispatched to Halleck that Sherman would command the expedition down the Mississippi, with 40,000 men, would land above Vicksburg, or up the Yazoo, cut the Mississippi Central railroad, and that he (Grant) would co-operate from where he was (Oxford). Grant drew up full instructions for Sherman and presented them to him. All this was done without knowledge of the fact that McClernand was using his influence at Washington to get command of an expedition with precisely the same object in view, viz: the capture of Vicksburg. Grant's instructions to Sherman were to go to Memphis, taking along one of his present divisions, assume command of all the troops there, including Curtis' forces then east of the Mississippi, organize them into brigades and divisions as if of his own army, and move as soon as possible down the river to a point above Vicksburg, and with Porter's coöperation proceed to the reduction of that place. Grant's object in hurrying Sherman to Memphis was to anticipate the possible appointment of McClernand to the very expedition he had planned for Sherman. But with all his hurry he was too late. The Washington machine, even in spite

of Halleck, had ordered that McClernand should have a command in the expedition against Vicksburg. Grant was ordered to divide his command into four army corps and assign one to McClernand. He informed McClernand of this and ordered him to report at Memphis.

Sherman meanwhile had arrived in Memphis (December 12th), and began immediately the Vicksburg movement. He formed and organized three divisions, the First, Gen'l A. J. Smith; Second, Gen'l Morgan; Third, Gen'l M. L. Smith, and sent word to Gorman to make up a strong division at Helena, which became his Fourth Division under Steele. Admiral Porter dropped down from Memphis with his whole gunboat fleet and was ready to co-operate. Preparations were hasty, but the expedition was to be in the nature of a surprise, while Grant held Pemberton at Grenada. By the 19th, the Memphis troops were embarked. By the 21st Helena was reached and Steele's division was taken aboard. By the 22d the troops and fleet rendezvoused at Friar's Point, and Sherman issued formal instructions to army and navy, how to proceed and how to coöperate. On the 25th, Christmas day, Milliken's Bend was reached, and Smith's division was landed and ordered to march inland and break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg to Shreveport, La. He sent the other three divisions by boat up the Yazoo, with orders to land at Johnson's plantation, thirteen miles from the mouth of the river. All were then ordered to make their way toward Hayne's Bluff, by such roads and approaches as could be found. The way was difficult, being through swamps and bayous, some fordable and some having to be bridged. Haine's Bluff was the northern-most of the Vicksburg range of bluffs, and was heavily fortified, being the key to the Vicksburg right.

Sherman advanced his men over obstacles of every kind,

and in the face of an almost constant skirmish fire from the enemy, until he came within range of the guns on the fortifications. Here it took intricate and tedious manoeuvering to pass the obstacle presented by the last bayou, the Chickasaw. But by the morning of the 29th, all were in position and ready to make a lodgment on the foot-hills ahead of them. The First Division was to make a diversion directly on Vicksburg, while the navy was to play on Haine's Bluff He estimated that the entire Confederate forces then in front of him were about 15,000 men, under Luther Smith and S. D. Lee.

At noon on December 29th, Sherman gave his orders for attack. Morgan was to lead his division in person and Steele was to support him. Sherman's artillery opened along the whole line, and the Confederate artillery replied. Soon the infantry opened fire, and one brigade of Morgan's command crossed the intervening bayou, but soon took the cover of the banks and could not be moved. Blair's brigade of Steele's division got across the bayou and reached the foot-hills, but being unsupported, and meeting with a withering artillery fire, fell back, leaving 500 men behind. Other brigades took wrong directions and did not cross the bayou at all. The attack failed, and the situation was so critical that Sherman could not get his men off the field till darkness afforded a cover for his movements.

Sherman determined, at first, to renew the assault, but on second thought, gave it up, and looked for another point below the bluff. He found one at Blake's plantation. Porter undertook to cover the landing there with his gunboats. Everything was in readiness for a landing and a dash for the hills, when a dense fog fell on the scene, precluding further operations. It had been raining incessantly and the waters were ten feet above their ordinary level. It

became the part of wisdom to withdraw. The sound of engine whistles in Vicksburg told that reinforcements were coming to the enemy. The withdrawal took place on January 1st, and on the 2nd Sherman had all his forces on board the boats and was on his way to the mouth of the Yazoo. He had listened long and in vain for the sound of Grant's guns in the direction of Yazoo City, or some point in the rear. He retired, disappointed at not having gained the key to Vicksburg, yet he had contributed his share to the carrying out of those broad designs which he and Grant had approved in their Oxford camp.

Sherman's return to the mouth of the Yazoo brought him face to face with McClernand, who had just arrived from Washington. He was thunder-struck when McClernand read to him orders from the War Department, authorizing him (McClernand) to the command of the expeditionary force on the Mississippi. Sherman explained to him what he had been doing, how he had been coöperating with Grant, and how he expected that Grant would soon be in the rear of Vicksburg. McClernand told him that Grant need not be expected in that direction, that he had been driven back from Coffeeville and Oxford to Holly Springs. Sherman could then explain why Vicksburg had been reinforced, and he fell back at once to Milliken's Bend, ten miles above. But he did not as yet have the light on the appointment of McClernand that Grant had, within a few days after issuing his orders to Sherman.

On December 20th the enemy's cavalry dashed into Holly Springs, twenty-eight miles in Grant's rear, and captured the garrison and stores. Forrest pushed his cavalry to the railroad between Jackson and Columbus and cut it at several places. This shut Grant's supplies off, though he had striven hard to prevent just such a catastrophe. He

was forced to retreat from the line of the Tallahatchie, and in giving up he sent word to Halleck that the line of communication was too long to warrant a rear movement on Vicksburg from the north, but that he should send reinforcements to Memphis, and he (Grant) would command the Mississippi expedition in person. This was not in derogation of Sherman's command, but because he knew that McClernand was to supersede Sherman. On this retreat Grant learned a new point of war. His supplies were gone, and he was forced to live off the country. He fared better than he expected, and afterwards declared that if he had known an army could be subsisted in this way with so much comfort he would have given up the idea of preserving his communications, and would have moved on to the rear of Vicksburg as he had at first designed.

On December 23d, Grant was back at Holly Springs. He had sent Sherman word of his change of base, but it had not been received. Though Sherman was censured for his failure by the reckless correspondents and by some envious officers, Grant gave him full credit for a skillful and tenacious trial, and took especial pains to designate in his report of the operations the intricate and treacherous nature of the section Sherman was called upon to traverse. Sherman almost congratulated himself on his defeat, for he grimly asked, "What would have become of us if we had succeeded with Grant far away and Pemberton's reinforcements pouring into Vicksburg. It would have been sure capture or death to all of us."

The situation was now a peculiar one. McClernand held full authority from Washington to command the Mississippi expeditionary force. Sherman could not but obey him. Grant was in command of the Department, and he was where he could not be heard from. Yet he had already

planned another move on Vicksburg. Sherman's mind, too, was active. He proposed to McClernand that while waiting for further orders from Grant, the expeditionary force should ascend the Arkansas fifty miles, and capture Arkansas Post, then held by 5,000 Confederates, and a point whence issued craft which endangered the Union fleet. McClernand acquiesced, and embarked his whole army on transports, Sherman commanding his Second and Morgan his First Corps. Porter piloted them up the Arkansas with his gunboats, and bombarded the fort for several days. The army disembarked and took position so as to reach the flank and rear of the enemy's position. On January 11th, the forces were in place and well up under the fortifications. Porter was ordered to open fire, which was the signal for an assault all along the Union lines. Sherman moved his lines with great regularity over the intervening spaces and in the face of a heavy fire. As they approached the parapets a white flag appeared and the order "cease firing" was given. The token of surrender was followed by the appearance of the respective brigades within the fort, who were ordered to "stack arms." The surrender was complete, and netted 4,791 prisoners, with a loss of several hundred killed and wounded. Sherman's losses were four officers and seventy-five men killed, thirty-four officers and four hundred and six men wounded. The losses in Morgan's corps were less. McClernand remained on the steamer Tigress during all the time of this battle and capture, but he was very willing to rejoice over results and claim the honors that were really due, for it was a creditable affair throughout, and a very bright conception on Sherman's part, not only because it removed a rearward menace, but because it kept the men active and gave them

an opportunity to recover from the effects of their defeat in the Yazoo bayous.

The fort was dismantled, the stores were removed, and on January 13th, 1863, the troops were re-embarked. They arrived at Milliken's Bend on January 21st, where they awaited the arrival of Grant, who had already determined to abandon the line on the interior south of Corinth, and turn his entire attention to the capture of Vicksburg in some other direction. On January 29th, he arrived at Young's Point, near the mouth of the Yazoo, and on the 30th assumed command of the expedition against Vicksburg. McClernard protested against this, but Grant was the department commander and protest proved in vain.

In the reduction of Arkansas Post, Sherman was fortunate in having the coöperation of so energetic, valiant and original a naval officer as Commander Porter. There were many similarities in their characters and methods. Both lived to ripe ages, and to enjoy the repose of peace for years after they had fought their battles and earned their fame. Both found a deep place in the affections of their countrymen. They died within two days of each other, and the nation shed the tears of a double sorrow over their biers.

David Dixon Porter, Admiral Commanding the United States Navy, died at his home in Washington, D. C., on the morning of February 13th, 1891: Sherman passed away at a little after noon of February 14th, in his New York home.

Admiral Porter was born at Chester, Pa., June, 8, 1813, and was fourth son of the famous old Commodore David Porter, the Francis Drake of the American Navy, who, as commander of the Essex in the war of 1812, was a greater terror to the merchant navy of England than was ever the

pirate Alabama and Raphael Semmes to the commerce of this nation during the Rebellion.

Five generations of the Porter family served in the American marine. Alexander Porter was captain of a Boston merchant ship. His son David commanded the Delight and the Aurora in the Revolutionary War. At one time he was confined on the old prison ship Jersey, and after the war he was made a sailing master in the United States Navy. David's sons, John and David, were both in the navy. The former reached the grade of Commander, and the latter was that renowned commodore whose services in the naval war with France, with Tripoli, and finally with Great Britain, are lustrous in naval annals. His son was the subject of our sketch.

At the age of eleven, we find the young Porter sailing after pirates in the West Indies with his father. The latter, through a conflict with some of the local authorities, incurred certain penalties at the hands of the home government, and was suspended for six months. Smarting under this punishment the father entered the navy of Mexico, at that time struggling against Spain for independence, and the lad was made a midshipman in the Mexican service.

Under his cousin, Capt. David H. Porter, who had also gone from our navy to that of Mexico, David D. Porter cruised against the commerce of Spain, discovered and suppressed a mutiny, and did some excellent service. The climax of his career in the Mexican service was reached when Captain Porter, in command of the armed brig Guerrere off Cuba, attacked two Spanish war vessels convoying a fleet of merchantmen. The noise of the battle brought out the sixty-four-gun frigate Leander, and, after a desperate fight, the Guerrere was captured. Captain Porter and

eighty of his crew were killed, and the young midshipman was taken prisoner. He was then fourteen years old.

Young Porter's capture by the Spanish sailors led to his restoration to the United States Navy. For a time he was imprisoned in the guard ship at Havana, but he was soon released and made his way back to the United States by way of Vera Cruz. February 2nd, 1829, he re-entered the United States Navy as midshipman, and in the same year his father also resigned from the Mexican service.

To February 27th, 1841, he spent twelve years in the Mediterranean and on coast survey duty. In the Mexican War he took part in every naval engagement fought. During the year following that war he was on furlough and commanded merchant vessels in the Isthmus trade, running out of New York. Among his exploits at this time was that of running the steamer Crescent City into the harbor of Havana during the excitement relative to the ship Black Warrior. The Spanish Government had refused to permit any United States vessel to enter that port. Running under the shotted guns of Moro Castle, Porter was ordered to halt. He replied that he carried the United States flag and the United States mail, and he would go in. And he did.

Lieutenant Porter began his career in the Rebellion by taking command of the Powhatan of the Gulf squadron, where his vessel blockaded the Southwest Pass. He was promoted to the rank of commander from April 22, 1861. When it was resolved to attack New Orleans Porter reported to Farragut with a fleet of twenty-one mortar schooners, each carrying a 13 inch mortar, besides five war steamers as convoys. The land forces coöperated under the command of General Butler.

With this formidable fleet of mortar vessels, in the spring

of 1862 Farragut and Porter began their memorable attack on Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the river defenses of New Orleans. For six days and nights, from April 18th to April 24th, Porter bombarded the forts, throwing 16,800 shells at the enemy's works. Then occurred the famous river fight and the running of the forts by Farragut's fleet. After the latter went up to New Orleans the forts surrendered (April 28th) to Commodore Porter, whose flotilla had been left below.

The next conspicuous service of Commander Porter was performed soon after, in the operations of the Mississippi between New Orleans and Vicksburg. "The mortar flotilla," wrote Farragut in his official report, June 30, 1862, "have never done better service than at Vicksburg." In fact, its bombardment of the forts enabled Farragut's fleet to run by them. In July of that year Commander Porter was ordered to take his mortar fleet to Fortress Monroe, and then received the command of the Mississippi squadron as acting rear admiral, September, 1862. This force was increased from a dozen vessels to many times that number by putting guns and protective armor on the ordinary river boats.

Taking eight of these vessels, early in 1863, he coöperated with General Sherman in the reduction of Arkansas Post, silencing the fort by the heavy fire of his sixty-six guns and knocking the bomb-proofs to pieces. Returning to Vicksburg, where Grant was operating, on the night of April 16th, he ran the batteries with his fleet, leading off in his flagship, the Benton, and, although every vessel was struck by the fire from the forts, little damage was done. Being now south of Vicksburg, Porter attacked Grand Gulf in connection with Grant's army, bringing to bear eighty-one pieces of artillery and silencing the batteries.

His fleet, however, suffered not a little in this engagement, the Benton, for example, being struck forty-seven times and losing twenty-six men. When Vicksburg finally surrendered, Commander Porter received the thanks of Congress for his services and also a commission as rear admiral.

One more great exploit was to crown the admiral's career. Toward the close of the year 1864, having been put in command of the North Atlantic blockading squadron, he was ordered to coöperate with a land force commanded by General Butler to reduce Fort Fisher and the other works on Cape Fear River preparatory to capturing Wilmington. The troops were sent on transports, and on Christmas eve Admiral Porter began a tremendous bombardment from thirty-five vessels, five of which were ironclads, holding nineteen others in reserve. In a little over an hour the forts were silenced. Still, General Butler did not consider the works substantially injured, and concluded, after a reconnoissance, that they could not be carried by assault. He therefore returned with his command to Hampton Roads. Admiral Porter asked for a renewal of the attempt, which was granted, with General Terry in command of the troops.

January 13th and 14th Porter resumed the attack, and early in the morning of the 15th, with forty-four vessels in a curved line, besides fourteen held in reserve, he opened a tremendous fire with careful aiming, taking the transverses in order and dismounting the guns between them. The result was that the infantry were driven to their bombproofs, gun after gun was silenced, and so many of them were dismounted that, at the time fixed for the assault in the afternoon, there were few to be feared. Then a land attack was made, and after several hours of hard



ADMIRAL PORTER.

fighting Fort Fisher was captured by General Terry. For this brilliant assault 1,400 sailors and 500 marines had been landed, and they all took part in the action. Once more Congress gave Porter a vote of thanks.

After the war, when the grades of General and Lieutenant General were awarded to Grant and Sherman, those of Admiral and Vice Admiral were given to Farragut and Porter, dating from July, 1866. On Farragut's death, Porter was made Admiral of the Navy, August 15, 1870, and it was provided that the grade should lapse when he should cease to hold it. Meanwhile, as Vice Admiral, he had been made Superintendent of the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

The twenty-one years through which Admiral Porter held his high grade were years of peace. A part of his leisure time was devoted to literature, he being the author of "A Life of Commodore David Porter," a novel called "Allen Dare and Robert le Diable," "Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War," "Harry Martine," and a "History of the Navy in the War of the Rebellion." He also wrote several valuable reports, and his essays and testimony before committees of Congress showed a vigorous and progressive interest in the problems of national defense and naval construction.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG.

After the fall of Arkansas Post, Sherman's expedition rendezvoused at Napoleon, January 18th, 1863. Grant came down from Memphis, in person, to interview Sherman. He had the investment and capture of Vicksburg fully in mind, and designed to make a passage up and down the Mississippi, past the Vicksburg fortifications, by a second effort to cut the canal across the Penninsula. There was still a conflict of authority and some feeling between Grant and McClernand, but a vast majority of the officers recognized the rectitude of Grant's claims, by virtue of his general command of the Department of the Tennessee. In December, 1862, the Western armies had been formed into five groups or corps. The command of the Thirteenth had been given to McClernand; the Fourteenth to Thomas; the Fifteenth to Sherman; the Sixteenth to Hurlbut; the Seventeenth to McPherson; the last two being at and back of Memphis.

After consulting with Sherman, at Napoleon, General Grant ordered Sherman's and McClernand's Corps to Vicksburg to resume work on the canal, and repaired thither himself to superintend operations. The work before these two corps was most difficult owing to continuous high water. Ere anything satisfactory was reached, Sherman received orders from Grant to report to him at Milliken's Bend. He went and was informed that Grant deemed Vicksburg approachable by way of the Yazoo River, if the bayous leading into it could be threaded. He had tried Steele's Bayou with five

gunboats and found no obstruction except fallen trees. He therefore ordered Sherman to test the feasibility of getting an army through to the Yazoo, and to draw on his own corps for sufficient force to remove all obstructions and hold all available points. He supplied him with two steamers and promised to send him as many additional ones as he might need.

This was really Grant's first move on Vicksburg, and in view of its importance he chose for its leader one whom he thought best fitted for the hazardous enterprise. Sherman started up the Bayou with the Eighth Missouri, who were watermen, and with a full supply of axes and tools for removing obstructions. Sixty miles up, he met Lieutenant Woodworth with the gunboat Price, and then turned into Black Bayou, up which Admiral Porter had pushed some gunboats, amid the thickest kind of obstructions. At Deer Creek he met Admiral Porter, who thought he would be able to make his way to the Rolling Fork and Sunflower. Sherman returned to Black Bayou, and disposed his forces so as to clear the obstructions. He ordered up two additional regiments. On March 19th, Porter was attacked by the enemy and sent for Sherman to come to his rescue. He immediately dispatched some 800 men to Porter's aid, and sent word that he would follow with all the forces he could gather. Following the sound of Porter's guns, the forces made their way through water and cane brakes to the rescue. Coming upon the enemy, mostly sharp shooterswho were picking off Porter's men from the gunboats, they were dispersed, and Porter felt greatly relieved. But inasmuch as his aims were now known and a force of the enemy had really passed below him for the purpose of felling trees and cutting off his retreat, he deemed it best to back down the bayou with his boats

covered by Sherman's troops. This failure to reach the Yazoo above Haine's Bluff was a disappointment to Grant. He ordered the troops back to Young's Point, which they reached on the 27th of March.

On April 3rd, 1863, the Third Division under General Tuttle was assigned to Sherman's corps. The corps now comprised three divisions commanded by Generals Steele, Blair and Tuttle. At this date it became apparent that the effort to divert the Mississippi through the canal was a failure, and equally, that to gain Haine's Bluff by way of the Yazoo was impossible. There was much speculation among army commanders as to what should be done next. Sherman favored a land movement in the rear of Vicksburg, by way of Oxford and Grenada, to be coöperated with by the gunboats on the river. But Grant would take no backward step, and concluded on a river movement below Vicksburg, so as to make it a diversion in favor of General Banks, then besieging Port Hudson.

While these experiments were being tried, Farragut had succeeded in running part of his fleet past the fortifications of Port Hudson, and in communicating with Grant. Through Farragut, Banks was also communicated with. He was then pushing his Red River expedition with a large army, and with a view to the capture of Port Hudson, under the coöperation of Farragut. It seemed to be the sentiment of Halleck, that Grant having exhausted his genius and the patience of the authorities, in his efforts to reach Vicksburg, should go the help of Banks, and make Port Hudson the objective of the combined armies. Then, communications down the Mississippi being open, a northward movement of the combined armies might effect the reduction of Vicksburg. But Grant regarded the distance between the two armies as too great, and the intermediate

obstacles as too insurmountable, to make this combination, practicable. He was once more suffering from political clamor. Vicious correspondents were reviving their old slanders. All the McClernand influence was against him. The cry went up in Washington for his removal. Lincoln said: "I rather like the man. I think we'll try him a little longer." Rosecrans had gotten no further than Murfreesborough, Tenn., in his efforts against Bragg. Banks had achieved no military results with his mammoth expedition. Burnside had met with disaster at Fredericksburg. Grant's efforts on Grenada, up the Yazoo, and to canal the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, had all failed. There had really been nothing to relieve the gloom of the country since Corinth and Iuka. The swamps, the intricate bayous, the sickly climate, the rains, the high waters, indeed entire nature seemed to conspire with the Confederates on the line of the Mississippi and to mock the genius of the Union generals and the strength of the Union forces.

Sherman had taken occasion to put his views of the capture of Vicksburg, by a rear movement, starting from Memphis and carried down to the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha, on paper, and to submit them to Col. Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff. His letter was able and showed that he had good military reasons for his convictions. It was most courteous in tone and its conclusion ran: "I make these suggestions with the request that General Grant simply read them and give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I prefer he should not answer them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they deserve. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous coöperation and energetic support as though I had conceived it myself."

As already said, Grant had determined on his move to

the south of Vicksburg, and nothing shook his plans. He found no more faithful and able subordinate than Sherman, who merged all conceptions in those of his superior, and fought the harder to convert them into success. Grant's first grand step was to throw all of his army below Vicksburg. In the last week in March, 1863, he ordered all his forces to concentrate at Milliken's Bend on the west side of the Mississippi, above Vicksburg. McPherson's corps came thither from Lake Providence and Sherman's from Steele's Bayou. McClernand's corps was already there. Hurlbut's corps was stripped of all its strength, except what was barely necessary for a rear guard. Boats and floats of every kind were collected from Cairo and St. Louis.

On March 29th, McClernand was ordered to move by way of Richmond to New Carthage, twenty-seven miles below, and on the west bank of the river. Sherman and McPherson were to follow, as fast as rations and supplies arrived. The roads were low and much overflowed, and the march was slow, but New Carthage was occupied on April 6th. It was soon surrounded by water, and the remainder of Grant's columns were forced to rendezvous at Perkins's, twelve miles below, which point they only reached by a continuation of boat bridges across bayous and overflowed flats.

At this juncture Grant started Grierson, with 1,700 cavalry, on that memorable raid from La Grange, during which he traversed the entire State of Mississippi, destroying the main lines of railroad leading to Vicksburg, and arriving at Baton Rouge, La., with 500 prisoners, having lost but three killed and seven wounded of his own men. Grant ordered this raid not more as a diversion in favor of his own contemplated movement to the south of Vicksburg,

than as a test of the ability of an army to live off the country, and of his theory that the interior of the Confederacy had been weakened by the gradual forcing of its strength to the exterior.

When the Mississippi army was once below Vicksburg, its greatest need would be for boats and barges with which to cross to the east bank of the river. It was determined to run these past the Vicksburg batteries. Volunteers went up from the army, and numerous steamers were manned, each protected by cotton bales and wet hay, and each having in tow a line of transports and barges. While seven of Porter's iron clads engaged the Vicksburg batteries, these steamers were to run the gauntlet of the twenty-eight heavy guns which commanded the river for a distance of fifteen miles. The night of April 16th was selected for the perilous undertaking. Porter led the way, and at eleven o'clock his first gunboat was discovered oppposite the first battery, which instantly opened fire. Porter responded and instantly his whole fleet opened a terrific fire. The steamers with their long tows hugged the Louisiana shore and steamed ahead with all their force. The night was dark, and the Confederates set fire to houses in Vicksburg so as to illuminate the river. This brought the respective steamers into view and each became a target for the enemy's shot. There was a terrible wreckage of vessels and their tows. Those which caught fire were cut loose and permitted to float away with the current. Every steamer was struck, and those entirely disabled and which could be reached by boats below, were taken in tow and drawn out of reach of the destructive shots. One transport, the Henry Clay, having in tow a large barge filled with soldiers, took fire and burned to the water's edge. As she floated helplessly with the current, General Sher-

man, who was watching the bombardment in a small boat, picked up the pilot as he floated by on the blazing wreck. The burning vessels helped the aim of the enemy, whose fire grew more intense as they saw that the desperate undertaking was about to prove, in part at least, successful. The commingled smoke and flame on the river, the glare of the burning buildings on the bluffs, the belching of heavy guns from the batteries and the bursting of shells over the water and the craft, the terrific responses from Porter's gunboats, made up a scene of appalling grandeur, and one without parallel in the annals of warfare. This terrific ordeal lasted for over two hours and a half, when the vessels passed one by one beyond the range of the shore batteries. Porter came out of the fire with all his gunboats, and but few of the steamers were damaged beyond repair. The loss of life was insignificant. Sherman's part in this undertaking was, on his own responsibility, to have four yawl boats hauled across the swamp to the reach of the river below Vicksburg, and manned with soldiers ready to pick up the wrecks which might float by. He was in midstream when the fleet was making its perilous trip, and he describes the scene as sublime.

The army below Vicksburg had now the support of a gunboat fleet, and all the steamers, transports and barges necessary for the operations which had been mapped for McClernand's corps. Grant ordered McClernand to move at once on Grand Gulf and capture the place. But this officer delayed the movement. Porter grew impatient and requested Sherman to ask Grant to come down in person to the front to examine the situation for himself. Sherman sent the request, and though Grant was sick, he rode from Milliken's Bend, forty miles, in one day and reached Perkins's at night. He was astounded to find that McCler-

nand had been wasting so much precious time, and became convinced of the fact that McClernand was not the man to command his advance column. It was then that he determined to take command in person and remain with the advance. He made a hasty return to Milliken's Bend to hasten the advance of McPherson's corps, and came back to share the fortunes of the army, in person.

On the night of April 26th, six other transports ran the Vicksburg batteries, with twelve barges laden with forage and rations. With these Grant hoped to be able to embark his entire army at Perkins's, but they proved inadequate, and he was forced to march to Hard Times, twenty miles further down, over a water laden road and through deep channels. The Thirteenth Corps arrived there on April 29th and was followed by the others. Sherman's Fifteenth, arrived on May 6th. Grant had prospected the eastern shore and found that there was but one point between Grand Gulf and Warrenton where a good road led to the bluffs, and that it was protected by the enemy's fortifications. He therefore determined to make a direct attack on Grand Gulf, which was protected by a series of rifle trenches and two batteries of thirteen heavy guns. The gunboats would attack and silence the batteries, and the troops would land and storm the works. Ten thousand of the Thirteenth Corps, (McClernand's) were put on transports and moved to a point just out of range of the Grand Gulf batteries. On the morning of April 29th, Porter was in position and began the bombardment, keeping it up for over five hours and frequently running his vessels close up to the batteries. He could inflict but little damage on account of the elevation of the batteries, and in return he received but little damage. He had demonstrated the futility of further firing and so withdrew.

Grant was disappointed, but on conferring with Porter, it was agreed to run past the batteries that night, disembark the troops on the transports at Hard Times, and march them thence to De Shroon's, three miles below. Porter ran his fleet by without much damage and on the morning of the 30th was at De Shroon's, ready to take the entire Thirteenth Corps aboard, if necessary. Another prospecting tour on the east bank revealed a good road from Bruinsburg, six miles below Grand Gulf, to Port Gibson, twelve miles inland and on high ground.

It ought not to be omitted that while Grant was operating here, he had intrusted to Sherman a most delicate operation on the north of Vicksburg and up the Yazoo. It was not only delicate as a military operation, but was particularly delicate as to Sherman's military reputation, for he had been over the Yazoo ground twice without success, and the operation proposed was in no sense to be a success, except in so far as the good results of a feint might follow. The operation was a diversion on Haine's Bluff, simultaneous with the attack on Grand Gulf. Grant expressed his unwillingness to place Sherman where he might draw criticism, yet such was his confidence in him that he said he had no other man to whom he felt like entrusting this operation. Sherman replied, "I believe the diversion at Haine's Bluff is proper and right and will make it, let whatever report of repulses be made." He accordingly (April 29th) moved ten regiments on transports up the Yazoo, made a mock disposition for attack and succeeded in drawing a heavy fire from the batteries upon both the land and naval forces. He kept this up for two days, causing great anxiety in Vicksburg and many changes of troops. The demonstration answered every purpose for which it was made, and Sherman retired without loss. On with-

drawing from the Yazoo, he marched this part of his corps directly to Perkins's and to Hard Times, where as already stated he arrived on May 6th.

On April 29th, Grant landed his advance corps (the Thirteenth) at Bruinsburg, on the east shore of the Mississippi, and on the morning of the 30th its advance, supplied with three days' rations, was moved two and a half miles inland. The Seventeenth Corps was ferried across as quickly as possible. By night the entire Thirteenth Corps and part of the Seventeenth were firmly established on Mississippi soil, and McClernand was well on his way to surprise Port Gibson, twelve miles inland and at the junction of the road leading to Grand Gulf, and also out to Jackson, the capital of the State. Port Gibson once in his possession, Grand Gulf would be turned and its evacuation become necessary. Well had he telegraphed Halleck, on landing at Bruinsburg, that he "now regarded half the battle as over."

When eight miles from Bruinsburg McClernand struck the enemy (May 1st), posted in force and ready for defence, in a country admirably fitted for that purpose. McClernand hastened up his rear divisions and developed his force, throwing Hovey, Carr and H. J. Smith to his right and Osterhaus to his left. In a short time the whole force was engaged with artillery and musketry. Grant heard the firing at Bruinsburg and immediately started for the front, where he assumed entire command. McClernand's right was driving the enemy, but Osterhaus was making no headway, though fighting vigorously. A part of McPherson's corps was up, and two brigades of Logan's division were sent to help Osterhaus. The battle raged thus for two hours, when McPherson reached the field with the remainder of his corps. The left was the pivotal point.

McPherson threw J. E. Smith's brigade in on Osterhaus' left, and both Grant and McPherson accompanied the movement, whose object was to over-reach and turn the Confederate right. It was a grand success. The Confederates were completely flanked, and by sunset their entire lines had been doubled up and swept away. They retreated toward Port Gibson, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. They were pursued to within two miles of Port Gibson, when night called a halt and the Union troops slept on their arms, with orders to renew the attack in the early morning. The Union losses in the battle of Port Gibson were 130 killed and 718 wounded. That of the enemy was about the same. Grant captured over 600 prisoners. The move from Bruinsburg had been a surprise, for Bowen, the Confederate general, said he had only been able to get two brigades down from Vicksburg in time to participate in the fight.

During the night the Confederates evacuated Post Gibson and crossed the Bayou Pierre, burning the bridges. Early next morning (May 2nd,) the Union troops entered Port Gibson, flushed with victory and eager for further fight. Grant ordered McClernand to repair the bridges, and McPherson to pursue. The pursuit was active and unremitting for fifteen miles, to Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big Black River, fifteen miles from Port Gibson. Several hundred prisoners were captured. This was May 3d. This rapid and successful movement forced the evacuation of Grand Gulf, and Grant rode into the town to find that Porter had preceded him by a few hours, and had already landed a a navel force in the stronghold.

Sherman was, all this time, pushing his corps from Millikin's Bend toward Perkins's. Grant sent him a detailed account of the situation, with orders to join him by the

best means at his command, and wound up with the laconic remark: "The road to Vicksburg is open." Grant's situation was now such that he could not think of sparing troops for Banks. The decisive battle for Vicksburg must be fought in a few days, and he would have need of every resource. He had word that the Confederate General Johnston had arrived at Jackson, and that reinforcements were pouring in to that point. There was therefore more propriety in Banks coming to his rescue, than in his going to Banks's rescue. He felt moreover that the enemy in his front were greatly demoralized, and therefore the proper one to attack. The fall of Grand Gulf, and the victory at Port Gibson had inspired his own men. He ought to take advantage of that inspiration then and there, and not dissipate it by a long backward march into the unknown.

Perhaps no army was ever more peculiarly situated than Grant's at this juncture. He was within fifteen miles of Warrenton, the southern extension of the Vicksburg fortifications. Pemberton's command in and about Vicksburg, and along the line of railroad to Jackson, numbered 50,000 men. Gregg was rapidly forming an army at Jackson, to coöperate with Pemberton. If they were permitted to unite forces, they would outnumber and crush Grant. He could defeat Gregg before Pemberton came to the rescue, but in so doing he would be venturing between two armies, and even if Pemberton did not attack in his rear, he could at least destroy his communications. So he could attack Pemberton and drive him into Vicksburg, but this would be to leave Gregg in the open country and hovering on his rear. One or the other of these armies must be crushed separately. Grant decided that it should be Gregg's, and in order to settle the matter of danger to his communications, he determined to cut aloof from Grand

Gulf and depend on the country for supplies. The army was to become its own base of operations. This determination was reached in the face of a howl from Washington to go to the aid of Banks, and to make Grand Gulf a base of operations against Port Hudson, and in spite of the persuasions against it of most of his subordinates. At midnight of May 3d, he started to the front at Hankinson's ferry, leaving orders for Sherman to cross as quickly as possible to Grand Gulf, and prepare for the march, and for all of the available troops to be hurried down and across the Mississippi.

On May 4th, Grant ordered McClernand and McPherson to make extensive reconnoisances. On the 7th McPherson moved a division to Rocky Springs, ten miles from Hankinson's, and Grant took up his headquarters there. On the 8th Sherman came up to Hankinson's with his corps, having crossed the Mississipppi and marched eighteen miles, in forty-eight hours. He was surprised at the situation when he arrived. It was cramped and confused, and he wrote Grant to "stop the incoming of further troops till his army was supplied with wagons, and then to act as quickly as possible, for this road will be jammed as sure as life, if you attempt to supply 50,000 men by one single road." The reply was, "I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance. We started from Bruinsburg with two days' rations, and received no more for some days. Abundance was found in the meantime—corn meal, bacon, vegetables, and abundance of beef and mutton. A delay now would give the enemy time to reinforce. If Blair were up I be-

lieve we could enter Vicksburg in seven days. You are where the troops have lived off the people and may find a scarcity of provisions, but as we get on new soil corn and cattle will be more abundant. Bring Blair's two brigades as soon as possible."

Grant had not imparted his purposes, except in this way. Their very originality and audacity excited admiration and there was hardly a general but who said "Well, he's worth sticking to at any rate. If this wins all our fortunes are made." The army being now well in hand, a forward movement began, McPherson holding the left nearest Black River, McClernand the right, and Sherman following by two roads. At Rocky Springs Grant heard that the Confederates were fortifying at Edward's Station on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad. He at once changed the position of his corps. McPherson and Sherman were to hug the Big Black and strike the railroad at Bolton, east of Edward's Station. Sherman was to remain there while McPherson tore up the railroad as far as Jackson and then return. This would enable Grant to avoid a battle at Edward's Station, and at the same time would sever the Jackson and Vicksburg Confederates. Both Sherman and McPherson fell to this design with alacrity. McClernand was thrown to the left, and on the 9th of May marched to the Big Sandy river. McPherson marched to within seven miles of Utica, Sherman moving on the same general front. Grant's position now was with Sherman's centre. He had 40,000 men in motion, with 120 artillery guns. The movement continued, varied to suit circumstances, till May 12, when it came within two miles of Raymond. Here McPherson unearthed the enemy, 5,000 strong. The fight for Raymond must now take place. McPherson deployed, and the battle began. The enemy stood fire for a brief time and then

fled through Raymond, which was entered by the Union troops at 5 P. M. McPherson lost 69 killed and 341 wounded, while the enemy lost 100 killed, 305 wounded and 415 prisoners.

Pemberton fell to Grant's original idea of marching on Edward's Station, and was completely deceived by his deflection eastward to Raymond. Grant's way to Jackson was clear. He ordered McPherson to throw back a column to meet Sherman at Fourteen Mile Creek, and McClernand to throw forward one till Sherman was touched. The troops were now in contact, the marching was difficult, the fields were robbed of corn and the mills brought into requisition to grind, and the ambulances were turned into ammunition wagons.

On the 13th, Johnston took command in Jackson, whence the beaten Confederates at Raymond had fled. Grant's orders for the 13th were that McPherson should march to Clinton, Sherman was to follow closely, and McClernand to follow Sherman. It was well that the movement was thus prompt for Johnston had 10,000 men at Jackson and expected 13,000 more in a few days. Grant had kept up a feint against Edward's Station in order to deceive Pemberton as to his designs on Jackson, but Johnston saw through the design and ordered Pemberton to attack Grant in the rear at Clinton.

McPherson reached Clinton at 2 P. M. and tore up the railroads and bridges. Sherman was ordered to take the direct road from Raymond to Jackson. McClernand was ordered to fall down to Raymond with all his corps, except a brigade or two to keep up the appearance of an attack on Edward's Station, and to be in readiness to aid either Sherman or McPherson.

On the 14th McPherson was ordered to move at day-


WALNUT BLUFFS
REDOUBT
REDAN
N E BASTION
OUTWORKS
ABATTIS
MISSISSIPPI RIVER
VICKSBURG
DE SOTO
TEXAS RAIL ROAD
FERRY
RIFLE PITS
REDAN
MAIN FORT
ABATTIS
VICKSB: JACKSON R.R.
LUNETTE
INNER WORKS
REDOUBT
OUTWORKS
REDAN
ABATTIS
MILES
FANCY POINT
BAYOU SARA
THOMPSONS B
FOSTERS
C. CREEK
OUTWORKS
PENTAGON
REDOUBT
RIFLE PITS
SUPPORTS
BIG SANDY CREEK
OUTWORKS
ABATTIS
REDOUBT
LUNETTE & REDOUBT
REDANS
CAMP
PORT HUDSON
CLINTON-PT HUDSON R.R.
MISSISSIPPI RIVER
FERRY
CHANNEL
LAKE JARDINE
TELEGRAPH
ROSS LANDG
RIFLE PITS
ABATTIS
BASTION
OUTER BASTION
RIFLE PITS
OUTWORKS
RIFLE PITS
CAMELLIERE
ABATTIS
BASTION
REDOUBT
RIFLE PITS

break on Jackson, ten miles from Clinton. Sherman was to move in the same direction from Raymond. McClernand was ordered to move one division to Clinton, one to a point near Mississippi Springs, and to hold one in Raymond for support. Grant now sent his first message to Washington since leaving Grand Gulf. It ran: "I will attack Jackson to-day."

Both Sherman and McPherson were off at daylight. At 9 A. M., Crocker, in McPherson's advance, struck the enemy, five miles from Jackson, and drove them to within two miles and a half of the city. Here the enemy was found in force under Johnston, and artillery firing began. Sherman had a similar experience on his route and at about the same time. Grant was now well supported, for Blair's division of Sherman's corps had newly arrived and a fresh division of McPherson's corps.

As the enemy's position was revealed it was found to be strong, on a semi-circular ridge, with wood on the right and rolling ground in front. Batteries commanded the roads, on both sides of which the national troops were deployed. At 11 A. M. McPherson ordered an advance. His skirmishers were hotly received and were ordered back to the lines. A charge was then ordered and Crocker's line swept forward with cheers carrying the Confederate outworks. The whole corps followed till within range of the guns on the Jackson works. Here he brought his artillery into play, and halted his columns.

Sherman had driven in the skirmishers on the Mississippi Springs road and had forced one Confederate battery from its position. He had pushed his way till well in front of the Jackson intrenchments. Grant was with him, and seeing the character of the obstacles ahead, he asked Sherman to send a force to the extreme right to reconnoitre.

It did not return, and Grant rode in that direction, with his staff, to find that the road was clear into Jackson and that the enemy had evacuated the town. Sherman at once forced the situation in his front, captured the ten pieces of artillery which had been playing on him, with 150 prisoners, and triumphantly entered the city. McPherson moved simultaneously, capturing seven guns. At 3 P. M. the two corps united in the city, and the American flag was raised on the capitol amid the cheers of the two victorious corps. The enemy escaped by the Canton road, the only one by means of which it could hope to form a junction with Pemberton. McPherson immediately sent Stevenson's brigade in pursuit, but the enemy had effectually escaped, by sacrificing the artillery which had been used to keep the Union forces at bay. Grant's swiftness had precipitated battle before Johnston's reinforcements arrived. It also kept him out of the way of an attack on his rear by Pemberton. In all seventeen cannon were captured. McPherson lost only thirty-seven men killed and 228 wounded, and Sherman but four killed and twenty-one wounded. The enemy lost 845 in killed, wounded and prisoners.

At 4 P. M. Grant called his generals together and gave orders for the morrow. McPherson was to occupy the entrenchments inside and out. Sherman was to destroy railroads, and all property of the enemy. Never was destruction more complete. Railroads were destroyed in all directions, together with bridges, factories and arsenals. Jackson was wiped out as a railroad centre and supply depot.

But while triumph crowned the situation, there was danger ahead. Johnston was in communication with Pemberton and evidently intended to join him. The nearest point on the Vicksburg and Jackson road where he could do this

was Bolton. McClernand was ordered to make for this point with all his force. McPherson was ordered to take the road to Clinton and thence to Bolton. Blair was ordered to hasten thither with his division of the Fifteenth Corps. Grant's army was well situated for this convergent move, and nothing but excessive rains interferred with it. So prompt had the response been that on the morning of the 15th a detachment of cavalry of Osterhaus's command had driven out the enemy's pickets and seized Bolton. Hovey came up from Clinton soon after and held the town. And so the outstanding forces clustered in and came within supporting distance. At 4 P. M. of the 15th Grant was at Clinton to take in the situation. Bolton sure and no enemy; he was clearly between Johnston and Pemberton, why not take a step toward Vicksburg? To McClernand, he ordered, "Move to-morrow toward Edward's Depot. Feel your way and don't bring on an engagement unless you are sure of your ground." On that very day Pemberton moved his forces from Edward's Station toward Dillon, intending to cut Grant's communications, not knowing he hadn't any to cut. But he was met with an order from Johnston to march to Clinton, the only point the two armies could be brought together. To reach there he had to go back to Edward's Station. He was full 25,000 strong with ten batteries.

Grant became aware of all this, and changed his design of leaving a part of Sherman's force in Jackson. He ordered Sherman to Bolton with all celerity, stating that he wanted every man up, as the fight was evidently to be at Edward's Station and at any moment. In one hour, Sherman had his columns in motion. The enemy was moving out from Edward's Station. Grant had his columns in motion, part on the direct road from Bolton to Edward's, part on the middle road from Raymond to Edward's, and part on the

southern road from Raymond to Edward's. McClernand had charge of the advance.

At 5 P. M. of the 15th Smith's division on the southern road struck the enemy, five and a half miles from Edward's Station, and opened an artillery fire. Osterhaus, on the middle road, heard it, and pushed forward till he uncovered the enemy in force. Pemberton fell back a little and formed a line of battle, stretching across the three converging roads on which Grant's troops were advancing. The region was known as the Champion Hills, and by this name the battle was designated. When it was found that Pemberton with all his Vicksburg forces was in the way, McPherson sent for Grant to come forward at once. He came to find the enemy strongly posted on the Champion Hill ridge. Their position was excellent, in the midst of timbered heights, with an open front irregular with ravines. Their lines extended for four miles, and their left was their key. When Grant took the situation in, he renewed his directions to have his forces hasten to the field, and superintended their disposition.

Already active firing was going on. It was the morning of May 16th, 1863. McPherson moved his corps splendidly into action. Hovey gained ground continuously on the right. Logan kept even pace with him. Eleven guns and 300 prisoners fell to their keeping, and they gained the brow of the heights. But the woods and roads formed a natural fortification for the enemy and they rallied, beating Hovey back. Grant was watching the point, and he sent in a brigade of Crocker's division which had just arrived. This encouraged Hovey and he held his ground. Yet the enemy had the advantage, for McClernand's advance divisions had not come on the scene as expected. They made a terrific onset on McPherson's batteries which were play-

ing on them with telling effect, but were met and repulsed by Smith's brigade of Logan's division, with the loss of many prisoners. The threatened turning of their left caused them to throw themselves with greater fury than ever on Hovey, who had been fighting for three hours, and whose ammunition was out. Hovey was forced to call again for help. Grant expected every moment to hear of the arrival of McClernand, and did not wish to change the disposition of the battle till he arrived. But he did not come. Grant then changed the face of his forces so as to let Crocker's and Boomer's brigades into the fight. They made a dashing charge, and Hovey regained five of his lost guns. It was now evident that the enemy was massed in this particular front, and that the position was in danger. Stevenson's brigade was thrown in further to the right. It made a charge on the double quick, through ravines and up hills, and captured seven guns and several hundred prisoners. The enemy fell back unceremoniously, and, unmindful of the fact that Logan had been steadily advancing all the while, they found themselves with a force in their rear, with Hovey and Crocker pressing their front. They could not reform their broken lines, and the battle was over. The victory of Champion Hills was a matter of history.

McClernand now appeared on the left. Grant ordered his fresh troops, at once, to pursue the enemy. Had they been on hand according to orders, the entire Confederate army might have been captured, or the victory obtained sooner and at less cost. As it was, Grant fought every man he had at command, and lost 426 killed, 1,842 wounded and 189 missing. The enemy's loss was estimated at between three and four thousand killed and wounded, while nearly 3,000 prisoners were captured. Loring's entire Confederate

command was forced away from Pemberton during the fight, and in order to escape had to make a wide detour, before it could join Johnston.

The Confederate defeat at Champion Hills was complete. Many prominent Confederate officers fell. The retreat revealed great demoralization, and much valuable property was abandoned. Pemberton and Johnston were permanently severed. Pemberton himself fled to Smith's Ferry over the Big Black, where he left a division to hold it till Loring arrived, who never came. The pursuit was kept up till Edward's Station was reached, and the whole line was strewn with wreckage of battle. All these victories were enlivened by what now were dignified comicalities in the shape of dispatches from Washington requesting Grant to turn his attention to the support of Banks. He was getting that way now, and in time would reach him.

Pemberton was on his way to join Johnston when he met Grant at Champion Hills, and on the very day of the battle Johnston had marched ten miles toward Pemberton. Sherman evacuated Jackson at noon of the 16th, paroling prisoners and leaving wounded in order to reach the scene of action. He marched twenty miles and reached Bolton by night, where he was informed of the victory of Champion Hills. His whole corps was ordered to Bridgeport, just north of Edward's Station, and on the road leading into Vicksburg. This meant that Grant was going to move on Vicksburg, and that Sherman should have the post of honor on his right. It also meant that he should touch the Vicksburg front, if at all, at Haine's Bluff, the very point he had attempted three times before to gain in other directions.

Once at Bridgeport, Sherman's first duty was to cross the Big Black, and all the pontoons were sent with him.

Grant marched his centre on the line of the railroad, and directly to where it crossed the Big Black. Here he found the enemy in force and strongly entrenched. McClernand's corps fell into line, Carr's division on the right, and Osterhaus on the left. Skirmishing and artillery fire continued for several hours, when Lawler's brigade charged upon one of the enemy's parapets and carried it. He was quickly followed by other commands, and the Union troops began to swarm inside of the entrenchments. The enemy fled precipitately to the Big Black crossing, leaving all their guns behind. That part which had crossed became so panic stricken that they set fire to the bridge, leaving those on the east side to cross the river as they might. Some tried to swim across, of whom many were drowned. The wreck and confusion was fearful. One entire brigade was surrounded and captured. Others hid in the entrenchments and were afterwards captured. The Union loss was twenty-nine killed and two hundred and forty wounded. The Confederates lost 1,751 prisoners and eighteen cannon, besides their killed and wounded.

Pemberton did not stop further to contest Grant's crossing of the Big Black. Discomfited by repeated defeats, and trembling lest Sherman should turn his right from Bridgeport and beat him into Vicksburg, he hastened into that stronghold with his disorganized army and left all the ways in his rear open for Grant's army. Word flashed along the whole line to repair bridges and cross the Big Black. To Sherman he said, "Secure a position on the west side of the Big Black as soon as you can, and if such information as you can gain warrants you in believing that you can go immediately into the city, do it. If you have doubts, throw out troops to your left to connect with those here. We will then move in three columns, if roads

can be found, and either have Vicksburg or Haine's Bluff by to-morrow night. The enemy have been so terribly beaten yesterday and to-day, that they will hardly make a stand, unless they rely on Johnston's reinforcements, and I do not think Johnston will attempt to reinforce with anything at his command, if he is at all aware of the condition of things here."

The small supplies Grant had been carrying were nearly exhausted. The country he was in had been exhausted of crops and animals. It was imperative that he should have fresh supplies. To Grand Gulf was not a long way, but it was a dangerous one. All this added to the importance of reaching and holding Haine's Bluff. Once there, the question of future subsistence would be settled, by way of the Yazoo and upper Mississippi.

McPherson and McClernand built bridges of everything they could find, and by the morning of the 18th of May their corps were on the way to Vicksburg. Sherman reached Bridgeport on the 17th, and found that Blair's pontoon brigade had already laid a bridge. Sherman crossed before daylight on the morning of the 18th, and by 9 A. M., had struck the Benton road, within four miles of Vicksburg. He now commanded the Yazoo River on his right, and halted till the other commands could come up.

When Sherman struck the Walnut Hills running off to the Yazoo and terminating in the series of bluffs, of which Haine's Bluff is the most conspicuous, Grant was with him. Sherman sent Col. Swan to the bluff to capture the Confederate battery there. He found it abandoned. Swan saw a Union gunboat two miles down the Yazoo, which he signalled. It steamed up, and took on board the guns of the abandoned battery. Swan then returned and reported the

glorious news, that the army had a safe flank and source of supplies. Grant and Sherman then rode together up to the bluffs, the long wished for goal of the campaign. As they gazed up and down the Yazoo from the spot where Sherman had made so many ineffectual efforts to get a hold, the latter turned abruptly round and exclaimed to Grant, "Until this moment I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end clearly until now. But this is a campaign; this is a success, if we never take the town." Thus with the magnanimity of a true soldier and man, Sherman rejoiced with his triumphant superior in the success which lay at their feet.

Grant now formed his lines for an advance on Vicksburg. Sherman's corps was to operate on the right, McPherson's in the centre and McClernand's on the left. Sherman pushed his right clear to the Mississippi, in view of the Union fleet. All of the 18th, the Union skirmishers kept forcing the Confederates ahead, and picking up prisoners. That night the various corps came into place, and on the morning of the 19th, the siege of Vicksburg began. Communication was opened with the fleet. Roads were built to the foot of the Yazoo bluffs, by which supplies could arrive. The Confederates had been forced entirely within their strong entrenchments. Grant's account of stock was as follows: A twenty day campaign; two hundred miles traversed; five battles fought and five victories won; twenty-seven heavy guns and sixty-one field pieces captured; 6,500 prisoners captured; 6,000 Confederates killed and wounded; a state capital taken; a stronghold on the Mississippi (Grand Gulf) in his possession; two Confederate armies forced apart; a total loss to himself of 4,335 killed and wounded; a new supply line opened; an enemy environed.

On that day (May 19th) Grant ordered an assault along his entire line. He was determined to take advantage of the demoralization in the ranks of the enemy, and test to the utmost the strength of his works, situated, as they were, on the steep hills and deep ravines which run back from Vicksburg. The Union line completely invested the city on the north and east. McClernand's corps could not complete the investment on the south, without attenuating his line too much. The troops were in high spirits, after their frequent successes. Grant's first order was for all the commands to push up as close as possible to the entrenchments, and wait till 2 P. M., when all the artillery should fire three volleys. Sherman's advance was the most difficult because the enemy seemed to be massed on the north side of the city. He, however, pushed Blair's division well to his front, and posted his artillery in the most advantageous positions. When the signal was given, Blair advanced over almost impassible ground, and in very irregular line, but got a foothold on the works, along with the Thirteenth regulars. Steele's division, on Sherman's right, drove in the lines and captured several outworks. The firing was intensely heavy, and Sherman's losses were heavy. McPherson tried to advance his corps, but the roughness of the country retarded all his operations. Only a single brigade succeeded in carrying the works in its front. McClernand also advanced slowly, and effected nothing substantial. When night came, Sherman called off his advanced forces to points where they could bivouac without danger. The assault had been unsuccessful. The Confederates had acquired new spirit, now that they were behind well ordered entrenchments, and in that stronghold which had defied so many formidable assaults.

On the 20th of May, Grant called his generals together

for the first time and compared notes with Sherman, McPherson and McClernand. It was agreed that the assault had failed because the ground was more difficult than expected and because the lines of attack were, by reason of the ground, along the strongest part of the fortifications, being on the three main roads leading into the city. There was a slight shifting of guns and forces to avoid as many obstacles as possible, and then the assault was to be renewed. Grant sent word to Porter to bombard the front from his mortar fleet. Porter opened fire on the 20th and kept it up on the 21st, dismounting many of the enemy's guns and causing such a panic among the citizens that many of them dug temporary shelters in the sides of the hills.

Sherman had reconnoitered all of his front in person and had determined upon the points for his second attack. He put all his batteries into position and had them covered with good epaulements. He brought his troops forward in support and in concealed positions. Orders for the second assault had been given, and it was to take place at 10 A. M., on May 22d. Sherman's men were ready on the minute. A forlorn hope, carrying plank with which to cross the ditch, advanced to the ditch on a run. The lines of infantry rushed from cover and followed. Instantly the enemy rose from behind the parapets and poured a destructive fire upon his lines. For two hours a severe and bloody battle ensued, in which Sherman's forces were repulsed at every point. They retreated to cover behind the spurs of ground close to the Confederate works. Grant came to Sherman, and, pointing to the works, Sherman said that his assault had been a failure. Grant responded that the result had been about the same with McPherson's and McClernand's corps. While they were talking an orderly delivered a note to Grant. It read that the troops of McCler-

nand had carried the parapets in their front and that the Union flag waved over Vicksburg. Grant discredited the note, which, it seems, was from McClernand, and instantly rode down the lines to verify it. If Sherman did not receive word from him by 3 o'clock, he was to make another assault on the position in his front. Not having heard at precisely 3 o'clock, he ordered another assault, which, like the first, was unsuccessful. It afterwards turned out that McPherson had been unsuccessful in his assault, and that McClernand's corps, instead of having gained any material advantage, had only succeeded in capturing one or two of the outlying works of the enemy. The matter caused great feeling among the generals, and that feeling was kept up until McClernand was removed ultimately from the command of his corps. It turned out that McClernand had sent during the day three or four similar dispatches to Grant, all of which were fulsome and incorrect.

In all of the assaults of that day, the troops fought with great persistency and in the face of one of the most consecutive and murderous fires they had experienced during the whole war. The losses of the day footed up fully 3,000, and the army was made fully sure that over ground so rough and so much obstructed, Vicksburg could not be carried by storm. There was no murmuring when they were compelled to fall back, and there was no demoralization in their ranks. Whole detachments remained over night close up to the Confederate intrenchments and really dug their way back out of the ditches. The assault was regarded as without parallel in modern warfare. No similar attack on fortifications of equal strength had ever been undertaken by European generals unless the assaulting party outnumbered the defenders at least twice or three times. It was made with perhaps fully 30,000 men in line,

and instead of meeting a garrison, it met an entire army. According to Pemberton's own statement, he had nearly 19,000 men in the trenches.

The repulse forced the Union troops to leave their dead behind them. They could not return during the next day to bury them, for the entire field was commanded by Confederate guns. For two days the corpses lay festering between the two armies, and the stench became so intolerable to the besieged, that Pemberton proposed to Grant an armistice of two hours and a half to enable the troops to bury their dead. The offer was accepted and the Confederates took advantage of the opportunity to carry off the dead horses and mules lying in their front, and which were very offensive. The armistice really lasted for several hours, during which time many of the officers and men exchanged civilities. On this day also Grant reported his investment of Vicksburg to Halleck and at the same time gave him a full account of the assaults and his reasons for their failures.

After this, it became clear that further operations would have to be conducted in the nature of a siege. While the three corps retained their respective positions—Sherman on the right, McPherson in the centre and McClernand on the left—all of them were considerably strengthened by arriving brigades, and McClernand's corps was sufficiently extended to enable him to draw his supplies from Warrenton without danger. Both Hurlbut and Prentiss were ordered to send forward, as quickly as possible, all the troops they could spare, and, says Grant, "The siege of Vicksburg is going to occupy time, contrary to my expectations when I arrived behind it. To watch the enemy and prevent him from collecting a force outside near enough to attack my rear, I require a large artillery force. Contract

everything on the line of route from Memphis to Corinth, and keep your artillery well at south of here. By this means you ought to be able to send me quite a large force." Grant had much occasion to fear for his rear, for it was well known that Johnston was collecting a force at Canton and was determined to strike a blow. Grant's hope that Rosecrans in Tennessee might make a diversion in his favor was disappointed. He did not seem to be pushing Bragg with such energy as would prevent him from detaching reinforcements from his army and sending them to Johnston. Halleck, at Washington, seemed now fully alive to the situation and was directing all his energies toward the strengthening of Grant's position. He even went so far as to dispatch to Banks that he should come to the rescue of Grant.

On the 23rd, orders were issued for the pick and shovel to be called into requisition. There were 40,000 men on duty. The weather was extremely hot. The character of the ground presented obstacles to digging of a formidable nature. There were few engineering troops in the command and only four engineer officers, while fully five times as many might have been called into requisition. Most of the positions were within a few hundred yards of the Confederate parapets and it was with difficulty that the Union soldiers could establish for themselves comfortable camps. But by and by these difficulties began to be surmounted and camps became quite comfortable and safely connected by covered ways. Details were made to open roads, cut out fallen timber and construct the regular approaches of the siege. As the ground was broken, batteries were placed in advantageous positions to keep down the Confederate fire, and lines of parapets and trenches were made to connect these batteries. The enemy dared hardly show

himself above the parapets, for every appearance was a signal for a sharp artillery fire or an attraction for sharpshooters. So effective was the activity of the sharpshooters that at the end of a fortnight nearly all of the Confederate artillery was withdrawn and they fired but few shots. The labor in the trenches was performed by pioneers, or by details from the lines, or by negroes. Several of the pioneer companies had negroes attached to them, who had come into the lines and who were paid for their services. The aggregate length of the trenches was twelve miles, and eighty-nine batteries were put into place during the progress of the siege, the guns of those from the rear being moved forward as the siege advanced. The troops were moved at the same time and encamped in the rear of their batteries.

By May 30th there was in position 220 guns, mostly light, and one battery of heavy guns on the right, commanded by naval officers. Each day the artillery fire of the Confederates slackened and by this time it was hardly employed at all. The silence of their artillery was attributed to Pemberton's desire to save his ammunition. Sometimes the enemy resorted to mining in order to delay the approaches of the Union Army, but they were usually feeble efforts and did not result in much damage. They made occasional sorties, which were sometimes sources of delay; and then they run counter-trenches down from their salients, and parallel to those of the besiegers, but their secret positions were almost always uncovered on the following day, and they were routed out of them by bayonet charges. They occasionally threw fire balls and hand grenades, which, bursting, flung their fragments around, carrying confusion into the ranks of those near by. On May 27th Grant sent to Porter, asking him to run the ironclad Cincinnati down

to the south of Vicksburg, to enfilade the Confederate lines on his left, and silence a water battery there, which was doing considerable damage. The vessel was protected with logs and hay, and steamed with a full head to her position. The Confederates opened fire upon her from several batteries, which crippled the gunboat so as to render her almost useless. All of the Union batteries in the vicinity opened their fire, in aid of the gunboat, but the current being very swift, she was compelled to expose her stern, which was unprotected by iron plating, and she was very nearly destroyed by plunging shot from a ten-inch Columbiad upon the hills. She was run across the river and made fast to a tree, but before the hawser could be tied, she drifted out under Confederate fire again, and finally filled and sank, drowning fifteen of the crew and twenty-five or more wounded which she had on board.

During these siege approaches, the principal position for Sherman's batteries was on a ridge about 400 yards from the enemy's lines, and at a point near the head of the stream on the north side of their defences. On Blair's front were four batteries of six guns, and his approach started from the left of the principal battery near the graveyard road, and was directed against the salient of the work commanding this road; the same which he had assaulted on the 22d of May. This approach was carried forward until it reached a large oak tree, subsequently known as "the lone tree," which gave its name to the battery erected there. From the right of this approach, other approaches were started, following around the hillside, just outside of the enemy's lines. Work upon these approaches was generally suspended during the day, though the position of the sharpshooters on the different ridges afforded the best protection to the working parties. To the left of "the lone



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tree," another parallel was constructed to the foot of the hill in front. This allowed the construction of a parapet on the brow of the hill and within eighty yards of the enemy's works, from which the sharpshooters were enabled to give them serious annoyance. To the left of Blair's brigade was Ransom's, encamped in a ravine. His trenches were located on the hillside which was here very steep. His parallels ran around the foot of the hill, and were sufficient to admit of the assembling of his entire brigade.

From the 24th of May McPherson had been carrying on a series of most systematic operations, which had resulted in trenches, parapets, parallels and cross trenches. All of the batteries on Logan's, Ransom's, Blair's, Tuttle's and Steele's fronts were able to bring converging, direct, enfilading and reverse fire on all parts of the Confederate lines in their fronts. While the same operations had been going on in McClernand's corps, he had not changed the position of his divisions to the same extent as Sherman and McPherson. He had laid out an extensive system of parallels, but it was found exceedingly difficult to get him to widen and strengthen them sufficiently to allow of free communication between them. On the night of the 24th of May, Lauman's division arrived on the south side of the city, and was put into position, so as to effectually guard the Warrenton road. By June 11th, Herron's division, from the Department of Missouri, arrived, and was assigned to a place on the left of Lauman's. He immediately formed a strong line of trenches on the Warrenton road, and his approaches were directed against the extreme southern limit of the defences of Vicksburg.

Grant now learned that Johnston had been reinforced by at least 10,000 men, and that it was reasonably certain he would make a determined effort to raise the siege. He,

accordingly, sent word to Banks that he had already gathered all the effective forces to his aid that could be obtained in West Tennessee and along the line of the Mississippi. He, therefore, asked that Banks give him as much assistance as possible, and stated that he would be pleased if he could come as general of such forces as he could spare. On the 25th of May, Grant sent Osterhaus's command as far as Big Black River to destroy bridges and obstruct the approaches to Vicksburg. On the 26th he sent a force of 12,000 men under Blair to drive off the enemy, supposed to be collecting between the Big Black and the Yazoo. It was not expected to fight Johnston but to destroy all stock, forage, roads and bridges. Blair moved along the Yazoo for over forty miles and accomplished the purpose of his expedition, preventing Johnston from moving on Vicksburg in that direction, and also from drawing supplies from the region between the two rivers. On May 31st Johnston had a force of twenty to twenty-five thousand strong at Jackson and Canton, and was using every effort to increase it to 40,000. With this force he intended to move on Haine's Bluff. Porter was requested to send a body of marines to Haines' Bluff to hold the place till relieved by other forces. Hurlbut not as yet having responded to Grant's order, a second order was sent, telling him to permit no boat to leave Memphis going north until transportation for all of his troops was furnished. Singularly enough, on this date Grant received dispatches from Banks, requesting him to send him 10,000 men and setting forth the necessity of concentration. Grant replied quite characteristically, that concentration was necessary to the success of the campaigns in the West, but that Vicksburg was the vital point.

As soon as Blair returned, Grant sent a brigade of nearly 1,200 cavalry, under Mower, up the Yazoo to Mechanics-

burg, to watch the course of the Big Black from Bridgeport, and to obstruct the roads. On June 3rd, one of Hurlbut's divisions arrived, and it was sent at once to support Mower at Mechanicsburg. On the 8th another division arrived from Memphis under Smith, and was ordered at once to Haine's Bluff, which place again became of most vital importance, for if Grant should be compelled to raise the siege, he might still retain possession of Haine's Bluff, and thus hold undisputed control of the Mississippi River thus far. He ordered it to be strongly fortified, so that it could be held against a sudden movement by a force of 10,000 men, and so that it would be capable of giving protection to at least 40,000 men. Washburn was placed in command at Haine's Bluff, and in three days' time he had it so enclosed as that it was defensible against any force which was likely to be brought against it.

Since the beginning of the siege Grant had received fully 20,000 reinforcements, and his entire force amounted to 75,000 men, half of whom remained in the trenches till the end of the siege. The other half formed an army of observation and closely watched all the movements of Johnston in the rear. On the 11th of June Grant informed Sherman that if Haine's Bluff should be besieged by Johnston, he (Sherman) would be detached temporarily from his corps and given command at the bluff. At the same time Grant said that it was evident the enemy had brought large reinforcements from Bragg's army and with no other design than to make a desperate attempt to raise the siege of Vicksburg. Both McPherson and Sherman were left under standing orders to hold parts of their commands in readiness to send to Haine's Bluff in case that place should be besieged. McClernand also was armed with instruc-

tions which would enable him to act with promptitude in case of a movement on their rear by Johnston.

By June 21st, the national works had approached so close to those of the besieged that the picket lines were in hearing distance, and often times the Union and Confederate pickets made agreements to withhold hostilities until they could have a talk and make an exchange of tobacco and rations. The Confederate pickets often let fall the information that the besieged really expected another assault very soon. They said also that the men were somewhat inclined to be mutinous because their officers would not surrender; also that the authorities were preparing 2,000 or more boats with which they expected to cross the Mississippi, in case they were forced to surrender. On the 22nd of June, Grant received positive information that Johnston was crossing the Big Black River with the intention of marching directly on his rear. Sherman was directed to take command of the force in the rear, and to take troops from his own and McPherson's corps and add to the force which had already been sent out to meet Johnston. Parke's Ninth Corps was also included in this new command which now amounted to nearly one-half Grant's whole army. Said Grant: "Should Johnston come, we want to whip him if the siege has to be raised to do it," and Sherman's instructions were, that he should use all the forces indicated as he deemed most advantageous, and if more were required, he should call on Grant, and they would be furnished to the last man both at Vicksburg and at Union Point. Grant also said to McPherson: "Sherman goes out to meet Johnston, if he comes, and the greatest vigilance will be required on the line, as the Vicksburg garrison may take the same occasion for an attack also. Batteries should have a good supply of grape and cannister." His instructions

to Parke were: "We want to whip Johnston at least fifteen miles off if possible." This new force threw up a line of works extending from the Yazoo to the Big Black River, almost as strong as those which defended Vicksburg, so that now the city was not only surrounded by Confederate defences, but by an outer line of Union defences. Grant found himself again between two Confederate armies. Besieging one, he was threatened with a siege by another. If both should combine to assault him from different sides, it seemed quite possible that the garrison of Vicksburg might yet elude his grasp, and to prevent this contingency was the object of his sleepless vigilance.

A little while before this, Grant had received from Sherman and McPherson official communications couched in strong language, complaining of a congratulatory order issued by McClernand on May 30th. It magnified McClernand's importance, at least in his own eyes, and was altogether unmilitary and offensive in its tone. He had succeeded in getting it published in Northern newspapers, copies of which were sent to Sherman and McPherson. They branded his assertions as false, and called on their commander to interfere. Grant immediately wrote McClernand, enclosing his offensive address, and asking him if it was a correct copy of what he had written. If it were not a correct copy, he asked that one should be sent to his headquarters. The next day McClernand sent him a correct copy, and on the following day, he was relieved of his command and ordered home. He was succeeded by Gen. Ord. This was the termination of what had been a continuous struggle with McClernand ever since the campaign against Vicksburg started, and indeed the beginning of the trouble could be traced back to 1861, at Cairo. Grant had been repeatedly urged to relieve McClernand on

account of his offensive letters, but the only answer which Grant ever gave was, that he could not afford to quarrel with a man whom he was obliged to command.

On June 10th, Pemberton sent word to Johnston that he would endeavor to hold out in Vicksburg as long as they had anything to eat. He said the enemy kept bombarding the city, day and night, from seven mortars, and also kept up a continuous fire on his lines with artillery and musketry. They subsisted on greatly reduced rations, but had enough to hold out for twenty days. "The men are becoming fatigued, but yet retain pretty good spirits. At some points the enemy's works are within twenty feet of our intrenchments. The men have been thirty-four days and nights in the trenches, without relief. The prices of food in the town have risen enormously. Flour is $5.00 a pound, or a thousand dollars a barrel, in Confederate money. Meal is $140 a bushel; molasses ten to twelve dollars a gallon; and beef sells as high as $2.50 a pound; mule meat sells at $1.00 a pound and is in great demand. Many families, even of wealth, have eaten the last mouthful of food they possess, and the poorer classes are on the verge of starvation. There is scarcely a building that has not been struck by shells, and many have been entirely demolished. A number of women and children have been killed and all who do not remain in the caves on the hillsides are in danger."

On June 25th, Grant fired a heavy mine, which extended thirty-five feet from the point of starting, and had been filled with 1,500 pounds of powder. A heavy artillery fire was opened along the line at the moment of explosion. Huge masses of earth were thrown high into the air and the ground was shaken as if by an earthquake. A few of the Confederate soldiers were thrown into the air, one or

two of whom came down inside of the national lines. The enemy, however, had detected the digging of the mine and had withdrawn most of their troops out of the reach of its effects. The cavity made in the ground was large enough to contain two regiments. As soon as the smoke rose a breach was discovered in a parapet in front of the cavity, when a column of infantry rushed into the cavity in order to take possession of the breach. The ditch and slope were gained and a desperate struggle ensued in the crater, but the Confederates soon withdrew into their interior lines. The loss in this singular hand to hand encounter was about thirty on each side. The crater was called by the soldiers "the death hole." Across the aperture rifle pits were built on the next day, and a covered gallery was commenced from which further mines or counter mines could lead. Another mine was sprung on July 1st, which demolished the entire redan, leaving an immense chasm where the Confederate works had stood. Many of those manning the works were killed or wounded, but no serious attempt was made to charge, on account of the danger which attended it, and the inconsiderable results which followed the explosion of the 25th.

Amid all these difficulties nothing seemed to weary the patience or depress the hope of the commander. Even after the unsuccessful assault of May 23rd, he said: "There is no doubt of the fall of this place ultimately." On the 24th to Halleck, he claimed that the enemy were now undoubtedly within his grasp, and that the fall of Vicksburg and the capture of the entire garrison was only a question of time. Without evincing any enthusiam, he was undoubtedly the most confident man in his army. On June 3rd, he said prophetically that the approaches were gradually nearing the enemy's fortifications, and that in five days more

his batteries should be on their parapets. One day while riding along his lines, he stopped at the house of a Confederate woman, who asked him tauntingly, if he was ever going to get into Vicksburg. He said, "Certainly." She replied, "When?" "I cannot tell exactly when I shall take the town," he said, "but I mean to stay here until I do, if it takes thirty years."

By July 1st the approaches in many places had reached the enemy's ditch at nearly a dozen different points. The Union regiments could be put under cover within from five to one hundred yards of the Confederate works. The hand to hand character of all the late fighting showed that further progress could be made only by digging, which was becoming more tedious and difficult every day. At this juncture, Grant made up his mind to try another assault and had fixed it for the morning of July the 6th. He had even issued orders to prepare the approaches so that troops could debouche with ease, and to widen the main approaches so that the men could move readily by fours. Johnston was moving against the rear and on the night of July the 1st, encamped at Brownsville on the Big Black, and on the 3rd sent word to Pemberton that about the 7th of the month he would create such a diversion as would enable the garrison to cut its way out. This movement was never made, as the sequel will show. The same knowledge of the situation which induced Grant to make a second final assault upon the fortifications also satisfied Pemberton that the time had come when he must either capitulate or evacuate the city. He addressed to each of his four division commanders a note stating that unless the siege of Vicksburg was raised and supplies thrown in, it would become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. He saw no prospect of the former, and there were many

obstacles to the latter. He requested them to inform him, with as little delay as possible, respecting the conditions of their troops, their ability to a make marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to a successful evacuation. Two of the officers favored surrender; the others declared that an attempt at evacuation would not succeed. Influenced by these sentiments, Pemberton sent the following to Grant, on the morning of July 3rd: "I have the honor to propose to you an armistice of —— hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to retain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed to you under a flag of truce, by Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen." At 10 o'clock in the morning, the white flag appeared. Hostilities in that quarter at once ceased, and Bowen and Col. Montgomery came from the works of Vicksburg toward the national lines. The Confederate soldiers became greatly excited, conjecturing that a surrender was contemplated. To counteract this, a story was put into circulation to the effect that Pemberton was simply sending out to ask Grant's permission to remove some sick and wounded to a point outside of the lines. Bowen was received by Gen. Smith, and expressed a wish to converse with Grant. Smith would not consent to this. Bowen then suggested that perhaps it might be well for Grant and Pemberton to meet. Grant was informed of this suggestion and sent a verbal message, that if Pemberton wished to see him, an interview could be had between the lines on McPherson's front, at 3 o'clock P. M. In reply to

Pemberton's written note, he returned the following: "Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice of several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course, can be ended at any time you may choose by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition to appoint commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those above indicated."

At 3 in the afternoon Pemberton came to the front in company with Bowen and Col. Montgomery. Grant was surrounded by Gens. Ord, McPherson, Logan, A. J. Smith and several members of his staff. The two commanders met on the hillside under a tree, within 200 feet of the Confederate works. The works of both sides were crowded with unarmed men, leaning over the parapets, looking eagerly on. After the two generals shook hands, Pemberton asked what terms of capitulation would be allowed. Grant replied, those that had been expressed in his letter of the morning. Pemberton, in rather a haughty manner, said that if this were all, the conference might as well terminate and hostilities be resumed immediately. Grant said, "Very well," and turned away. Gen. Bowen, however, suggested that two of the subordinates present should retire and consult and then report such terms as they thought might be worthy the consideration of their chiefs. Grant did not object to this, but said that he would not consider himself bound by any agreement of his subordin-

ates. Smith and Bowen were deputed to retire and consult, Grant and Pemberton in the meanwhile walking up and down between the parapets, in conversation. After a little while Smith and Bowen returned with a proposition, as made by Bowen, that the Confederates should march out of Vicksburg with the honors of war, carrying muskets and field arms with them, but leaving heavy artillery behind. The proposal caused Grant to smile and he instantly rejected it. Some further conversation took place, when it was agreed that Grant should send his terms to Pemberton by 10 o'clock that night. The hostilities were not to be resumed until the correspondence had terminated. On Grant's return to his headquarters, he called into consultation all of his corps and division generals and heard their opinions of what terms would be proper to allow Pemberton. With the exception of the opinion advanced by Gen. Steele, Grant found none which he could wholly sanction. He, therefore, framed terms, which reconciled themselves to his views of the situation, and placed them in writing, sending them to Pemberton. They were as follows: "In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard and take possession at 8 A. M., to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines; the officers taking with them their side arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have and also the necessary cooking

utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers, as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." Pemberton called a general council of his officers and submitted Grant's letter to them. All except one recommended the acceptance of its propositions, and at a later hour that night the following reply was made: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted, but in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At 10 A. M. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg and to surrender city and garrison under my command by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers retain their side arms, personal property and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." It was after midnight when Grant received this response. He immediately sent word that he could not accept the proposed amendments in full, and that it would be necessary for Pemberton to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself; and again Grant said he could make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. Whilst he did not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, he could not place himself under any restraints by stipulations. To

this Pemberton replied that he would accept the terms as they had been proposed and as they were now understood.

As soon as Grant had received Pemberton's first communication, he gave Sherman orders to march directly out against Johnston the moment the surrender should be consummated, believing the enemy would surrender by the night of the 3rd of July or on the morning of the 4th. He instructed Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy the railroad on the north of Jackson. At the same time he directed Steele and Ord to be in readiness to move the moment Vicksburg was surrendered. His design was to break Johnston up as thoroughly as possible. He left Sherman with full power to make all the arrangements to reach this end and promised him the aid of all the troops in his command, except one corps. On the night of the 3rd orders were passed along Grant's lines that the pickets should be men of more than ordinary ability, and should be allowed to say to the Confederate pickets that in case of surrender, officers and men would be paroled and allowed to go home. On Saturday morning, July 4th, Pemberton marched his garrison out of Vicksburg and beyond the lines it had defended for so long a time. They stacked arms in front of the conquerors and laid down their colors where many of the besiegers had lain down their lives, and then in full view of the Union forces, who were lining all the parapets, they returned inside of their works as prisoners of war. The number that surrendered was 31,600, including fifteen generals and 2,153 officers. One hundred and seventy-two guns were also surrendered. This was the largest capture of men and material ever made in war at one time. The return of the garrison as prisoners within their works was followed by the entry of the Union troops. Logan's division was the first to enter the town,

because it was regarded as entitled to this honor, by having been most heavily engaged in both the assaults, and being nearest in its approaches to the Confederate intrenchments. His division was headed by Grant and his staff. The division was marched directly to Pemberton's headquarters, where he sat with his generals on a porch. They all saluted Grant, but did not extend to him the courtesy of a chair. Pemberton seemed especially broken up and surly. Finally one of the Confederates offered him a seat. He asked for a drink of water and was informed that he could find it inside. He entered and met a negro, who gave him the desired cup of water. Grant continued his journey down to the wharf, where he consulted with Admiral Porter on the flagship. On the 6th of July he moved his headquarters into Vicksburg.

On the night of the 4th, he announced the capture of Vicksburg to the Government thus: "The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great aid to us at this moment. It saves probably several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman with a large force moves immediately on Johnston to drive him from the State. I will send troops to the relief of Banks and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside." He also sent word to Banks of the capture of Vicksburg and offered to send him a corps of troops. By July 13th the paroles were completed and the Confederate garrison took up its line of march. When they reached the fortifications, each man's name was called and checked off on the rolls. The Union troops crowded the way on both sides for some distance beyond the intrenchments, and the prisoners marched between the lines thus formed. For hours they streamed through these exultant lines, suf-

fering all the bitterness of defeat. No insults or taunts were heard, no cheers of triumph, nor sounds of cannon saluted their ears. They, marched silently and sadly on, and by sunset of that day Vicksburg was free from Confederate forces.

An important and inevitable consequence of the fall of Vicksburg was the surrender of Port Hudson, which occurred on July 8th, to General Banks. The Confederacy was thus divided into two parts by the Father of Waters, and all the objects of the armies and navies operating on its waters were accomplished.

We must now follow Sherman on that hasty movement eastward, designed by Grant to crush Johnston, and of which Sherman was the veritable leader. With his usual promptitude he had his forces across the Big Black by the 6th of July and was on the march to Bolton, where he expected to meet the other corps. By the 8th, there had been a general convergence of the corps upon Clinton, where Johnston was stationed. On the 9th it was discovered that Johnston was retreating toward Jackson, leaving behind his cattle, hogs and sheep, which were first shot and then thrown into the stagnant pools, the only water supply, to putrify. The weather was intensely hot and army movements most fatiguing. Yet Sherman ordered prompt pursuit, and by the 10th had driven Johnston behind the Jackson intrenchments, where he made a stand.

Sherman now closed his lines about the place, his own corps holding the centre from the Clinton to the Raymond road; Ord's Thirteenth on the right, stretching to Pearl River, below the city; and Parke's Ninth on the left. On the 11th all these corps pressed close in and shelled the city from all directions. Lauman's brigade of Ord's Thirteenth disregarded orders and pressed too close in. It

was beaten back with great loss and its commander was censured. It looked now to Sherman as though he had a siege before him as at Vicksburg. He prepared for this by tightening his lines on the three sides of the city which he held, and by sending back to Grant for the appliances with which to make siege progressions. Meanwhile he was busily carrying out Grant's orders as to the destruction of railroads, cars, bridges, and the driving off of cavalry. He carried this devastation far and near.

Johnston was hoping that scarcity of water would induce Sherman to exhaust himself in assaults. But he soon found that Sherman had other intentions, and one of Johnston's intercepted telegrams ran, "If the enemy will not attack, we must, at the last moment, withdraw. We cannot attack seriously without risking our entire army." All the while Sherman was pressing closer to the Confederate intrenchments, using sharpshooters and artillery with much effect. On the 16th, he received a fresh supply of ammunition, which Johnston heard of. This decided him to evacuate the place, avoiding further assault or siege. All night Sherman's picks and shovels were busy, and off in the city rumbling sounds were heard. Morning revealed the fact that the enemy had taken advantage of the darkness to make an hasty exit across the Pearl River, burning the bridges and leaving the roads paved with loaded shells and torpedoes. Steele's division was at once sent in pursuit. It followed fourteen miles to Brandon. Owing to the intensely hot weather and the scarcity of water, Sherman decided that a pursuit over a tract of country ninety miles wide and with troops already over-exerted, would necessarily be fatal to his command. He therefore called off the pursuit, and devoted two or three days to further work of destruction, assisting, meanwhile, the in-

GRANT AND PEMBERTON.

habitants, whose homes had been ruined by war, by generous gifts of provisions out of the army stores. Grant acquiesced in his decision, and ordered him to send Ord back to Vicksburg, Parke to Haine's Bluff, while Sherman might encamp in the vicinity of the Big Black. Choosing as healthful a camp as he could find, he reached it on July 27th, and prepared for a long and much needed rest during the warm weather. His whole loss on this expedition was less than 1,000 men. He had inflicted a loss on Johnston of 71 killed, 504 wounded and nearly 2,000 prisoners.

In the entire series of battles culminating in the capture of Vicksburg, the losses are thus summanized by Badeau:

UNION FORCES.

Killed	1,243
Wounded	7,095
Missing	535
Total	8,873

CONFEDERATE FORCES.

Surrendered at Vicksburg	32,000
Captured at Champion Hills	3,000
" " Big Black	2,000
" " Port Gibson	2,000
Loring's command, cut off	4,000
Killed and wounded	10,000
Stragglers	3,000
Total	56,000

Add to this the immense destruction to railroad property, steamers, cotton, etc., besides arms and munitions for an army of 100,000 men, and some idea can be formed of the extent of the material loss to the enemy occasioned by

the Vicksburg disaster, as well as of the gain to the national forces.

But Vicksburg was not to be measured by such exhibits. Towering over the unprecedented list of prisoners, guns and small arms captured was, as Sherman eloquently says, "The great fact that its possession secured the navigation of the great central river of the Continent, bisected fatally the Southern Confederacy, and set the armies which had been used in its conquest free for other purposes. * * * * The campaign of Vicksburg, in its conception and execution, belonged exclusively to Grant, not only in its great whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain many of his letters and notes, all in his own handwriting, prescribing the routes of march for divisions and detachments, specifying even the amount of food and tools to be carried along. * * * * His success at Vicksburg justly gave him great fame at home and abroad. The President conferred on him the rank of Major General in the regular army, the highest grade then existing by law; and General McPherson and I shared in his success by receiving similar commissions as brigadier generals in the regular army."

Amid the intense satisfaction of the Government and the bewildering joy of the people, President Lincoln wrote Grant, under date of July 13th: "My Dear General: I do not know that you and I ever met personally. I write this now in grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a further word. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did —march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports and thus go below. * * * * When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf and the vicinity, I

thought you should go down the river and join Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong."

Halleck bestowed similar praise, and concluded his letter thus: "Your narration of the campaign, like the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly, and in every respect creditable and satisfactory. In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution and brilliancy of routes, these operations will compare favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your army have well deserved the gratitude of the country, and it will be the boast of your children that their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened the Mississippi River."

It must not be forgotten that the fall of Vicksburg was coincident with the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg by the Union forces under General Meade. The country experienced a double thrill on the 4th of July, 1863. We could hardly state more fully the result of the offensive operations on the Mississippi. Those which Meade had in hand and which resulted in the victory of Gettysburg, were quite of another nature. They were purely defensive, and were forced on the Union army in the East by the determination of Lee to try the very policy of invasion which Grant was so successfully carrying out in the West. While Vicksburg sealed the wisdom of Grant's policy, Gettysburg proved the failure of Lee's. As to the central field in which Bragg and Rosecrans were struggling, Murfreesboro would have ended the policy of invading the North by way of the Ohio, as effectually as Gettysburg did that of invading it by way of the Potomac, if it had not been for the Chickamauga back-set.

No sooner had Sherman and McPherson entered the cap-

ital of Mississippi the second time, than Grant sent in their names as worthy the honors of brigadiers in the regular army. These honors he epitomizes thus:

1st. "Their great fitness for any command that it may ever become necessary to intrust to them."

2d. "Their great purity of character and disinterestedness in anything except the faithful performance of their duty and the success of every one engaged in the great battle for the preservation of the Union."

3d. "They have honorably won this distinction upon many well fought battle fields. The promotion of such men as Sherman and McPherson always adds strength to an army."

As already stated, their merited promotion quickly came, and it is no discrimination to say that as to Sherman, no honor had ever been more richly or hardly won, and none ever fell on worthier shoulders. From Shiloh to Corinth; from Corinth to Memphis; from Memphis to the Yazoo; from the Yazoo to Arkansas Post; from Arkansas Post to Milliken's Bend; from Milliken's Bend to Perkins's; from Perkins's to Jackson; from Jackson to Bridgeport and Haine's Bluff and thence to Vicksburg; from Vicksburg back to Jackson; he had ever been prompt, daring and self-sacrificial. His constancy was unfaltering, his genius unfailing. Ever at Grant's right, he was trusted beyond all others. When Sherman tried an expedient, Grant was satisfied no generalship could do more. He proved to be as ready in independent command, as in his own, handling combined corps with the ease and safety of proficient generalship. The lustre of Vicksburg never paled on the head of Sherman.



MAJ. GEN. GEO. G. MEADE.

CHAPTER IX.

CHATTANOOGA.

The Mississippi River fell under control of the Union forces after the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The armies west of the stream became unimportant. Grant went to New Orleans to confer with Banks, and while gone his respective *corps de armee* were distributed as follows:— Parke's Ninth Corps returned to Kentucky to afterwards join Burnside's Army of the Ohio. Ord's Thirteenth Corps drifted to Natchez and thence to New Orleans and Texas. McPherson's Seventeenth remained in and about Vicksburg. Hurlbut's Sixteenth was at Memphis; Sherman's Fifteenth was east of Vicksburg on the line of the Big Black River. It was now composed of Steel's First division; Blair's Second division; Tuttle's Third division, and Ewing's Fourth division.

The camp was well chosen for health and comfort, and supplies were easily obtained by a short railroad from Vicksburg. From all appearances there was to be a month or two of rest during the hot weather. Sherman's family came to his headquarters on a lengthy visit. Grant's family visited him at Vicksburg, and many of the officers enjoyed the pleasure of family reunions.

But while times were thus restful on the Big Black, campaigns were in progress elsewhere. Bragg had centered his army at Chattanooga, after being driven southward by the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans. Burnside was centering his Army of the Ohio in East Tennessee, mostly

at Knoxville. Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee and executed that celebrated flank and rear movement on Bragg which forced him to evacuate Chattanooga and fall back to Chickamauga. Here he offered battle, which Rosecrans was forced to accept. The result was the bloody and disastrous affair of Chickamauga, in which Rosecrans was driven into Chattanooga, and practically surrounded by Bragg's forces. This blow fell heavily upon the country. The Government was paralyzed for the time being. It could hardly be realized that such a fatality was in store so soon after the momentous successes at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

Sherman was first apprised of the sad event, and of the further danger to the imprisoned Rosecrans of starvation, by a dispatch from Grant, September 22d, 1863, ordering him to send one of his divisions immediately to Vicksburg, to march thence to Chattanooga, and to come to Vicksburg himself. Here Sherman learned from Grant the alarming character of the situation as pictured in Halleck's dispatch. After a consultation the conclusion reached was that Sherman should march his whole corps to the scene. He hastened back to the Big Black, gave orders for his First, Second and Fourth Divisions to march at once, and left his Third (Tuttle's) in charge of the camp. He took his family to Vicksburg, and was soon ready for that memorable march which meant the rescue of a demoralized and starving army four hundred miles distant.

This grand march was carried on in the face of great difficulties. Word had come that all the routes of supply for Rosecrans were overtaxed, and the line of Sherman's march must be as nearly due East as possible, from Memphis; he to repair the damaged railroads as far as Athens, Ala., and thus keep up a line of supplies from Memphis.

By September 28th, Sherman's corps was on board the boats at Vicksburg, and on its way to Memphis, where it arrived on October 2nd. Here General Sherman and his family were grief stricken over the death of their little son, Willie, a boy of nine years, who had been pranking it as corporal in the Big Black River camp for two months, and who had endeared himself to the entire command.

On the arrival of Sherman at Memphis, where General Hurlbut was in command, he was furnished with dispatches from Washington, to the effect that all the troops that could possibly be spared in West Tennessee and on the Mississippi River should be sent without delay to General Rosecrans, then on the Tennessee River. Sherman was urged to act with all possible promptness, and if there were any boats at Memphis at the disposal of General Hurlbut, he was to send them down the river to bring up the troops. The dispatches contained information to the effect that a part of Lee's army had been sent to reinforce Bragg. They also requested that information be sent to Washington of the number of troops that had been already dispatched toward Decatur, where they then were; also of the number of troops that were to follow, and when. Special instructions accompanied these dispatches to Sherman to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad, as he progressed eastward, as far as Athens, Alabama, and to draw his supplies by that road, so as not to be dependent on the roads up to Nashville, which were already overtaxed by the demands of Rosecrans' army. When Sherman arrived in Memphis, he found that a part of his command had already gone to Corinth by rail, and that others were in the act of starting. The railroad was only in fair condition to Corinth, ninety-six miles, so that it took until the 9th for him to get his Second Division off, and then he gave orders for the

Fourth Division to march with their wagon trains up the common road.

On October 11th, he followed his command on the road to Corinth. When at Colliersville, he was attacked by the enemy, who were stationed in a brick depot building, punctured with loop-holes. He formed a company of the 69th Indiana and a part of the regulars, distributed them about the depot building, and opened an artillery fire upon it. When this small force was disposed, ready for the attack, the enemy made a sortie from the building, upon the rear of his trains, and succeeded in getting away with some horses, but a few of the cool and practised shots of the regulars drove them back. There was general skirmishing for a few hours around the place, when Corse's division came up, having charged on the double quick for several miles, and drove the enemy off. The next day, all damages were repaired and Sherman's troops entered Corinth. Here he received a dispatch from Grant to the effect that he had arrived in Memphis on Oct. 14th, and that he would be off in a few hours for Cairo. He also said that McPherson would be in Canton on that day. Sherman also received dispatches at Corinth, from Halleck, to the effect that the important matter to be attended to on his march, was that of supplies, and that when he arrived at Eastport, he might dispense with the railroads; that even if he found the enemy so strong as to prevent his reaching Athens, nevertheless he would have greatly assisted Rosecrans in drawing away a part of the enemy's forces from him. On Oct. 18th, Sherman and his staff rode to Burnsville, and on the 19th, they reached Iuka, where he was agreeably surprised to hear of the arrival at Eastport, ten miles away, of two gunboats, under the command of Capt. Phelps, which had been sent up the Tennessee River, by

Admiral Porter, to his aid. After a study of the situation here, he was satisfied that in order to reach Gen. Rosecrans, he would have to take the road north of the Tennessee River, and so on the 24th, he ordered his Fourth Division to cross at Eastport, under the escort of the gunboats, and to move direct for Florence. On this date, he received the general orders from the Department at Washington, appointing Gen. Grant to the command of the military Division of the Mississippi, and authorizing him, on his arrival at Chattanooga, to supersede Gen. Rosecrans by Gen. Geo. H. Thomas. The same orders conveyed the information that he (Sherman) had been appointed to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee. He found at this juncture, that the Army of the Tennessee was made up of three corps. To the Fifteenth Corps, his own, part of which was then in advance of him, he assigned the command, temporarily, to Gen. Frank P. Blair. Gen. Hurlbut's corps, the Sixteenth, remained back at Memphis. McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, was at Vicksburg.

On Oct. 27th, while pushing repairs to the railroad at Bear Creek, and patching the many breaks between it and Tuscambia, he was handed a dispatch from Grant, to this effect: "Drop all work on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, cross the Tennessee and hurry eastward, with all possible dispatch, toward Bridgeport, till you meet further orders from me." As this implied an absence from his command, he immediately issued all the orders to McPherson and Hurlbut, which he deemed necessary for his Department of the Tennessee, and further ordered a collection of a force out of the Sixteenth Corps, of 8,000 men, under Gen. G. M. Dodge, to follow east as far as Athens, Tenn., and there await instructions. All repairs on the Charles-

ton railroad were instantly discontinued, and all the divisions of the Fifteenth Corps were marched to Eastport, where they crossed the river and were hurried eastward. In person, Sherman rode to Florence on Nov. 1st, whither his divisions followed rapidly. Their rapid march soon brought them to Elk River, a wide and deep stream, which could only be crossed by a ferry. Deeming this process too slow, he changed the route thirty miles to the north, by Elkton, Winchester and Deckerd. At this last point, he came in communication with the Army of the Cumberland, and, by means of telegraph from this point, with Gen. Grant, at Chattanooga. He received by telegraph from Grant, the same orders that he had received before, to push his command forward with all possible dispatch, and to proceed in advance of it in person. Sherman did so and reached Bridgeport on the night of November 13th, leaving his troops to follow him, by their several roads. At Bridgeport, he received another dispatch from Grant at Chattanooga to come up in person with all haste, and to have his troops follow him as fast as possible. He took passage on one of the three small steamers, which were carrying stores up as far as Kelly's Ferry, and there he found orderlies and one of Grant's private horses waiting for him, on which he rode to Chattanooga, reaching it on Nov. 14th. He was heartily welcomed by Grant, Thomas and all of the officers, who fully realized the extraordinary efforts he had made to reach that remote point, and to force forward his columns to its relief.

And now, while Sherman's troops are heading for Bridgeport and making their long and rapid march, it is proper for the reader to understand the situation in and about Chattanooga, as well as the broader situation, which necessitated the change of commanders in the Department of the

Tennessee, the consolidation of the respective armies then operating in the West, and the appointment of Grant to the command of the new Department of the Mississippi, as well as of Sherman to the new Department and Army of the Tennessee.

It was on September 19th and 20th when Rosecrans suffered his severe repulse at the battle of Chickamauga, nine miles south of Chattanooga, and was compelled to retire into Chattanooga, with a heavy loss of life and munitions of war, and with the sacrifice of immense strategic advantages. Driven into Chattanooga by Bragg, he was surrounded by a superior force, which occupied the most advantageous positions on the ridges to the east and west of the town, and which almost entirely cut off his lines of communication. The situation was most desperate. His men were demoralized and threatened with starvation. His signal defeat at Chickamauga had carried consternation to the Government and the country. Grant, who had been injured by a fall from his horse, when on a visit to New Orleans, had been solicited to take the field as soon as he felt himself sufficiently recovered. On Sept. 28th, he telegraphed that he was ready for any duty he might be called upon to perform. The dispatches from the field of action to the Government were exceedingly confused, and in consequence of it, Grant sent one of his staff to Cairo, so as to be out of the line of confusion and where he could communicate directly with the Government. Almost the first dispatch which came to this officer was to the effect that Grant should come to Cairo as quickly as possible. On his arrival there, he found another dispatch from Halleck to the effect that he should go to the Galt House, at Louisville, to meet an officer of the War Department, and that he should take with him his staff, ready for field operations. At

Indianapolis, he was met by Secretary Stanton, who handed him an order, creating for him a new command of the military Division of the Mississippi, including all the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, and therefore embracing the three original Departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland and the Ohio. At this time Burnside commanded the Department of the Ohio and Rosecrans that of the Cumberland. It had become apparent to the authorities at Washington that the time had arrived when there should be a consolidation of the various commands in the West in the hands of one person. The danger at Chattanooga was so imminent and was increasing with such rapidity as to make it absolutely necessary that some person should act at once. At the same time Secretary Stanton exhibited the order to Grant, which relieved Rosecrans of his command, and substituted Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, the next in rank in the army. This substitution was to be entirely with Grant's consent. He accepted it at once, preferring Thomas to Rosecrans. The Secretary of War accompanied Grant to Louisville. On the way, the military situation was discussed, when the secretary made known his fears that Rosecrans was preparing to abandon Chattanooga, and urged Grant to assume command at once, and before this mischief was consummated. Grant immediately telegraphed to Rosecrans and Thomas, assuming command of the new military division, and appointing Thomas to the Department of the Cumberland. On Oct. 19th he started for Chattanooga.

In the disastrous battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans had lost over 16,000 men and thirty-six cannon, and but for the gallantry and persistency of Thomas and his corps, the army would have been destroyed and Chattanooga lost. As it was, Bragg pushed his force up to the top of Missionary



BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.

Ridge, east and south of the town, and threw up a formidable line of works. This ridge is from four to five hundred feet high. He also pushed his forces on to Lookout Mountain, west of the town, and three miles distant. Lookout rises to a height of 2,200 feet. West of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Valley, whose western edge is Raccoon Mountain, a ridge quite as lofty as Lookout. The supply route for Chattanooga was by way of the railroad along the southern bank of the Tennessee, and immediately under Lookout Mountain. Both Lookout Mountain and Lookout Valley had been abandoned by Rosecrans, who thus sacrificed his line of supplies in that direction. The situation of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga, therefore, was one of siege. The Confederate batteries commanded railroad and river, and all supplies were cut off, except those which could be obtained by wagons from Nashville, a distance of sixty miles away. Bragg could watch every movement of the Federal army, and from the high points of Lookout Mountain, he could throw shells into Rosecrans' camp. All his positions were strongly fortified. Rosecrans was forced to put his command upon half rations. Thousands of his soldiers lay sick in camps and hospitals. Forage could not be procured and more than 10,000 mules and horses perished in and around the town. All military horses were sent back to Bridgeport, over the mountains, a third of them dying on the road. Even if he had been able, he could not have retreated without sacrificing all his artillery. His stock of ammunition had so run down as that there was not a supply on hand for one long-fought battle. It seemed that under these circumstances, all Bragg had to do was to wait, continue his quiet siege and in the end Chattanooga must inevitably fall without a battle. Starvation would reduce the besieged

and throw them into his hands quicker than any operations which he might see fit to carry on. Such was the situation of the Army of the Cumberland on the 19th of October, 1863, when Gen. Grant took the command. No other Union army had ever found itself in such straits during the war.

Grant's first dispatch to Thomas was: "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible." To this, he received the reply: "I will hold it till we starve." On the morning of the 20th, Grant started from Louisville by rail, and arrived at Nashville on the same night. He pushed straight on to Bridgeport, on the Tennessee, and then went by horse, over the mountains, to Chattanooga, telegraphing to Halleck, Sherman, Porter, Thomas and Burnside on the way, attending to the various questions of supplies, and directing the movements of his three armies, as it were, from the saddle. He reached Chattanooga at dark on the night of the 23rd, and found that the situation as he had been given to understand it, was not in the least exaggerated. The army was hemmed in on every side by the enemy. The soldiers were downcast. There was hardly a possibility of holding it much longer. Escape would have been exceedingly difficult by the impassable defiles in the rear. The position was such as that no military defence could possibly have been made, for the horses had either died or been sent away. It was even dangerous to send reinforcements thither, for there was no means of supplying them. Such a night of gloom had never been injected into Grant's army experience.

After notifying Halleck of his arrival, he requested the approval of the order placing Sherman in the command of the Department of the Tennessee, with headquarters in the field. The request was promptly met, and Sherman found

himself occupying Grant's old command, the Army of the Tennessee. Though Thomas was the ranking officer, he accepted this change with great magnanimity, and said that he understood that an independent command had been prepared for him, when Rosecrans should be relieved, but that he had decided not to accept it. Now, however, since the arrangement was that Grant was to have an independent and supreme command, he was entirely satisfied to accept the Army of the Cumberland. Hooker had been already ordered from the East by the Department at Washington, and his arrival was expected. Thomas had ordered him to concentrate his command at Bridgeport, with a view to securing the Tennessee River and the wagon road on the north side of it, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Grant and Sherman rode over the field together, and approved of Thomas' disposition of Hooker's forces. All saw that the first and paramount consideration was the gaining of some means of supporting the army. Grant ordered Hooker to cross the river at Bridgeport, and made such other disposition of the forces then at his command as would secure the outlet of Lookout Valley, and if possible the Lookout Heights themselves, from whose summits the river was controlled for several miles. All of Thomas' orders thus far issued, had been looking in the same direction. Gen. Smith, Chief Engineer of the Department of the Cumberland, was instructed to make a lodgement at Brown's Ferry, and throw a bridge across the river there. In two days, he had pontoons ready. On the 26th, he started sixty boats down the river, each containing thirty men. The boats were loaded with pontoon sections. They floated by the enemy's pickets, rounded the foot of Lookout Mountain, and landed at Brown's Ferry, where in the face of a sharp fire from Confederate pickets, they managed

to secure the heights rising from Lookout Valley at its outlet to the river, and to throw an excellent pontoon bridge across the stream. The force was so posted as to command this bridge, and the artillery was placed so as to command the roads leading around Lookout Mountain to the enemy's camp in Chattanooga.

On the morning of the 26th Hooker's corps crossed the Tennessee on the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, with a large part of the Eleventh Corps under Howard and a portion of the Twelfth Corps, under Geary. He marched directly along the railroad and down the valley to Wauhatchie. Following the western base of the Raccoon Mountain, he finally descended through a narrow gorge into Lookout Valley proper. As the column emerged into the valley, the movement was detected by the enemy on Lookout Mountain, who shelled his columns but did not retard his march. Hooker kept on down the valley, and on the evening of the 28th, he halted his command within one mile of Brown's Ferry. Grant's intention now became manifest to the enemy, and a corps was sent in force to attack Hooker. It made its attack upon Geary, stationed near Wauhatchie. Howard was at once sent for to come to his support. In marching up, he found the Confederates strongly posted on the hills on his left, so as to command his line of march. He ordered an assault upon these hills, which were steep, wooded and unknown, but his men scaled them under heavy fire and captured their summits, together with many prisoners. Geary had been fighting for fully three hours without assistance, and finally succeeded in repelling the assault on his front. All these engagements were carried on during the night, which was beautifully moonlit. Before 4 o'clock in the morning, the battle was over and the enemy were repulsed at every point. Out of some 7,000

men which Hooker had engaged, his loss was 416 in killed and wounded. The loss of the enemy was equally great in killed and wounded, and besides they lost over a hundred prisoners. Howard fortified the heights which he had obtained, and Hooker's entire corps took possession of them, This decided the fate of Lookout Valley and secured the line of supplies between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Thus in five days after the arrival of Grant at Chattanooga, the imperilled command there had been rescued from immediate danger. The door for relief had been opened. The siege of Chattanooga had been raised and the isolated and defensive army there was ready to assume the offensive. Rosecrans had been on the defensive. Now, in the incredibly short time of less than a week, Bragg with his superior forces and great advantages of position was thrown on the defensive. Not only supplies of rations and ammunition were teeming into the town, but two corps of excellent soldiers were ready to be added to the national army, while Hooker threatened the most formidable position then in the possession of the enemy, namely, Lookout Mountain. The relief of the army at Chattanooga seemed to have been almost miraculous. The spirit of the men was at once revived. Memory of Chickamauga was gradually lost, save as it seemed as an inspiration for revenge. The soldiers seemed to feel that there had been a decidedly new departure, and that their new commander could not only appreciate a desperate situation, but had the ability to relieve it.

Meanwhile Grant was anxiously looking for the arrival of Sherman. The situation at Knoxville in East Tennessee had grown very serious. Bragg had felt so sure of his position around Chattanooga as to dare to detach Longstreet's division to attack Burnside at Knoxville and

secure control of East Tennessee. The Government had grown very uneasy about Burnside's fate, and Grant was in constant receipt of communications, urging him to hasten to Burnside's relief. This he could not do before Sherman's arrival, nor could he until such arrival, carry out any part of the design which he had formed after arriving at Chattanooga, which design was of a threefold nature: First, to beat the enemy back from his strongly fortified positions around Chattanooga; secondly, to go to the relief of Burnside in East Tennessee; and thirdly, to make Chattanooga such a point, as that he could effectively operate from it in the direction of Alabama and Georgia. Every day he felt as if Sherman should be on hand. Every day he feared that Longstreet might return and take his old place in Bragg's ranks; but whilst he was anxious about Sherman's arrival, he knew that his march was proceeding as rapidly as possible. The 330 miles which intervened between Memphis and Chattanooga were miles which embraced various difficulties, both such as nature imposed in the shape of mountains and rivers, and those which the enemy interposed by obstructing roadways, making dashes into his trains, and occasionally confronting him with almost regular lines of battle. At length, on the 13th of November, as already stated, Sherman announced his arrival at Bridgeport, and bore to Grant at Chattanooga, the welcome news that his troops were following close behind him. On the 14th, Sherman's advance reached Bridgeport, where it would have been sooner, but for the high water on Elk River, which drove them some thirty miles out of their way. On the 17th Sherman announced to Grant, that the leading division of his force was on its way from Bridgeport, by the Tennessee, to Chattanooga. It was

to be followed on the next day by the remainder of his command.

On the day after Sherman's arrival, in person, at Chattanooga, he rode out in company with Grant, Thomas and other officers, to the hills on the north bank of the Tennessee whence they could view Chattanooga, the entire line of Missionary Ridge, and its terminus on the Tennessee River, the point which Sherman was expected to take and to fortify. He returned at once to Bridgeport, where he spent the time for several days urging up his men and getting ready for the great battle which impended, his position in which he now knew well, and whose responsibility he felt with a keenness of a resolute and able commander. Grant had submitted to him and Thomas the general plans of the battle, after they had ridden over the field together and studied its topography.

According to the plan as sketched in Grant's mind, the battle should begin on November 21st, at daylight. By this time, Sherman's troops were expected up from Bridgeport, marching on the north side of the Tennesse River, and crossing upon a pontoon bridge to be sprung across the Tennessee near the mouth of the Chickamauga, ascending the hills at the northern end of Missionary Ridge and taking a firm hold. In order that Sherman might be able to accomplish this without possibility of failure, he was to be reinforced with one division of the Army of the Cumberland, under Gen. J. C. Davis. The course of Sherman's troops was to be protected by batteries, under Brannan, Thomas's chief of artillery. After crossing the river, Sherman was to move rapidly forward, cover the heights on the north end of the ridge, and push his forces as far as to the ravine, through which ran the tunnel. This crossing and advance was to be in the nature of a surprise, and

was to be effected before it was possible for the enemy to concentrate on his front. After Sherman succeeded in getting into position, well up the end of the ridge, Thomas, whose position was in the valley, was to push his left out until it touched Sherman's right, and move forward simultaneously with him and in his support. The valley southeast of Chattanooga was Grant's centre. In it was Thomas's army. The right was Lookout Mountain. As already stated, Hooker held a position on its southern skirts, commanding Lookout Valley. He was supported by Geary's division and two brigades under Cruft, from the Fourth Army Corps. On the 20th, Howard was ordered to take position on the north side of the Tennessee, near the pontoon bridge, over which Sherman was expected to pass, and to hold himself in readiness to move there to the coöperation of Sherman or of Thomas, as needed. Long's brigade of cavalry was to be thrown out on to Sherman's left flank, and if it should not be needed for Sherman's purposes, it was then to cross the Chickamauga and raid the enemy's communications in the rear, doing as much damage as possible.

Sherman began his march from Bridgeport by sending Ewing by Lookout Valley, to make a feint on the left flank of the Confederates, in the direction of Trenton. He crossed his other divisions at Brown's Ferry, marched up the north bank of the river to the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek, and kept them concealed in the woods until they were ready to cross. Owing to the heavy rains and bad condition of the roads, he was unable to get more than one division into position by the 21st, and Grant delayed the battle to give him further time. By the 23rd, another division reported, and by daylight of the 24th, Sherman with 8,000 men was intrenched on the east

bank of the Tennessee. Thomas now learned that Sherman's movements across Lookout Valley had been discovered by Bragg, and he directed Howard to cross over into Chattanooga, so as to lead Bragg to suppose that Sherman's troops were coming to reinforce Chattanooga. Howard crossed on Sunday and took position in the rear of Thomas' army, and in full view of the enemy. On the 20th, Bragg had notified Grant to withdraw all non-combatants from Chattanooga. This was done for the purpose of covering up a movement of Bragg's own to the south, with the intention of going to the relief of Longstreet. To test the truth of this theory, Grant ordered Thomas to try the enemy's lines on the morning of the 23rd, drive in his pickets, and see if he still held his force on the front. This movement was participated in by Sheridan's and Hood's divisions of the Fourth Corps and supported by Baird's division of the Fourteenth. They moved out on the plain, as if on parade, and in full sight of Bragg and his army on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. They formed their lines regularly and moved forward to attack the enemy, advancing with rapidity. They steadily pushed back the Confederate lines, and finally with a sweeping charge, drove the Confederates out of their first line of rifle-pits and sent them on a full run to the rear, capturing fully 200 prisoners. Here they made themselves secure by throwing up temporary breastworks, and sending a strong picket to the front, to protect the new line. The spot thus captured was known as "Orchard Knob," and a strong battery was placed upon it.

After Sherman crossed the Tennessee River, at the north end of Missionary Ridge, he placed his command in three columns, which followed in their advance the general direction of Chickamauga Creek. His left was under Gen. M.

L. Smith and rested on the creek; his centre was under Gen. J. E. Smith; and his right was under Gen. Ewing. The whole, as a corps, were under the command of Gen. Frank P. Blair. Davis's division moved to the attack in support of these. All of the officers had supposed that Missionary Ridge was an even range at its northern extremity. When Sherman left the river, he passed over the foothills and pressed up to what was supposed to be the main portion of the ridge, but when he reached the top of this, which was accomplished in the midst of lively skirmishing, he found a deep ravine between this hill and the next. On the opposite side of this, the Confederates were heavily entrenched, and this was the very point which he had been ordered to take. Finding that the opposite side of the ravine was strongly fortified, and fearing that he could not capture it without a prolonged fight and unnecessary loss, he fortified the top of the first hill and prepared to hold the ground that he had thus far gained. Here he was attacked by the enemy with a heavy artillery and musketry fire. After a severe struggle, their attack was repulsed. He then prepared for the night, posting his command so as to hold the positions gained. Howard, after taking his new position in the valley, pushed out his left, so as to connect with Sherman's right. At midnight Sherman received word from Grant to attack the enemy at dawn of the next day, and that Thomas would attack in force early in the day.

While Sherman's attack upon the enemy's left at Missionary Ridge had been going on, Hooker had been pressing his right on the slope up Lookout Mountain, thus drawing Bragg's attention to this point and away from Sherman while crossing the river and getting into position. Hooker was under instructions from Thomas, that if he at any time

felt himself able to carry the enemy's position, he should do so. On the 24th, at 4 A. M., Hooker reported his troops ready to move. Finding that Lookout Creek had been swollen with recent rains, so that he could not cross without building a temporary bridge, he sent Geary up the creek to effect a crossing at Wauhatchie. Geary made his crossing, and while the enemy were watching Hooker building the bridge, he came, under cover of a heavy mist, down the creek until he was on the enemy's flank and rear. The enemy, under Stevenson, were six brigades strong, posted on the northern slope of the mountain, midway between the palisades and the Tennessee River. They had a continuous line of earthworks lower down the slope, so as to prevent an assault from the direction of the river. On each flank were rifle-pits, batteries, walls of stone and abatis, as against an attack from either Chattanooga or Lookout Valley. As Geary moved down the right bank of the creek, he soon encountered the enemy's pickets. They gave the alarm, when the troops rushed into the breastworks and rifle-pits. All these positions were soon covered by artillery planted by Hooker's orders. He sent a brigade of Osterhaus's division up the creek to build another bridge, and left Cruft with a small command out on the first bridge to attract the attention of the enemy. The second bridge was completed by 11 o'clock, when Osterhaus's division crossed to Gen. Geary on the right bank. Under cover of an artillery fire, the entire line advanced, pressing the enemy closely back. By noon Geary's advance had driven the Confederates around the peak of the mountain, when he was ordered to halt and reform his men, but having the Confederates on the run, he kept pushing forward, driving them into disorder and panic. He was supported by other brigades coming up on the high ground on his right and doub-

ling up the confused Confederate lines, which had been reinforced, but were still unable to resist the sweep of Hooker's troops as they rounded the curve of the mountain at Craven's House, the spot selected by the enemy for his last stand. From here, he was driven in confusion and rout down the rocks and precipices in the Chattanooga Valley. It was now 2 o'clock, and Hooker was unable to see his immediate front on account of the mist which had settled on the top of the mountain. He halted his troops in position, threw up temporary breastworks, with his line on the east side of the mountain, his right resting on the palisades, his left on the mouth of the Chattanooga Creek. From this position, he reported to Thomas, who ordered Carlin with his brigade to report to him, who was placed on the extreme right, thereby relieving Geary's troops. During the night, the Confederates abandoned the top of the mountain while the Summertown road remained open, leaving behind him his camp and garrison equipage. This gave to the Union army full control of the river and railroad up to Chattanooga. While the mists still clung on the mountain, early on the 25th, Hooker was ordered to press forward on the Rossville road, carry the pass and operate on Bragg's left and rear. Advancing down the valley, he found the Confederate pickets holding the right bank of the Chattanooga Creek, where the bridge on the Rossville road had been destroyed. Here Hooker was delayed for some three hours, when Osterhaus crossed his infantry on the stringers and pressed forward, driving the enemy's pickets over to Rossville. They were driven out of this, and Rossville Gap, a point of great importance, fell into Hooker's possession.

On the same morning, that of Nov. 25th, Sherman made his disposition for his main attack. Holding his centre

with three brigades, he moved gradually east and west along the base of Missionary Ridge, with his right and left flanks. Corse, advancing from the right centre and supported by Lightburn on the left and M. L. Smith on the right, occupied the summit in the woods, within eighty yards of the entrenched lines of the enemy. From this point, Corse assaulted the main Confederate line and for over an hour, a heavy contest was maintained, during which, both Confederate and Union forces were driven back and forth several times. In the end, Corse managed to maintain the summit, which he had first secured. The commands of Loomis and M. L. Smith also joined in this contest, which did not end until 3 o'clock. The Union force held their own at all points, but did not make much headway. Sherman found himself at this point fighting the heavy and concentrated columns of the enemy, and thus far the main portion of the battle had fallen to his share. It was, however, a part which Grant had expected him to play in the contest, and he was playing it manfully and to the purpose. Thomas, Howard and the other commanders in the centre felt anxious for Sherman's welfare. Grant was more than anxious, but did not wish to change the situation until Hooker could be heard from, on the extreme right. Grant felt that Hooker's appearance there would be the signal for relief to the stubborn fighting which Sherman was encountering. It was also to be the signal for the grand move from the centre. Finding that Hooker had been delayed, by reason of the destruction of the bridge near Rossville, and that the expected diversion was not to come from that quarter, Grant ordered Thomas to move out his four central divisions—Baird on the left, Wood and Sheridan in the centre and Johnson on the extreme right—with two lines of skirmishers in the front, supported by the

entire force. They were to press forward, carry the first line of rifle-pits, halt and await orders. The movement was to begin at 3 o'clock, at a signal by six guns, fired in rapid succession from Orchard Knob. When the guns sounded, the troops, impatient of their all-day wait, while Sherman's men had been so hard at work, pressed eagerly forward, divisions, brigades and regiments striving with each other for the advance. With the very first movement, Bragg began to hurry reinforcements from his right and left to strengthen his troops against the assault on his centre. This centre was under the command of Gen. Breckenridge, in whose front were four lines of breastworks. The first line had been captured by the movement on the 23rd, leaving three lines of formidable rifle-pits, the first of which was near the foot of the ridge. From this to the top was a steep ascent of 500 yards covered with timber and rocks. Half-way up this, another line of breastworks had been thrown up. On the top of the hill, were the enemy's heaviest breastworks, protected by some fifty pieces of artillery.

As the Union troops advanced, cheering and echoing the cheers of each other, they broke into a double quick, all striving to be first to reach the rifle-pits, at the foot of the ridge, which were held by a strong line of the enemy's troops. The batteries from the top of the hill poured down upon them a rain of shot and shell, soon changing it to grape and cannister, which, united with the fire of the infantry from the rifle-pits, made progress very difficult. Dashing through this fire, Thomas' soldiers swept onward, drove in the enemy's skirmishers, charged on the line of works at the foot of the ridge, captured it at the point of the bayonet, routed the Confederates, sending them at full speed up the hill, and killed and captured large numbers.

The several commands reached the rifle-pits almost at the same time and were prepared to lie down, in accordance with the instructions, but they were subjected to such hot and plunging fire from the enemy on the crest of the ridge that, without further waiting for orders from their officers, first one regiment and then another started up the ascent, until the entire line advanced over and around rocks, under and through fallen timber, charged up the ridge, each determined to reach the summit first, each cheered on by their officers. The centre of Sheridan's division reached the top first and crossed to the right of Bragg's headquarters. The rest of the line was soon up, and, almost simultaneously the ridge was carried in more than half a dozen places. The enemy concentrated and made a most determined stand, but it lasted only a short while. They could not withstand the terrible onset of the Union troops, and were driven from their lines into broken and panic-stricken retreat. Battery after battery, regiment after regiment, were captured by the victorious troops. From the time the charge began until the troops occupied the top of the ridge, not over an hour had elapsed. Bragg, Breckenridge and a number of Confederate generals barely escaped capture. Sheridan pushed his advantage for about a mile, driving the enemy ahead of him, out on the Chickamauga road. At a high point on the road, he had an engagement with them. They had posted eight pieces of artillery, for the purpose of covering their retreat. This position, Sheridan flanked, when the enemy hastily decamped, leaving two pieces of artillery and a large number of wagons.

Looking back over the battle field at Chattanooga we can now see how admirably the plans were laid, and what an important part Sherman was to play. Perhaps no scene had ever been more thoroughly prospected in advance by

the generals who were to enter upon it. We have seen by what exquisite manœuvering the siege was raised and the roads and supply lines opened down to Brown's Ferry and Bridgeport. One advantage of the new road, up from Brown's Ferry, was that as soon as it entered the hills on the north side of the Tennessee, it was out of sight of the Confederates on Lookout Mountain, and hence Bragg could not tell whether troops marching on it were destined for the relief of Burnside at Knoxville, or of Thomas at Chattanooga. This was most important, for Bragg was far more concerned for Longstreet, whom he had detached for Knoxville, and any attack upon whom, from the direction of Chattanooga, would necessarily be in the rear, than he was for his own elevated and apparently secure position.

Investigation had shown that the north end of Missionary ridge was insecurely guarded by Bragg, and the line of the left bank of the Tennessee from South Chickamauga Creek westward to the main Confederate front was held only by the enemy's cavalry pickets. These facts determined the chief point of onset. The massing of the Union forces was to take place in that direction. Sherman was to cross the Tennessee, from the right to the left bank, as he did. Thomas was to throw in a divison to his aid, and connect with his right, and then fully coöperate with Sherman as he made his advance up the northern slopes of the ridge. In addition to this Sherman was to keep his left well swung round toward Chickamauga Station, which was Bragg's source of supplies, and the valley leading down from which toward Dalton would become his line of retreat, in case he was forced from his position. To cut the railroad here, would also imperil Longstreet, and completely sever him from Bragg.

At an early period it was discovered that Bragg was

apprehensive of an attack on his left. This impression was engendered by Hooker's active operations in Lookout Valley, and to keep it up became a prime object on the part of Grant. It was for this purpose that Sherman was ordered to deflect his leading division from Bridgeport toward Trenton, in the valley west of Lookout, and to keep the camp fires brightly burning, so as to give the appearance of large concentration of force there, and so as to disguise the fact that his main body was really on the march up the river to the pontoon crossing opposite Missionary Ridge.

We have seen how Grant had fixed the date of the battle for the 20th, and how it was postponed to the 24th, on account of the inability of Sherman to get his forces up and into position in time. This delay brings to light an important and even heroic part of Sherman's military history, though one apt to be dimmed by the recital of more brilliant field operations and by the smoke of actual cannonade. As the central spirit of these operations, upon which hung all Grant's plans and the fate of the great battle, it is eminently proper that their details as well as those of the splendid move across the Tennessee and up the slopes of Missionary Ridge should become a part of his life.

Sherman's mood was shaped by what he had seen on his visit to Grant and Thomas at Chattanooga, and he had seen enough of the acute apprehension for Burnside's safety in East Tennessee, and of the condition of men and animals in Chattanooga, to inspire him with renewed energy. He had looked over the ground of his future operations and was in full accord with all that was to transpire. He hastened back to Bridgeport to find his troops coming in from their 330 mile march from Memphis. He had deflected his leading division (Ewing's) to Trenton, to coöperate

with Hooker. He had hastened J. E. Smith's division forward, and was urging the others up as fast as they arrived at Bridgeport. He found his troops in elegant condition after their long march, and they were responsive to his every order, able and willing for the toil and hardships of a forced march over the terribly cut up road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. The Brown's Ferry bridge broke repeatedly under the strain of his rapidly marching forces, and he was compelled to suffer delays which no human capacity could anticipate or prevent. Labor was incessant night and day. Not until the 23rd did Ewing's division get across the bridge, and he was no sooner across than the bridge fell again, cutting off his rear division entirely. This was Osterhaus', which deflected to Hooker and helped him in the splendid charge which won the heights of Lookout Mountain.

At last, and after these Herculean efforts, Sherman's three divisions lay behind the hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga. A brigade of the Second Division was sent to North Chickamauga Creek to man the boats for the pontoon bridge, which had been prepared there, and quietly drop them down at midnight to a point above the South Chickamauga, at which point it was to land secretly and drive off or capture the enemy's river pickets. The entire brigade was to drop below the month of the Chickamauga, disembark, and quickly send the boats across for fresh loads. Every Confederate picket, except one, was captured, and the brigade was promptly disembarked. Speedily the boats now plied between shore and shore, and by daylight of November 24th, two divisions, General Morgan L. Smith's and General John E. Smith's, comprising 8,000 men, had been ferried across, and had ensconsed themselves behind respectable rifle pits. By noon

of that day the regular pontoon bridge had been completed, both of whose ends were now protected, and the crossing of which by the other troops, the artillery and the munitions, was secured. A pontoon was also thrown across the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, communicating with the two regiments which had landed on the north side. At this point in his hurried and delicate operations, Sherman bore willing testimony to the completeness of the whole business. All his officers and men manifested a willingness and skill which he praised highly. He had never beheld work done so quietly and effectually, and he challenged the annals of war to show the laying of a bridge, 1,350 feet in length, so noiselessly and in so short a time.

Jeff C. Davis's division crossed the bridge promptly, and at 1 P. M., Sherman had his three divisions in line, marching from the river and up the northern slopes of Missionary Ridge. As already stated, M. L. Smith held the left, following substantially the line of Chickamauga Creek; J. E. Smith held the centre with double column; General Ewing held the right, prepared to deploy constantly to the right. Heavy lines of skirmishers preceded the respective columns, advancing under a drizzling rain and low hanging clouds which cloaked their operations. Thus a brigade of each division was pushed rapidly up the hill, and then the enemy for the first time seemed to realize the character of Sherman's audacious movement. They immediately opened a heavy artillery fire on Sherman's position, but Ewing soon got some guns in position and replied with effect. Lightburn pushed his command over the depression in his immediate front and took position on the hill beyond, where he was furiously attacked, but managed to hold his own. Though disappointed in the nature of the ground, which Sherman had conceived to be a grad-

ual slope, he felt secure where he was, and ordered the position to be fortified and his flanks to be extended. At 4 P. M. the enemy felt his left and precipitated a sharp engagement, in which they were repulsed. It cost Sherman the loss of General G. A. Smith, who was severely wounded, and whose command devolved on Col. Tupper. As night drew on Sherman ordered Jeff C. Davis to keep one of his brigades in contact with the bridge, one close up to the position on the hill and one between. All night heavy details were kept at work on the intrenchments. Howard had connected his left with Sherman's right, as had been prearranged, and had left three of his regiments with Ewing.

During the night the sky cleared and Sherman's camp fires revealed his position to the enemy above him and the Union forces in the valley of Chattanooga. At midnight orders came from Grant that Sherman should attack at dawn of day, (November 25th,) with notice that Thomas would attack early in the day. Before daylight Sherman and his staff were in the saddle and rode out on his extreme left near the Chickamauga, then up the hill which Lightburn held, and around to the right of Ewing. This hasty review of the situation, decided Sherman to make his attack directly on Missionary Ridge with his wings supporting. Quite a valley lay before him, and the opposite hills presented steep sides, covered with wood. Beyond them lay another ridge, still higher. One point on the crest of the first ridge was held by the enemy, behind breastworks of logs and earth. The entire crest of the second ridge was known to be occupied by the enemy in force, from which a plunging fire could be directed on the crest of the first. The gorge between those two crests was the one through which several roads and the railroad tun-



BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

nel passed, which fact made it doubly important to the enemy, as it afforded a means of turning his flank and attacking his supplies and communications.

Sherman disposed his forces for the attack. The brigades of Cockrell, Alexander and Lightburn were to hold on where they were. General Corse was to lead the attack from Sherman's right centre pushing up the narrow ridge in his front, supported by one of Lightburn's regiments. General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with Corse. Loomis was to move along the west base of the ridge, supported by the reserve brigades of General John E. Smith. Corse was ready by sun-up, and the bugle sounded "Forward!" Three of his regiments moved down the hill, on the right centre, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced till within eighty yards of the intrenched position, where Corse found a secondary crest which he gained and held. Here he called for reinforcements, which were sent, but the space was narrow and fully exposed to the sweeping fire of the enemy's musketry and artillery, so that it was a fatal spot on which to crowd too many men. Corse's way out was to assault. This he did in gallant style, bringing on a close and sanguinary contest, driving and being driven for over an hour, but all the while holding his grip on his first position. Smith kept gaining ground steadily on Sherman's left, and Loomis fought his way by slow degrees around to the right till he was abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment, where he became the object of a murderous fire from the enemy, which, while it did him much harm, served to relieve the pressure on Sherman's centre. All of Sherman's artillery that could be brought into requisition was playing on the hill to his front.

It was now 10 A. M. The fight had fully developed and

was being conducted with stubborn fury by both sides. Corse fell, badly wounded, and was succeeded by Col. Walcut, of the 46th Ohio, who continued the contest with spirit, pressing onward at all points. Loomis continued to make progress to the right. Ewing felt that he could spare part of his command from the left, and he sent Raum's and Matthias' brigades to the support of the centre. They moved to join Walcut, under a terrific fire of cannon and musketry, but accomplished their object. The ground, however, was too narrow for full deployment and they remained on the west side of the ridge. The enemy, meanwhile, had massed heavily in the tunnel gorge, and had worked a large body, under cover of the bushes, upon the right flank of this new command. They debouched and attacked suddenly, throwing the Union troops into disorder and compelling a retreat to the foot of the hill, where they were reformed. As they were only supporting columns, their discomfiture had no effect on the general attack. Corse and Smith and Loomis still held their own, engaged in fierce struggle throughout the day. Even the retreat of the two supporting brigades was turned to the discomfiture of the enemy, for when they attempted to pursue, full advantage was taken of the exposure of their flanks, and they were driven in disorder behind the cover of the hills.

The hour of 3 P. M. had arrived. Sherman was manfully doing the part assigned to him. It was a bright clear day, and the amphitheatre of Chattanooga lay at his feet, filled with Thomas' army. The master spirit of the battle was also there, and Sherman looked down on the scene wondering what Grant's dispatch could have meant that "*Thomas would attack early in the day.*" Column after column of the enemy was streaming out toward Sherman. Battery after battery was concentrating its fire on his posi-

tion, rendering it more untenable every moment, at least making progress more dangerous and impossible. While Sherman's heart was beating with anxiety, Grant's too was palpitating with desire. He had listened long for sound of Hooker from down the valley and on his right, and Bragg's left, and he was still anxiously listening. It came not, but he was sure it would come. At any rate, Sherman's fine attack had even more than answered the purpose intended. The enemy had greatly weakened their centre to contend with Sherman. The critical hour had arrived for all.

At a little after 3 P. M. Sherman noticed the white line of musketry fire rolling out from the front of Orchard Knob in the valley, and extending further and further right and left. He could only hear the faint echoes of sound, but could see enough to know that Thomas' army was in motion. He felt confident of the result, for he knew that his morning's work had drawn heavy masses of the enemy to his front. Therefore he held on with the greater determination, refusing to be reinforced, and confiding to Thomas' efforts to break the enemy's centre.

Soon the long light clouds of musketry smoke in the valley disappeared behind the intervening spurs of the ridge, and the further progress of Thomas' army was unknown to Sherman till late in the evening, when the glorious news was broken to him that it had swept irresistibly up the ridge, and had broken through the enemy's centre, capturing all before it, and forcing a disastrous retreat. Then pursuit became the order of the day, or rather night. Morgan L. Smith was ordered to feel the tunnel. He found it vacant, except as occupied by the dead and wounded of both armies. The reserve of Jeff C. Davis was ordered at once to cross the Chickamauga on the pontoon and push rapidly toward Chickamauga Depot. Howard's corps, which

lay on Sherman's right, was ordered to follow Davis at 4 A. M. The entire Fifteenth Corps was ordered to follow at daylight. All these troops were compelled to cross the pontoon on the Chickamauga. By 11 A. M. of the 26th Davis reached the depot in time to see it in flames, with the enemy strongly posted on either side. These he drove off. The desolation at the depot was such as war only unfolds. The flames were consuming all manner of supplies intended for Confederate use while the invasion of Kentucky and Tennessee progressed. Piles of corn, sacks of corn-meal, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, gun carriages, pontoons, and all the paraphernalia of a great army and grand campaign, were feeding the hissing flames.

Sherman halted here only long enough to rescue what supplies he could from the flames. Then he pushed the pursuit with all swiftness and persistency, for he knew that both Thomas and Hooker were doing the same, and that Grant's object was to inflict all the damage he could on Bragg before he reached Dalton, the point whither he was supposed to be tending. Sherman found the roads strewn with wrecked impedimenta, and at last struck the enemy's rear guard, near a dark, deep swamp. Here a smart battle ensued, which delayed Sherman's further progress for the night. Grant reached the scene during the night and ordered a continuation of the pursuit on the morrow. It was kept up to Graysville, when Hooker's guns were heard further south and near Ringgold. As the roads were filled with troops, Sherman pushed no further in that direction, but sent Howard to break up the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, while he returned to destroy the eastward communications between Bragg and Longstreet. He however, sent Jeff C. Davis' division to Hooker's assistance and left the Fifteenth Corps at Graysville, ready for any emer-

gency. But his personal movement was checked by a request from Hooker for further help, he having come upon the enemy in strong force at the mountain pass beyond Ringgold and having had a hard battle. Sherman's disposition of Howard's corps, had already turned the position of the enemy in Hooker's front, and by the time Sherman reached Hooker, the enemy had fled to Tunnel Hill, a point outside of the Chattanooga Valley and entirely off the soil of Tennessee.

At Ringgold Sherman again met Grant, and it was agreed that all that could be accomplished in the way of pursuit and destruction in that direction had been achieved. Sherman was therefore ordered to confine his further operations to the direction of Charleston and the line of the Hiawasse. This would be to aid Granger's corps which Grant had already started to Burnside's aid at Knoxville, and, as it turned out, to place Sherman also in the direct line of march thither.

In the battles which are grouped under that of Chattanooga, Grant's losses were 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 330 missing, a total of 5,616. The enemy's losses in killed and wounded were lighter owing to their more advantageous positions, but to them must be added the loss of 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery wagons, and 7,000 small arms. Hooker fought with about 10,000 men, Sherman with 20,000, including Howard's corps, and Thomas with 30,000. Bragg had 45,000; equal to thrice that number considering the advantages of his positions. In many respects Chattanooga was one of the most magnificent battles ever fought. The plans were well studied and deep. They embraced the most delicate manœuvres under the very eye of the enemy. Only the most skillful generals, and those in thorough accord, could have held to

the original plans. Only the most undaunted soldiers could have turned the toil which preceded action and the heroism which was required for it into victory. Chattanooga was the crowning result of a myriad of causes, a culmination of grandly conceived and concentered ideas, all betokening military genius of the highest order and military execution as definite as machine work. Tenacious fighting did the work at Shiloh. Magnificent strategy conquered Vicksburg. Complicated manœuvre bewildered Bragg at Chattanooga, and prompt action drove him like a whirlwind from his proud pinnacle. The importance of the victory to the country could not be magnified. It laid bare the very heart of the Confederacy. Its powerful border stronghold was gone, as well as its base for further Northern operations in the West. There was a way to Atlanta and the fields and magazines of the South. And it was a victory as important to Sherman as to Grant, in showing that the Government had made no mistake by giving to the one the control of the Division of the Mississippi and to the other the command of the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman received the direct compliments of Grant for his steadfast and heroic part in the battle. The Government thanked him through its officials, and after his return from Knoxville the Senate and House of Representatives resolved, "That the thanks of Congress and of the people of the United States are due and are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and officers and soldiers under him, for their gallant and arduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of the Cumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle of Chattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success of our arms in that glorious victory."

CHAPTER X.

KNOXVILLE AND MERIDIAN.

After the magnificent battle and splendid victory at Chattanooga, or rather Missionary Ridge, Nov. 25th, 1863, Sherman's forces pursued the fleeing Confederate columns as far as Ringgold, where they met those of Hooker, who had also been engaged in a vigorous pursuit. Here Grant came up, who, on learning that Bragg was in full retreat toward Dalton, ordered the pursuit off, in order that he might relieve Knoxville, where Burnside was known to be in great danger. Even before the battle of Missionary Ridge, Bragg had detached Longstreet's corps to augment the Confederate forces which were closing in on Knoxville and threatening its capture, together with entire East Tennessee. Grant and Sherman spent the night of Nov. 27th together at Graysville, and the whole matter of the relief of Burnside was talked over. Grant would go back to Chattanooga at once, and start Granger's Fourth Corps toward Knoxville. Sherman was to march his corps in the same direction, keeping out well into the country and picking up all the forage he could find, so as to relieve the slack stores at Chattanooga.

By Nov. 29th all his columns converged at Cleveland, and the next day he was at the railroad crossing on the Hiawassee, near Charleston. Here he had word from Grant, to the effect that Burnside was completely invested by Longstreet, and in need of instant relief, and that he

(Grant) had lost faith in Granger's ability to reach the scene in time. He therefore asked Sherman to assume command of all the forces moving up the Tennessee, including Granger's Corps, and out of them to organize such a force as he deemed adequate for the situation. The necessity for promptitude was great, and this new tax on Sherman's tired troops was felt keenly by them.

But Sherman was equal to the task. He outlined his march with great dispatch, and by the night of December 3d his cavalry advance, under Long, reached Knoxville to convey to Burnside the welcome news that Sherman was rapidly approaching with force sufficient to raise the siege. On December 5th the head of Sherman's infantry column reached Marysville, fifteen miles distant from Knoxville. This approach was too much for Longstreet, and he hurriedly raised the siege, after having tried in a desperate assault to break through Burnside's fortification. Longstreet retreated up the valley toward Virginia. Sherman halted his entire army, except two divisions. With these and his entire staff, he pushed on and entered Knoxville on December 6th to consult with Burnside as to measures of pursuit. Burnside said he had already taken steps to pursue, and thought he would be successful with the aid of two of Granger's divisions. Sherman tendered him the help of his own jaded and half frozen forces. Having spent a few days in and about Knoxville and supplied Burnside with all he needed to conduct a vigorous pursuit of Longstreet, he began an easy return march to Chattanooga, which was reached on December 16th. Here, Sherman was ordered to restore the two divisions of Howard and Davis, borrowed for the occasion of the Knoxville campaign, to their original place in Thomas' army, and to take his own

Fifteenth corps into Northern Alabama for the balance of the winter.

Sherman's report furnishes the details of this Knoxville operation, so promptly executed and so pregnant with results. Its gist is to the following effect:—Grant's fears that Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, induced him to order Sherman to take command of all the troops moving to Burnside's relief, and to hasten to his rescue. Seven days before, he had left camp on the Tennessee with with two days' rations, without a change of clothing and with but a single coat and blanket per man. He was illy sppulied for such a march, having no provisions except what had been gathered on the way to Charleston. But the thought that 12,000 fellow-soldiers were beleagured in a mountain town, 84 miles distant and that relief must be had in three days, was a stimulus to further sacrifices. That night Howard repaired and planked the railroad bridge at Charleston, and at daylight the army crossed the Hiawasse, and marched to Athens a distance of fifteen miles. In the night his cavalry overtook him in Athens. Here he sent word to Granger, who was skirting the Tennessee, to push out and meet him at Philadelphia.

On December 2d, he moved rapidly toward Loudon, twenty six miles distant, sending his cavalry ahead to save, if possible, the bridge across the Tennessee, which was held by a Confederate Brigade under Vaughn. The cavalry moved rapidly and captured every Confederate picket, but Vaughn's artillery proved too strong for a successful cavalry dash and darkness set in before Howard got his infantry up. The enemy decamped in the night destroying pontoons, running locomotives and cars into the Tennessee and abandoning four guns and many provisions, which fell into Howard's hands in the morning. The destruction of the bridge

here forced Sherman to the east, and made him dependent on Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was now important that Burnside should know of Sherman's coming. Sherman, therefore, ordered Long's Brigade of cavalry to move hastily from Loudon and push to Knoxville in twenty-fours hours at whatever cost of life and horse-flesh. The distance was forty miles and the roads very bad. This force was off by daylight of December 3rd. After its departure, Sherman ordered the Fifteenth corps from Philadelphia to the Little Tennessee at Morgantown, expecting to find a crossing. But the water was too deep and cold, and a bridge became indispensable. One was improvised and finished by the night of December 4th and, by the morning of the 5th, Blair's Fifteenth Corps, and Granger's and Davis' Divisions were across. On that day he received word from Burnside that Long's Cavalry Brigade had arrived at Knoxville, and that Longstreet still lay before the place, but was showing evidences of retreat. Howard had marched from Loudon and had crossed the river on an ingeniously constructed bridge, seven miles below Morgantown. Sherman used all haste, and by the night of the 5th his columns converged at Marysville. Another messenger from Burnside told of the retreat of Longstreet in the direction of Virginia, with all his (Burnside's) cavalry at his heels. Sherman ordered Granger, with two divisions, to push ahead and report at once to Burnside, so as to be ready to take part in the pursuit. Sherman himself rode from Marysville to Knoxville, on December 6th, leaving his command to rest or move at leisure. On his arrival he and Burnside inspected the fortifications, and it was Sherman's opinion that they were practically proof against assault.

Burnside tendered Sherman the following letter:— "General: I desire to express to you and your command my

most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptnes in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approach served to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the present, any other portion of your command but the corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section; and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately with him in order to relieve us, I deem it advisible that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front of Bragg's Army. In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

A. E. BURNSIDE, Major General Commander.

Having seen Granger's forces into Knoxville, and General Burnside's in pursuit of Longstreet, Sherman returned to his own command. He marched it back to Tellico, and thence to Charleston. On December 14th, his forces lay along the Hiawassee. There he left his cavalry and marched the rest of his troops by easy stages back to Chattanooga and Bridgeport, as Grant had ordered, where Jeff C. Davis was ordered to take the Fifteenth Corps to Alabama, and the rest were distributed to their proper commands. Since the departure of his corps from the Big Black River, after the fall of Vicksburg, Sherman had been constantly on the move and had made one of the longest forced marches—Memphis to Chattanooga—and fought one of the grandest and most decisive battles of the war. His losses to this date, including the battle of Chattanooga, were, as far as reported, 265 killed, 1332 wounded and 290 missing.

On December 19, 1863, Sherman was at Bridgeport, below Chattanooga on the Tennessee, where he gave the necesary

orders for the distribution of the Fifteenth Corps along the line of the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and of the Sixteenth (now Dodge's) along the railroad from Decatur to Nashville, all to repair railroads and get ready for the Spring campaign.

On December 21, 1863, Grant moved his headquarters from Chattanooga to Nashville, leaving Thomas in full command of the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga. About this time General Logan succeeded to the command of Sherman's old corps, the Fifteenth relieving General Blair. Grant's despatches to Halleck at this time were, "I am now collecting as large a cavalry force as can be spared, at Savannah, Tenn., to cross the Tennessee River, and co-operate with Hurlbut's command at Memphis, cleaning out entirely the forces now collecting in West Tennessee, under Forrest. It is the design that the cavalry, after finishing the work they first started upon, shall push South through East Mississippi and destroy the Mobile road as far South as they can. Sherman goes to Memphis and Vicksburg, in person, and will have Grenada visited and such other points on the Mississippi Central as may require it.... I want the State of Mississippi so visited that large armies cannot traverse there, this winter." This was the incipient stage of the Meridian campaign.

Sherman received word from Grant to meet him in Nashville for a conference. Sherman started for that place on December 21st. Their talk was of the Spring campaign. Grant was already pondering that movement South from Chattanooga which was originally designed to end at Mobile, where Farragut was to meet him with the fleet, but which, under changed circumstances and Sherman's genius, became the "March to the Sea." He did not however broach this matter till January 15th, 1864, but he and Sherman agreed at

Nashville that whatever direction the Spring campaign took, it would be necessary to free as many of the Union troops then holding the Mississippi as possible. In order to do this the Meridian campaign and the Shreveport expedition of General Bank's were planned for the winter.

Sherman's Department, that of the Tennessee, embraced the east bank of the Mississippi from Natchez to the mouth of the Ohio, and thence up the Tennessee to Decatur and Bellefonte, Ala. McPherson was at Vicksburg and Hurlbut at Memphis, with their respective commands. The Confederates still maintained a respectable infantry and a large and active cavalry force in Mississippi, threatening the river navigation and raiding the railroads. Sherman was satisfied he could crush these and set the river garrisons free by one or two quick moves inland from some river point. Banks could do the same west of the river. To this Sherman now turned his attention, with Grant's approval.

After giving all necessary orders for the distribution of his forces in Southern and Middle Tennessee he spent Christmas, 1863, with his family in Lancaster, Ohio, and arrived in Cairo on January 3d, on his way down the Mississippi. On January 10th, 1864, he arrived at Memphis and explained to Hurlbut his intention of starting with an army of 20,000 men from Vicksburg for Meridian and tearing up the Vicksburg & Selma and Mobile & Ohio Railroads. Hurlbut was to prepare two of his divisions for the campaign. Sherman found General W. S. Smith's Cavalry Column, 2,500 strong, at Memphis, sent there by Grant, to aid Sherman in his campaign, as well as to punish Forrest, who was continually raiding the Tennessee and Mississippi garrisons. This force now fell to Sherman's command. He proposed to join it with Hurlbut's Cavalry, scattered between Columbus, Ky., and Corinth, and thus make up an

effective force of 7,500 cavalry under General Smith. This was done, and Smith was ordered to move from Memphis directly to Meridian on February 1st, 1864.

Meanwhile, Sherman had been down to Vicksburg to acquaint McPherson with his object and prepare as much of his command as was needed for the campaign. He had come back to Memphis to help Smith off on his cavalry expedition and was again back at Vicksburg on January 27th.

The Confederate General Polk was in command at Meridian, with two divisions of infantry, one posted at Canton and one at Brandon. He had also two strong divisions of cavalry, one under Armstrong, operating between Yazoo City and Jackson, the other under Forrest, operating toward Memphis. Sherman moved out from Vicksburg on February 3d, 1864, with two divisions, his right commanded by McPherson, his left by Hurlbut. He crossed the Big Black and marched direct for Meridian, 150 miles distant, striking the Confederate Cavalry and driving them into Jackson, which was reached on February 6th. Passing through Brandon, Morton was reached on the 9th. The enemy's infantry was flying before him, but his cavalry was flitting about him, forcing him to keep his columns well in hand.

By the 12th, Hurlbut's command reached Decatur, followed closely by McPherson. On the 14th, Meridian was reached, the enemy having evacuated and gone toward Demopolis, without offering any serious resistance. Here Sherman remained five days, burning all public property and destroying the railroads, at the same time waiting for Smith's Cavalry to put in an appearance, of which up to that time, he had not heard the remotest word. During this time, he kept a large force at work breaking up the Mobile & Ohio Railroad north and south; and also the Jackson & Selma Railroad east and west. He was determined to damage these

roads so that they could not be used for hostile purposes, during the war.

Some envious persons insisted that his destination was Mobile, and that because his expedition did not go there, it was a failure. But he never had any intention of going to Mobile. This was made clear in his letter to General Banks before starting from Vicksburg, in which he said that he expected to be back to Vicksburg by March 1st to co-operate with Banks in his movement upon Shreveport. But Sherman by no means wished to disillusion the enemy as to his intentions; on the contrary, he desired to keep up the impression that his objective was Mobile, and this for purposes which the reader can very well guess.

The object of the Meridian expedition was to cut and destroy all the inland railroads, runnning back from the Mississippi and also running north and south, so that Sherman could gather from the defensive force on the Mississippi River a corps of men fully 20,000 strong to be used in the spring campaign, whatever its direction might be. This object Sherman achieved by his Meridian campaign. The secondary object was the destruction of Forrest's Cavalry forces, which had been a constant menace on the supply route running from Memphis eastward. As to this, the expedition did not accomplish very much, owing to the failure of General Smith in handling his large cavalry force in accordance with the specific instructions which Sherman had given him at Memphis. Instead of starting on February 1st, as Sherman had ordered, Smith did not leave Memphis until the 11th of the month, and when he did start he allowed Forrest to intercept him at West Point on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, and to defeat him with an inferior force.

Sherman waited impatiently at Meridian until February 20th, when hearing nothing from Smith, and having de-

stroyed all the railroads in and around that centre, he ordered McPherson to move his corps leisurely back to Canton, whilst he, with Hurlbut's corps and the cavalry, moved north to Marion and Union.

From this point he dispatched his cavalry further north in quest of Smith. He then directed all his infantry to concentrate at Canton, which they reached on February 26th. As yet no word had been received from Smith, and it was not until Sherman's arrival at Vicksburg that he learned that Smith's movement had been an entire failure.

On February 27th, Sherman left the troops at Canton under the command of General Hurlbut, with orders to leave there early in March, and move leisurely to Vicksburg. Sherman himself rode to Vicksburg, in the latter part of February, and there found letters to the effect that he should give aid to General Banks; but Grant would not hear to this, and ordered his return to Huntsville, Ala., to prepare for the spring campaign. Sherman was somewhat dissatisfied with the conflicting orders, and took advantage of the time at his command to steam down to New Orleans to see Banks. He reached New Orleans March 2d, and found Banks about ready to move on Alexandria. Banks urged him to remain over the 4th of March to participate in ceremonies connected with the inauguration of the civil government for Louisiana. Sherman was not organized for displays of this kind, especially during war times, and took his departure from the State on March 3d, reaching Vicksburg on the 6th, where he found the officers and soldiers, who had been with him to Meridian, had returned. Here he reorganized his Vicksburg troops, and left General McPherson in command there with a fair compliment of forces. He made up a division and placed it in command of General T. K. Smith, which he dispatched to the aid of Banks, on the



GENERAL LONGSTREET.

Red River, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet. He made up a similar division and placed it in the hands of General J. A. Mower, which proceeded to Atchafalaya and captured Fort DeRussy, below Alexandria; thus enabling Porter's fleet to ascend the Red River to Alexandria, where it awaited the arrival of Banks.

The delays of Banks and the unfortunate results of his Red River expedition, prevented the return of these two divisions to Sherman in time to participate in his movement of the following spring. Indeed, they never joined his army at all, but were able to get back in time to assist General Thomas in the defeat of Hood at Nashville, in the latter part of 1864.

When Sherman arrived at Vicksburg he received a letter from General Grant to hasten back to Huntsville, Ala. Leaving McPherson with full instructions at Vicksburg, he hurried up the river to Memphis. On his way up he met Captain Badeau, of Grant's staff, who was the bearer of a letter from Grant dated Nashville, March 4, 1864. The letter was marked private.

This letter was not of greater moment to Sherman, than that which gave it birth was to Grant and to the Union. It not only marked a man and men for preferment, but it stamped a policy which had been of long growth, and whose outcrop would be the beginning of a desired end.

Before interpreting this letter, let us see what the situation was. The campaigns of the west and south-west, and indeed throughout the Union, during the year of 1863, had been remarkable, in the respect that where they had been conducted on a principle of separate and selfish action, they had been fatal. Where they had been conducted on the principle of concentrated and co-operative action, they had resulted in material victories. This had been made particu-

larly apparent in that union of departments and concentration of force, which gave to Grant the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, to each of his entrusted subordinates the command of individual departments, and had brought him to unite them all at Chattanooga. But while the Government was willing to accept a logic which was clear, *viz.*, the necessity for combined movement of all its armies under a single, clear-headed, fearless and faithful leadership, it had not yet struck the man, in whose genius it could have implicit confidence. The amiable and popular McClellan, the over prudent and pains-taking Halleck, had failed in those essentials which make victory sure and profitable. They had failed, therefore, to inspire the authorities with that severe and unquestioned confidence, which only could justify the placing of supreme control of the armies and the destiny of the country in their hands.

Certain members of the Cabinet, notably Secretary Stanton, had early become impressed with the importance of supreme superintendence and single effort under a General of adequate capacity It required stirring events, the victories of united armies, the admonitions and arguments 1863, to force these ideas into a conviction in places where it could be given effective and tangible shape. Grant's growth as a successful commander, his genius, his skill, his persistency and wonderful grasp of situations, his tactical powers, his repeated victories, his freedom from political complications, the confidence reposed in him by all of the officers and men of the armies, and now by the Government and the country, greatly simplified the labor and lightened the responsibility of choosing a suitable General-in-Chief.

Another thing now impelled to the adoption of the principle of a single command, that was the political and general military out-look. The Confederate schemes to carry the

war into the North, which had been the central features of the operation of 1863, had failed, but they were now to be supplemented by a disintegrated and demoralizing political doctrine, which had been introduced into the National Democratic platform at Chicago, to the effect that the war for the Union had been a failure and should be abandoned. The General-in-Chief of this doctrine, which was to be exemplified on the stump, the official in command of the Democratic political forces for 1864, was an old commander of the Union Armies, and his popularity was expected to be sufficient to carry the doctrine to a bloodless victory. In the face of such a doctrine, and of so illustrious an exponent, it would not do to push a military contest for any length of time without crowning it with sure and substantial victories. Such victories were demanded at the dawn of 1864. It was clear that the year inaugurated both a political and military crisis. Though the energies of the Confederates had been taxed to their uttermost, yet it was as much as ever a unit in its determination, and still lived vigorously in its armies. So, the energies of the Union had been largely, though not so exhaustively drawn upon, and it was as much committed to a policy of peace as the Confederates and their Northern allies, though only through the test of victory. The issue was clearer than ever before. Defeat on either side meant ruin more than ever before. The scale must soon turn one way or the other, and that decidedly.

The eastern theatre had not been formerly progressive at any time; in the western theatre, during all of 1863, it had been active and aggressive on the part of the Union officers and soldiers, and had been productive of most substantial results. These facts furnished not only an indication, but an inspiration to the authorities and the country. They

made the history of former and more concentrated effects conspicuous. They induced the spirit of heroic rally for an effective and final blow. Such a blow would necessarily be made more difficult than any other to deliver, for Union success could only result in driving the Confederates together, and compacting their force. There must be no further division of lines giving them the advantage of striking from a common central point, but a gradual concentration of lines. The lesson of other Union victories must now be presented in ten-fold force. There must be no waste of precious energy, no discordant policies, no defensive tactics, no strategy that was not bold nor aggressive, no lack of concentration, no division of military counsels, no fear of consequences. As the issues were clear and closely joined, so the arbiters—the armies—must be kept face to face, in close contact and perpetual meeting, till the final and desired verdict was signed, sealed, delivered, and declared to the world.

The bill to revive the grade of Lieutenant General in the Armies of the United States was introduced into Congress soon after the battle of Chattanooga, and had been pending ever since. The instincts of Legislators, spurred by a growth of sentiment in the country, and by deliberate study of the situations, of forces and results, led to definite action on the part of Congress, on February 26, 1864, when both Houses sanctioned the Bill.

It was approved by President Lincoln on March 1st, and under its provisions he conferred upon General Grant an office which had not existed since 1798, when the grade of Lieutenant General was tendered as an honorary offering to General George Washington, who held it for one year, when it was discontinued. In 1855 it was conferred by Brevet on General Winfield Scott. The authorities at

Washington neither favored nor opposed this Bill, while it was pending, yet they were confident of its efficacy; and all connected with war affairs, including the President, felt that the man for the mission was already in the foreground. But they were aware that it was a very grave measure, and felt that the responsibility for it should not be detached from the people, who were the real source of power.

Hitherto the grade had been honorary. Now it would carry both new and stupenduous power, and would-be efficient in breaking up hitherto irremediable evils, only as those powers were wielded wisely or foolishly.

On March 3d, 1864, Halleck sent the following despatch to Grant:—"The Secretary of War directs that you will report in person to the War department as early as practicably, considering the condition of your command. If necessary, keep up telegraphic communications with your commanders, while en route to Washington."

On the next day Grant started for the Capital, but before he started he wrote to Sherman the private letter already mentioned. It read as follows:

NASHVILLE, TENN., March 4, 1864.

DEAR SHERMAN:—The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place.

I now receive orders to report at Washington immediately, in person, which indicates either a confirmation or a likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to comply with the order, but I shall say very distinctly, on my arrival there, that I shall accept no appointment which will require me to make that city my headquarters. This, however, is not what I started out to write about.

While I have been eminently successfully in this war, in

at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

The word "*you*," I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day; but, starting in the morning, I do not know that I shall find time just now.

Your friend,

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

On the receipt of this letter by Sherman, at the hands of Captain Badeau, as already stated, he replied as follows:

NEAR MEMPHIS, March 10, 1864.

GENERAL GRANT:

DEAR GENERAL:—I have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th, and will send a copy of it to General McPherson at once.

You do yourself injustice, and us too much honor, in assigning to us so large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. I know you approve the friend-

ship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue as heretofore to manifest it on all proper occasions.

You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue as heretofore to be yourself; simple, honest and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings who will award to you a large share for securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at Donelson also, you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that victory admitted the ray of light which I have always followed ever since.

I believe you are as brave, patriotic and just, as the great prototype Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted and honest as a man should be; but the chief characteristic in your nature is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in his Saviour.

This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubt, no reserve; and I tell you that it was this that made us act with confidence; I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got into a tight place you would come—if alive.

My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but I

confess your common sense seems to have supplied all this.

Now as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come out West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley; let us make it dead sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slope and Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk! We have done much, but still much remains to be done. Time and time's influence are all with us; we could almost afford to sit still and let these influences work. Even in the seceded States your word now would go further than a President's proclamation, or an act of Congress.

For God's sake and for your country's sake, come out of Washington! I foretold to General Halleck, before he left Corinth, the inevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.

Your sincere friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

In his letters to Halleck, dated as far back as January 15th, respecting the movement of Sherman in his Meridian campaign, and also in his last instructions to Sherman prior to going to Washington, Grant gave the following outline of his views, respecting the Spring campaign: "I look upon the next line for me to secure, to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile, Montgomery, Atlanta; To do this, large supplies must be secured on the Tennessee River, so as to be in reach of the railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee for a considerable length of time. Mobile must be the secondary base. The destruction which Sherman will do to the

routes around Meridian will be of material importance to us in preventing the enemy from drawing supplies from Mississippi, and in clearing that section of all large bodies of rebel troops. I do not look upon any point except Mobile in the South and the Tennessee River in the North as persistent practical starting points from which to operate against Atlanta and Montgomery."

Thus, long in advance of the formal mapping of the movement against Atlanta, and of the final orders to Sherman, which he so grandly executed, they were foreshadowed by the one who was to become the Commander-in-Chief of the American Armies.

In obedience to Halleck's summons, Grant made a rapid journey to Washington by special trains, arriving at the Capital on March 8th. On March 9th, he was formally presented to the President and his Cabinet. President Lincoln said "General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that with what I here speak for the nation, goes my hearty personal concurrence."

General Grant replied, "Mr. President, I accept the commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving upon me, and I know that if they are met, it will be to those armies, and above

all to the favor of that Providence which leads both the nations and men."

The investiture was then made complete by the action of the President, who assigned the new Lieutenant-General to the command of all the National Armies, with his headquarters in the field, and thus brought about one of the most momentous military changes which had characterized the history of the war.

When Lieut.-General Grant took command of the armies of the United States, and glanced at the situation from his high station, he saw the enemy in strong numbers, under its ablest generals and on its best fighting ground in the State of Virginia, and between the two Capitals, Washington and Richmond. Across this section, Lee's army stretched, south of the Rapidan, covering Richmond and menacing the National Capital. If the Federal armies, concentrated in the West, drove Johnston from Dalton, established a new line from Altoona to Mobile, and did all that was now contemplated under Sherman, it would only result in harder Confederate consolidation in the path between Washington and Richmond. Lee's army, therefore, became an important and direct objective. This, together with the chivalric consideration that Lee stood at the head of the Confederate Generals, and had proven more than a match for the best Federal leadership, induced Grant to assume personal command of the Army of the Potomac, and operate his other armies through the generals who had proven their ability and secured his entire confidence.

Therefore, on March 10th, he started to the front of the Army of the Potomac, investigated the situation, confirmed Meade in his command of the Army, discussed the military situation with him, and on the 11th of March returned to Washington. He started immediately for Nashville,

where he arrived on the 17th, and wrote to Sherman to meet him there. Sherman hastened thither from Memphis, arriving there on March 17, 1864.

Sherman's first words to Grant were, "I cannot congratulate you on your promotion, the responsibility is so great." To this the quiet man responded with "silence."

Not to be put out, Sherman laid before Grant with glowing colors, and with all his natural persuasiveness, the duty of remaining in the West. "Here" said he, "you are at home," "you are acquainted with your ground. You know us, and we know you; here you are sure to succeed. In the East you must take command of a new campaign, on an unfamiliar field, with soldiers and officers whom you have not tried, whom you have never led to victories. They cannot feel towards you, as we do. Besides, near Washington, you will beset, it may be, by seeking politicians. Stay here where you have made your fame, and use the same means to consolidate it."

While this mutual faith, which Sherman spoke of, would make his Western operations easy, yet nothing but personal observation and superintendence would insure the success that Grant desired in Virginia, on that strange field and among men and officers unused to his guidance. So Grant prepared to parcel his Western domain, and to leave the commands in whom he could best confide.

To Sherman, as the one of all others best entitled, both by long experience and by close personal friendship, he gave the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, the high post which he had just evacuated. This position would give to him an opportunity to acquire a separate and distinct renown, which Grant felt was now clearly his due, Of his ability to do this, he had not the least doubt. The two traveled together as far as Cincinnati. The plans for

the Spring movement on Johnston, and into the heart of Georgia, were all talked over and understood, but Sherman was left without any detailed instructions.

McPherson was assigned to the command of the department of the Tennessee. Sherman was thus placed over Thomas, and McPherson over Hurlbut, but both these seniors acquiesced. A general assignment of work having been made, and Sherman being left with the largest discretionary powers, Grant hurried eastward to assume the burden of activity in the field. By the 23d of March, he was again in Washington superintending the organization of the Army of the Potomac and preparing for its forward movement, which was to take place on the 5th of May, 1864.

From his headquarters, on April 4, 1864, Grant wrote to Sherman the following letters, and received the following replies, which became the basis of all the campaigns of the year 1864. These letters embraced essentially all the orders Sherman ever received from him, of a peremptory nature, and, as will be seen, they devolved on Sherman both the plan and execution of the campaign about to be inaugurated by him. His armies were to be directed against Johnston, then strongly entrenched at Dalton, Ga., and he was required to follow him up closely and persistently so that in no way possible could he detach any part of his force to the assistance of Lee at Richmond; Grant undertaking, in like manner, to hold Lee so closely that he could not detach any part of his force to the assistance of Johnston's Army. Armies, and not places, were to be the objectives of both commanders.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., April 4, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi:

GENERAL:—It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and

allow me to take the initiative in the Spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme, as at present determined upon.

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defense of Red River to General Steele and the Navy, and to return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed 4,000 men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than 25,000 men. To this I will add 5,000 from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with 10,000 men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of James River. This will give Butler 33,000 men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than 25,000 effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other under Crook, to start from Charlestown, on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.

You, I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible; but all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia, I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

I am, general, very respectfully,

your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
NASHVILLE, TENN., April 10, 1864.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, and afford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to get on a common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war.

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty co-operation. I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock out Joe Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to Colonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the methods in which I propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps and division commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield, Thomas and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, and am completing the army organization according to the orders from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and cattle on the line of the Tennessee. Each of the armies will guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select garrison at Knoxville and Loudon, with 12,000 men will drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johns-

ton's right by the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield on his left front—it may, be pushing a select body of about 2,000 cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah towards Athens, Ga.

Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and move against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him cautiously, presistently, and to the best advantage. He will have two divisions of cavalry to take advantage of any offering.

McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if A. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty thousand of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas. If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for Rome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe he will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.

McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas' divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at Columbia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this division to operate on McPherson's right, rear or front, according as the enemy appears. But the moment I detect Johnston falling behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work well he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks, or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east of Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.



CAVALRY COLUMN ON THE MARCH.

Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the right, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its Eastern communications, according to developed facts.

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look, but I will ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or Banks.

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem, viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we can find.

I will inspire my command, if successful, with the feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that very ground.

As ever, your friend and servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

CULPEPPER COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 19, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:— Since my letter to you of April 4th, I have seen no reason to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy remain still and allow us to take

the initiative. Rain has continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two, that it will be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more should fall in the meantime. I think Saturday, the 30th, will probably be the day for our general move.

Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my letters.

What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other, believing a single defeat, without any victory to sustain them, better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping, too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a given point South, thereby enabling them to throw their force first upon one and then on the other.

With the majority of military commanders they might do this. But you have had too much experience in traveling light, and subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience has not been thrown away. My direction, then, would be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow him up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this army to do it.

The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge, officers and men feel well.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 24, 1864.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT, commanding Armies of the United States, Culpepper, Virginia.

GENERAL:— I now have at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your staff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume the offensive as possible. I only ask as much time as you think proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from Cairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of them should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march to Decatur, to join General Dodge.

McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at Decatur at the earliest possible moment. From these two points he will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville and Lafayette, where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton; or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah. I see that there is some risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and, should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga, via. Will's Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him. My own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston stands at Dalton we must attack him in position. Thomas feels certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army. Supplies are the great question. I have materially increased the number of cars daily. When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty per day. Yesterday the report was 193; to-day, 134; and my estimate is that 145 cars per day will give us a day's supply and a day's accumulation.

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty days' rations, and to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread. Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance of the whole matter.

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten our communications from that direction.

Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot commit to paper.

I am, with great respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

At no point in the history of the war is correspondance fuller or more unique. Grant and Sherman enter into it with a spirit that is altogether unusual, and they evince a determination to agree that is remarkable. Both are full of original suggestions; both are considerate; both feel the newness and gravity of responsibilities; both prove that they are men for the situation. The confidence between the two crops out in every line they write. There is no assumption

on the part of either, but a freedom that borders on brotherhood, and a similarity of aim that shows almost a twin genius.

Ahead of them was something to deter an ordinary mortal. One was embarking on a trial which had proven the official death of distinguished Generals. The other was equally to try the unsolved. Fame or disgrace was in the pathway of each. Had there been jealousy, or feeling, or assumption, on the part of either, the future might have wept for their respective fates, and for the fates of their armies and the country. But both rose as responsibilities thickened. They had long since learned the beauty and necessity of co-operative work. They both realized to the fullest that they and the existing situation were outcrops of a sentiment which their united efforts had engendered and cultivated. Their present positions were due to the fact that a single will should dominate military projects and events. Hence they were to be one, or nothing. The chief would condescend till the subordinate was his equal; the subordinate would co-operate till he stood abreast of his chief. Rank would make no link to be broken by jealousy or selfishness. As the duties were common so should the fame be. There was entire recognition of individual and official strengths and weaknesses. Sherman knew how to trust; Grant how to confide. The one believed he could never draw on the other wrongfully. As the sequel proves, neither were to be disappointed. Their strifes were as one strife. There never was an exaction that fulfillment did not follow; there never was a responsibility that was not shared equally. Nothing was vain between these two great minds. Would that it were our province to follow both through the histories they were then about to make! But this privilege is denied, except where those histories touch and overlap,

as they often do. Yet in following Sherman we may, nay must, see much of his chief, for, as already stated, there is coincidence of duty and of purpose, and the work of one was to supplement that of the other. There may be two lives written, but they must be merged in the same glorious cause.

CHAPTER XI.

CHATTANOOGA TO ATLANTA.

We have already mentioned that combination of circumstances, military, political and otherwise, which persistently and inevitably led to the concentration of martial command in the hands of a single general. We have also feebly sketched the considerations which led to the choice of Grant as the man best fitted for the supreme post of General in Chief.

Grant's promotion meant the promotion of Sherman. His dispatch to Sherman at Vicksburg to hasten to Nashville indicated Grant's purpose. Before Grant left Washington to return to Nashville, he notified the authorities of his desire to appoint Sherman to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and thus make him his (Grant's) successor in the West. He further expressed his desire to entrust Sherman with the campaign which was, in his judgment, to be fought out in Georgia.

Much as Sherman had impressed himself on Grant, great as the confidence was which existed between them, close as their consensus was as to military objects and methods, able as Sherman had proved himself at Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga and in his Knoxville and Meridian campaigns, yet Grant's proposition suggested inquiry in administration circles. Halleck admired Sherman but doubted his ability to command the entire Western armies. Lincoln questioned Grant, but was disposed to yield to his judgment. There

were others who doubted if he had sufficiently fought down the charges of insanity made against him at Paducah when he astounded the newspaper idiots with the information that 200,000 men would be required to conquer and retain Kentucky and Tennessee. But Grant was firm; so firm indeed, as to almost make it a condition that Sherman should be thus honored and given the opportunity of fighting an independent command. In the end he had his way, and the same order which placed him in command of all the armies, placed Sherman in charge of the Military Division of the Mississippi.

Let us now see what manner of man this Sherman was, who was so pre-eminently trusted by his superior and so highly honored by his Government. Badeau thus paints him as he and Grant sat at their Nashville interview, on March 17, 1864:—"Sherman was tall, angular and spare, as if his superabundant energy had consumed his flesh; sandy haired, sharp featured; his nose prominent, his lips thin, his grey eyes flashing fire as fast as lightning on a summer's night; his whole face mobile as an actor's, and revealing every shade of thought or emotion that flitted across his active mind; his manner pronounced; his speech quick, decided, loud. His words were distinct; his ideas clear, rapid, coming indeed almost too fast for utterance, but in dramatic, brilliant form, so that they got full development, while an eager gesticulation illustrated and enforced his thought simultaneously with speech itself. Boiling over with ideas, crammed full of feeling, discussing every subject and pronouncing on all; provoking criticism and contradiction and admiration by turns; striking ideas out of the flintiest mind; sympathetic; suggestive to himself as well as to others; starting new notions constantly in his own brain, and following them up, no matter how far nor whither they led; witty, eloquent,

sarcastic, logical; every attribute of person or temper or intellect indicated genius—every peculiarity fascinated or commanded the attention. No one could be with him half an hour and not concede his greatness, or fail to recognize the traits that have made him world renowned. Such was Sherman."

After drawing an equally faithful portrait of Grant at the same interview, Badeau continues: "These two, so different, had been together in evil report and good report, in disaster and in victory, in battles, sieges and campaigns, and neither had ever failed the other. Each seemed to find in the traits of his friend that which his own nature, perhaps, lacked, or at any rate appreciated. Grant was fascinated by his brilliant coadjutor, who excited in him a depth and reality of regard such as he rarely showed; and Sherman reposed on the calm strength of his chief with a confidence and an entireness which never faltered and was never deceived. They knew each other well, and each recognized the attributes that made the other's power. Each, too, was great enough to be magnanimous, and they were ready now to enter upon the new and wider fields to which they were assigned, each with the same confidence in the ability and the loyalty of his friend which had hitherto sustained their intercourse in its remarkable purity, and doubtless had enhanced the measure of success which each had then attained."

As already stated, Sherman accompanied Grant on his return to Washington, as far as Cincinnati, during which trip the chief developed his principal ideas of the Spring campaign, and the other fully comprehended and sanctioned. In his orders to Meade on April 9, Grant said, "Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, and the heart of Georgia is his ultimate aim. If successful, he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile,

with the help of Banks." This dispatch indicates the conclusion at which these two had arrived on their journey, though Sherman was unfettered by detailed instructions. No written orders were then given him; none were deemed necessary, for Grant's confidence in his fidelity and ability was unlimited. He had no fears that his conceptions would not be appreciated and executed in a spirit of loyalty, and no desire to limit the operations, curtail the privileges, or subtract from the honors which Sherman had now an opportunity to earn. When they parted Sherman was distressed on account of Grant's decision to remain in the East, though sustained by the confidence Grant reposed in himself. Of this quiet confidence Sherman well said: "The simple faith in success you have always manifested, I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the Savior."

All being now understood between the two generals, Sherman returned to Nashville and addressed himself to the task of making the western conquests secure, to the establishment of easy communication between his military centres and to the organization of a grand army for a move into Georgia, coincident with that contemplated by Grant upon Richmond. The most delicate part of this task, if not the most difficult, was the disposition to be made of the old Department and Corps commanders, so as to not destroy their future usefulness, yet so as to secure the best material for new conquests. In performing this part of the task both Grant and Sherman subjected themselves to much newspaper criticism, but the end vindicated their judgments. They knew their officers pretty thoroughly by this time, and their own supremacy in their respective spheres was so well established, that not even political influence at Washington could, for any great length of time, frustrate their choice of subordinates or interfere with their designs of campaign.

Sherman visited the front of his lines, going first to Pulaski to see General Dodge; then to Huntsville, where McPherson had arrived to take command of the Department of the Tennessee; then to Chattanooga to confer with Thomas; and lastly to Knoxville to talk over the situation with Schofield, who had succeeded Burnside. By the end of March Sherman had his three army comrades about him at Chattanooga, where the plan of campaign against General Joseph E. Johnston, then strongly entrenched at Dalton, thirty miles to the South, was frequently discussed. The campaign was to be opened in the Spring, it was to be a hard and unrelenting one, the country was difficult, the supplies would have to be furnished over a long and exposed road from the Chattanooga, or rather Nashville, base, till another could be found.

About the matter of supplies Grant was particularly anxious, but Sherman was awake to the situation. He had effective guards on the route from Louisville to Nashville, and thence to Chattanooga, 136 miles distant, and his responses were resolute:—"I am resolved, when General Grant gives the word, to attack Johnston in the manner hitherto described, if our men have to live on beef and salt." Again, "If Banks can at the same time secure Mobile and open up the Alabama river, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my problem—provisions." Again, "If the enemy interrupt my communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever I can find. Georgia has a million inhabitants; if they can live we should not starve." Again, "That we are now all to act on a common plan, converging on a centre, looks like enlightened war. From me you (Grant) shall have thorough and hearty co-operation. . . . Glad I am that there are now minds at Washington able to devise. I now know the re-

sult aimed at; I know my base and have a pretty good idea of my lines of operation. No time shall be lost in putting my forces in mobile condition. I would ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or Banks. I believe I have the men and the ability to march square to the position assigned me, and to hold it. I will be ready at the drop of a hat to cross the Tennessee and pitch in."

At this juncture Sherman was put out because the men, 10,000 in number, whom he had loaned Banks, had not been returned, and he was forced to make his preparations without them. This was a delicate matter, and Sherman did not hesitate to seek the advice of his chief. Sending his plans, as arranged without these troops, to Grant's chief-of-staff, he said, "Please read these papers and communicate their substance to the General, as I have more faith in his judgment, as to the measure of strength to make certain military ends, than in my own."

Sherman's preparations were somewhat retarded in the latter part of March by Forrest's raid into East Tennessee and the capture of Union City, Paducah and finally Ft. Pillow, where the colored garrison was massacred. As a raid, this was successful in point of damage done and in the escape of the force without punishment, but it failed to draw Sherman's attention from his front.

On April 10, 1864, Sherman's estimate of the forces in his three Departments was:—Army of the Cumberland, Thomas commanding, head-quarters at Chattanooga, active, 88,800; Army of the Tennessee, McPherson commanding, headquarters at Huntsville, active, 64,957; Army of the Ohio, Schofield commanding, headquarters at Knoxville, active, 26,242. Out of these he was preparing a compact army, to

be ready by May 1, 1864, for active operations in Georgia, and the proportion he expected each to furnish was:

Army of the Cumberland	about	50,000 men.
Army of the Tennessee	"	35,000 "
Army of the Ohio	"	15,000 "
Total	about	100,000 men.

These troops were all to be as free as possible from incumbrances. The regiments were to take along but one wagon and one ambulance each. Officers were allowed but one pack-horse each. The soldiers were to carry food and clothing but for five days. It was to be a quick and light moving army. Tents were forbidden to all except sick and wounded, and for use as head-quarters of brigades and divisions. Sherman did not have a tent throughout the campaign, his only cover being a tent-fly spread on poles or bushes. He had never seen an army go out to battle with fewer impedimenta, yet at no time was it in want of food, ammunition or clothing.

As May 1st approached, and the time for a forward movement drew near, his efforts had resulted in a movable army composed as follows:

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS:

Infantry	54,568 men.
Artillery	2,377 "
Cavalry	3,828 "
Total	60,773 men.

Field guns, 130.

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MAJOR-GENERAL MCPHERSON:

Infantry	22,437 men.
Artillery	1,404 "
Cavalry	624 "
Total	24,465 men.

Field guns, 96.

ARMY OF THE OHIO, MAJOR-GENERAL SCHOFIELD:

Infantry	11,183 men.
Artillery	679 "
Cavalry	1,697 "
Total	13,559 men.

Field guns, 28.

Grand total, 98,797 men and 254 guns.

In the Army of the Cumberland (Thomas) were the Fourth Army corps, General Howard; the Fourteenth, General Palmer; the Eleventh and Twelfth, consolidated as the Twentieth, General Hooker; and other commands in reserve or in garrison.

In the Army of the Tennessee were the Fifteenth Army corps, General Logan; the Sixteenth Army corps, General Dodge; the Seventeenth Army corps, General Blair (to arrive), and their reserves and garrisons.

In the Army of the Ohio, were the Twenty-third Army corps, General Cox, the cavalry corps, General Stoneman, and the garrisons and reserves.

The position which the two armies had now assumed, brought out prominently the strategic character of the region and the value of its primary feature, Chattanooga. The mountain system of East Tennessee ran direct into the heart of the Confederacy. Chattanooga was a natural stronghold on the line of the Confederate communication. Bragg had felt this when he captured it, and the surrounding mountain system from Rosecrans. He, and all other Confederate generals, had felt that from this point they would always be seriously menaced if it were not regained, and it was this thought that assayed the movement which Grant had rebuffed. The position of Chattanooga had transferred to the Union Armies, the advantages of interior lines, and of a deliberate offensive.

The mishap of Bragg at Chattanooga completed his disappointment, and paved the way for his successor, General J. E. Johnston, who found himself in possession of Dalton, directly south of Chattanooga, with an army of at least 45,000 effective men, with several thousand cavaly ready to be recalled, and with the promises of a large contingent militia from the States of Georgia and Alabama.

Johnston fortified himself strongly in and about Dalton, the first important position south of the Union advance line, now at Ringgold, in front of Chattanooga. He had been pressed by his Government to make an effective campaign to redeem the disaster of Missionary Ridge. But with a wisdom superior to that of his advisors, he had declined the undertaking and had passed the winter in security.


On the 4th of May, 1864, the Army of the Potomac was ordered to cross the Rapidan. On the same day Grant flashed the words over the wires to Sherman, to find him ready to lead out his three armies upon the enemy. There was a striking parallelism between the movement of the two Generals. There lay before each Union Commander in Virginia and in Georgia, a hostile army, which was his objective. There lay before both an important city, one the Capital of the Confederacy, the other the heart of its industry. These were remoter geographical objectives. The desire of both was to fall upon their opponents and overthrow them in battle. This, in both cases, would have been to drive an exhausted remnant backward, if not already captured.

As for Sherman, his aim was to fight the battle for Atlanta near Chattanooga, while his lines of supply were short and safe. The reverse was Johnston's policy. For him, success lay in the defeat of Sherman, after drawing his forces far away from their base, so that retreat might be long and disastrous.

Johnston's position in and around Dalton was well nigh impregnable. In his front, on the line of advance from Chattanooga, or rather from Ringgold, where Thomas's Army lay, the mountain ridge, known as Rocky Face, raises a huge and natural barrier, divided only by a ravine, known as Mill Creek Gap, or more familiarly, Buzzard's Roost. Through this ravine ran the wagon and railroad to Dalton, together with the Creek (Mill Creek, a tributary of the Oostanaula). Upon the slope of this ravine, Johnston had planted batteries, sweeping in all directions, and at its eastern end he had mounted artillery, which swept directly across it. In order to detain his assailants under the fire of his batteries, Johnston had flooded the ravine by means of dams on Mill Creek, felled abatis through the entire ravine, raised his flag on an accessible spur, and now felt secure in his position.

On May 5th, Sherman rode out to Ringgold and, in pursuance of the orders received from Grant, plunged into his great canpaign. Johnson had counted on Sherman flinging himself in direct attack against his fortified position, but he could hardly hope for such a piece of fortune from an antagonist so able as Sherman, who had already decided that Johnston's right and centre were secure, and that a movement must be made upon his left. It might be said that Johnston himself was somewhat aware of his own weak points, for while Sherman was busily preparing his supplies and arranging his forces, Johnston was busy in cutting roads in the rear of his position, so that whatever direction Sherman's columns might take, he would be able to march the faster and confront them.

On the 6th of May, Schofield and McPherson got into position. On the 7th of May, Thomas moved against Tunnel Hill, driving off a force of pickets and finding the tunnel and railroad intact. At Tunnel Hill he was full in front of



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the bold Rocky Face and of the Buzzard Roost gorge. Sherman had no intentions of attacking Johnston's position severely in front, but depended on McPherson to capture and hold the railroad in his rear, which would force Johnston to detach largely from his main force against him, or rather to evacuate his position at Dalton altogether. With this purpose, Sherman had hitherto posted his three armies; his right under McPherson at Gordon's Mill on the Chickamauga; his centre under Thomas at Ringgold; his left under Schofield at Red Clay, due north of Dalton, on the Georgia line. Schofield was to move south on the enemy's right; Thomas was to actually enter Buzzard's Roost and make a determined demonstration; all which was designed to cover McPherson's quiet move down on the west, through Ship's Gap, past Villanow, and through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, 18 miles south of Dalton and on the railroad. Should he reach the railroad, he was to break it up and cut off Johnston's supplies. This, according to Sherman's estimate, would force Johnston to retreat, when McPherson was to attack him on the flanks. Thomas and Schofield finding their respective fronts relieved, were to fall upon Johnston's rear, and if possible bring on a general battle while his ranks were in a state of confusion.

In pursuance of this plan, Thomas pushed forward and entered Mill Creek Gap. Geary's division of Hooker's corps took position at Duggs Gap. Newton's division of Howard's corps forced its way well towards Dalton. Schofield pushed thither with his entire corps, but this gallant and concentrated attack was not designed to carry Johnston's position, much less expected to do so, for Sherman had based everything on McPherson's detour.

McPherson, as ordered, had entered Snake Creek with a corps of Logan and Dodge, preceded by Kilpatrick's division

of Cavalry, which came into contact with Canty's Confederate cavalry brigade, and drove it into Resaca. Here the discovery was made that Johnston had fathomed Sherman's scheme, had dispatched part of his force thither, and had made the place so strong as to defy attack. That night, May 9, Sherman received word from McPherson, that he had found Resaca too strong for surprise, and had fallen back to Snake Creek, which he had fortified. He had done the full measure of his work in startling Johnston from his fancied security; but had not succeeded in doing what Sherman designed, viz., capturing Resaca by surprise. Sherman had felt that McPherson was strong enough for this with his 23,000 men, and he fully expected that he would achieve it; he felt certain that if he had succeeded in capturing Resaca, Johnston would not have ventured to attack him, and that Thomas and Schofield would have been able to capture half his army and artillery in the rapid pursuit which had been prepared for.

Johnston still kept up a strong front at Dalton, and Sherman, with Hooker's 20th corps, was within easy supporting distance of McPherson. On May 11th, he perceived signs of the evacuation of Dalton, and gave orders for a general movement, leaving Howard's corps and Stoneman's cavalry in observation in front of Buzzards' Roost Gap. He directed all the rest of his army to march straight through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca. These operations consumed the 12th and 13th of May. When the ranks of Thomas' and Schofield's army were quite through the Gap they deployed against Resaca; McPherson on the right, Thomas in the center, and Schofield on the left. As had been anticipated by Sherman, Johnston had abandoned his impregnable defenses at Dalton, and was found at Resaca with the bulk of his army, acting purely on the defensive. He was behind a complete line of entrenchments, strongly manned at all points.

On the 14th, Sherman closed his lines in around the town, and during all of the 15th, was engaged in active skirmish and actual battle. On the same day, he laid two pontoon bridges across the Oostanaula, three miles below Resaca, by means of which he could threaten Calhoun, a station seven miles below Resaca. On the previous day he had sent Garrard's calvary down the Oostanaula, with orders to cross and attack, or threaten, the railroad at a point between Calhoun and Kingston.

The battle of the 15th was not an attempt to assault the works, but to press in upon them at all points. Towards evening McPherson moved his whole line of battle forward until it gained a ridge overlooking the town. From this point his field artillery could reach the railroad bridge of Oostanaula. The enemy made several desperate attempts to drive him away, even extending them far into the night, but in every instance they were repulsed with heavy loss. Thomas pressed obstinately through Camp Creek Valley, and Hooker's corps crossed the Creek where a severe engagement resulted with Johnston's center and right, in which the troops of Thomas and Scofield, crossing the valley, separating their positions from the Confederate entrenchments, vigorously endeavored to carry them; but the treacherous bottom of Mill Creek and the heavy undergrowth of vines and the trees felled upon slopes and in the ravine prevented further advance, and nothing special was gained there; indeed, in the evening Johnston was enabled to regain much of the ground which had been captured earlier in the day. This terrific advance by Hood's and Hardee's, corps or rather this determined attack by them, had been ordered by Johnston, in order to counteract the effect of McPherson's successes on the Union right in the morning.

Johnston now heard of the attempt of the Union right to cross at Lays' Ferry on the pontoons and he quietly counter-

manded his orders for an attack and crossed the Oostanuala at night, burning the railroad bridge behind him. One of his divisions, Stewart's, not having received the countermand, attacked Hooker's corps and was badly repulsed. Late in the afternoon Hooker followed up his advantage, and his trophies were not only Stewart's position, but four guns and several hundred prisoners. The Union losses in the engagements about Resaca footed up 600 killed and 3375 wounded.

Of the situation at this date, Sherman says: "Had Johnston remained in Dalton another hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he only evacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it. The movement by us through Snake Creek Gap was a total surprise to him. My army nearly doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of natural position, artificial fronts and roads and concentrated action. We, on the other hand, were compelled to grope our way through forests and across mountains with a large army necessarily more or less dispersed. Of course I was disappointed in not having crippled his army at that particular stage of the game. But it all resulted for the best."

From Resaca, Johnston retreated down the railroad to Cassville, four miles east of Kingston, with the Union army in pursuit. At Calhoun, Hardee had a sharp engagement with McPherson, who had crossed on the 16th at Lays Ferry, and again another engagement with Newton's advance, which was moving on the Resaca road. Meanwhile Davis had marched his division westward to Rome, where he took possession of a few heavy guns, and all of the valuable Rolling Mills and Iron Works there. On the 17th, Thomas' column was fully in contact with Johnston's rear guard near Adairsville, but by the morning of the 18th, the enemy had disappeared, and the Union pursuit was kept up to Kingston, which was reached on the forenoon of the 19th.

At Resaca the railroad line runs nearly due south, but at Kingston it makes a junction with the Rome railroad, and changes its direction due east. On that date McPherson's column was four miles west of Kingston. Schofield and Hooker were on the roads leading from Newton and Cassville, diagonally with the route followed by Thomas, the head of whose column was four miles east of Kingston towards Cassville. When in this position, Sherman got word from Thomas that he had found the enemy drawn up in line of battle, on open ground, half way between Kingston and Cassville, and that they were evidently prepared for battle. Sherman ordered McPherson to hurry forward by roads to the south of Kingston, and to come up on Thomas's right. He visited Thomas, and found him with his troops deployed about six miles from Kingston, but he reported that the enemy had fallen back in good order to Cassville. Knowing that the respective roads, on which the troops were traveling, converged at the seminary, near Cassville, Sherman ordered them to push forward and deploy as rapidly as possible.

In taking up his third position at Cassville, Johnston had choosen his ground well, on a steep entrenched ridge, with a valley in front, which was under the control of his artillery. His losses thus far had not been great. He had been re-enforced by French's division of Pope's corps, and, inspired by this and his favorable circumstances, he ordered an attack upon Sherman's lines, which miscarried through a misapprehension of General Hood.

Sherman, suspicious of this, moved into position in front of Cassville, and ordered his artillery to play upon the entrenchments. This was to be followed by a concentrated attack on the next morning at daylight. All night, skirmishing was kept up. On the 20th, the enemy retreated, and Sherman ordered his cavalry in pursuit. This retreat had

been agreed upon during the night at a conference between Polk, Hood and Johnston, in which the two former persistently urged it for the reason that their position was untenable under the sweep of the Union batteries. Johnston and Hardee thought otherwise, but at length yielded; and, thus at a single step, the Confederates abandoned the whole valley of the Etowah, which river they crossed on the morning of the 20th, making a longer stride in retreat than ever, passing both Allatoona and Ackworth, and making for the chain of hills which crosses from east to west in front of Dallas and Marietta.

This retreat of Johnston's ended the third stage of Sherman's campaign; the first stage having ended with the retreat of Johnston from Dalton, the second with his retreat from Resaca, and the third with his retreat from Cassville. As Sherman was now well in advance of the railroad trains, on which he depended for supplies, he paused for a few days at Cassville, and repaired the railroad and built the bridge at Resaca, which had been destroyed.

The authorities of the south remonstrated with Johnston for falling back without a battle at Cassville; but his friends came to his rescue by saying that it was all strategy, that he was deliberately drawing Sherman into his meshes further and further away from his post of supplies, and that in due season he would be prepared for the offensive and would give decisive battle. It was to Sherman's interest to have such a battle come on as soon as possible, while his strength was greatest. Every movement subtracted from his strength by being forced to leave guards along the railroad, while it equally added to Johnston's strength, who was now continually picking up the detachments, which he had left behind him for a similar purpose. Sherman found that at Cassville Johnston had evidently prepared for a grand battle. There

were long lines of fresh entrenchments on the hill before the town, extending for three miles to the south, and embracing the railroad crossing. He was also confident that Polk's entire corp had come from Mississippi to join Johnston, and that he now had in hand three full corps, Hood's, Polk's and Hardee's, numbering sixty thousand men. He could not, therefore, understand why he had declined battle under circumstances so favorable.

Sherman now began to doubt whether it would be possible to bring his opponent to the offensive, on the north side of the Chattachoochee. But, for the time being, he consoled himself with the easy mastery of the Etowah and its bridges, and derived confidence from the weakness exhibited by his enemy in declining to fight on favorable terms. After his army had secured the much needed rest, and the repairs had been perfected in his rear, Sherman gave the word forward. His necessity and his success thus far impelled him to make another effort to cut off his opponents retreat, and, having thus disloged him, grapple with him upon open ground. Supposing that Johnston would halt in the natural stronghold of Allatoona Pass, Sherman determined to make a movement to the right, and that of the widest character, but this time in a manner somewhat different from his former movements. Filling his wagons with twenty days' supply, he started his entire army, except the garrisons at Rome and Kingston, for Dallas, to the south-west of Allatoona. This movement began on the 23d of May. His columns were arranged across the Etowah and beyond, as a covering for the flanking movement. But Johnston detected it on the very day it started, and took his position at New Hope Church, east of Dallas, covering the various routes leading back to the railroad. Here Hood was on Johnston's right at the Church, Polk was in the centre, and Hardee on the left,

across the road to Atlanta. On the 25th, Hooker, who was leading Thomas' advance, came up near the Church, where Geary's division skirmished severely all the afternoon and up to sunset. Hooker got his other two divisions in hand and assaulted Stewart's division of Hood's corps at the Church for two hours with intense fury, and ceased only when night-fall and a severe storm forced him to desist.

All of Sherman's columns were thrown into line about Dallas—McPherson and Davis off on the right, Thomas on the main road in the centre with Hooker's 20th corps in advance, and Schofield on the left. The night after Hooker's engagement was intensely dark and the convergence of Sherman columns caused some confusion. The morning revealed a strong line of entrenchments facing the Union Army, behind which was a heavy force of Conferderate infantry and guns. The battle commenced on the 26th and was fought with great desperation all along the line, but without marked success on either side. Again it was renewed on the 27th with varying success.

On the 28th, Sherman became convinced that Johnston was in person at New Hope with his entire army, and, feeling that it was nearer to the railroad, which was Sherman's objective, than to Dallas, he withdrew McPherson from Dallas to Hooker's right, but before McPherson could execute the order, he was confronted with a heavy force, and fiercely assailed on his right. He resisted this bold and daring assault with great stubbornness, inflicting upon the enemy a terrible repulse; but it was not until the first of June that he was enabled to withdraw from Dallas and to effect a close junction with Hooker in front of New Hope.

Meanwhile Thomas and Schofield were gradually overlapping Johnston's force on his right, and therefore extending the Union left nearer and nearer the railroad, the nearest

point of which was Ackworth, eight miles distant. During all these days a continual battle was in progress upon the skirmish lines, which was taking advantage of every species of cover; both parties digging rifle trenches and fortifying themselves behind logs. Occasionally one side or the other would make dashes which usually ended in defeat with great loss of life.

By the first of June, General McPherson had pushed in upon the right, close to New Hope Church, but without any intention of direct attack; the object being to work the lines slowly and steadily toward the left till all the wagon roads between New Hope, Allatoona and Ackworth were under control. When this object was accomplished, Sherman dispatched Garrards and Stoneman's divisions of cavalry against Allatoona, which they reached ithout opposition, and where they repaired the railroad forward from Kingston and Allatoona, embracing the bridges across the Etowah River. Such had been the nature of Sherman's movements that Johnston found himself out-generaled, and on the night of June 4th he evacuated his lines, leaving Sherman master of the situation. He spent a few days in fortifying Allatoona and in bringing up supplies, and on the 11th of June moved his army forward to Big Shanty, a railroad station in full view of the Kenesaw mountains.

In this instance Sherman's movement, slow and cautious as it was, and all the time under fire, was the only one he could hope to execute with success. A move to the right would have thrown him too far from the railroad, which he was compelled to keep open and use. Once at Allatoona, he had a good base of supplies, and here and at Ackworth he received large reinforcements. Substantially, in the month of May, he had forced his antagonist from Dalton, Resaca, Cassville, Allatoona and Dallas, and had advanced his lines

victoriously for a hundred miles, from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, over mountains and through ravines, constituting one of the most difficult routes an army could be called upon to traverse. The fighting had been almost continuous, and of a kind which rendered a computation of losses almost impossible. That they were heavy was clear, and when the official figures came in for May they showed that Thomas had lost 1,294 killed and 5,562 wounded; McPherson, 216 killed and 1,055 wounded, and Schofield, 1,863 killed and 7,436 wounded. Johnston figured his total losses for May at 721 killed and 4,692 wounded, together with over 3,000 prisoners.

The battle of New Hope Church was a drawn one as to fighting, but in its manœuvres the vantage was with Sherman, who made his railroad point and forced Johnston to fall back to the Kenesaw mountains. At Ackworth, Sherman was joined by Blair with his two divisions of the Seventeenth corps, he having come from Cairo, by way of Clifton on the Tennessee. Allatoona was strongly fortified under Sherman's directions and was to be used as his secondary base of supplies.

During this active and perilous month, active and perilous alike to Grant and Sherman, neither forgot the other. On the day after Grant's assault on Spottsylvania, and again on May 20th, he sent word to Washington recommending and urging the promotion of Sherman to the rank of Major-general in the regular army. He was full of inquiries and suggestions for Sherman's progress and welfare, and Sherman, in turn, kept him posted as to the plans and results of those gallant assaults and brilliant flanking operations which so much resembled those of his chief, and which were daily carrying him nearer his goal. Never for a single moment did Sherman lose sight of the relation his campaign bore to that which Grant was conducting. His dispatches, at various intervals,

ran :—"Notify General Grant that I will hold all of Johnston's army too busy to send anything against him." Again :—"Should General Grant want me to hasten events at any time, let me know, and I will push in spite of the weather. Again :—"One of my first objects being to give full employment to Joe Johnston, it makes but little difference where he is, so he is not on the way to Virginia." Again :—"General Grant may rest easy that Johnston may not trouble him, if I can help it by labor or thought." Again :—"I have sent daily telegrams to Halleck. You therefore know where we are and what we have done. If our movement has been slower than you calculated, I can explain the reasons, though I know you believe me too earnest and impatient to be behind time."

On June 10th Sherman moved his entire army forward to Big Shanty, where it was in plain sight of the enemy, posted on three hills known as Kenesaw Mountain, Pine Mountain and Lost Mountain, and forming a complete defence for Marietta and the railroad. On each mountain were signal stations and lines of parapets, protected in front by abattis. Behind these were heavy masses of infantry. Johnston had chosen his ground well and was evidently ready for a sturdy stand. Sherman found before him the same problem he had confronted at Dalton, Resaca and Dallas. The only defect he could see in Johnston's line was that it covered ten miles of front and was therefore too long to be held successfully by an army of 60,000 men. But every point of it overlooked Sherman's position, and no step could be taken without the greatest caution. He studied the situation very deliberately. To resort to his previous methods of a flank movement would here be more dangerous than before, for his supply line had been lengthened, and any flank movement necessarily threw

it open to attack, unless, forsooth, such movement were successful in cutting the enemy's supply line.

All things considered, Sherman thought it best to assault Johnston's position. He formed for this purpose, with McPherson on his left, following the railroad which curved around the base of Kenesaw and facing Pine Mountain. Schofield was on the right facing Lost Mountain. Hood occupied the Confederate right opposite McPherson; Polk the Confederate centre opposite Thomas; and Hardee the Confederate left opposite Schofield.

Thus posted, Sherman's object was to work slowly toward the enemy, and in doing this something very like a battle raged along his lines for days. The rain poured down almost incessantly. The roads back to his depot became impassable and he was forced to make new ones. Every step gained by his armies gave rise to a new intrenchment. While thus inching his way forward, he was greatly harassed in his rear by the enemy's cavalry, compelling him to detach cavalry guards as far back as Resaca, and strengthen all the garrison as far back as Nashville. Anticipating a raid from Forrest on the railroad below Nashville, he ordered Sturgis from Memphis to attack him, but Sturgis was defeated and driven back into Memphis. On hearing of this Sherman ordered A. J. Smith, who was returning from the Red River Expedition and was on his way to join Canby at New Orleans, to take the offensive at Memphis, with two divisions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth corps. He defeated Forrest at Tupelo. in July, and prevented his anticipated raid on Sherman's supply lines.

By June 14th, Sherman found his lines fully entrenched for ten miles, and corresponding with those of the enemy. His skirmishers were actively engaged all the time, and had been for days, working their way through dripping thickets and tor-

rent washed ravines, followed closely by their regiments and brigades, entrenching and holding every coigne of vantage. On this date Sherman reconnoitred the situation personally and discovered a Confederate battery surrounded by a group of officers abreast of Pine Mountains. Though the orders were that ammunition should be used sparingly, he had two or three batteries turned on the spot, with the result that the officers were scattered and General Polk killed.

On the 15th, Sherman pressed all his lines closer, with a view to an attack upon any weak point that might be discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. It was now discovered that Johnson had abandoned his Pine Mountain defences, thus contracting his long front till it embraced only Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. The abandoned ground was quickly taken advantage of by both Thomas and Schofield, and in their advance they captured many prisoners, among them the entire 14th Alabama Regiment, 320 strong. McPherson was now well to the left, around the north end of Kenesaw. Sherman kept up his persistent approach through the 16th, when the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain. The loss of these positions was no detriment to Johnston, who had found out the faulty length of his first line and had thus purposely contracted it. Besides, Sherman's advances were costly as to men, and his own position was not being bettered by anything thus far abandoned by the enemy. Even when Sherman's right had swung round so as to threaten the railroad below Marietta, it found Johnston further contracting and entrenching, and covering Marietta and the roads south of it.

Two days of rain impeded further progress, but Sherman consumed them in strengthening his lines on the left and centre, so as to be prepared for an attack from Kenesaw on his depot at Big Shanty, and at the same time be able to sub-

tract forces from his left to be gradually worked towards his right. He kept Gerrard busy with his cavalry division on the left, while both McPherson and Thomas swung slightly to the right. No opportunity for direct assault yet appeared. In front of the Union army frowned Kenesaw, entrenched with the security of a regular fort, and swarming with the enemy. Sherman's own troops were covered everywhere by entrenchments, and his skirmishers fought under the protection of improvised breast-works. He took into his employ detachments of negro refugees, for the purpose of sparing his troops the fatigue of erecting their defences.

On June 19th, Johnston again fell back, and Sherman thought he had retreated entirely from Kenesaw to the Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles in the rear. But he was soon disillusioned, for, on ordering an advance, he found him still thoroughly concentrated and covering Marietta, his front being Kenesaw mountain, and his flanks resting respectively on Nose creek and Noonday creek. It was an intensely strong position, and its greatest strength lay on the right, opposite McPherson and nearest the railroad, for whose safety Sherman was at all times most anxious. Again the enemy's cavalry were reported to be operating in Sherman's rear, and again he gave orders reinforcing all the guards back as far as Resaca, and ordering Smith to push his divisions from Huntsville to Kingston.

On the 21st, Sherman, in his dispatches to Halleck, thus mapped the situation:—"This is the nineteenth day of rain and the prospect of fair weather is as far off as ever. The roads are impassable. The fields and roads become quagmires after a few wagons have passed. Yet we are at work all the time. The left flank is across Noonday Creek. The right is across Nose Creek. The enemy still holds Kenesaw, a conical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and his flanks retired

to cover the town and railroad. I am all ready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troops and artillery to move with anything like life."

Under these unfavorable auspices Sherman pressed operations with all the earnestness in his power, striving to keep his fortified lines in close touch with those of the enemy, and constantly feeling forward for his supply lines or his probable lines of retreat. On the 22d of June, Sherman ordered Thomas to advance his extreme right, which was Hooker's corps, and Schofield to keep his army in close support. This advance of Hooker brought on an extremely hot engagement, which eventuated in advantage to neither side, and moreover was the cause of serious misunderstanding between Hooker and Sherman, and required the personal appearance of the latter at the front to settle.

On June 23d, Sherman continued to press closer to the enemy, feeling for his weak points and more determined than ever to assault. Every inch gained now was by hard skirmishing and actual fighting, which could not last always. On this day his sketch of the situation, as sent to Washington, was :—" We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance against fortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, and Johnston must have at least fifty miles of trenches, with abattis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily fighting all the time. . . . Our lines are now in close contact and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal of artillery fire. As fast as we gain one position the enemy has another all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. Our losses are light and our supplies are ample."

On the 24th and 25th Schofield was ordered to extend his lines further to the right, with a view to thinning the enemy's front. All the commanders now agreed that the last poin

of line extension had been reached, consistent with safety, and that there was no alternative left but direct attack on the enemy's fortifications. So an assault was ordered for June 27th. The points of attack were chosen and the troops prepared. The batteries, planted for the purpose, opened a terrific cannonade for several hours, and then, precisely at the hour fixed, the armies of McPherson and Thomas rushed forward to the assault, the former striking Hardee's corps, and the latter Loring's (formerly Polk's). At all points they were met in great force and with determined courage. McPherson fought his way up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, but could not reach the top. Thomas managed to force his way over some of the enemy's parapets, but could not hold them, and his troops fell back, losing two of their most valued leaders General Harker, killed, and General McCook mortally wonnded. By noon the assault was over, and had completely failed to break the Confederate lines at any point, though the assaulting columns still held close to the enemy's entrenchments, under improvised parapets. McPherson lost, in this assault, 500 men and several officers, and Thomas lost 2,000 men. The enemy's loss did not exceed 800 in killed and wounded.

Quick to measure results, and not needing a second experiment to teach him what to do next, Sherman threw his right, under Schofield, across Olley Creek, where he gained a position which threatened Johnston's line of retreat. Stoneman's cavalry was thrown still further to the right, in the direction of the Sweetwater. Satisfied that his men had done all they could in direct assault, Sherman's resolve was to resort once more to his old manœuvre, a flank movement, and this time he executed it with even greater tactical brillancy than before. Orders were issued to bring forward supplies enough for the wagons, and to strip the railroad back



DEATH OF GEN. McPHERSON.

to Allatoona, that place to be the depot for the time under the protection of Garrard's cavalry.

Sherman thus outlined his movement to Halleck, under date of July 1st: "Schofield is now south of Olley Creek and at the head of Nickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, and to-morrow night propose to move McPherson from the extreme left to the right, back of Thomas. This will bring my right within three miles of the Chattahoochee, and within five miles of the railroad. By this movement I think I can force Johnston to move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad and the Chattahoochee, when I will, by my left flank, reach the railroad below Marietta. But in this I must cut loose from the railroad with ten days provisions. Johnston may come out of his entrenchments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what I want, for Thomas is strongly entrenched on lines parallel with those of the enemy, south of Kenesaw. I think that Allatoona and the line of the Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move. The movement is substantially down the Sandtown road and straight for Atlanta."

On the night of July 2d, McPherson drew out of his entrenchments on the left, leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, to occupy them, and moved behind Thomas, stretching to the right as far down as Nickajack. Johnston detected this movement, and, divining its import, beat a hasty retreat from the fortress of Kenesaw during the night. Sherman expected as much, and as soon as he confirmed it by observations on the next morning, he ordered a swift pursuit by every possible road, hoping to catch Johnston before he could cross the river. But Johnston had prepared himself for retreat, and had covered the line of the Chattahoochee with works, with advanced trenches out as far as Smyrna Church, five miles from Marietta. By pressing hard against

the Smyrna entrenchments, Thomas gradually forced them, compelling the enemy to seek the river entrenchments at the point where the railroad crossed, called Turner's Ferry. At this point Sherman engaged in brisk skirmishing for a period of four days. After driving the enemy well together and feeling his lines thoroughly, he threw a large force across the Chattahoochee, above Turner's Ferry, Schofield crossing at Soap Creek on July 7th, Howard two miles below, at Power's Ferry, while McPherson lay at Rosswell ready to cross at any moment. All these forces entrenched their positions, built strong bridges, forcing Johnston to cling to the river below. Cramped in this position and fearing the flanking operations well under way, Johnston fled from his position on the north-west banks of the river at Turner's Ferry, thus leaving Sherman master of all North Georgia, between the Tennessee and Chattahoochee.

A second month had passed since Sherman left Chattanooga. It had been a month of adroit manoeuvre, of excessive toil, of hard fighting. From Kenesaw to Marietta had really been a continuous battle, lasting from June 10th to July 3d. His losses for June were :—

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND (THOMAS):

Howard's Fourth corps.....	602 killed,	1,542 wounded.
Palmer's Fourteenth "	353 "	1,466 "
Hooker's Twentieth "	322 "	1,246 "
Totals.....	1,277 killed,	4,254 wounded.

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE:

Logan's Fifteenth corps	179 killed,	687 wounded.
Dodge's Sixteenth "	52 "	157 "
Blair's Seventeenth "	47 "	212 "
Totals	278 killed,	1,056 wounded.

ARMY OF THE OHIO:

Schofield's Twenty-third corps.....	105	killed,	362 wounded.
Cavalry.....	130	"	68 "
Totals.....	235	killed,	430 wounded.

A total loss for the month of June in killed and wounded of 7,530.

Johnston figured his losses for the same time at 468 killed and 3,480 wounded; a total of 3,948, not counting prisoners, which Sherman estimated at over 2,000.

Sherman's last two movements had been rapid and brilliant. The moment he threw McPherson from his left to his right, in front of Kenesaw, and thereby stretched his right down toward Turner's Ferry on the Chattahoochee, he presented two alternatives to Johnston; first, either to attack Thomas in his front, or second, to permit Sherman to reach his railroad below Marietta, or even cross the Chattahoochee. Johnston, of course, preferred to abandon Kenesaw and Marietta and fall back to his Chattahoochee entrenchments, which covered his positions on that river, a broad and deep stream. Sherman had not suspected the existence of entrenchments at this point, and fully expected to capture a portion of Johnston's army in the act of crossing the river, and when he came to view them, afterwards, he pronounced them the strongest pieces of field fortifications he had ever seen.

But Sherman well knew that no fortifications could avail Johnston on that side of the river, for Atlanta was only nine miles away, and in sight, and the ground favored the practice of the manœuvres which had hitherto driven him out of all his impregnable holds. He therefore arranged his forces, as already stated, and with the result that Johnston evacuated his trenches, burned the railroad bridge, pontoons and trestles, and left Sherman in full possession of the north-west bank of the river.

Sherman now prepared to take the initiative south of the Chattahoochee. Rousseau's cavalry column came in to him at Marietta with the report that it had broken up the Montgomery railroad, which brought Johnston's south-west supplies from Opelika. Stoneman's cavalry was sent below Atlanta to threaten the railroad. Blair was to remain at Turner's Ferry keeping up the feint, while the respective corps crossed above. This point of crossing was deemed best, as affording immediate protection to the railroad; and it should not be forgotten that the further Sherman progressed southward the more important his rearward communications became. The crossing kept McPherson still on his left, but it threw Schofield to the center and Thomas to the right. On July 13th Sherman's dispatch to Halleck read :—"All is well. I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona and Marietta, both fortified and garrisoned points. Have also three places to cross the Chattahoochee. Only await Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, to cross in force and move on Atlanta."

On July 15th Stoneman returned and was ordered to take Blair's place at Turner's Ferry, while Blair moved his seventeenth corps up to Roswell to join McPherson. On July 17th the crossing of the river began, and with it the movement of the Union forces on Atlanta. There was no opposition to the crossing except from cavalry. Thomas crossed, and swung around facing Peach Tree Creek, which empties into the Chattahoochee at Turner's Ferry. Schofield crossed, marched out to Cross Keys and then swung in on Thomas' left. McPherson crossed, marched out to Stone Mountain, east of Decatur, where he broke up the railroad toward Atlanta, and finally joined Schofield's left at Decatur.

It was now July 18th, Sherman got word that Johnston had relinguished the command of the Confederate army and

had been succeeded by Hood. He inferred that this meant fight, and sent word to all parts of his army to be on the alert. On July 19th, Sherman had his three armies converging on Atlanta, and meeting with so little resistance that he was led to conclude the enemy intended to abandon the place without a battle. McPherson was on the railroad near Decatur. Schofield had a direct road to Atlanta. Thomas was hugging Peach Tree Creek in line of battle, and building bridges for his respective divisions. He was immediately in front of the Confederate works. On July 20th, there was still a gap between Schofield and Thomas, which Sherman was endeavoring to fill with two of Howard's divisions. Hood had evidently discovered this, for he massed his troops on the Buckhead road, and struck into the interval. The sudden blow fell on Hooker's three divisions and those of Newton and Johnson, and such was its intensity that the Union troops were rolled back in confusion. But they quickly recovered and returned in furious parry. For five hours the battle raged, the conflict at times being hand to hand. Thomas got his batteries to bear on the scene, and by and by the enemy weakened and drew off, leaving their dead and many wounded behind. The Confederate loss in this rally was nearly 5000, while the Union loss was 1733, most of which fell on Hooker's corps. This rally came from the Peach Tree line of the enemy which Johnston had prepared, from which to fight the battle for Atlanta. Hood, in his indiscreet and impetuous style, took early advantage of it, as he thought, but with the result above stated. The result enabled Sherman to compact his lines and close up on the enemy's entrenchments, overlapping them to the left.

McPherson still had his Fifteenth corps on the Augusta railroad and his Seventeenth thrown out on his left. Schofield was on his right, and Howard's, Hooker's and Palmer's

corps of Thomas' army on the extreme right. Johnston's plan of attacking Sherman from his Peach Tree Creek defences, as the latter crossed the Chattahoochee, and before he could form his line for the investment of Atlanta, having failed under Hood's management, Hood now determined to try the second plan which was to leave the entrenchments and Atlanta itself under a strong guard and march to the right, so as to fall on Sherman's left flank as it moved forward to complete the line of investment. Sherman's intention was to call in his left and pass it to the right for the purpose of reaching and destroying the Macon railroad, below Atlanta, but before he could execute these orders Leggett's division had secured by assault a fine position on Leggett's Hill, and Blair's entire Seventeenth was on the further side of the Augusta railroad, while Dodge's Sixteenth was busily destroying the railroad from Decatur to the enemy's skirmish lines.

This was the situation on July 21st. On that night Hood moved out to the east beyond Decatur and the Augusta railroad, and quietly awaited his opportunity in front of Sherman's extended left. The next morning Sherman found, much to his astonishment, that the lines of works on the heights commanding the southerly banks of Peach Tree had been vacated during the night, and he supposed that Atlanta had also been abandoned. Sherman ordered Thomas to push rapidly across these abandoned lines and close in upon the city. Then he hastened to McPherson's left, to find that a brisk engagement was already on and that from the nature of the firing something unexpected in that quarter was happening. McPherson rode to his front, from the Howard House where he had been consulting with Sherman. Logan's corps had been thrown in on Schofield's left so as to connect with Blair's right. Dodge's corps was sent to Blair's left. Still the noise of battle increased and gradually extended along

Schofield and Thomas' front. But it was not this that disturbed Sherman so much as the sound of heavy artillery fire that came from the direction of Decatur. Every minute was undeceiving him as to the true character of the battle. The busy firing in front of Schofield and Thomas was only a cover for something else. The heavy booming off toward Decatur meant that Hood was working determinedly on his extended and weakened left, and that there was danger of turning it and getting in his rear. Hood's attack was made by Hardee's corps. When McPherson reached the scene and took in the situation, he instantly ordered up his reserve brigades and threw one of Logan's brigades across the narrow interval between the corps of Blair and Dodge. Following the road through the woods in the rear of the Seventeenth corps, and unaware of the proximity of the enemy, he was killed by their musketry fire, and his horse issued riderless from the woods.

Sherman ordered the staff officer, who brought him word of McPherson's death, to find General Logan and order him to refuse his left and fight the battle with the Army of the Tennessee, holding fast to Leggett's Hill, which he, Sherman, would personally look to Decatur and the safety of his rear, and would send re-inforcements if required. Sherman also ordered Thomas to make a strong sally on the right and not stop until Alabama was reached, if such a thing were found possible. The game of his antagonist was now apparent to Sherman, and the contour of the ground favored him. While Stewart's corps was keeping up appearances in Thomas' front, Hardee's and Hood's own corps were really making victorious progress upon and around Sherman's left. Smith's division was driven back with the loss of four guns, upon that of Leggett, which still clung to its crest, and kept up a terrific battle till late in the afternoon. Wheeler's

cavalry burst in upon Decatur and drove back the trains toward the Chattahoochee, capturing several wagons. The brigade's of the Fifteenth corps which McPherson had ordered up now came into position in the rear, filling up the gap between Blair and Dodge. Almost all of Sherman's left had by this time formed a new line, facing westward. Upon this the enemy made terrific attacks, breaking repeatedly through Logan's lines and making captures of guns. It was now 4 P. M., and it seemed that Hood was desperate. Sherman was no less so, for the hour was most critical. Hood made his last determined assault, directed mainly against Leggett's Hill and along the Decatur road. It met with a bloody repulse in the centre, but along the railroad it swept away the Union lines, with the loss of an entire battery of twenty pound Parrott guns, which were turned upon Sherman's forces. Wood's division was whirled further to the left in order to catch the enemy on the flank. Schofield and Logan, the latter fighting McPherson's army, concentrated all their available forces and raked the advancing enemy with their remaining artillery. Wood made a splendid charge under cover of the twenty guns which Schofield had placed in a new position, and regained much of the lost ground. Logan had rallied a broken division, in person, and with it swept the remainder of the field. The day was done, Hood stopped exhausted. Beating a retreat back over the ground of advance, and carrying only two of the captured guns as trophies, he was pursued by Sherman to the very gates of Atlanta.

This battle of July 22d, usually called the battle of Atlanta, was most determined and bloody. The Army of the Tennessee, under Logan, bore the brunt of it, and nobly it did its work. Logan reported the losses as follows:—

Union loss	3,521
Enemy's dead, buried and reported	3,220

Prisoners sent north	1,017
Wounded prisoners	1,000
Estimated loss of enemy	10,000

On the date of this battle Rousseau returned from his cavalry raid on the Alabama road at Opelika, and on the next day Garrard returned from the line of the Augusta road. Both had been successful in destroying railroads and breaking up the enemy's communications. Grant now called attention to the anxiety of the Confederate government for Hood's welfare, and to the possibility of his being reinforced from Richmond. Sherman, therefore, felt that he had no time to lose. He at once set about to carry out his original intention of throwing the Army of the Tennessee to his right, leaving Schofield to stretch his left to the Augusta road, then destroyed, and sending his cavalry by both flanks to destroy the Macon road. With his supplies thus cut off, Hood would thus be forced to evacuate Atlanta, and fight on open ground.

On July 24th Howard was given command of the Army of the Tennessee, much to the chagrin of Generals Logan and Blair. Stanley took command of Howard's Fourth corps. Hooker resigned as commander of the Twentieth corps and Slocum succeeded him. These changes gave rise to a considerable amount of feeling at the time, but Sherman did not make them hastily nor without first consulting Thomas. On July 25th Sherman's army stood:—Army of the Tennessee (Howard) on his left; Army of the Ohio (Schofield), left, touching the Augusta railroad; Army of the Cumberland (Thomas), right, and lines conforming with Atlanta defences. It was strongly entrenched, and the line extended for five miles.

On July 26th he despatched two cavalry columns, Stoneman's 5,000 strong and McCook's 4,000 strong, with orders to meet at Lovejoy Station on the Macon road, south of At-

lanta, and there destroy it. This project failed for want of concert, except an easily repaired damage. McCook was surrounded and compelled to cut his way out with the loss of 500 men, and Stoneman with 500 men was captured. These disasters were inflicted by Wheeler's cavalry, which then appeared on Sherman's rear at Calhoun and ran off 900 beef cattle.

Sherman had fixed July 27th for his flanking movement. It began promptly by the removal of Dodge's Sixteenth corps (Army of the Tennessee) across from his extreme left to his right and into position at Proctor's Creek. Blair's Seventeenth corps followed and deployed on Dodge's right. Logan's Fifteenth came next and entered on Blair's right. Jeff C. Davis' division was pushed down to Turner's Ferry, to cover the general right flank. All were ordered to entrench. Sherman's right now covered the Bell's Ferry road, leading due west from Atlanta. On the 28th, at 11 A. M. Hood made a determined assault on Logan's and Blair's front. He kept it up with great fury, till 4 P. M., during which time many of the scenes of the previous attack on the left were repeated. But the Union troops were better prepared, and they gave the enemy a warm reception. Their "gallant advance," as Sherman called it, was repulsed at every point, and they left the lines of their retreat covered with five thousand dead and wounded. The Union loss was six hundred. During this battle Sherman sent orders to Thomas and Scofield to attack in their front, the supposition being that Hood had drawn largely from his forces there in order to make his assault, but they found the parapets ahead of them fully manned.

Thus far Sherman's movement to his right was promising well; his men were greatly encouraged by the results on the 28th, and they realized that it was possible to compel Hood

to come out of his fortified lines to attack at a disadvantage, or seek battle on a fair field. Sherman therefore kept up his movement. The fifteenth corps was pushed down toward the Sandtown Road, where its right was prolonged by Davis' Division. Then Wood's Division of Palmer's Corps was taken from Thomas and swung to the right, and so the right was gradually lengthened and strengthened, till by the end of July, Sherman's line reached from the Augusta Road on the left, to the Sandtown Road, a distance of ten miles, all strongly entrenched. The bridge across the Chattahoochee, had been rebuilt, and the trains, arriving daily from Nashville, kept up a full compliment of supplies. For the month of July, Sherman figured his losses at 3,804 killed and missing, 5,915 wounded, a total of 9,719. Those of the enemy approximated 11,000. Thus closed the month of July, 1864.

In early August, Atlanta was in a state of siege. The weather was hot, but Sherman's men were in good spirits, his skirmishers kept close to the enemy, and every day brought its continuous clatter of musketry. His movement to the right was continued, and Hood kept even pace with it by extending his entrenched left. The news of the disaster to his cavalry columns had disconcerted Sherman somewhat, but he ordered the guards along his supply line to be increased, and still felt secure. By degrees Schofield's whole army was moved to his right, extending his line to East Point. Thomas was ordered to thin his line, by parting with Johnson's division of the Fourtenth Corps, which was pushed to the extreme right rear, and held in reserve for a bold dash on the Macon railroad, below East Point. Out of the remnants of his defeated cavalry divisions, which had now gotten in with their reports of disaster, Sherman organized three smaller divisions under Garrard, McCook and Kilpatrick. He had become convinced that cavalry could not, or would not, secure

a lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, therefore he ordered Schofield to make this a special object, and for this purpose placed the Fourteenth Corps under him. Schofield was now in command of fully 27,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, and on August 4th, Sherman ordered him to strike the Macon railroad about East Point. He failed to move on account of the refusal of Palmer to obey his orders. Palmer resigned, and Jeff. C. Davis was appointed to command the Fourteenth corps.

On August 5, Schofield's extension struck an outwork of the enemy which he attacked, but unfortunately got entangled in the trees and bushes and lost 500 men in killed and wounded. This defeat was not without its value, however, for it showed that the enemy were extending their entrenchments as fast as Sherman forged to the right.

On August 7, Sherman thus outlined the situation to Halleck: "Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and General Grant, and they are very satisfactory. We keep hammering away all the time, and there is no peace inside or outside of Atlanta. To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaulted yesterday, turned it and gained the ground where the assault had been made, and got possession of our dead and wounded. He continued to press on that flank and brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. He drove the enemy behind his main breastworks which cover the railroad from Atlanta to East Point, and captured a good many of his skirmishers, who are of his best troops—the militia hug the breastworks closely. I do not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but will push forward by parallels and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured. I have sent back to Chattanooga for two thirty-pound Parrott guns, with which we can pick out almost any house in the town. I am too impatient for a siege, and don't

know but that this is as good a place to fight it out, as further inland. One thing is certain, whether we get into Atlanta or not, it will be a used up community when we are done with it."

On August 10, his thirty-pound Parrotts arrived and were placed in position. For two days all the batteries played on Atlanta, and the infantry lines were advanced at every available point. Sherman was ever on the alert for an opening for assault. But Hood was equally wide-awake, and offered no opportunity. Sherman now put Kilpatrick with his newly-formed cavalry on his right rear; Gerrard on his left; and McCook on the railroad about Marietta and in reserve. His dispatch to Grant on this date read: "Since July 28, Hood has not attempted to meet us outside of his parapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually his communications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad bridge, well entrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle of desolation around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault his works, which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches. I have lost a good many regiments, and will lose more by expiration of service; and this is the only reason why I ask for reinforcements. We have crippled, killed and captured more of the enemy than we have lost by his acts."

Here then is indication that Sherman had changed his plan to approach Atlanta by parallels, and had determined to once more resort to his old tactics. On August 12th he was apprised of the capture of the forts in Mobile Bay by Farragut. This was most important as Farragut's operations were auxiliary to his own, and Mobile had been counted as a possible objective from the start of his campaign. On this date he also received the welcome news that he had been commissioned a Major General in the regular army. The enemy was still holding fast in his front, and seemed determined to

do so even though every house in the town were battered down. He must be drawn out for a square fight, or forced out by attacking his communications.

On August 13th Sherman, therefore, ordered the Twentieth corps to the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee to protect the communications to that point, while the rest of his army moved boldly and rapidly to the Macon railroad below East Point. He was the freeer to do this because the frequent attacks on his communications back of Allatoona, led him to believe that Hood had dispossessed himself of his cavalry for raiding purposses. As a counter to this Sherman withheld his orders for a general army movement for a few days and dispatched Kilpatrick's cavalry division to destroy the Macon road near Jonesboro, with the hope that Hood would thus be forced to evacuate Atlanta, and he (Sherman) would be able to overwhelm him while retreating. By the 22d of August, Kilpatrick returned, having made the circuit of Atlanta and destroyed much, but by no means enough to effectually cut off Hood's communications. On the 24th, Sherman telegraphed to Halleck: "Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. Will be ready to commence movement around Atlanta, by the south, by to-morrow night, and for some days you will hear little of us. Will keep open a courier line back to Chattahoochee bridge by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth corps will hold the bridge. Will move with the balance of the army provisioned for twenty days."

On the night of August 25th Sherman began his movement with great secrecy, and dexterously shifted his army by successive movements from left to right and from north to south. Schofield held on at or near East Point, and presented a bold front, while the armies of Thomas and Howard, pivoting on him, reached the West Point railroad, breaking it up thor-

oughly. By the 29th Thomas was well in place, and moving from Red Oak to the Fayettville road; Howard was pushing for Jonesboro; and on the 30th Schofield cut loose from his fortifications and marched out to Morrow's Mills on Thomas' left. On August 31st Sherman moved his entire army straight for the railroad. Schofield reached it at Rough and Ready; Thomas between there and Jonesboro; while Howard found Jonesboro occupied by the enemy. Thomas and Schofield were both ordered toward that point, which they approached, tearing up the railroad as they advanced, and driving the enemy within their fortifications. On September 1st the Fourteenth corps closed up on the enemy's works, and at 4 P. M. Davis' division made a charge over the parapets, capturing an entire Confederate brigade and two batteries of ten guns. Speedily, Sherman sent two divisions of Blair's Seventeenth to the rear of Jonesboro to cut the railroad, so that Hardee's corps could not escape; for now it was known that his entire corps was at Jonesboro, whither Hood had sent it with the consciousness that its fall meant the fall of Atlanta. But Hardee escaped under cover of the night.

That was a night of anxiety to all the Union Generals. They had taken awful risks, were far away from their communications, and were playing a game whose winning or losing must turn on a very few hours. At length, and about midnight, the Union camps were awakened by sounds of heavy explosions in the direction of Atlanta. Sherman had ordered Slocum to feel forward from the Chattahoochee bridge toward the north of Atlanta to observe the effects of the rearward movement on that front. At first, Sherman thought that Slocum had been acting rashly and had become terribly engaged, or that perhaps Hood had attacked him in force. But there came a lull in the explosions. At 4 A. M. they broke out again, and louder than before. They were

now of a nature to be understood. The enemy was blowing up his magazines, store-houses and trains. Soon Atlanta burst into flames. Hood's rear guard had done its work, and Hood himself had made his escape in the night toward Macon. When Sherman struck Hardee at Jonesboro, he really struck the force Hood had placed there to cover his retreat. The pursuit was joined in the morning and continued to near Lovejoy Station. Here word reached Sherman that Slocum had heard the same explosions in the night, had marched rapidly forward to find Atlanta evacuated, and had entered the city unopposed. Sherman had won Atlanta.

His army remained at Lovejoy's for a few days, during which he decided that it would be useless to pursue Hood's army further. He, therefore, ordered his army back to Atlanta for rest. It began to fall back on September 5th, and soon Thomas found a camp in Atlanta, Howard one at East Point, and Scofield one at Decatur, where the soldiers enjoyed much needed repose and were cheered by the daily bulletins of thanks from the loyal north for their bravery and their victory.

Of his own achievement, Sherman says :—"Of course the glad tidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North, where the people had patiently awaited the news of their husbands, sons and brothers, "Away down in Dixie" and congratulations came pouring back full of good will and patriotism. This victory was most opportune, Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterwards, that even he had previously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away, that General Grant seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg and that my army seemed to have run up against an unpassible barrier, when the news came that "Atlanta was ours, and fairly won." A presidential election then agitated the North. Mr. Lincoln represented the National cause, and

LIVING OFF THE COUNTRY.

General McClellan had accepted the nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was, better to allow the South to go free to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should be slavery. Success to our arms, therefore, at that instant was a political necessity; and it was all important that something startling in our interest should occur before the November election. The brilliant success at Atlanta filled that requirement and made the success of Mr. Lincoln certain."

On September 3d, Sherman received the following congratulatory dispatch from President Lincoln:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Sept. 3, 1864.

The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major General W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers under his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverence displayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor has resulted in the capture of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
President of U. S.

Grant, too, from an overflowing heart, dispatched to his western marshal:—

Major-general Sherman:—I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired with *shotted* guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amid great rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-general.*

To which Sherman replied:—"I have received your dispatch, and will communicate it to the troops, in general

orders. . . . . I have always felt that you would personally take more pleasure in my success than in your own, and I reciprocate the feeling it its fullest extent."

And again the unselfish Grant telegraphed on Sept. 12th: "I feel you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if equalled. It gives me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any living man, myself included."

Badeau's analysis of Sherman's Atlanta campaign, and its comparison with that of his chief, is worthy of a place here:—

"It was four months since the national hosts moved out under the shadow of Lookout Mountain against Johnston's army. During that period they had marched four hundred miles, fought thirteen distinct battles, and captured thirteen thousand prisoners; they had made seven successful flanking movements; crossed the Oostenaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee rivers; turned three mountain ranges and captured fourteen towns. Sherman had entered the campaign with ninety-eight thousand troops, and received reinforcements which brought his numbers up to one hundred and thirteen thousand. At the end his army was eighty-one thousand strong. He had lost four thousand four hundred killed, twenty-two thousand eight hundred wounded, and four thousand four hundred missing; total, thirty-one thousand six hundred men. In the rebel army the losses were three thousand killed, eighteen thousand nine hundred wounded, and twelve thousand nine hundred prisoners; in all, thirty-four thousand eight hundred soldiers.

"The strategy of the campaign had been almost one continuous success. The flanking movements at Dalton and Resaca were conceived with a clearness and executed with a precision

not often rivalled, and were all the more creditable because performed in the presence of a master in the art of war.

"When the army moved from Kingston, Sherman hoped not only to avoid Allatoona, but Kenesaw, but the rebel strategy at this point was admirable. The national object was divided, and Sherman returned to the railroad sooner than he had intended or desired. But Allatoona was turned and the complete success of the manoeuvre was only delayed.

"The assaults at Kenesaw have been sharply criticized, but even remembering their immediate result, it must be owned that they had produced good fruit. They demonstrated to Johnston that his opponent was not destitute of boldness, and they proved the mettle of the men, who gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he dared not show a head above them.

"It is impossible not to perceive the parallel between these alternate attacks and the flanking movements and those in the Wilderness campaign. At East and West the national generals pursued an aggressive policy in a difficult region, with forests to penetrate, breastworks to carry, and rivers to cross. At East and West a skilful opponent took every means to compensate by position, superior knowledge of the country, and all defensive arts, for an inferiority in numbers not half so marked in either instance as had been declared. In Georgia, as in Virginia, the progress was slow but steady; neither commander ever lost an inch of ground, and after every battle each national army advanced. Sherman's strategy was, however, more uniformly that of manœuvring than Grant's; he fought but one offensive battle during the campaign, though his movements were invariably aggressive; yet Grant as often as Sherman compelled the rebels to abandon their positions by pure strategy. Sherman was oftener attacked than Grant; Johnston once assaulted with vigor, and when

Hood assumed command, the offensive-defensive policy was fairly attempted.

"The fighting was harder at the East, the battles bloodier and longer, and oftener; for both sides felt that at the East the issue must after all be decided. Richmond was a political as well as a military strategic point, and the insurgent government naturally concentrated greater force, and made a more desperate effort for their capital. At the East it was indispensable that the armies of the rebels should be not only depleted, exhausted, beaten, driven from their stronghold—but destroyed. Sherman's campaign, however, as well as Grant's tended to this end. It not only annihilated the railroad communications of the enemy at the West; not only penetrated to the heart of the Confederacy, consumed its products and intercepted its supplies; but most important of all, the capture of Atlanta released Sherman to co-operate more absolutely and closely with Grant.

"Sherman, indeed, always felt that he too was fighting against Richmond. He appreciated thoroughly the necessity for co-operation and concentration, and in every step he took regarded its effects upon the general scheme. He considered that he bore his part in a game in which there were many players, and he gave help and expected it in his turn.

"But though his movements were a part, and a most significant one, of operations which extended over a continent, the campaign at the West was Sherman's own. Grant gave him his army and his aim, but allowed him to follow Johnston in his own fashion, only requiring him to expect no reinforcements from Eastern troops, and to prevent the Western rebels from reinforcing Lee. Sherman, indeed, reported his operations daily, and Grant often advised him, but only to encourage and approve, not to countermand. He allowed his own movements to de effected by Sherman's needs, and

planned campaigns and fought battles to occupy rebel forces which might otherwise be sent or ordered to Georgia; but during the four months in which Sherman was making his way to Atlanta, Grant never once interferred with his general plan or with any particular movement; and thus, although Sherman's subordination was such as almost to invite a superior to interpose.

"But what their relations were at the beginning, they continued at the close. Grant was as considerate and unselfish, as anxious for Sherman's fame when his great lieutenant had stepped up unto the ranks of the world's captains, as when his friend had been called crazy two years before; and none could be quicker to acknowledge and proclaim a success which for a time, in the eyes of many, eclipsed his own, for Sherman seemed first to gain his prize, though none knew better than he, that his work was still incomplete when Atlanta fell.

"Sherman on the other hand, grew in power, and greatness, and fame. He was more conscious of his own ability after he had handled a hundred thousand men in independent movements during an entire summer; he had learned what success was, and relished it; he could not be unconscious of the far different position he now held before the country; but he was as ready to submit his judgment to that of his chief, as quick to obey an order, even if he did not approve it, as thoroughly subordinate, as when he rallied a broken division at Shiloh, or led a corps with all the energy of his nature in what he deemed a hopeless campaign behind the Vicksburg Hills."

Our life of Sherman would hardly be complete without Swinton's portrait of him sketched while in the flush of victory after Atlanta:

"The central figure in the Georgian drama, the man on whom its success chiefly hung, had been well fitted to the role

he was called to play. Both by native temperament and by the accidents of his experience, Sherman had been made apt for the bold and novel method of warfare which it was needful to wage. A man of soldierly instincts, Sherman had received the training of the full curriculum at West Point, where his military abilities gained him bright scholastic honors. The long interim between his graduation and the outburst of the great war, seems to have done but little additional for him, either in martial experience or in martial fame; and nevertheless that interval must have been a generous seed-time, since no man in the country at the fall of Sumter was a more thorough potential soldier. Amongst Sherman's early-displayed traits was a broad and thorough view of campaigning, which comprised at once a complete plan at the outset, and thereafter attention to the minutest details. Of Sherman it soon became insufficient to say that he knew the art of combat, but that he knew perfectly how to march, to feed, and to fight a great army, and reduced each one of these to a distinct and complete science.

"Sherman, moreover, above all Union commanders possesses the geographical eye. His campaigning ground lies as a grand chart before him, whereof every inch passes under his vision: it elevations, its depression, its watercourses, its vegetation, its network of roads, and all its possibilities too, as well as its present features, he deems it not beneath him to study. At a glance the features of a landscape take on in his eye their military hue: a mountain range appears to him a natural traverse, the rising ground yonder a bastion, this precipitous pass a gorge, that river a wet ditch to be passed; and thus he may be said seldom or never to miscalculate the amount of the aid which nature tenders, to him, or has lent his adversary. Some things, too, of the natural surroundings, as well as their military significence, evidently

catches the gaze of his commander, and that, even in his official reports. But it is that other faculty of measuring and grasping the terrain on which he manœuvres and gives battle, though its breadth and its length be meted as it often was, by hundreds of miles in a single campaign, of which we mainly speak. His ground he studies with an anatomist's nicety, now watching the great backbone formed by the mountain chain, now the ribs and spines it puts off on either hand, with those great arteries, the rivers fed by the lesser water-courses, the veins. Striking here, he knows that he will touch the heart of the country, or there, that he will paralyze the right arm of its strength. Nor is it merely the surface elevations and depressions, nor the geological drift of the land, nor its clothing of forest and undergrowth, nor its irrigation, nor the capacity and direction of its turnpikes and paths, nor the nature of the soil, which may affect his marching or his bivouacs, that Sherman investigates; but he evidently learned thoroughly the natural products of the land, with a view to the question of supplies for him and for his opponents, and this, too, not by a tardy experience, but before he sets foot on the campaign, and not in his own neighborhood only, but for scores of miles on all his possible lines of advance. Accordingly, it had been related of him, that even while campaigning on the Mississippi years before, he was intently studying the whole theatre of his Georgia triumph, and indeed all the interior of the Confederacy. It is also said that at the very beginning of the war he obtained from the Census Bureau in Washington a map, made at his own request, of the cotton States, with a table showing the cattle, horses, and products of each country, according to the last census returns reported from those States; so that afterwards, when the time for such enterprise arrived, he was practically familiar with the resources of the whole country on his line of march.

"The natural bent of his genius, also, provoked Sherman to undertake campaigns of the audacious nature of the Georgia and Carolina excursions. Being original in his conceptions, he habitually thought of many things which but few other commanders would have thought of, and, indeed, provided for a hundred fancied contingencies and dilemmas which his opponents never attempted to bring about. If ever unduly elated by success, the first error of over-confidence was apt to rouse him to his customary discretion and skill; but a certain pride, joined by his bull-dog tenacity of purpose, commonly induced him to try to work through as he had begun, in order to prove himself to have been right at the start. He possessed a rare and felicitous union of method and originality, having a great devotion to order and system, which, however, he overthrew when they became trivial and constraining, as concerning petty things, and as being the marks of a mind working in a rut.

"He was a martinet in his ideas of military regulations, discipline, drill, subordination, and held himself and his subalterns implicitly to obeying orders; nevertheless, neither in fashioning his campaigns, nor in executing their tactical details, was he hampered by any traditional leathern-stock method, since no small part of his success was due to the presence in his command of strict discipline and unquestioning obedience to orders on the one hand, and a certain freedom from restraint and wise latitude in the choice of means on the other. His own temperament was conscientiously exact and scrupulous, but yet bold and facile in invention, and naturally bent on some new and better way of doing an old thing, never admitting meanwhile that anything was impossible merely because it had not been done before.

"He was not always correct in his judgments of men, and sometimes hasty in uttering opinions upon matters beyond his

professional scope and in which he was not an expert; but with regard to the latter it may be said, that it never could be averred of anything relating to the military art, and of the former, that no incompetent subordinate ever had the chance to deceive him twice. In the constitution of his mind there was a kind of intellectual absolutism which might have led, but happily did not, to dangerous manifestations. It was controlled, indeed, by his soldier's habit of fidelity to orders; but on emergency and under the push of circumstance might obviously have asserted its supremacy. In this respect Sherman differed remarkably from many brother officers, most of whom looked to the way in which the people would regard their actions, kept always in mind their liability to be halled before the popular tribunal, and never quite sank the citizen in the soldier. The tendency in Sherman of which we speak became the stronger from his being impetuous rather than imperturbable in spirit, and self-confident in ratio to his past successes."

"Sherman had a fine organizing and administrative ability, which he exhibited not only in his wonderful composition and preparation of vast armies, but also in directing municipal affairs in several conquered cities like Memphis, Atlanta, and Savannah. In the latter function, however, he showed, as was not unbecoming a soldier, the tact rather of an executive than of a legislative or judicial mind. Being a born general, his quick eye, his deftness and his martial instincts, saved the time which many journeymen soldiers lose by awkwardness and slow comprehension. He was prescient from the start, and being among the first to detect the approach of war, was also amongst the few who at once appreciated its gravity. Accordingly, his scorn of three months' troops, and his bold estimate of two hundred thousand men as requisite to march from the Ohio to the Gulf, procured him a rather premature

verdict of insanity from the "sixty-day" sages of Washington.

"Remarkable above all was Sherman's restless energy, which kept him at work in season and out of season, and allowed no moment's respite in his measureless activity. This quality enabled him not only to superintend his campaigns, but to personally direct to a wonderful extent the evolution of their details. He was accustomed to know thoroughly the condition of the manifold departments of his armies, and to perform many of those functions which some officers would be glad to shift upon their aides-de-camp. Allied to this trait was his perfect self-reliance and confidence, which made him desire, wherever possible, to take supreme responsibility.

"There are two classes of commanders, of which one may be said never to have gained a battle if gained, or to have lost it if lost, it was some corps, division, or brigade commander who saw and seized the key-point, or repulsed some unexpected assault, or made some happy unauthorized attack, or knew the ground whose nature had not been explained to him; or else it was some accident of fortune that gained the victory, or some error or inferiority of the enemy, and in short, anything but original planning. Nevertheless, even such are invaluable, if only they know how to use the greatness of others, though they be not great themselves.

"However, Sherman belonged to the other class, and whatever victories he gained are his own. No aid-de-camp drafted his plan of campaign, no subordinate detected for him the key-points of his battle-grounds, and whatever there is of good or bad in Sherman's soldiership is his own, for glory or blame. Accustomed to thoroughly plan and prepare his campaigns at the outset, so that he had a tolerably just perspective of their daily progress, he was left with leisure to employ great care upon details. His field orders are remarkably specific in their instructions, pointing out to sub-divisions

the roads to be taken, and the times of starting and arrival, and the methods of manœuvre and attack, with such minuteness as to shift much of the responsibility of the issue to the shoulders of the general-in-chief. Such orders form a marked contrast to the loose and general and conditional instructions of some commanders, whence one conceives a low idea of the influence they have exerted on the actual issue. Sherman, however, had himself furnished fine models of the promptness and precision which he desired in others. For a single example, at Vicksburg Grant had ordered Sherman to be ready with supplies of all descriptions, to move back against Johnston on the 6th of July, for which time an assault on the city had been fixed. Sherman, without a moment's delay, prepared himself, though he might have taken leisurely advantage of the interval; hence, when it so hapened that Vicksburg fell an the 4th, the same day Sherman's columns were marching against the Confederate commander. Grant says, "when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once." The same trait of promptness was visible in his forced marches during the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns, while, as to his precision, being a master in the art of handling troops, a hundred battalions would move to and fro beneath his skilful touch with the smoothness of mechanism."

CHAPTER XII.

PREPARING FOR THE GRAND MARCH.

After the close of the Atlanta campaign Sherman established a neutral camp at Rough and Ready in order to effect an exchange of prisoners and facilitate the removal of non-combatants from the city. He was determined to make Atlanta a purely military position, and one which would not repeat the disorderly and mixed control he had experienced at Memphis and Vicksburg. For this he was charged with barbarity and cruelty by the Confederate press and its congeners in the North. He answered, "If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity seeking. If they want peace they and their relatives must stop the war." He says he "knew that the people of the South would read in this measure two important conclusions; one, that we were in earnest; the other, that if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor 'to die in the last ditch,' that the opportunity would soon come.'"

When General Hood and the Mayor of Atlanta took it upon themselves to question his motives and criticise his actions, he vindicated himself first to his government in the following vigorous language: "It is sufficient for my government to know that the removal of the inhabitants of Atlanta has been made with liberality and fairness, that it had been attended with no force, and that no women or children have suffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectors and friends.

"My real reasons for this step were:—We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and occupation.

"We want to contract the lines of defence so as to diminish the garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs. This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels and redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used by families as residences.

"Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly captured. As captors we have a right to it.

"The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner or later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.

"The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and hurtful to our cause. A civil population calls for provost-guards, and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlasting complaints and special greviences that are not military.

'These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of the United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General Hood and his people or not."

It is unneccessary to say that Sherman's course in the matter met with the full approval of the War Department, which said: "Not only are you justified by the laws and usuages of war in removing these people, but it was your duty to your own army to do so."

In a direct and scorching reply to General Hood, Sherman said:

"You style the measures "unprecedented" and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented, for General Johnston himself very properly and wisely removed the

families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourself burned dwelling houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to the town that every cannon shot and many musket shots from our line of investment, that overshot the mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro; and General Johnston did the same, last summer, at Jackson. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a "brave people."

"I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of dark history.

In the name of common sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace and prosperity have plunged a nation into war —dark and cruel war—who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts, that were left in the honorable custody of ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you) hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into re-

bellion in spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana, turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared, by act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received! Talk thus to marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town-full of women and the families of a brave people at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their friends and people."

By the middle of September, 1864, Sherman had his battle reports in and these questions of camp and local government settled. Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee with his cavalry, threatening Sherman's communications, and Forrest was supposed to be moving thither from Mississippi. As against them, Newton's division of the Fourth corps was moved back to Chattanooga, Corse's division of the Seventeenth, to Rome, and Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steadman at Chattanooga, were all ordered to be on the alert. Hood remained below Boonsboro at, or near Lovejoy station, and up to this date had given no indication of his future plans.


While Sherman's army was enjoying a rest, he was in the midst of mental activity and was really passing through one of the most critical periods of his military career. No military policy beyond Atlanta had yet been developed. None could be fully developed until Hood showed his hand, and set in operation a new chain of conditions. It is curious to

note developments at this time, and to study the nature of those hypotheses and thoughts which grew and shaped themselves into initiatives as much by sheer force of circumstances as by personal deliberations. To write them up historically is next to impossible, but they can be gathered and grouped, without shading or theory, by outlining the official dispatches of the period, and by following the threads which led to future determinate action on the part of Sherman.

On September 10th, Grant's dispatch to Sherman in reply to one to the effect that "We must have the Alabama river," read: "Now that we have all of Mobile that is valuable, I do not know but it would be the best move for General Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, while you move on Augusta, Ga. I would like to hear from you, however, in this matter."

Sherman replied that night:—"Our roads are broken near Nashville and Wheeler is not yet disposed of—I do not think we can afford to operate further, dependent on the railroad. It takes so many men to guard it, and then it is nightly broken by the enemy's cavalry that swarms around us—If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. The country will afford forage and many supplies, but not enough in any one place to admit of delay—If you can manage to take the Savannah river as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole state of Georgia; otherwise I should risk our whole army by going too far from Atlanta."

These two dispatches show that Grant and Sherman were at an early agreement as to the necessity of cutting loose from Atlanta. Grant was most considerate of the goal; Sherman of the start. Grant had given over the idea of going to



MAJ. GEN'L GEO. H. THOMAS.

Mobile, since its forts were now in Union hands, and suggested Savannah as an objective for Canby, and Augusta as an objective for Sherman. Sherman's dispatch suggested a general sweep of Georgia by his forces, and dependence on such a future base as Grant might provide him at Columbus or Augusta, by means of combined naval and land forces operating on the Savannah and Chattahoochee.

On September 12th, Sherman made known to Halleck his further thoughts of the situation: "There is a large abundance of forage in Alabama and Georgia, and independent columns might operate by a circuit from one army to another and destroy the enemy's cavalry. Our railroad is repaired and bringing supplies, but I doubt its capacity to do more than feed our trains and artillery horses. As soon as General Grant determines for me the next move on the chess-board, I will estimate the number I will want."

On September 15th 1864, Sherman's dispatch to Halleck contained the following: "I am awaiting a courier from General Grant." Grant had written on the 12th. Sherman received the letter on September 20th. Grant's letter authorized its bearer, Colonel Porter, to explain to Sherman the exact state of affairs about Petersburg. It then went on and described Grant's intended move to his left so as to control the Southside, or Lynchburg and Petersburg railroad. Continuing, it prefigured his intended move for the capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington. Then reaching the Atlanta situation, it went on:—"What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not exactly see. The difficulties of supplying your armies, except when they are constantly moving beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movement, Canby could have sent 12,000 more men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could have been taken. With these

forces, my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever one should be abandoned by the enemy you could take, and open up a new base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer to you is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views, and to have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It would probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans here indicated will be executed."

Under date of September 20th, Sherman replied to the above letter, whose arrival he had been awaiting. The coincidence of his views with those of his chief is strongly marked. Observe, Grant has left him independent. Observe, also, that Sherman and Grant await each other's suggestions. There is perfect confidence between the two, and a condescension on the part of the one as gracious and trustful as the subordination on the part of the other is manly and loyal. That part of Sherman's reply which bears directly on the Atlanta situation, ran: "If successful at Wilmington I suppose the fleet will be sent at once to the Savannah river. Then the reduction of that city is the next question. If once in our possession, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with 60,000 men, hauling some stores and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of people can find subsistence, my army won't starve; but as you know, in a country like Georgia, with a few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so harass and delay an army, that it would not be a formidable object; but if the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah river, I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta as that the enemy would doubtless give up one

or the other; then I would move so as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give us Augusta, with the only powder mills and factories remaining in the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah river. I would prefer his holding Augusta; for then, with the Savannah river in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a mere question of time. The campaign could be made in the winter. The more I study the game the more I am convinced it would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without an objective beyond. I can start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to the State, but resulting in no permanent good. I therefore give it as my opinion that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and its river; that Canby should hold the Mississippi river and send a force to Columbus, Ga.; that I should keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia and Charleston; and that I should start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce and the city of Savannah is in our possession."

This full flow of solicited opinion along the line of Grant's suggestions brought the two Generals close together, and the consensus proved to be the intimation and outline of what afterwards was the "March to the Sea." Its when and its details could now be matured. No, no; not yet! The situation shifts as if by magic. Hood has not been fully considered in these golden suggestions and paper plans, or if so, he only appears as a quiescent factor. But this is not to be. He is not only to be potential, but the father of a new set of circumstances which were to modify and re-shape all pre-arrangements. On the very day after Sherman sent his letter to Grant, (September 21st.) Hood moved his army from Love-

joy to Palmetto Station, on the West Point railroad, twenty-four miles south of Atlanta. On the same day his cavalry appeared on the north, or west, side of the Chattahoochee. Here was a bid to Sherman to enter the heart of Georgia at will, to march where he pleased—to Macon, Augusta, the sea. But there was something behind all this. Sherman inferred that it meant the assumption of an active offensive by Hood and a grand attack upon his railroad communications. On the 22nd, Hood announced to Bragg, "I shall, unless Sherman moves south, so soon as I can collect supplies, cross the Chattahoochee and form a line of battle near Powder Springs. This will prevent him from using the Dalton road, and force him to drive me off, when I shall fall on his rear." On the 24th, a heavy body of Forrest's cavalry attacked Athens, Ala., and captured its garrison. Here then, Hood had anticipated the very movement Grant and Sherman had been discussing, and had boldly cleared the way for it; in fact, had dared Sherman to take it. This audacity had the semblance of brilliancy. It might have unnerved men of different compositions from Grant and Sherman. Whilst it must be admitted it gave rise to new considerations and situations, the former said of Hood's movement, "It exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army which had been beaten and decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive could successfully undertake the offensive against the force that had so often defeated it." The latter telegraphed his preparations to meet Hood's design: "Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama line, leaving open the road to Macon and Augusta; but his cavalry is busy on all our roads. I have sent Newton's division to Chattanooga and will send another to Rome. If I were sure Savannah would soon be in our possession, I should be tempted to march for Milledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have."

Jeff Davis, the Confederate President, came to Hood at this time, and all along his route had proclaimed the new campaign, which was to recover Atlanta, visit upon Sherman the fate of Napoleon at Moscow, and establish Southern supremacy in the heart of Tennessee. He little dreamed that he was giving away the deep-laid scheme of Hood, and that he was forewarning those who surely would be forearmed.

Forrest was found to be moving on the railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga with a superior cavalry force. Grant, with his usual solicitude for Sherman, and with characteristic pugnacity, advised:—"It will be better to drive Forrest from Middle Tennessee as a first step, and then do anything you may feel your force sufficient for. When a movement is made on any part of the sea-coast, I will advise you."

All of Grant's and Sherman's Georgia and seaward movements had been predicated on the element of time, but Hood's movement dispelled the element of time, in fact Sherman found that Hood's movement was formidable unless he (Sherman) should cease to nurse the thought of extending the advantages of Atlanta further into Georgia and to the sea-coast. Sherman made confession of this in his reply to Grant:—"In Middle Tennessee we are weak. . . . . I have already sent one division to Chattanooga and to Rome. . . . . If I send much more I will not be able to threaten Georgia much. . . . . Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that are in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts. Hood is now at West Point road, twenty-four miles south of this, and draws his supplies from that road. Jefferson Davis is there to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road. Forrest is now Lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's cavalry."

In response to this Grant ordered all recruits to be sent to Nashville and placed under Sherman's orders. Sherman himself called for reinforcements from Kentucky, and ordered all to concentrate at Nashville. It was manifest that a double attack, one of infantry and one of cavalry, was to be made on his communications, and that no thought of anything else was worthy of consideration, till both were repelled, On September 28th, Grant telegraphed Halleck:—"Everything indicates that the enemy are going to make a last and spasmodic effort to regain what they have lost, and especially against Sherman. Troops should be got to Sherman as rapidly as the lines of communication will carry them. If there are no troops in the Western states send them from further East." On the same date Sherman telegraphed:—"Forrest has got into Middle Tennessee, and will, I feel certain, get on my main road to-morrow or to-morrow night, but I will guard well from this back to Chattanooga, and trust to troops coming up from Kentucky to hold Nashville and forward to Chattanooga."

All these dispatches are in dismal contrast with those which but a few days before had mapped so glowing an offensive. Yet if they are despairing, they evince the energy born of despair. Hood's movement was thwarting, but there was no thought that he could create an emergency which would prove overwhelming. On September 29th, Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga with Morgan's division of the Fourteenth Corps, with orders to meet Forrest's movements in Tennessee.

It would have been a sad fate for Sherman if he had lost his army for want of supplies, or if he had been forced to back to Tennessee over his hard earned battle fields. Yet larger armies than his had met with such a fate, and upon this President Davis, Hood and all the Confederate author-

ities fully counted. It may be said that Sherman was nervous and excited over the situation. Granted; but he was not shaken in the faith that he could ere long march to the sea and prove to the world that the confederacy was the shell it had been assumed to be, for on September 28th, he said:—"I want Appalachicola arsenal taken, also Savannah, and if the enemy does not succeed in breaking my roads, I can fight my way across to one place or the other; but I think better to hold on to Atlanta and strengthen to my rear and am therefore glad you have sent troops to Nashville." As the emergency thickened Sherman seemed to gather new inspiration, and as the situation darkened his genius seemed to find new light. Trusting to Grant to protect Nashville, take Appalachicola and Savannah, backing him on the one side and opening a way on the other, he felt equal to all else.

On September 29th, Hood crossed the Chattahoochee. On October 1st, Sherman telegraphed to Grant: "Hood is evidently across the Chattahoochee below Sweetwater. If he tries to get on our road this side of the Etowah, I will attack him; but if he goes to the Selma and Talladega road, why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and to the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on the defensive."

Here we have the full flash of that thought which was to carry Sherman to the sea. It had been born of the suggestions passing between him and Grant. They had nursed it in secret and in theory till it had assumed pleasing proportions. It required the circumstances which Hood threw around it to develop and harden it into practical shape. It was no longer a raid, but a military counter to Hood's own daring movement. It risked little, for Hood was to be pro-

vided for at any rate, and that, just as soon as he was sufficiently committed to his northern movement as to no longer prove a menace to Sherman's rear. It was Hood that was dallying with a desperate situation, and not Sherman.

Still Hood was crowding Sherman. He marched directly on Sherman's rear in the direction of Marietta. Sherman was forced to follow him. Leaving Slocum's Twentieth corps in Atlanta, he hastened back to Marietta with his remaining corps. On October 4th, he learned that heavy masses of the enemy had been seen marching for Allatoona. He signalled over the mountain tops to Corse at Rome, to hasten to Allatoona. On the 5th Sherman reached Marietta and Kenesaw, to find that the enemy had already struck the railroad ahead of him and had destroyed it from Marietta to Allatoona, fully eighteen miles. He could hear the reverberations of the cannon at Allatoona, where a million rations were stored.

He immediately ordered Cox's Twenty-third corps to move due west to the Burnt Hickory road, with the hope that it might be able to come in between Hood's main body and the force attacking Allatoona. He followed direct for Allatoona with the rest of his army. While with the signal officer at Kenesaw, the signal came that Corse had reached Allatoona. Later in the day came the welcome signal that the attack on the place had been repulsed. The attack had been made by 5000 of the enemy and Corse had fallen severely wounded. His dispatch next day ran: "I am short a cheek bone and an ear, but able to whip all hell yet." The enemy's retreat was hastened by the proximity of Cox's corps, and they fell back on the main body toward Dallas, doing much damage to the railroad, but leaving behind over 200 dead and 411 prisoners. Corse's defence had been a handsome one. He had lost 707 men, killed and wounded. His bravery was made the sub-

ject of special mention by Sherman. It took 10,000 men fully seven days to repair the damage to the railroad.

These happenings so engrossed Sherman that he sent no dispatch to Washington from Oct. 1st till the 9th. Then out of all the gloom came the significant ray: "It will be physically impossible to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler and the whole batch of devils are turned loose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the Selma and Talladega railroad, at Blue Mountains, 60 miles south of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga, and strike with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen and Savannah. Until we repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses and people will cripple our military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose 1000 men monthly, and will gain no results. I can make the march and make Georgia howl."

Sherman had sent Corse back to Rome, with orders to feel the country to the South. He soon reported that the enemy was in force at Cedartown and Villa Rica. On the 10th the enemy appeared south of the Etowah and at Rome. This determined the direction of Hood, and Sherman ordered all his forces to Kingston, telegraphing at the same time to Thomas, then at Nashville, that it looked as if Hood was bound for Tuscambia, for he was then crossing the Coosa below Rome. "Let me know," he continued, "if you can hold him with the forces now in Tennessee and the expected re-inforcements. You know what I propose to do. I will be at Kingston to-morrow. I think Rome is strong enough to resist any attack, and the rivers all are high. If he turns up by Summerville, I will get behind him." Consecutively with this he telegraphed Grant: "Hood is now crossing the

Coosa, twelve miles below Rome—bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State? He will have ample force when the re-inforcements now ordered reach Nashville."

Grant replied, as might have been expected of one who believed that the destruction of opposing armies was the only way to end the war, that "if there is any way of getting at Hood's army I should prefer it; but I trust to your judgment. I find I will not be able to send a force from here to act with you at Savannah; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of roads as he has to protect could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson (Wilson had been sent from Sheridan's army to take command of Sherman's cavalry) turned loose you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than before."

But Sherman had not waited for his reply. He had gone to Rome and had learned from Corse that Hood's army had disappeared. Then he became so thoroughly convinced of the wisdom of changing the following up tactics of the campaign, of leaving Hood entirely to the mercy of Thomas, and of marching across Georgia for Charleston and Savannah, that he dispatched Grant again:—

"We cannot now remain on the defensive. With 25,000 infantry and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break my road. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, sending back all my wounded and unserviceable men, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee or Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive I will be on the offensive. Instead

of me guessing what he will do, he will have to guess at my plans. The difference in war would be fully 25 per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Appalachicola. Answer quick, as I know I will not have the telegraph long."

It is interesting to note the cautious and enlarged glance of the Chief and the fiery and localized glance of his able subordinate. There is no disconcert except that which grew out of Grant's thought that Hood would certainly go north and Sherman's that he would surely follow him. Grant's thought led to the belief that Hood should be destroyed before Sherman left him, and but for his unbounded faith in Sherman's genius he would have insisted on this result. Grant's answer to Sherman's imperative message was promptly wired, though Sherman did not receive it for a day or two. It ran:—"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, yon may make it, destroying all the railroads south of Dalton or Chattanooga as you think best."

Right in the face of this acquiescent and assuring dispatch, there was dire trouble for Sherman. Hood had slipped up the Chatooga valley with his whole army and suddenly invested Resaca. Sherman was compelled to turn thither his entire available force. Cox was called in from Rome, Stanley from McGuire's and Howard from Kingston. They all reached there on the night and morning of the 13th, but only to learn that Hood had passed up the valley ahead of them, toward Dalton, burning the railroad and destroying everything possible. He had boldly demanded the surrender of Resaca, but finding it resolutely garrisoned, had hastened on, contented with a simple threat to attack. Hood captured a regiment of colored troops at Dalton, and carried his destruction of the railroad to Tunnel Hill, a distance of twenty-three miles.

On October 14th, Sherman ordered Howard through Snake Creek Gap, and Stanley around by Tilton, to capture the force of the enemy supposed to be at the Western entrance of the Gap. Wood carried Ship's Gap, capturing part of the force left to guard it. Hood had now gotten to Lafayette, and Sherman hoped to bring him to battle there, but he escaped down the Chatooga valley, with Sherman in pursuit. By October 21st, Sherman was as far down as Gaylesville, where Schofield joined him with fresh forces from Chattanooga.

At this moment Sherman appears to have been in doubt about his previous plans. He informed Schofield that he wanted the road from Chattanooga to Atlanta repaired, yet still announced his intention of making "the interior of Georgia feel the weight of war." At the same time he said, "We must follow Hood till he is beyond the reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive." Thomas had discouraged the idea of his marching away and leaving him (Thomas) to take care of Hood. Grant had thought it best for him not to leave an unpunished enemy in his rear. Now Sherman thought it best to see Hood "beyond the reach of mischief" before he took the offensive.

Sherman followed Hood down the Chatooga Valley to Gadsden, but without thought of catching him, for he was lightly equipped and had no intention of standing battle. Meanwhile, Sherman was forced to live off the country, and found plenty of food and forage. This fact encouraged him in his resolve to make the "Grand March." He therefore began to shape things so that he might cut loose and dare what he had so long contemplated. He had pursued Hood as far as Gaylesville, and so telegraphed Halleck on October 19th. He did this; convinced that Hood would not invade Tennessee except by way of Decatur.

On the same date he telegraphed to his Chief-quartermaster at Atlanta: "Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the 1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary for war. Send all trash to the rear at once, and have on hand thirty days' food and but little forage. I propose to abandon Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to sally forth to ruin Georgia and bring up on the seashore. Make all dispositions accordingly. I will go down the Coosa until I am sure Hood has gone to the Blue Mountain."

Sherman's pursuit of Hood ceased at Gaylesville. On October 26th, he learned that Hood had made his appearance about Decatur. This was evidence to Sherman that he (Hood) intended to invade Tennessee. The fact left him free to march through Georgia, but at the same time he must see that Thomas was amply provided to resist the invading forces of Hood. The easy manner in which Hood whirled his forces through valleys and over rivers, the certainty with which he found supplies away from any base except that of his own army, were fine object lessons for Sherman, and highly confirmatory of the opinion that he could do the same with similar ease and certainty.

How was Thomas situated, or likely to be? He had at Nashville some 8,000 new troops. He had at Chattanooga Steedman's division of 5,000 men, besides the garrisons at Chattanooga, Bridgeport and Stevenson. Rousseau's division, 5,000 strong, occupied Murfreesboro. Granger's division, 4,000 strong, was at Decatur and Huntsville, Alabama. At the various crossings of the Tennessee were several brigades of cavalry and infantry. Wilson was rapidly mounting and forming a division of cavalry in Nashville. A. J. Smith was returning from Missouri with his division of 10,000 men. Schofield's Twenty-third corps was forwarded to Chat-

tanooga from Resaca. Sherman, therefore, felt that Thomas would have an ample force at his command to contend with Hood and garrison his forts and depots. He was convinced, also, that even a general as slow as Thomas was, would have ample time to make all his preparations, for he had learned that Hood found a scarcity of supplies about Decatur and Tuscambia, and had moreover run short of ammunition, so that he was forced to reach Tuscambia before crossing the Tennessee, in order to get new stores by way of the road round by Meridian and Corinth, Miss. Hood did not attack Decatur, but marched westward toward Corinth, where he remained for nearly a month, at a point south of the Tennessee, opposite Florence.

Thomas now sent Stanley's Fourth corps to Pulaski, Tenn., and Schofield's Twenty-third to Columbia, Tenn. On October 31st, 1864, Sherman was informed that Hood had crossed the Tennessee above Florence, and that Forrest had actually attacked and captured two Federal gunboats and five transports on the river, a feat which was regarded as unprecedented. Sherman's situation was now anything but enviable. The month of October had closed with great damage to his communications, with vain pursuits of Hood, with a bold invasion of northward territory, and with the State of Tennessee confused and unprepared. The country was filled with wild rumors of danger to Thomas, and of Sherman's indifference to his fate.

Grant, looking on the scene with his broader eye, felt no anxiety for any of Sherman's great movements; neither did the Government nor Sherman himself. But all felt, and Grant in particular, that if Thomas was defeated by Hood, Tennessee and Kentucky would be thrown open to the enemy and all the advantages of Sherman's Atlanta campaign lost. Here was a responsibility Grant would have to assume in the

end. Thomas' troops were scattered and would be hard to concentrate. Sherman would not be present to direct him, in case he (Sherman) started on his novel and dashing campaign through Georgia. Thomas had never commanded an independent army, and had said he did not "wish command of the defence of Tennessee, unless you (Sherman) and the authorities at Washington deem it absolutely necessary." All these things caused Grant to pause and say to Sherman in a dispatch of November 1st: "Do you not think it advisable, now, that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army destroyed you can go where you please with impunity. I believe, and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is far away he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are pushing in another. If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary."


To this Sherman replied from Rome on November 2nd: "If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee river, I may turn in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on his line of retreat; but thus far he has not gone above that river. General Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest; and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Ala. No single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff Davis' cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by manœuvering. Thus far I have confined my efforts to

thwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction; but I regard the pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction; but unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his."

All this time Sherman was bent to the hardest kind of work not only in studying the Tennessee situation, but in repairing his broken road back to Chattanooga, and planning for his Seaward Campaign. The above dispatch shows that his designs were growing and taking firmer hold, and he added to their support the confession that he could not undertake to catch Hood, and the determination that Hood should not thwart him by drawing him away to the south-west and out of the heart of Georgia.

His railroad back to Chattanooga was again in repair, and he moved his headquarters to Kingston. Evidently not satisfied with his last dispatch to Grant, and in the light of fuller information gained at Kingston, he telegraphed him again on Nov. 2d:—"If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my movements I have thrown Hood well to the West, and Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him till the reinforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta and can stand a month's interruption to our communications. I do not believe the confederate army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have enough cavalry to checkmate them. I am clearly of the opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement through Georgia."

Sherman's second dispatch on Nov. 2d was really unnecessary, for Grant's reply to his Rome dispatch came promptly:—"Your dispatch of 9 A. M. just received. I dispatched



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you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north, ought to be looked upon now as the "object." With the force, however, that you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory, I say then, go on as you propose."

Here then the disturbing conditions which Hood had given rise to, practically cease to operate on the destinies of Grant's and Sherman's armies and on the plans of their leaders. Chief and subordinate are together in design, and each ready to co-operate to the fullest extent. Indeed, ever since Grant's dispatch of October 11th, saying: "If you are satisfied the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroads south of Dalton and Chattanooga as you think best." Grant had been in active preparation to support and facilitate the march. On October 13th, he announced his decision to the Government: "On mature reflection, I believe Sherman's proposition is the best that can be adopted," and on the same day he issued full instructions to Halleck to provide supplies for Sherman on his arrival at the coast, and for Canby and Foster to co-operate with Sherman.

Sherman had reduced his army to four corps of infantry, by sending back to Thomas fully 25,000 men. These corps were the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth and Twentieth, with one division of cavalry. They lay between Rome and Atlanta. All Sherman's sick and wounded had been sent back to Chattanooga. The road was fully open and the telegraph was working. His wagons were all fully loaded, and were ready for a start at an hour's notice. Hood was far away and so committed to his Tennessee campaign as that he could not possibly return to indulge in a stern chase. The

presidential election was on, and Sherman was waiting till it was over.

On November 6th, 1864, Sherman wrote in detail to Grant. His letter is curious in the respect that as the date of his departure arrived, he was nervously weighted with a sense of its responsibilities, and felt it proper to sit as an inquisitor on his own judgments. Said he:—"The only question in my mind is whether I ought to have dogged Hood far over into Mississippi, trusting to some happy accident to bring him to bay and to battle. But I then thought that by so doing I would play into his hands, by being drawn or decoyed too far away from our original line of advance. I felt compelled, therefore, to do what is usually a mistake in war, *viz.*, divide my forces, send a part back to Tennessee, retaining a part here. I admit that the first object should be the destruction of that army, and if Beaureguard moves his infantry and artillery up into the pocket about Jackson and Paris, I shall feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly against him, and myself move rapidly against Decatur and Purdy to cut off his retreat. But this would involve the abandonment of Atlanta and a retrograde movement, which would be of very doubtful expediency. I am more than satisfied that Beaureguard has not the nerve to attack fortifications, or to meet me in battle, and it would be a great achievment for him to make me abandon Atlanta by mere threats or manœuvres."

While this letter confessed the accuracy of that military science which demanded the defeat and destruction of Hood, and even contained a momentary misgiving of his own strategy, it nevertheless went on with suggestions as to the proposed route, all of which were based on what Hood might yet do, and on the probable force which might be gathered in his (Sherman's) front while his march was pro-

gressing. The letter set the 10th of November as the day for starting.

On November 8th, Sherman received Grant's dispatch, in reply to his letter of the 6th :—"I see no present reason for changing your plan. Should any arise you will see it, or if I do, I will inform you. I think every thing here is favorable now. Great good fortune attend you ! I believe you will be eminently successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for."

Sherman's entire line was now all activity. His trains were busy whirling toward Chattanooga the stores which had accumulated at Atlanta and other supply points. Steadman had arrived at Kingston to superintend the final evacuation of the posts from Atlanta to Chattanooga. Corse was called in from Rome, after burning all the mills, factories and buildings that could be nseful to the enemy. Word had arrived that A. J. Smith was at Paducah on his way to Thomas with two divisions, and could therefore reach Nashville before Hood. All the troops designed for the "Grand March" were ordered to rendezvous at Atlanta. The campaign may be said to have begun at this time. November 10th, as had been promised.

On November 12th Sherman started from Kingston for Atlanta, and on his way received telegram from Thomas to the effect that he had no fears Beauregard (now in command) could now do him harm and that if he attempted to follow Sherman, he (Thomas) would follow him as far as possible; that if he did not follow Sherman, he would thoroughly organize the troops at Nashville, and believed he then had enough to thoroughly ruin Beauregard, unless he got out of the way very rapidly. He also believed that the greater part of Beauregard's army was near Florence and Tuscambia, that Sherman would therefore have a clear road for several days,

and hoped his success would fully equal his expectations. The destruction of everything in Sherman's rear had now fully begun, and his reply of "All right" to Thomas was the last dispatch that passed over the wires between Atlanta and Chattanooga. As Sherman rode into Atlanta that night, his reflections on the situation took this turn:—"It was surely a strange event—two hostile armies marching in opposite directions, each in the full belief that it was achieving a final and conclusive result in a great war; and I was strongly inspired with the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attack upon the rebel capital at Richmond, though a full thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, for better or worse, it would end the war."

Sherman had not as yet decided upon an absolute route. It was indispensible that he should have alternatives. At the beginning, it was no "march to the sea," but a grand campaign on a general plan. If the Atlantic could not be reached, he must make the Gulf of Mexico. In his last dispatch to Grant he said:—"If I start before I hear further from you, *or before further developments turn my course*, you may take it for granted that I have moved by way of Griffin to Barnesville; that I break up the road between Columbus and Macon good, and that if I feign on Columbus, I will move by way of Macon and Millen to Savannah; or if I feign on Macon, you may take it for granted I have shot off toward Opelika, Montgomery and Mobile Bay, I will not attempt to send couriers back, but trust to the Richmond papers to keep you well advised, I will see that the road is completely broken between the Etowah and Chattahoochee, and that Atlanta itself is utterly destroyed."

For weeks before Sherman's start, the country had been passing through a period of gloomy agitation. The prosecution of the war had been made a political issue. It was the

last opportunity the Democrats would have for four years of regaining power, and if they succeeded, the Confederates would gain their end. The enemy, therefore, North and South made frantic efforts to inflame and prejudice the public mind. Grant's campaign against Richmond was declared hopeless. Hood was certain to march to the Ohio. Sherman was courting annihilation. The North was proclaimed as in favor of acquiescing in Confederate demands. Northern cities were full of Confederate refugees and spies, plots were laid to release the prisoners at Chicago and burn the city. A great conspiracy against the government was detected in the Western States. Riots broke out in New York City which according to General Dix, contained "more disaffection and disloyalty, independent of the elements of disturbance always here, than any other city in the Union."

The election relieved the gloom, in so far as it was attributable to politics. Lincoln was elected by a popular majority of over 400,000 votes. It occurred on November 8th. The result was the signal for hurrying re-inforcements to the front. Grant asked for his quota, saying: "Sherman's movement may compel Lee to send troops from Richmond, and if he does I want to be prepared to annoy him." McClellan resigned his commission in the army on November 8th. The entire military situation changed with Sherman's start. Grant said, "I would not, if I could, just now do anything to force the enemy out of Richmond or Petersburg. It would liberate too much of a force to oppose Sherman with." The whole effort now and for some time would be clear a path for Sherman and to augment Thomas' force, on which the brunt of the next heavy fighting was sure to fall. Supplies were already on their way to the neighborhood of Savannah. Rations for thirty days, clothing for 60,000 men, and forage for 15,000 horses, were ordered to Mobile bay to await the

possibility of Sherman's appearance there. Canby was ordered to operate on Beauregard's and Hood's communications. Foster was directed to destroy railroads between Savannah and Charleston. Rosecrans was ordered to assist Thomas directly.

As already known, the departure of Sherman, threw the command of all the Tennessee forces on Thomas. His operations depended on the course Hood might take after the designs of Sherman were revealed to the enemy. Thomas, therefore, in the midst of his preparations to meet Hood should he cross the Tennessee, kept strict watch on him, lest he migh' turn in pursuit of Sherman. He was prepared to follow if Hood took a backward step. On November 16th, Sherman marched out of Atlanta. On the same day Beauregard telegraphed word to Richmond: "Sherman is about to move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta or Macon, thence probably to Charleston or Savannah." This information was sent too Hood, who was left his choice of dividing his forces and going to the rescue of General Cobb in Georgia; or of at once assuming a bold offensive and thus relieving him. Hood immediately chose the latter, and put his columns in motion, intending to strike between Thomas' forces at Palaski, and those at Nashville. Thomas divined his intentions and fell back before Hood's superior numbers. He fully adopted the policy of slow retreat back to Nashville, for the double reason that it gave him time to concentrate his scattered forces, while it encouraged Hood to pursue, thus committing him more and more to his northern movements, and, of course, drawing him further from Sherman's rear. All possibility of Hood's forces following Sherman came to an end in this way, and Thomas had to prepare for the great battle of Nashville, which was begun on December 15th, 1864, and resulted in the total defeat of Hood and

his retreat from Tennessee with the loss of more than half of his army. The prophecy of Jefferson Davis had come true. The snows of winter had indeed witnessed a "Moscow retreat." It was not Sherman, however, but Hood who had played the part of the discomfited Napoleon. Thomas had not only rolled back a daring invasion whose success would have undone all of Sherman's work since he left Chattanooga, thrown both Kentucky and Tennessee irretrievably into the Confederacy, and prolonged the war for years, but he annihilated the Western Confederate army, the very object Sherman had set out to achieve eight months before. Since Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi had been drained of material to fill the ranks of Hood, the fully appointed and hopeful legions which Sherman led out of Atlanta could not only march unmolested to the sea, but could go whither they would in the face of the disheartened officers and broken squads of the enemy.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE MARCH TO THE SEA.

On November 12, 1864, Sherman cut off all communications to his rear, and threw his army into that campaign whose destination he did not know, whose direction was to be controlled by circumstances, whose support was to be the resources which the country provided. He would have to make all the time possible, meet emergencies as they arose, conform as nearly as possible to his ideal plan, co-operate as effectively as he could with his chief. It was a bold undertaking, and if executed successfully would prove as useful in results as it was brilliant in conception.

By November 14th all his troops were in or near Atlanta, and he had arranged them into four corps. The Fifteenth Corps under General P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth Corps under General Frank P. Blair, composed the right wing of his army, to whose command General Howard was assigned. The Fourteenth Corps under General Jeff. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, under General A. S. Williams, composed the left wing of his army, to whose command General Slocum was assigned.

Osterhaus' Fifteenth Corps embraced the four divisions of Wood, Hazen, J. E. Smith and Corse.

Blair's Seventeenth Corps embraced the three divisions of Mower, Leggett and G. A. Smith,

Davis' Fourteenth Corps embraced the three divisions of Carlin, Morgan and Baird.

Williams' Twentieth Corps embraced the three divisions of Jackson, Geary and Ward.

Sherman's Cavalry division was under command of Kilpatrick, and was held subject to Sherman's own orders. It embraced the two brigades of Murray and Atkins.

This force had been thoroughly purged of sick and non-combatants. The artillery had been reduced to sixty guns. Each soldier carried forty rounds of ammunition on his person, and the wagons contained enough to make up two hundred rounds per man. Rations for twenty days were in the trains. Forage for five days was taken along. A good supply of beef on the hoof was driven with the army. The wagons numbered 2,500 and the ambulances 600. This well equipped well armed army of able bodied and experienced soldiers, numbered 55,255 infantry, 4,584 cavalry and 1,759 artillery, a total of 60,598 men.

The army started under rigid orders, obedience to which was insisted upon to the letter, not only as a means of general safety and discipline, but as a source of individual protection to the soldiers. The first field order ran substantially as follows:—

"The General commanding deems it proper to inform the men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Twentieth corps, that he has organized them into an army for a special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General Grant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to a new one. All the chances of war have been considered and provided for as far as human sagacity can. All he asks of you is to maintain that discipline, patience and courage which have characterized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strike a blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producing what we all so much desire

—his complete overthrow. Of all things, the most important is that the men during the marches and in camp keep their places, and do not scatter about as stragglers or foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It is also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loaded with anything but rations and ammunition. All surplus servants, non-combatants and refugees should go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on our march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these simple cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those of the past."

This order was followed by another, specifying the details of conduct and management. It ran :—

1. For purposes of military operations this army is divided into two wings, viz :—Right wing, General O. O. Howard commanding, composed of Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps; left wing, General H. W. Slocum commanding, composed of Fourteenth and Twentieth corps.

2. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry (Brigadier-general Kilpatrick) will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.

3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition and provision train, distributed habitually as follows :—behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ambulances, ammunition and provision wagons. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order of march, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The

separate columns will start habitually at 7 A. M. and make about fifteen miles a day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather near the route travelled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn meal or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass; but during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes or other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of camp. To regular foraging parties must be entrusted the gathering of provisions and forage, atany distance from the road traveled.

5. To corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down, in districts and neighborhoods where the army is immolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce devastation more or less relentless according to the measure of such hostility.

6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack mules for their regiments or brigades. In

all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

8. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, comprised, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance guard, repair roads and double them, if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practice the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on one side, and instruct troops to assist wagons at steep hills or at the crossing of streams.

Captain Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army, pontoon trains fully equipped and organized, and the commander thereof will see that they are fully protected at all times.

The wagons were lightly loaded and each corps had its complement of about 800, making a train stretching fully five miles in length. The wagons kept the roads, while the men moved by the side, except the advance and rear guards. Sherman reached Atlanta on November 14th, to find that his orders for the destruction of the place were being carried out. Foundries, machine shops and arsenals were ablaze, and the hissing of flames and bursting of loaded shells made day and night appalling.

On the morning of November 15th the forward movement

began. The right wing and the cavalry moved southeast toward Jonesboro. The left wing moved eastward by way of Decatur toward Madison. By means of these divergent lines, Sherman designed to threaten both Macon and Augusta, and thus prevent a concentration of the enemy on Milledgeville, which was his real objective, and was distant about 100 miles. He had calculated that his columns could concentrate at Milledgeville in about seven days. The movement was by four roads and at the rate of fifteen miles a day, as in the general orders. On the 16th, Sherman followed his columns in person, with his staff, a small supply train, and a guard of one company each of cavalry and infantry.

Of his departure, Sherman says:—"About 7 A. M., of November 16th, we rode out of Atlanta by the Decatur road, filled by the marching troops and wagons of the Fourteenth corps, and reaching the hill just outside of the old rebel works, we naturally paused to look back upon the scenes of our past battles. We stood upon the very ground where was fought the bloody battle of July 22d, and could see the wood wherein McPherson fell. Behind us lay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke rising high in the air and hanging like a pall over the ruined city. Away off in the distance on the McDonough road, was the rear of Howard's column, the gun barrels glistening in the sun, the white-topped wagons stretching away to the south, and right before us the Fourteenth corps, marching steadily and rapidly, with a cheery look and swinging pace, that made light of the thousand miles that lay between us and Richmond. Some band, by accident, struck up the anthem, "John Brown's Soul Goes Marching On;" the men caught up the strain, and never or before or since have I heard the chorus of "Glory, Glory, Hallelujah" done with more spirit or in better harmony of time and place.

"We turned our horses' heads to the east. Atlanta was soon

lost behind the trees and became a thing of the past. Around it clings many a thought of desperate battle of hope and fear, that now seem like a memory of a dream; and I have never seen the place since. The day was extremely beautiful, clear sunlight with bracing air, and an unusual exhilaration seemed to pervade all minds—a feeling of something to come, vague and undefined, still full of venture and intense interest. Even the common soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called out to me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is waiting for us at Richmond." Indeed, the general sentiment was that we were marching to Richmond, and that there would be an end the war, but how and when they seemed not to care; nor did they measure the distance nor count the cost of life, or bother their brains about the great rivers to be crossed and the food required for man and beast, that had to be gathered on the way. There was a "devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men that made us feel the full load of responsibility, for success would be accepted as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this "march" would be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool. I had no purpose to march direct for Richmond, but always designed to reach the sea coast first at Savannah or Port Royal, S. C., and even kept in mind the alternative of Mobile."

The first day's march was a successful trial. Its track was marked by the destruction of the railroads, as ordered, and by experiments of the respective commands with those general orders designed as their permanent code of procedure. There were no burnings except under order of the commanders, no murders nor rapes, no pillages nor violence except those of a purely exceptional kind committed by the desperate few in defiance of order and discipline.

The date of Sherman's movement was the signal for con-

fusion and alarm in the ranks of the enemy. General Cobb then commanding in Georgia, sent a frantic appeal to Richmond for help. "We have no force," said he to hinder him (Sherman) and must fall back to Macon, where reinforcements should be sent at once." Beauregard telegraphed from Tuscumbia that all available forces should be sent from the Carolinas to Cobb's aid. Taylor, at Selma, was ordered to gather all the State troops of Mississippi and Alabama, and hold them ready for an instant move. Wheeler was instructed to use his thirteen brigades of cavalry against Sherman and harass him at all points.

Sherman's second day's march was even more successful than the first. His portion of the army passed through Covington with closed ranks. Here was a chance to witness the effects he was producing in the country. As his troops passed along, waving their colors and playing the "National Airs," the whites looked on with a curiosity, which, for the time, held their hatred of the "Stars and Stripes" and the National cause in restraint. The negroes were wild with joyous excitement, and loud in their prayers of thanks for the arrival of the day that betokened liberty for them.

At Covington, Sherman shaped his left wing for the move on Milledgeville, by turning thither the Fourteenth corps. Slocum's Twentieth was well ahead at Madison and the crossing of the Oconee, in its feint on Augusta, and had destroyed the railroads to that river, including the bridges. It then turned south to Eatonville, to close in with the Fourteenth, in the demonstration on Milledgeville. Everything was progressing finely. The foragers found plenty of meal, bacon, sweet potatoes, cows, cattle and mules. The crops had been good. and had been gathered for the winter, and the country had not been visited by marching armies. Sherman's orders were being carried out faithfully, and foraging

became a fine art with the daring men to whom it was entrusted. Complaints were heard of the irresponsible class of men which came to figure as "bummers," but very often these were mere hangers on, and their crimes in no way tainted the obedient and orderly conduct of those who respected discipline and had at heart the *morale* of the army.

By November 23d, Sherman marched, with the Fourteenth corps, into Milledgeville, to find that Slocum had already preceded him, with the Twentieth corps. Thus his left wing had accomplished its journey as designed, and was now firmly and finely encamped in and around the capital of the State. But what of the right wing? A report soon came from Howard to the effect that he was only twelve miles to the south at Gordon station, where the Milledgeville branch of the Macon and Savannah road started. He had made his feint on Macon, by marching his two corps directly thitherward to the Ocmulgee, which he crossed on pontoons. Thence he started his Seventeenth corps eastward for Gordon station, sending his Fifteenth with Kilpatrick's cavalry to feign further on Macon. Kilpatrick struck the enemy four miles from Macon, and drove them back to the defences held by the infantry. He charged these defences and gained the first parapets, but could not hold them, and so swung back to his own infantry supports, which were now near Griswold station. The Fifteenth corps now deflected eastward, tearing up the railroad and proceeding slowly under a rear guard composed of a brigade of Wood's division. On November 22d, this brigade was heavily attacked by Smith's division from Macon. The attack was handsomely repulsed and the enemy were driven back into Macon.

Sherman's two wings were then (Nov. 23d) practically together, the left at Milledgeville and the right at Gordon Sta-



GEN'L JUDSON KILPATRICK.

tion twelve miles distant, and he regarded the first stage of his grand march as successfully accomplished. The Governor of the State, the cabinet officers and the legislature had flown from the capital at Sherman's approach, but most of the citizens had remained to gratify their curiosity and take their chances of life or death at the hands of the "wicked yankee invaders of their sacred soil."

Here Sherman learned from the Southern newspapers something of the consternation which his bold and unprecedented invasion was creating. The calls for aid were most frantic, and they demanded that the entire south should rise up in its majesty and attack the foe, front flank and rear; that it should be starved by the destruction of provisions of every kind; that all bridges should be burned and all roads obstructed; that nothing should be left of the impudent host, which, at any rate, was only covering up a tricky design for escape with its life by fleeing across country to the protection of the Union fleets on the coast.

On November 17th, Cobb announced officially, "We are falling back rapidly to this place (Macon). We are too weak to resist them unless reinforced promptly. The prisoners should be removed from this place." On the same date Hardee was ordered from the sea-coast, to gather up and concentrate all the detached garrisons, hospital convalescents, reserves, militia and volunteers. On the 18th, Governor Brown, of Georgia, informed Jefferson Davis that a heavy force of the enemy was "marching on Macon, burning towns and laying waste the country. We have not sufficient force; I hope you will send reinforcements till the emergency is past." On the 19th, Hardee arrived upon the scene, and so perfectly was Sherman's feint upon Augusta working, that both Hardee and Cobb agreed that Augusta was his destination. They therefore whirled all their forces from Macon

toward Augusta, only to find that Sherman's real objective was Milledgeville.

While the Confederate Generals and Georgia officials were frantically appealing to Richmond for help, they were no less earnest and loud in their alarms to the "People of Georgia." Beauregard's proclamation ran :—

"People of Georgia :—Arise for the defence of your native soil ! Rally around your patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers ! Obstruct and destroy all the roads in Sherman's front, flank and rear, and this army will soon starve in your midst. Be confident. Be resolute, Trust in the overruling providence, and success will crown your effort. I hasten to join you in defence of your homes and fire-sides." Senator Hill's appeal read :—"People of Georgia :—You now have the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy the enemy. Put everything at the disposal of our Generals. Remove all provisions from the path of the invaders and put all obstructions in his path. Every citizen with his gun and every negro with his spade and axe can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy by retarding his march. Georgians, be firm ! Act promptly and fear not!" Six members of congress at Richmond joined in the following appeal :—"We have had a special conference with President Davis and the Secretary of War, and are able to assure you they have done and are doing all they can to meet the emergency that presses upon you. Let every man fly to arms ! Remove all negroes, horses, cattle and provisions from Sherman's army and burn what you cannot carry. Burn all bridges and block up the roads in his route. Assail the invader in front, flank and rear, by night and by day. Let him have no rest !"

Sherman's easily victorious route had not been without comic happenings, and these direful threats and wild appeals had their amusing side. Whatever effect they were produc-

ing on the citizens, they were certainly not carrying despair to the heart of the invading army, nor even creating such alarm as to distract its attention from the main object. After destroying the arsenal at Milledgeville and such other public property as might be of use to the enemy, Sherman was ready for his second stage of invasion. This time Millen was the objective, a point where the railroad from Augusta intersects the Georgia Central, running from Savannah to Macon. The orders were for the right wing under Howard to follow the line of the Central, or Savannah railroad, by roads to the south of it, and for the left wing under Slocum to move by roads to the north of that railroad through Sandersville, Davisboro and Louisville. The distance from Milledgeville to Macon was about one hundred miles. Kilpatrick's cavalry was to make a circuit to the north of the moving infantry columns and come in with a dash on Millen, rescuing the prisoners there. But the conditions had somewhat changed since Sherman's arrival at Milledgeville. Wheeler's Confederate cavalry had now passed his column, and appeared in his front. Hardee was present in person and using all his efforts to organize an opposing infantry force. He now claimed to have 10,000 men in shape for resistance.

On November 24th, Sherman took the northern route with the Twentieth and Fourteenth corps, which reached Sandersville together on the 26th. Here a brigade of Confederate cavalry crossed his path, which was speedily driven into and through the town by his skirmishers. On the way thither, Sherman was made to witness the fact that the enemy were burning forage and provisions in his path. He informed the citizens of that place that if this continued, he would execute to the letter his general orders as to devastation. This had the desired effect, and with very few subsequent exceptions the inhabitants ceased to contribute to their own ruin.

Sherman halted his left wing at Sandersville long enough to hear from his right. It did not take long for word to come. The Fifteenth corps was already opposite to his front and the Seventeenth had been making its destruction of the railroad swift and sure. Meanwhile, Kilpatrick had been heading rapidly for Waynesboro, a point midway between Augusta and Millen, on the Augusta branch of the Savannah, or Central railroad. On his way he came in contact with Wheeler's cavalry, with whom he had several severe skirmishes. Learning that the National prisoners had been sent from Millen to Augusta, he retraced his steps to Louisville, where Sherman added an infantry division to his cavalry, and started him again towards Waynesboro, with orders to attack Wheeler and keep up the delusion that a movement on Augusta was intended. He drove Wheeler through Waynesboro and across Brier creek, thus completely covering Sherman's left flank. Once at Waynesboro, Kilpatrick took the railroad south to Millen, relieving Sherman from fear of attack on his trains as his left wing gradually concented in the direction of Millen.

By December 3d, the Fourteenth corps was at Lumpkin's station, fourteen miles north of Millen. On the same day, Sherman entered Millen with the Seventeenth corps, and halted to hear from his other corps. Slocum came in, with the Twentieth, at Buckhead Church, four miles north of Millen, while Howard was really further east than Millen, at a point opposite Scarboro, on the Ogeechee, with his Fifteenth corps. Sherman, therefore, had his whole army once more concentrated in and around an important objective. Hitherto he had drawn but little on his army stores, having found abundance in the country. His men and teams were in excellent condition. He had traveled two-thirds of the distance to the sea, had studied all phases of the respective situations

as they arose, and had made up his mind as to what his future route would be. In all things he did not forget that the enemy's hostility might be expected to increase as he advanced, nor that the gradually changing aspect of the country from a richer to a poorer and sandier soil would cause him to rely more and more on the stores he carried along.

At this second stage of the march he learned that the consternation of the confederates had reached its highest pitch. On November 22d, the commander at Augusta confessed that he could muster only 4,000 men, and that the people showed little spirit. On November 23d, Hardee confessed that Wheeler had been driven back from Clinton and Col. Cross from Griswold, but that "I can gain no reliable information respecting the enemy's infantry." Bragg was at this trying juncture sent to the Georgia front, and on arriving at Augusta, confessed that Sherman had interposed between the Augusta and Macon forces, leaving him with only those to the east of the National army which were "feeble in number, weak in organization and discipline and very deficient in equipment. No offensive movement can be undertaken, and but a temporary defence of our scattered posts. If no more means can be had, our policy is to make sacrifices and concentrate. The country is being utterly devastated wherever the enemy moves."

With the thought that Sherman would make Charleston his objective, the alarm spread through the Carolinas, and the same appeals for help went up there as in Georgia. Beauregard's command was extended from the Mississippi to the sea-coast, and he was calling louder than ever for reinforcements. Wade Hampton was ordered to Augusta to organize a cavalry force. Amid all their abandonment of posts, the destruction of their supplies, railroads and manufactories of war appurtenances, and their cry for reinforcements

which did not materialize, it was evident to Sherman that the confederacy had drawn to the last on its resources, and that its effective strength was already in its organization at the front. However he was aware that fortified places existed whose reduction might retard his march. He had no time for these. His policy was to effectually destroy the enemy's communications and then to hasten to a new base of supplies for himself.

Sherman started from Millen direct for Savannah, his army marching by four roads, and by right and left wings as before. He had now to confront a Confederate division of 10,000 irregular troops which fell back before him, without offering resistance. His men retained all their old spirits and easily made their fifteen miles a day. The weather was propitious, and the roads were good. All that looked like war was the occasional picket-firing in his front as the enemy lagged on some knoll of observation, or as the guns of Kilpatrick off to the left or rear told of a lively skirmish with Wheeler's cavalry.

The depot and other public property in Millen had been destroyed, and the Seventeenth corps hugged the railroad to Ogeechee, effectually destroying it as it progressed. At this place, which Sherman entered on December 5th, he found that the Confederates had determined to make a stand. They had thrown up extensive earth works, but soon found that Sherman's advancing lines would extend beyond both their flanks, and they beat a hasty retreat back toward Savannah, in reality piloting the way of the invaders thither. This point was fifty miles from Savannah.

While marching from Ogeechee toward Pooler's Station, it was found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the roads, and that one of the Union officers had been badly wounded by their explosion. Sherman regarded this as murder, not

war, and his cure for this kind of deviltry was to set a squad of Confederate prisoners to work to remove the secret missiles.

By December 8th, Sherman's advance reached Pooler's Station, eight miles from Savannah. Here he discovered that the spaces between this point and Savannah showed evidence of being entrenched, and the prospect of another siege rose before him. He devoted the 9th and 10th to placing his forces and working them in toward the defences of the city. He threw his Fourteenth corps to the left on the Savannah river, his Twentieth next, his Seventeenth next, and his Fifteenth on the extreme right, thus completing the investment.

Savannah is twenty miles from the sea. Southwest of it, and twelve or fifteen miles distant, runs the Ogeechee, paralleling the Savannah. The Ogeechee empties into Ossabaw Sound. On its banks was Fort McAllister, commanding the river and sound. All the country about Savannah is low and marshy. The Confederate entrenchments extended with windings to conform to the sluggish creeks, all the way from Ft. McAllister to above Savannah on the Savannah River. The only land approaches to the city were by five narrow causeways, two of which were devoted to railroads. All these were commanded by artillery and obstructed by fallen trees. By means of reconnoitering parties, and by dint of great perseverance, Sherman made out the lines of defence and found them all backed and fronted by canals, ditches and bayous. An assault could only be made at great disadvantage and with possibility of failure, for Hardee was in command of the entrenchments, and whatever his force, he was not a General to let go an advantage lightly.

Sherman, therefore, saw that it was of vital importance to open communication with the fleet, which he had reason to

believe was somewhere near in some of the sounds, and perhaps in Ossabaw. So, on December 13th, he ordered Slocum to press the siege of Savannah, while Howard moved a division off to the Ogeechee to rebuild the bridge. This was promptly done, and Hazen's division crossed to the south side of the Ogeechee and moved down to the attack on Ft. McAllister. Kilpatrick had been sent around the fort with orders to communicate with the fleet below, and two men had been ordered to drift by the fort in a boat with the same object in view. They had found that the fleet was really in the sound, and that its signals could be seen if an elevated spot could be found. A platform was therefore erected on an old rice mill, and soon Sherman was in signal communication with all his land forces, and could see the rockets from the ships below the Fort.

Hazen made a swift march toward Fort McAllister, which was a strongly enclosed work, manned by two companies of artillery, and three of infantry, and mounting twenty-five guns. He deployed his division, so that both flanks rested on the river, pushed in his sharp-shooters to pick off the artillerists, and assaulted in three columns, in front and on either flank. The three assaulting columns reached the parapet at the same time, losing many men by the explosion of torpedoes with which their ways were paved. But they kept resolutely on, driving the enemy to the bomb-proofs and engaging in fierce hand to hand encounter. The Confederates surrendered only as they were individually overpowered, and soon Fort McAllister was in General Hazen's hands, at a loss to him of 24 killed and 110 wounded, but with a gain of its garrison and all its guns, besides the immense strategic advantages which followed. We must tell of these in General Sherman's own graphic language:—"At two P. M. we observed signs of commotion in the fort, which betokened the

arrival of Hazen, which had been anxiously expected. . . . . The sun was sinking and I was dreadfully impatient. At that moment some one discovered a faint cloud of smoke and an object gliding, as it were, along the horizon. Some one observed, 'It must be one of the squadron.' Soon the flag of the United States appeared, and our attention was divided between the approaching steamer and the assault on the fort. Another signal came from Hazen, and I replied go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching from below. The officers on the steamer signalled, 'Who are you?' The reply went back, 'General Sherman.' The signal came back, 'Is Fort McAllister taken?' The reply was, 'Not yet, but will be in a minute.' At that instant Hazen's troops came out of the woods that enveloped the fort, with flying colors and steady pace. The fort belched forth its heavy guns, covering the assaulting party with smoke. One of the colors was seen to drop but soon it rose again, and amid the white sulphurous smoke there was a pause. The smoke cleared, and now the parapets were seen to be lined with the blue of our men, whose musketry fire we could hear, or thought we could. Fort McAllister was taken, and we signalled the glad event to our friends on the gunboat, whose view had been cut off by a point of timber."

General Sherman resolved to communicate with the fleet that night. It was moonlight, and he and General Howard took passage in a row boat and rowed against tide, to the fort, where they met Hazen. After taking supper with him, the party embarked on a yawl, and pulled six miles further when they came to the Dandelion, a tender of the gunboat Flag, and were taken on board. After congratulations were passed, Sherman learned that the fleet had been expecting his arrival for several days, that Admiral Dahlgren was in command of the South Atlantic, that Foster was in

command of the Department of the South, with head-quarters at Port Royal, that ships loaded with stores for Sherman's army were then in Port Royal Sound, and that Grant was still besieging Petersburg.

It was a memorable night, that of December, 13th, 1864, for Sherman felt that his "March to the Sea" had really ended. He took advantage of his time while aboard of the boat to telegraph the Secretary of War, that Ossabaw Sound had been opened by the capture of Fort McAllister; that he had opened communications with the fleet, that he had completely destroyed all railroad communications and had invested Savannah; that his men were in good trim, the weather was fine, and he had not been molested, save by guerrillas on his march; that now that Ft. McAllister was taken, he could go ahead; that already two gunboats had been captured on the Savannah river, and the rest prevented from coming down; that Hardee was in command at Savannah with 15,000 men; that not a wagon had been lost on the trip, but that a large supply of negroes, horses and mules had been gathered up, and the teams were in far better condition than when they started; that 200 miles of rails, besides stores and provisions had been destroyed; and that the time had come to rid his army of all surplussage; that the capture of Ft. McAllister and the opening of communication with the fleet dissipated all the confederate boasts to head him off and starve his army; that he regarded Savannah as already gained.

The same night he met Foster who had come up the sound to communicate with him, and he promised to forward with all speed the clothing and supplies destined for Sherman's army, together with heavy guns for the reduction of Savannah.

On December 15th, Sherman returned to his lines. One month had elapsed since he had started from Atlanta on that

march which was now to be enshrined in poetry and history as the celebrated "March to the Sea." In that eventful month he had broken up the connection between the Confederate forces east and west of Georgia, by the destruction of 200 miles of railroad; had consumed the available provisions in a territory fifty miles wide; had liberated countless slaves and carried away 10,000 horses and mules; had destroyed a hundred million dollars of property, a large per cent. of which enured to the National advantage. His 65,000 men and 35,000 animals had practically lived off the country, and needed no food on their arrival, except bread, coffee and sugar. His herd of 5,000 cattle at the start, had augmented to 10,000. Instead of one remount, his officers had three or four at the end. Instead of a modicum of cooks and servants for each regiment at the start, there were at least fifty willing negroes for that duty, on the arrival at Savannah. Sherman's total casualties during the entire march were only 103 killed, 428 wounded and 278 missing. The spirit of the men was suberb throughout, and there was no duty they did not not enter upon with alacrity. "I only regarded," says Sherman, "the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a shift of base, as the transfer of a strong army which had no opponent and had finished its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea coast, from which it could achieve other important results. I considered this march as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war." Yet nothing can ever dim its lustre as a military achievement. Because it did not prove dangerous does not detract from its daring and originality, as it did not subtract from that brilliancy of manœvure which contributed to its success He completely confused and baffled all opposition, and it would have been the same had it been more skilled and formidable. But one great disappointment was incurred, and

that was the removal of the National prisoners from Millen before his forces could reach that point. Not only had he been instrumental in inflicting irreparable direct injury on the Confederacy, but the moral effect of his invasion was tremendous. It illustrated the weakness of the South, and demonstrated the exhaustless and formidable energies of the North. It carried 60,000 men from a remote point, where conquest was practically done and they were no longer needed, to a new base where they were in touch with Grant and his army of investiture, if needed, or ready for any enterprise calculated to further the victory which impended.

Almost simultaneous with Sherman's arrival at the coast, the victory of Nashville was announced, and thus the nation had a double cause for rejoicing. Nashville had long been a strained situation, one, even, which had required a personal visit from Grant; but now that the agony was over there, it could be looked upon as a vindication of Sherman's judgment in leaving Hood to the care of Thomas, while he pulled loose and dared his Georgia campaign. Sherman's absence, too, unheard-of, except indirectly, for a period of thirty days, had been a strain on Grant and the authorities, but now that the dark clouds had lifted and the dread silence had been broken, there went up songs of gladness from all corners of the land, and the spirit of joy presided wherever loyalty clung to the old flag.

By December 16th, the Federal gun-boats were passing freely up the Sound and the Ogeechee to Sherman's right, carrying welcome letters and supplies to the soldiers. Among these were letters from Grant to Sherman, written at several times, and based on word he had received from him through Confederate sources during his grand march. The first was dated December 3d, and informed Sherman that he had no fear of his reaching the coast; that Bragg had gone from

Wilmington, and that he (Grant) was preparing to blow up Fort Fisher and capture the place; that he had no general directions to give, but would wait for his (Sherman's) views on his arrival at the coast; but that he did hope, with the aid of Sherman's army, to get hold of the only two communications to the west remaining to the Confederates, and that this could be done by holding Savannah and Augusta. If Wilmington fell, the force there could co-operate with Sherman to this end.

On the receipt of further news, and after more mature thought, Grant wrote again under date of December 6th. He now regarded the communications as broken beyond repair for three months, during which time he expected to make an end of the Petersburg siege. He, therefore, thought it wise for Sherman to establish a base on the coast and come north by water, unless he saw objections to the plan. Thomas had been ordered to attack Hood.

These letters disturbed Sherman very much, especially the last one. He had no idea of going north by water; looked upon it as dangerous to the health and *morale* of his men; and saw infinite delay in it, owing to scarcity of transports. But while he could not disobey orders, he resolved to utilize the time during which the necessary fleet was collecting, to capture Savannah. He wrote Grant on December 16th to the effect that he had initiated measures for carrying his men by water to Virginia, but that he felt a personal dislike to turning northward without first capturing Savannah, and that in the event of its fall he had contemplated marching northward through the Carolinas, which object he thought he could achieve almost as quickly as if he went by water.

He had now invested Savannah closely, and on December 17th sent word to Hardee, saying: "You have doubtless observed that sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw

Sound and up the Ogeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundance of supplies of all kinds, and especially heavy ordinance necessary for the reduction of Savannah. I have already received heavy guns that can cast destructive shot far into the heart of your city; also I have for some days held control of every avenue by which the people and garrison of Savannah can be supplied. I am therefore justified in demanding the surrender of the city and its dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for your answer before opening my heavy ordinance. Should you entertain the proposition, I am ready to grant liberal terms to the inhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to assault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, I shall then feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and shall make little effort to restrain my army—burning to avenge the national wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large cities, which have been so prominent in dragging our country into civil war."

Hardee wrote back, denying that Sherman was near enough to do injury and that he controlled the avenues by which the city was approached. He also retorted that he was in communication with every part of his department, and that he would regret if he (Sherman) should adopt any means which would tend to drive him (Hardee) from the rules of civilized warfare.

On December 18th Sherman wrote more fully to Grant, and after a deliberate study of the situation. It ought here to be understood, as a matter of history, that Grant had reconsidered his wish to have Sherman come north by water, seeing that in order to get the necessary transports to him would cost fully two months' time, or as long, if not longer time, than for him to come by land. So on the 16th Halleck advised Sherman as follows:—"Lieutenant-general Grant

informs me that in his last dispatch to you he suggested the transfer of your infantry to Richmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your whole force, at least for the time being, and with such assistance as may be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and operate from such base as you may establish on the coast." Again, on the 18th, Halleck wrote:—"When Savannah falls, then for another wide swath through the Confederacy. But I will not anticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning and will probably write you his views."

This was the date of Sherman's letter to Grant, which was to the effect that he had made a demand on Hardee for the surrender of Savannah which was refused; that he was much nearer to the city than Hardee supposed; that his thirty pound Parrotts would soon test who was right; that Slocum felt certain he could make a successful assault at one or two points; that he would like to take Savannah before coming to him (Grant) but that he would do nothing hasty, and would embark for the James river as soon as sufficient vessels to carry his troops were reported; that he feared even this would cause great delay; that Forster reports that Hardee was not in communication with his Department by way of Charleston; that he (Sherman) had two of his divisions out breaking up the railroad from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; that he was satisfied that if he did not take Savannah the gunboats never would; that he was convinced when General Babcock, the bearer of his letter of the 16th, reached him (Grant) he would delay operations long enough to enable him to succeed at Savannah; then he continued, "With Savannah in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of people in Georgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice

to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia."

As Halleck had intimated, Grant wrote Sherman on the very date of his own letter, December 18th, saying in substance, "I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of your army here and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs appear now to be taking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not accomplish more towards that result where you are than if brought here, especially as I am informed since my arrival in this city (Washington) that it will take about two months to get you here, with all the other calls for ocean transportation. I want to get your views about what ought to be done. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost, he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views it may be well to indulge him till we get everything else in our hands. Congratulating you and the army again upon the results of your campaign, the parallel of which is not read of in past history, I subscribe myself more than ever, if possible, your friend."

Nothing remained to Sherman after the receipt of Hardee's refusal to surrender Savannah but to assault. He had completely invested the place, except on the East, where the plank road leads to South Carolina and where Hardee could easily throw a pontoon over the Savannah River. In order to cover this road, Sherman ordered Foster to move down from Port Royal. That the movement might be made sure, Sherman went in person to Port Royal, leaving Slocum and Howard with orders not to attack during his absence. He took a boat on the Ogeechee and sailed for Hilton Head, where he saw Foster. On the 20th he started back, but was caught in the mud in the Romney Marshes and detained for over



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twenty-four hours. On the 21st he was met by despatches to the effect that Savannah was in possession of the Union forces, and that Hardee had laid his pontoons and made his escape by the very route on which Sherman had expected to intercept him. He had gotten off his men and light artillery, had blown up the ironclads and navy yards, but had left behind all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway cars, steamboats and public property. Sherman hastened to his right on the Ogeechee to learn that his skirmishers had detected the absence of the enemy on the morning of December 21st, and that a forward movement had been ordered which resulted in the simultaneous occupation of the entrenchments by these troops. Sherman was disappointed at the escape of Hardee, but Grant looked upon the situation more philosophically and announced the fact to the Secretary of War thus:—"It is a good thing as it stands, and the country may well rejoice at it."

Sherman's right and left wings remained encamped outside of the city, but Slocum and Howard removed their headquarters within, and on December 22d Sherman followed them. Here he had often visits from Admiral Dahlgren, and at once set a heavy force to work removing the torpedoes from the river and making way with the harbor obstructions. Henceforth Savannah was free for the entry of the Union gunboats and transports. It was Sherman's Christmas gift to the nation.

In order to emphasize his triumph Sherman chose to couple it with that which he regarded as an essential part, viz: the victory of Thomas at Nashville. Without this he would have regarded his judgment as clouded and his fame as insecure. He therefore very justly combined the two in his special field order of January 8th, 1865, which read: "The general commanding announces to the troops compos-

ing the Military Division of the Mississippi, that he has received from the President of the United States and from Lieutenant General Grant, letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaign just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of Hood's army in Tennessee. In order that all may understand the importance of events it is proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. We held Atlanta, a city of little advantage to us, but so important to the enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the South, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regain the place, and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measures which he thought to be effectual. That army by a rapid march, gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterwards about Dalton. We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtake it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over toward Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we were not thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control events ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the Departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete the original journey. We quietly and deliberately destroyed Atlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry on war against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured his commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from the sea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the moment of our victorious entry into Savannah, came the welcome and expected news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville, and then had turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his artillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the fragments

down to Alabama. So complete a success in military operations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement that entitles it to a place in the military history of the world. The armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga and Murfreesboro, are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment may inscribe on its colors, at pleasure, 'Savannah' or 'Nashville.' The general commanding embraces in the same general success the cavalry under Stoneman, Burbridge and Gillen, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia and paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace of East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defensive, we have at all points assumed the offensive and have completely thwarted the designs of the enemies of our country."

Thus Sherman on January 8th 1865, supplemented his "March to the Sea" with the defeat of Hood. Grant supplemented it with the capture of Fort Fisher, January 17th 1865. This event closed the last important inlet of supplies to the enemy from the ocean. Fort Fisher was, moreover, of great moment at this juncture in a simply strategic sense. Thomas held Tennessee in his hand; Sherman held all the southern coast; Sheridan had driven the enemy out of the Shenandoah Valley; Grant kept Lee in Richmond. The control of the Cape Fear opened a new base, and enabled Schofield to push an army inland to meet Sherman on his northward march.

On the occupation of Savannah, Sherman, under date of December 24th, wrote to Grant, the following letter in response to Grant's of the 18th already quoted. It is very valuable in the respect that it foreshadows Sherman's future plan of campaign, a matter in which he was left practically free choice by both Halleck and Grant. The letter ran:—

"Your letter of the 18th is just received. I feel very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendations you pay my army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men the substance of your note. I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and *morale* of my army, now perfect.

"The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.

"The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force; and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah river, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Columbia, by any curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our course as much railroad as possible; then ignoring Charleston and Augusta both, I will occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the Charleston & Wilmington railroad somewhere between the Santee and Cape Fear rivers, and if possible communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren. Then I would favor an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking.

Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out. Still, I am aware that historically and politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the Administration may prefer I should give it attention and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on the subject, for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of little importance, after all the railroads leading into the interior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But on the hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me, in which case I should reckon on your being at his heels. Now that Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as quickly as possible. I feel confident that I can break up the whole railroad system of South and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time Spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his entrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.

"One reason I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege operations.

"I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I do not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as all important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down in Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.

"I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review the whole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has a confidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish you could run down to see us. It would have a good effect, and show to both armies that we are acting on a common plan. The weather is now cool and pleasant and the general health very good."

On the same date, December 24, 1864, Sherman wrote also in full to Halleck, going over the same ground as in his letter to Grant, and mapping a possible route through the Carolinas. He occupied the first days after the capture of Savannah in getting off these letters foreshadowing future movements, and sending telegrams announcing the fact and extent of his great victory. His dispatch to President Lincoln, which was sent by boat to Fortress Monroe, ran —"I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton."

He became the recipient of congratulatory dispatches from the President, many members of his cabinet, all the leading Generals, and countless private sources. On January 14, 1865, he published to the army the following joint resolution, passed by the Congress :—"That the thanks of the people and of the Congress of the United States are due and are hereby tendered to Major-general William T. Sherman, and through him to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantry and good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia to Savannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city; and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to be engrossed and forwarded to Major-general Sherman. Approved January 10, 1865."

A recount of the guns captured with Savannah raised the

number to two hundred and fifty and the bales of cotton to thirty-one thousand. Sherman posted his troops in and about the city as follows:—Slocum took the Savannah River to the seven mile post on the canal and Howard thence to the sea. Kilpatrick held King's Bridge till Fort McAllister could be dismantled, when he was to picket the roads to the north and west of the city. He then laid down a code for the government of the city, which left the civil authorities in possession but caused them to subscribe to the changed order of things. A few of the inhabitants left, but the greater part remained, and cast their lots in with the new regime. The city was excellently policed under the military governorship, the impoverished were supplied with food from the army stores, and the situation was quite peaceful and safe. Sherman doubted if it had ever had a better government than whilst under his control.

The campaign of Sherman which resulted in the capture of Savannah has a most interesting outside phase. During thirty days he and his army were cut off from all communication with the authorities at Washington and with General Grant, the directing spirit of all the armies. It can be imagined with what anxiety all the avenues of information were scanned in order to follow Sherman in his marches and to anticipate his intentions and wants. Grant may be said to have marched with him in imagination, at least, to have scanned every indication of progress and dwelt on every probability of result. The confederate papers gave him the first inkling of Sherman's whereabouts, and their consternation and appeal told the weight of the blows the South was receiving. They told how Bragg and Beauregard had been summoned to the rescue. This meant that Wilmington had been stripped of part of its garrison. Instantly Grant took advantage of its weakness, by throwing a force against it. He would call

back the force which had been detached against Sherman, or else see that any harm it might do Sherman was compensated for in another direction.

So, as other news came, and Ossabaw Sound seemed likely to become Sherman's destination, supplies were sent thither, and Grant sent a messenger to the same spot with orders to await his arrival and communicate with him at the earliest possible moment. All this was building entirely on probability, for as yet it was far from certain that Sherman would not turn to the Gulf of Mexico. When word came, in the form of Confederate news, that Sherman had captured Millen and that Schofield had gained a victory over Hood at Franklin, Tenn., Grant looked upon the situation as one favorable for starting Canby, then at Vicksburg, into Mississippi, and thus preventing the gathering of a force in Sherman's rear. He also forced his Wilmington expedition the harder, for the objects already stated. On December 3d, 1864, his letter to Sherman told of his preparations against Wilmington, and that Bragg had gone to Georgia. On December 4th, his letter to Butler read:—"I feel great anxiety to see the Wilmington expedition off, both on account of the present fine weather, because Sherman may now be expected to strike the sea coast at any day, leaving Bragg free to return." In the above letter of December 3d, he sketched for Sherman a general plan for future action, without giving minute instructions and said:—"With your veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from East to West, possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. This condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding any other part to the East of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls a force from there will cooperate with you." Again when the Richmond papers showed Sherman to be east of the Ogeechee, he urged Butler to make all haste with the

Wilmington expedition, lest he should "lose the chance of surprise and a weak garrison." On December 17th Grant received a long despatch from Thomas announcing his victory at Nashville and on the same date one from Sherman to the effect that he had captured Fort McAllister, opened communication with the fleet and invested Savannah. He (December 18th) congratulated both his generals. To Sherman he said, "I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command, on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehension for your safety was expressed by the President, I assured him that with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but that you would strike bottom on salt water, some place; that I would not feel the same confidence and security—in fact, would not have trusted the expedition to any other living commander."

When we consider the thoroughly cooperative spirit of these two military masters, how it operated to the extent of intense anxiety, even when the one could do no more than follow in his imagination the track of the other, the above letter of congratulation contains a meed of praise worth more than all other etters and resolutions combined.

CHAPTER XIV.

THROUGH THE CAROLINAS.

The end of the great rebellion was fast approaching. The giant of secession which had for four years withstood the blows of Union armies, was reeling in the arena. Sherman had reached the sea; Hood had gone down before Thomas; the supplies of foreign sympathizers had been stopped at Wilmington; every dangerous Confederate force had been cut off outside of Virginia. The confederacy had not received one staggering blow, but a succession of blows which carried dismay to its centre. Its generals were making the sad confession of irretrievable calamities. Its soldiers wer deserting. It even proposed, as a last resort, to arm the slaves. Its leaders, from President down, were at daggers points as to a final policy of salvation. On December 19th, 1864, Grant telegraphed to Sherman: "Jefferson Davis is said to be very sick; in fact, deserters report his death. I credit no part of this, except that Davis is very sick, and do not suppose that reflections on the military situation soothe him any."

The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, after the capture of Savannah, has been sufficiently set forth. Grant's design was to have Sherman come to Richmond by water. Sherman's suggestions and the impossibility of procuring transports led to a modification of the plans of the general-in-chief. Sherman had gone so far as to map a campaign by land, through the Carolinas, more rapid in time than by

water, and more fruitful of results in a military point of view. But as yet he had not received from Grant or Halleck such sanction of it as warranted his going ahead. The necessary sanction came on January 2d, 1865, in the shape of a letter from Grant, which read as follows: "Before writing you definite instructions for the next campaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written from Washington. Your confidence in being able to march up and join this army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect of such a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent the organization of new armies from broken fragments. Hood is now retreating with his army broken and demoralized. His loss in men has probably not been far from 20,000, besides deserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collected together, and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can we should act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving as I proposed, will do it.

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an entrenched camp ought to be held on the railroad betweeen Savannah and Charleston. Your movement towards Branchville will probably enable Foster to reach this with his own force. This will give us a position in the South from which we can threaten the interior without marching over long narrow causeways, easily defended, as we have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp be established at Pototaligo or Coosawhatchie?

"I have thought that Hood being so completely wiped out for the present, I might bring A. J. Smith here with fourteen to fifteen thousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines and move out with a greater force against Lee. It would compel Lee to retain all his present force in the defence of Richmond, or abandon them entirely. This latter

contingency is probably the only danger to the success of your expedition. In the event you should meet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find the sea-coast, of course. I shall not let Lee's army escape if I can help it, and will not let it go without following to the best of my ability.

"Without waiting further directions then, you may make your preparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies now operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leave out all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing that your information, gained daily in the course of events, will be better than any that can be obtained now.

"It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg; but failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coast ports in North Carolina now held by us. From there you could take shipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you could march the whole distance. From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty in supplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there here is but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected South of the river to bring you through. I shall establish communications with you there by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wants can be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, and to hear your plan and time of starting."

To this Sherman promptly replied, submitting a private plan of campaign, which embodied all of Grant's ideas, and those which he was at entire liberty to advance. It ran:—

1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head of Broad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal ferry and mass the wing in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo.

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across causeway to-

ward Hardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corps about Broad River; also by a rapid movement of the left to secure Sister's Ferry and Augusta road out to Robertsville.

In the meantime, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc., to be moved to a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got ready for another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the head of Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville and Coosawhatchie, by January 15th.

2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leading in the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance for forage. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by January 15th, Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at Coosawhatchie about the same date. Foster to occupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon as Howard gets Pocotaligo.

It was therefore January 2d 1865, that Sherman felt himself fully authorized by his chief to undertake that campaign which was to be known as his "March through the Carolinas," a campaign far more arduous and dangerous than that to the sea, though lost to the popular mind in the brilliancy of the latter. He made instant preparations for the start, and sent his right wing, under Howard, by boats to Beaufort, and thence twenty-five miles inland to Pocotaligo. His left wing, under Slocum, crossed the Savannah and occupied Hardeeville. All this was accomplished by January 14th, and thus the middle of the month found Sherman and his army fully established on the soil of South Carolina.

Just at this time General Sherman was considerably annoyed by the authorities at Washington, on account of his methods of caring for captured cotton and dealing with the negroes who had swarmed to his lines ever since leaving Atlanta. As to cotton, he regarded it as a legitimate capture and subject

to the laws of war, despite the impression that it was of the nature of private property which those who could establish their loyalty should not lose entirely. As to the negroes, he had not chosen to look upon them as entirely contraband of war, but left them to come and go as they pleased, using them, however, wherever their labor would spare his own troops.

He was also exercised about a proposition to make a second grade of Lieutenant-general for his especial benefit. The fact was, that the brilliancy of his late military efforts, connected with the differences between his methods of dealing with certain problems and those of some members of the cabinet, had excited such a feeling in his behalf as to give rise to a favoritism which would have been exceedingly flattering, but for the fact that it was too decidedly political to suit his tastes. Had he been ambitious of renown, other than that of a strictly military character, he might easily have headed a political party, so strong was sentiment in his favor at this juncture. But he wisely steered clear of complications of this nature, and kept his eye single on the cause to which he was already committed. He wrote to Grant, January 21, 1865, saying:—"I have been told that Congress meditates a bill making another Lieutenant-general for me. I have written to John Sherman to stop it, if it is designed for me. It would be mischievous, for there are enough rascals who would try to sow differences between us, whereas you and I now are in perfect understanding. I would rather have you in command than anybody else, for you are fair, honest, and have at heart the same purpose that should animate all. I should emphatically decline any commission calculated to bring us into rivalry, and I ask you to advise all your friends in Congress to this effect, especially Mr. Washburne. I doubt if men in Congress fairly realize that you and I are honest in our professions of want of ambition. I know I feel none.

and to-day will gladly surrender my position and influence to any other who is better able to wield the power. The flurry attending my recent success will soon blow over and give place to new developments."

History has never recorded such a warmth of disinterested loyalty. It is only matched by the fraternal graciousness of Grant's reply: "I have received your letter in which you say you would decline, or are opposed to promotion. No one would be more pleased with your advancement than I; and, if you should be placed in my position, and I put subordinate, it would not change our relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to support you that you have ever done to support me, and I would do all in my power to make our cause win."

Simultaneously with Grant's instructions to Sherman to move north by way of the Carolinas, he ordered Schofield's army from the west to operate on Wilmington, and if possible push into North Carolina to co-operate with Sherman. Schofield was given command of all the North Carolina forces, subject, however, to Sherman's orders. He was instructed by Grant to keep two objects in view, one to give Sherman material aid if needed, on his way north, the other to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. Following these instructions up, Grant further ordered that if he (Schofield) should feel justified he should cut loose from his base and strike for the interior to Sherman's aid. Thus Sherman was to be provided for at all hazards, and nothing should impair the triumph of his contemplated movement so far as his chief was concerned. In addition, Stoneman was ordered to push a cavalry expedition down out of East Tennessee into South Carolina, push toward Columbia and destroy railroads and public property in a section of the country where Sherman's forces would not be able to reach.

It was under these auspices that Sherman framed his last instructions to his army and began his northward march. His seizure of Pocotaligo, with the loss of only two officers and eight men, interrupted all communications between Charleston and the South. His army was officered, with a few slight changes, as it had been during the march from Atlanta. He was dispositioned as in the grand march, not to waste time on unimportant places, nor to be distracted from a central object, but to keep moving, carrying surprises and destruction into hitherto unvisited places. He would ignore both Charleston and Augusta, yet would feint on both so as to keep the enemy's forces divided, and their garrisons housed behind their entrenchments.

On January 19th, 1865, he gave final orders for a forward movement. At once he was confronted with formidable obstacles. It had been raining incessantly and the roads were nearly impassable. The rivers were high, and when a river is high in that region it means the overflow of extensive tracts, and the filling up of innumerable small bayous and waterways. Almost, if not altogether, two weeks elapsed before Sherman's forces were able to move according to orders. His Savannah river pontoons had been swept away, nearly drowning an entire division of the Fifteenth corps. But eventually Slocum got his forces well in hand at Sister's Ferry, forty miles above Savannah, and Howard his at Pocotaligo. Sherman was at Pocotaligo, and was giving out the impression that his destination was Charleston, by keeping a division active in attempts to cross the swollen waters of the Salkiehatchie river.

It was now February 1st, 1865, and the waters having subsided somewhat, orders were re-issued for the start. The delay had not been disappointing, for there were no combinations that depended directly on Sherman's move. On

the contrary, it had proved rather advantageous, for it gave Schofield, Thomas, Canby and Stoneman opportunity to perfect their co-operative movements. Sherman's army was still 60,000 strong. He had along sixty pieces of artillery, and 2,500 wagons carrying ammunition for one great battle, forage for a week and provisions for twenty days. He drove along a herd of cattle on the hoof, and for pork and vegetables he designed to rely on the country. The army moved under the same general orders as were published in Atlanta.

The movement was more directly co-operative than that from Atlanta, in fact it was convergent, while others now co-operated. Canby was under instructions to operate from the Mississippi toward Montgomery and Selma, to keep Hood's remnants engaged. Stoneman was to operate with cavalry on Sherman's left in South Carolina. Thomas was to fill the gap made by Stoneman in East Tennessee. Schofield had already occupied Newbern, and Wilmington was about to fall. At any rate he could reach Goldsboro. Word had come from Grant that Lee had sent 16,000 men south, and that Sherman might expect to meet them. He then continued:—"All the troops you come in communication with will be subject to your orders. From Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, or attempts to evacuate, I will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of 30,000 men to your support, from the troops about Richmond."

To this letter Sherman replied, mapping all the possibilities of his campaign. The substance of his reply is as follows:—"I rejoice in the fall of Ft. Fisher because it gives me another point of security on the sea-board. . . . . I withhold my consent to Admiral Dahlgren's assault on Ft. Moultrie, because the capture of all Sullivan's Island is not conclusive to Charleston. . . . . I am moving for the railroad west of

Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg, which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior. . . . . When I get to Columbia I think I will move straight for Goldsboro. I feel sure of getting Wilmington and maybe Charleston, and being at Goldsboro, with the railroads finished back to Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems Lee must come out. If Schofield comes to Beaufort he should be pushed to Kingston. . . . . I have no doubt Hood will come to Augusta. . . . . Canby and Thomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, keeping Hood's remnants employed. . . . . I find the enemy in our front, but giving ground as fast as we approach.

The real strength of the enemy lay at Augusta and Charleston. Here they had quite formidable numbers, but not sufficient to meet Sherman on equal terms in the open field. Wheeler's Confederate cavalry was still formidable, and Wade Hampton had been dispatched to the scene to raise additional troopers in his native State. Hood was clearly on his way from the west, with a possible force of 25,000 men. Estimating the combined forces of Hardee, Wheeler and Hampton at 15,000, Sherman naturally expected to confront a joint force of 40,000 men, quite enough to prove formidable, if not upon the field, at least at the river crossings. He therefore took all precautions, and made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster to watch his progress closely and provide for him a safe retreat to the coast should he meet with unexpected obstacles.

Taking Goldsboro as his objective, Sherman had before him a march of 425 miles, through an intensely hostile country, and across the trend of deep streams. He was not marching away from an enemy, whom a skillful general held in check, but into the teeth of opposing columns, which might become formidable armies should Lee escape from Richmond. Be-

fore, he had reached the sea coast, marching through and out of an enemy's country, now he was marching into an enemy's country and away from a coast base. Of the difference between this and his "March to the Sea," Sherman said:—"Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of the 'March to the Sea,' and of that from Savannah northward, I would place the former at one and the latter at ten, or the maximum."

On January 29th, Sherman sent his last dispatch for a fortnight to Grant. It read:—"You may rest assured I will keep my troops well in hand, and if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay so dearly that you will have less to do . . . . . I must risk Hood and trust to you to hold Lee, or be on his heels if he comes South." Meanwhile Grant was in precisely the same fix as when Sherman started from Atlanta. He did not wish to do anything to start Lee from his entrenchments till Schofield had taken Wilmington and had gotten into a position to assist Sherman. Sherman's army of 60,000 men, combined with Schofield's probable 40-000, would make a field army which might well defy the entire force of Lee, augmented by all the Confederate forces then at large in the Carolinas.

Sherman ordered all his columns to move for a point on the South Carolina railroad above Branchville. They all started on February 1st, under orders to make all the time possible. They found, at the start, obstructions from Wheeler's cavalry, but scarcely enough to consume much time. By February 3d, two corps were at Beaufort Bridge, over the Salkiehatchie, where the water was found very high, and a formidable troop of infantry in front. A diversion was made by one of Sherman's divisions through a swamp, where the soldiers had to wade in water up to their armpits, and on coming in upon the enemy, they fled in disorder, abandoning

the whole line of the Salkiehatchie. By February 5th all the corps were well together at Beaufort Bridge, and orders were issued to march straight for Midway, upon the railroad above Branchville. This point was reached on February 7th; and the work of destruction began. As this road was most important to the Confederacy, Sherman determined to stop long enough to tear it up for fifty miles. This also would give Slocum time to come up, he having encountered severe obstacles and being behind the right wing. On February 9th, Slocum struck the road at Blackville west of Midway, and so Sherman's army stretched along the line of road for a great distance.

On February 10th, Sherman issued orders for his army to move again on the 11th. The right wing was instructed to strike Orangeburg *en route* to Columbia. Kilpatrick was ordered to demonstrate toward Aiken, and keep up the delusion that Augusta, instead of Columbia, was the objective. Sherman was most anxious to reach Columbia in advance of Hood's forces, which were reported to be near the place. It was important to reach Orangeburg also, as the breaking up of the railroad there would sever the connection between Charleston and Columbia. Near Orangeburg the Edisto was found impassable and the opposite side guarded. Sherman ordered a division to a point five miles below the town, where a crossing was effected on pontoons. This division marched up on the north side of the river, and on their approach the enemy fled. The town was occupied by the entire Seventeenth corps that night.

Now the heads of all the columns were directed towdar Columbia, where the enemy had evidently concentrated, if reports and hypotheses were true. But it turned out that Sherman most effectually deceived the Confederate leaders. Hardee was indulging in the thought that Charleston was a



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sure objective. The commander at Augusta thought that place was destined to a visit. Columbia had been left to the keeping of a cavalry troop under Hampton.

By February 14th Wood's division of the Fifteenth corps struck the Little Congaree, a few miles below Columbia. The approach to the stream was over a wide extent of overflowed cotton fields, and on the opposite side was a newly constructed fort. The bridge across the river had been destroyed, but by a slight deflection a crossing was made and the fort was abandoned. Sherman was now behind the deep waters of the stream, and he knew that the directions taken by his other corps would soon place them on the same side. He therefore issued his general orders for the government of the troops while in Columbia. They were dated February 16th, 1865, and ran:—"General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near their mouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops; but will spare libraries, asylums and private buildings. He will then move to Winnsboro, destroying *en route* utterly that section of the railroad. He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water-tanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to accomplish consistent with proper celerity."

On February 16th, the entire Fifteenth corps reached a point opposite Columbia, marched up the Saluda and crossed that stream at the ferry, and reached Broad river to find its bridge in flames and Butler's confederate cavalry fleeing toward Columbia. Slocum struck the Broad at Alston, where he was expected to cross. The cavalry were also ordered to cross there. On the night of the 17th, Wood's division of the Fifteenth corps was ferried across the Broad, just above the city, and by morning were in position to cover

the laying of pontoons for the passage of the rest of the corps. On this date Col. Stone came out of Columbia to surrender the place and ask for orders. Sherman instructed Howard to regard the orders already issued and none other, and to march into the place. Many requests came to Sherman to favor properties of certain kinds, but he had embraced all in his general orders that he cared to. When the pontoon was laid across the Broad, Sherman and his staff and the entire Fifteenth corps passed over, and entered the city, to find that the cotton on hand and many of the warehouses had been fired by the enemy. The Fifteenth corps hardly halted in the city, but passed out on the Winnsboro road. The Seventeenth passed above the city some four miles, and Slocum's left wing crossed at Alston and passed on to the North. It was at Columbia that Sherman was handed a paper by an escaped Union prisoner. He placed it in his pocket, and on opening it at night found it to be from Adjutant S. H. M. Byers, of the Iowa 5th Regiment, who had been a prisoner of war at Columbia. It contained the words of the celebrated "Sherman's March to the Sea," which he had composed while a prisoner. The great quantity of burning cotton in the city was an invitation to a general conflagration. A high wind, on the night after Sherman's arrival, fanned the smouldering embers into activity, and the fire spread and consumed quite an extensive tract on the business portions. Sherman was blamed with incendiarism, but without just cause, for all the conditions of general conflagration had been provided by the escaping enemy.

On the morning of February 18th, Sherman did all he could to allay the suffering caused by the fire, even to the extent of turning over a large part of his beef for the sustenance of the people. He remained in Columbia over the 19th, his troops making their destruction of the railroads complete in

all directions. On this date, Grant heard of the capture of Columbia through the Confederate papers. With his usual solicitude for Sherman's welfare, he immediately telegraphed Schofield to turn his attention to Wilmington, saying, "you will either capture the place or hold a considerable portion of the enemy from Sherman's front." At this point Sherman managed to get a despatch to the coast to Admiral Dahlgren, who sent the same despatch to Grant. Grant instantly sent it to Schofield both to encourage and direct him. Its gist was that, "Sherman had been encountering bad roads and might yet be turned to the coast at Charleston or Bull's Bay, where supplies ought to be on hand. Richmond papers announce the capture of Columbia on the 17th. As he (Sherman) was then above the Congaree, it is hardly likely he will turn back. This success will probably force the evacuation of Charleston. In that case Gillmore (who had succeeded Foster) will have a loose force of 10,000 men, which I have directed to report to you. Should you find the capture of Wilmington impracticable, keep up a threatening attitude so as to detain all the force of the enemy possible in your front, and push your columns to Newbern."

On February 20th, the right wing of Sherman's army began its march toward Winnsboro, where it arrived on the 21st, to find that Slocum's left wing had already arrived. The right then swung off toward Fayetteville, N. C., with orders to cross the Catawba River at Peay's ferry. The cavalry was ordered to follow the railroad to Chester and then swing toward Rocky Mount, where the left wing was expected to cross. Sherman was with his Twentieth corps, and arrived at the river on the 23d, where a safe crossing was effected. He then diverted his entire cavalry toward Charlotte as a make-believe that his destination was thither, where he had learned Beauregard had centered all his detachments together

with a corps of Hood's old army. The rain had been pouring down so persistently, the rivers had become so high and the roads so bad that Sherman was compelled to halt his advance at Hanging Rock for a few days in order to allow his rearward corps to catch up.

At this date, Grant was in receipt of glorious news at Richmond. Fort Fisher had been captured; Fort Anderson had fallen; Wilmington had been occupied and its 61 guns and over 800 prisoners had fallen into Schofield's hands. He had started Stoneman on his Carolina raid, and Sheridan eastward to break up the Virginia Central, so as to prevent the feeding and the escape of Lee. A similar raid had been started from Eastport, Miss., and Canby was moving for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery. "These," said Grant, "with Sherman eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon."

And still other good news came to both Grant and Sherman. It was to the effect that Charleston had been evacuated on February 18th, and taken possession of by a brigade of Foster's troops. The moment Columbia had been occupied by Sherman, Hardee, in Charleston, felt that the place was doomed. There remained but one outlet and that was by the North Eastern Railroad, whose terminus was Cheraw. As soon as Sherman's march pointed toward this place, Hardee made all haste to escape thence before Sherman could reach it. He was not a moment too soon, for he barely got across the Pedee before Sherman arrived.

These conquests were simplifying the situation for Grant. His armies were now converging beautifully. He recommended Schofield for a brigadier generalcy in the regular army, and urged him to "push out and form a connection with Sherman at the earliest practical moment. If you reach Goldsboro and have a fair prospect of getting your road fin-

ished soon, it may be unnecessary for Sherman to come down to the coast. Make every effort to communicate with Sherman at once. . . . . If you and Sherman are united, you can keep as far in the interior of North Carolina as you may be able to supply yourselves. With the large force you have, Raleigh may not be found too far off." Thus every energy that Grant possessed was turned to the account of his great lieutenant, and this, even though he had no official knowledge of his whereabouts, yet an infinite trust that he was advancing in accordance with the information furnished by the enemy's papers. At this time his anxiety for Sherman's welfare became so intense as to be painful. On February 26th, he inquired of Thomas as to Stoneman's expedition. He attached great importance to this movement because it would throw a force on the west of Sherman which would be likely to detect any movement on the part of Lee to subtract from his forces for the assistance of North Carolina. In this connection he said, "The only hope of the enemy is now to fall on Sherman before he can be supported by Schofield."

It was not until February 27th, that all of Sherman's forces got across the Catawba and he was able to resume his march, with full columns, for Cheraw and Fayetteville. Kilpatrick was far to the left at Lancaster, keeping up the feint on Charlotteville and Salisbury, and under orders to act in close concert with the Fourteenth corps. Marching was now most desperate. Roads were now impassable except as they were corduroyed. Fortunately no enemy appeared to obstruct operations. By March 2d, Chesterfield was entered, after a brisk skirmish with Butler's cavalry. Howard entered Cheraw the day before, with the Seventeenth corps, and with the Fifteenth well in hand. Owing to the burning of the bridge across the Pedee by Hardee, Sherman was forced to deflect his left wing to Sneedsboro in order to effect a cross-

ing. At Cheraw, Sherman found great quantities of Confederate stores, and at this point he felt that he had a comparatively unobstructed march to the Cape Fear river, for the enemy appeared to be wholly disconcerted by his movement and unable to baffle him in any particular. Indeed at that very moment Lee's dispatches to his government read as follows:—"The accounts received from South and North Carolina are unfavorable. Beauregard reports from Charlotte that four corps of the enemy are advancing on that place, (*observe Sherman had no intention of marching on Charlotte,*) another tearing up railroads, and they will probably reach that place before he can concentrate his troops there. He states Sherman will doubtless unite with Schofield at Raleigh or Weldon. Bragg reports that Schofield is preparing to advance from Newbern to Goldsboro. He says no assistance can be expected from the State of North Carolina. Sherman seems to have everything his own way, which is calculated to cause apprehension. Beauregard does not say what he proposes to do or what he can do. I do not know where his troops are or on what line they are moving. General J. E. Johnston is the only officer I know who has the confidence of the army and the people, and if he is ordered to report to me I would place him on duty. It is necessary to bring out all our strength and, I fear, to unite our armies, as, separately, they do not seem to make head against the enemy. Everything should be destroyed that cannot be moved out of the way of Sherman and Schofield. Provisions must be accumulated in Virginia, and every man in all the States must be brought out. I fear it may be necessary to abandon all our cities, and preparations should be made for this contingency."

In the light of this dispatch, all of Grant's precaution and anxiety are excusable. He well knew with whom he had to

deal: better far than Lee, for he does not seem to have been aware of the fact that Grant had made it impossible for him to abandon Richmond without inevitable defeat and certain capture. The dispatch is historically valuable as showing how Sherman's advance was affecting the Southern situation, and extremely valuable from a military standpoint as showing how much his movements had contributed to the disconcert of the enemy. He was truly "having everything his own way," and was completing a far more scientific and valuable march than when traversing the fruitful fields of Georgia.

Among the stores appropriated or destroyed in Cheraw were twenty-four guns, two thousand muskets and thirty-six hundred barrels of gunpowder. By March 6th, after a rest in Cheraw, the line of march was headed for Fayetteville. Sherman now knew that General Jos. Johnston, his old antagonist, had been assigned to the command in the Carolinas in place of Beauregard, and, knowing his organizing ability, concluded that the rest of his march would be by no means a walk-over. After all of his corps were across the Pedee he arranged them so that his Seventeenth would be well on the right; his Fifteenth on the direct road; his Fourteenth, also on the direct road road from Swedesboro; his Twentieth to follow the Fourteenth. Kilpatrick was to skirt the left and keep interposed between Sherman's forces and those of Hampton and Wheeler, which were hovering in that direction. Pursuing this order of march, Laurel Hill was reached on March 8th. Here Sherman became satisfied that Wilmington had been captured by Schofield, and he determined to communicate with him. So he sent off dispatches by secret couriers to the effect that he might be expected at Fayetteville in a few days; that a boat ought to be sent up the Cape Fear river; that he expected to meet Schofield at Goldsboro; that he (Sherman) was progressing

finely, barring rains and difficult roads, which might detain him about Fayetteville; that in such case he would like to have some bread, coffee and sugar; that he expected to reach Goldsboro by March 20th.

Every mile of Sherman's approach, and every possibility of his union with Schofield rendered the situation more desperate for the enemy. Most stringent orders had been issued to destroy everything in the route of Sherman and Schofield. Lee had worked out a situation which contemplated the evacuation of Richmond and his escape, to join his forces with those of Johnston. Breckenridge had inquired to what point Lee wished to retire, and whither stores should be sent in case he (Lee) deserted the Confederate capital, and Lee had replied: "In the event of our abandoning our position on the James River, I shall endeavor to unite the army about Burksville, so as to retain communications as long as possible with the North and South, and also with the West. I should think Lynchburg or some place West the most advantageous to remove the Richmond stores." And now the cry was beginning to go up to concentrate everything, "all the available troops from every quarter," to "destroy Sherman." "If," said Lee to Johnston, "it is possible to assemble a superior force to meet him, and that force could be wrought into enthusiasm by your personal presence, great results might be achieved; and something of this sort must be done at once, or the situation is lost." And on the same day the enthusiastic Beauregard, disdaining Lee, but telegraphing directly to President Davis, said, "Should the enemy advance into North Carolina, towards Charlotte and Salisbury, as is now almost certain, I earnestly urge in time a concentration of at least twenty thousand infantry and artillery at the latter point, if possible, to give him battle there and crush him. Then to concentrate all forces against Grant,



GENERAL SLOCUM.

and then to march to Washington and dictate peace. Hardee and myself can collect fifteen thousand, and, if Lee could furnish twenty thousand more, the fate of the Confederacy would be sure." Poor fellow! He had not only failed to find out that Sherman had no intention of going to Charlotte or Salisbury, but, after a month of opportunity, he was in ignorance of the fact that he was moving along with sixty thousand determined soldiers at his back, who were perfect in discipline and without fear.

By March 11, Sherman reached Fayetteville, after one of the most tedious and trying marches of the campaign. His arrival there found Slocum in possession, with the Fourteenth Corps, and all the other corps well in hand. The only episode of the march thither, aside from the fact that the respective corps had literally to corduroy their ways, was a plunge made into Kilpatrick's divided forces by Hampton's cavalry. The latter, in his anxiety to join Wheeler at Fayetteville before Sherman's infantry came up, struck one of Kilpatrick's brigades, and actually captured its camp and artillery. But the defeated troopers rallied and drove off Hampton's men, recovering camp, artillery, and all that had been taken, except about two hundred prisoners. On his retreat from Fayetteville, the enemy burned the bridge across the Cape Fear River. This bridge Sherman substituted by two pontoons, one opposite the town and one four miles down the river; so that ample crossing was quickly provided for.

Fayetteville was another link in the chain which was gradually tightening around the vitals of the Confederacy. It was a demonstration of Sherman's power, and of the importance of the part that had been assigned to him in the closing of the stupendous drama. We hear of projects from the enemy to foil him; we hear of the anxious efforts of Grant

to assure his safe arrival at some co-operative point; but we hear also of desertions from the enemy, and a wail from Lee to the effect that hundreds and thousands of his men were "going over to the enemy." "Hundreds of the men," said he, despairingly, "are deserting nightly, and I cannot keep the army together unless examples are made of such cases. . . . . I am convinced that it proceeds from the discouraging sentiment out of the army, which, unless it can be changed, will bring us to calamity. . . . . I regret to say that the greatest number of desertions have taken place among the North Carolina troops, who have fought as gallantly as any soldiers in the army." Sherman's march was therefore having its effect in more ways than one. It was not only carrying dismay to the Carolinas and to the Confederacy, but it was telling with fearful effect on the *morale* of Lee's army.

At Fayetteville Sherman was greeted with the sound of a whistle, which betokened the arrival of a Federal steamboat. His couriers had gotten through safely to Wilmington, and the boat was the response to his messages. It was the first contact he had had with the outer world for nearly six weeks, and its effect was electrical on himself and his men. Sherman took advantage of the arrival of the boat to send off dispatches to Washington, and to place the families of fugitives who had sought his protection *en voyage* to a friendlier land. Under date of March 12th, he said to Stanton, Secretary of War:—

DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army has reached this point, and has opened communication with Wilmington. A tug-boat came up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. M.

I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which he will doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell you what I know will give you pleasure—that I have done all that I proposed, and the fruits seem to me ample

for the time employed. Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington are incidents, while the utter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and the utter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, and Fayetteville, are the principals of the movement These points were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in the Confederacy is safe against the army of the West. Let Lee hold on to Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what use is Richmond? He must come out and fight us on open ground, and for that we must ever be ready. Let him stick behind his parapets, and he will perish.

I remember well what you asked me, and I think I am on the right road, though a long one. My army is as united and cheerful as ever, and is full of confidence in itself and its leaders. It is utterly impossible for me to enumerate what we have done, but I enclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial. At Columbia and Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridges which the Confederacy had in this part of the country. This arsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged. I cannot leave a detatchment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it up with gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls. I take it for granted the United States will never again trust North Carolina with an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure.

Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army, I remain your servant, W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General*

On the same date he sent to Grant a full and graphic dispatch of his operations and intentions. It ran:—

DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon, Hardee, as usual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; but our pontoons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay as possible, I will be after him toward Goldsboro'.

A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off from here, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee, and flour. We are abundantly supplied with all else, having in a measure lived off the country.

The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though we have had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to almost any other body of men I ever heard of.

Our march was substantially what I designed—straight on Columbia, feigning on Branchville and Augusta. We destroyed, in passing, the railroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburg to the Congaree; again, from Columbia down to Kingsville on the Wateree, and up toward Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thence we turned east on Cheraw and Fayetteville. At Columbia we destroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among which were forty-three cannon. At Cheraw we found also machinery and material of war sent from Charleston, among which were twenty-five guns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here we find about twenty guns and a magnificent United States arsenal.

We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall therefore destroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use; and the United States should never again confide such aluable property to a people who have betrayed a trust.

I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of the vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us. Some I will send down the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land, under small escort, as soon as we are across Cape Fear River.

I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the

fruits of this march will be appreciated. It had to be made, not only to destroy the valuable depots by the way, but for its incidents in the necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If I can now add Goldsboro' without too must cost, I will be in a position to aid you materially in the spring campaign.

Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofield about Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentrate his scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him as soon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded.

Keep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro' or Charlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be most important.

The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left to the enemy, and it will not do for me to go there, on account of the red-clay hills which are impassable to wheels in wet weather.

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

And also on the same date he wrote fully to Terry, explaining his situation, mapping his intentions, and instructing Schofield how best to co-operate with him. His letter ran thus:

GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which left Wilmington at 2 P. M. yesterday, which arrived here without trouble. The scout who brought me your cipher-message started back last night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact of your opening the river.

General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy's steamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure two others known to be above, and we will load

them with refugees (white and black) who have clung to our skirts, impeded our movements, and consumed our food.

We have swept the country well from Savannah to here, and the men and animals are in fine condition. Had it not been for the foul weather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw or here; but at Columbia, Cheraw, and here, we have captured immense stores, and destroyed machinery, guns, ammumition, and property, of inestimable value to our enemy. At all points he has fled from us, "standing not on the order of his going."

The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, will now call on Lee to feed them.

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the load with oats or corn. Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at any risk. We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate at Goldsboro'. We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but he shall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with his railroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the same from Wilmington. If we can get the roads to, and secure, Goldsboro' by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth a million of dollars. I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does not catch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the army marches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form.

I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand useless mouths; as many go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest to go in vehicles or on captured horses *via* Clinton to Wilmington.

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course, and shall be most happy to meet you. I am, truly your friend. W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

Terry had already sent out a cavalry regiment to search for Sherman's advance, one company of which struck him at Fayetteville on March 12th. He now considered himself as in full communication with the coast forces and the outside world, and he learned that his old antagonist, General Johnston, was in command in the Carolinas, with a part of his western army, augmented by such reinforcements as he could gather on the spot. Johnston was at Raleigh, and at the head of an army which Sherman estimated at 35,000 men, including 8,000 cavalry under Butler, Hardee and Hampton. Sherman felt that the day for feints and easy marches was over for him, for Johnston was not to be outwitted by manœuvre, as his predecessor had been. Moreover, he possessed organizing ability of a high order, and was fast cohering and mobilizing his army. This made Sherman the more anxious to push a head to Goldsboro, and effect that anticipated junction with Schofield which would render them invincible and precipitate the last stage of the war.

On March 13th and 14th, Sherman, therefore, issued orders for the destruction of the arsenal at Fayetteville, and for the advance of his wings across the Cape Fear River and toward Goldsboro, where he had instructed Schofield to join him. The order of movement was with the Seventeenth and Fifteenth corps on the right and the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps on the left, but with four divisions of each wing lightly equipped ready for attack, and the wagon trains on the central roads. All the refugees had been sent toward Wilmington under escort. Almost from the start, Slocum's corps was met by determined opposition from Hardee's infantry and cavalry, which took advantage of the covers afforded by the nature of the narrow strip of country between the Cape Fear and North Rivers. Yet Sherman determined to push square in the front of Hardee, drive him back toward Averys-

boro, and then suddenly wheel to the right toward Bentonsville. But as he approached Averysboro, Hardee was found to be in a strong position, and Slocum deployed his Twentieth corps for battle. Kilpatrick was swung well to the right with his cavalry, and a strong brigade of infantry was thrown out on Hardee's left flank. It made a determined charge, carried the enemy's first lines and captured an entire Confederate brigade with a battery of three guns. Pursuit of Hardee was begun and kept up well in the direction of Smithfield. In this spirited engagement Sherman lost 77 killed and 477 wounded, while the enemy lost quite as many in killed and wounded, besides 250 prisoners.

Sherman's opening of communications to Fayetteville had made it possible for him to send dispatches to Grant and receive word in turn. They were in active consultation respecting the future. It was at Fayetteville that Sherman learned from Grant of the success of Sheridan in cutting Lee's western communications, and of the failure of Stoneman to reach the Carolinas in time to effect a diversion of the enemy from Sherman's left. Through Sherman, Grant was also now enabled to describe to the authorities his (Sherman's) condition and set forth the results of his campaign. Says Grant: "I am just in receipt of a letter from Sherman, from Fayetteville. He describes his army as in fine health and having met no serious opposition. Hardee keeps in his front, at a respectable distance. At Columbia he destroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments and forty-three cannon. At Cheraw he found much machinery and war materials, including seventy-five cannon and 3,600 barrels of gunpowder. At Fayetteville he found twenty pieces of artillery and much other material."

Again, and directly to Sherman, Grant said: "When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your back upon

the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against anything the enemy can do. Lee may evacuate Richmond, and he cannot get there with force enough to touch you. His army is now demoralized and deserting very fast, both to us and to their homes. A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if we did not follow. My notion is that you should get Raleigh as soon as possible, and hold the railroad back from there. From that point all the North Carolina roads can be made useless to the enemy without keeping up communications with the rear."

As had been previously determined, Sherman swung his left wing nearly due east from Averysboro and directly toward Goldsboro, whither he knew Schofield was marching. By March 18th, his left was within five miles of Bentonsville, and twenty-seven of Goldsboro. His right was somewhat nearer Goldsboro, and distant from his left about ten miles. Sherman was traveling with Howard on his right. He thought that he had driven the enemy sufficiently toward Raleigh to clear his left entirely. But it seems Johnston, knowing the danger of a junction between Sherman and Schofield, and resolved to attack Sherman's left before such junction could take place, had gathered all the forces he could and made a bold dash for Bentonsville. He had concentred them under Bragg, Cheatham, Hardee and Hampton on the night of the 18th, and when Slocum came into the neighborhood of Bentonsville, he struck Johnston in force. On the morning of the 19th, Johnston made a vigorous attack on Slocum, driving two of his brigades back on the main army, and capturing three guns. Slocum saw he had a formidable foe to contend with, and deployed his respective divisions in defensive line, with orders to throw up barricades. Sherman sent him word to hold on the defensive, till he could send reinforcements from the right. Hazen's division of the Fifteenth

corps was sent direct to Slocum, while the remainder of the corps was turned for Bentonsville with the intention of striking Johnston's rear. The Seventeenth corps was also ordered to Slocum. Kilpatrick came in upon Slocum's left. In this position Slocum received six heavy assaults from the enemy under the personal direction of Johnston, but he held his ground unflinchingly and parried them all with great loss to the foe. These assaults constituted the battle of March 19th, in a difficult country, filled with bushy swamps. On March 20th, the Fifteenth corps closed in on Bentonsville, finding freshly made parapets. It was therefore ordered to proceed with the greatest caution, till it could effect a junction with Slocum on the left. During this day Sherman got his forces in position, and found Johnston occupying the two sides of a triangle whose apex was on the direct road from Averysboro to Goldsboro, which embraced Bentonsville, and whose flanks, or wings, were protected by deep swamps. It was in every sense a strong and commanding position, and one which Sherman hesitated to attack. He had on hand but a small supply of food; he expected to hear daily of Schofield's arrival in Goldsboro; he was uncertain as to the strength of Johnston's forces. All things considered, he deemed it wise to simply hold his ground for a day or two and await developments, meanwhile sending his wagons to Kinston for supplies.

March 21st opened rainy and no operations were possible. But about noon Mower's command of Howard's wing broke through the Confederate lines, and began a pursuit of the troops in his front toward Bentonsville. Sherman checked this rash move, which would have precipitated a general engagement, and in order to secure Mower's safe retreat to his corps, a skirmish fire was opened all along the Union front. Sherman afterwards regretted he did not at once join general

battle in support of Mower's movement, for it proved to be directly along the only available line of retreat the enemy had. During that night the enemy beat a retreat in the direction of Smithfield, leaving his pickets as prisoners, his dead unburied and his wounded in the hospitals. The loss to Sherman in the Bentonsville engagements was 191 killed, 1,117 wounded and 296 missing. Johnston's loss, including prisoners, was 2,343.

On March 22d Sherman rode in the direction of Goldsboro, and when at Cox's Bridge he met General Terry with two divisions of the Tenth corps. The road was clear for his army to enter Goldsboro, and it moved thither. Sherman entered Goldsboro on March 23d to find Schofield in full possession with his Twenty-third corps. During the 23d and 24th his whole army came up, and entered the camps assigned them. By March 25th the railroad to Newbern was open and supplies began to pour in. Thus the long looked for junction between Sherman and Schofield was effected, and thus ended one of the longest and most important marches ever made by an organized army. Four hundred and twenty-five miles of hostile country had been traversed, and five large rivers had been crossed, at any one of which a small force could have offered serious impediments. The country was rendered doubly difficult by reason of swamps, which the rains had filled with water, and the roads were so impassable that corduroying afforded the only means of advance. Three important supply cities—Columbia, Cheraw and Fayetteville—had been captured. The evacuation of Charleston had been compelled. All the important railroads of South Carolina had been broken up, and an immense amount of military property destroyed. A section of country equal to forty miles in width had been devastated. Fifty days of midwinter had been spent in marching and ten in resting. The army had

arrived in splendid order, with men and teams as fresh as when they started from Atlanta or Savannah. Counting in with Sherman's successes those of Schofield and Terry in capturing Ft. Fisher, Newbern, Wilmington, etc., and opening the way to Goldsboro, the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newbern had fallen into the National hands in the short space of sixty days, and an army of one hundred thousand disciplined and victorious soldiers were in position for further operations.

March 23d was memorable in the annals of the war as a consummation of those vast plans which for months had been in operation, and which had brought within supporting distance of Grant a force equal to any further emergency. The very next day he ordered that celebrated move which was to turn Lee's right and force him from his Richmond base. After joining Schofield, Sherman felt strong enough to encounter Johnston, even if it should happen that Lee made his escape and effected a junction with him. He regarded himself as virtual master of the situation.

On March 25th, Sherman went up to City Point, to communicate in person with Grant. It happened that President Lincoln was present, on a visit to the front. Sheridan had come in from his eventful Virginia raid. There was, therefore, a meeting of distinguished officials and a comparison of views which were to have immediate bearing on the future. On March 28th Sherman returned to his army, fully informed as to the part he was to play in the Spring campaign, then about to begin.

A volume might be filled with the letters of congratulation and information which awaited Sherman's arrival at Goldsboro, and with his replies to them. We can find room only for the gist of one or two, which show how wide awake Sherman was to his immediate surroundings, and to the possibilities of the near future. Under date of March 24th, he wrote

Grant: "I send you a copy of my orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. The telegraph is now done to Morehead City, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston in boats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and clothing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from there twenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead City and Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip the army, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start. I feel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have got Johnston's army afraid of us. He himself acts with timidity and caution. His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits its operations to our stragglers and foraging parties. My marching columns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walk right through it.

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move we can checkmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defence of Richmond, or to abandon the *cause*. I feel certain, if he leaves Richmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy. I will study my maps a little more before giving my positive views. I want all possible information of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and what draught."

Admiral Dahlgren concludes a letter to Sherman, dated April 20th, and describing the coast operations in his (Sherman's) behalf, thus :—

"No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking the track you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was natural to desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any one spot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston.

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete in execution ; and now it is yours to secure the last army which rebeldom possesses. I hear of your being in

motion by the 9th, and hope that the result may be all that you wish.

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shocked every mind. Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratum of American opinion? Evidently it has not been the act of one man, nor of a madman. Who have prompted him?"

CHAPTER XV.

JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER.

Sherman's interview with Grant, at City Point, on March 28th, 1865, must have been a most interesting one. Imagine the weighty subjects discussed there, and the suggestions and plans for the future—a future which could not but be pregnant with revelations. Grant foreshadowed what might take place in view of Sheridan's successful raid and the desperation engendered by Sherman's union with Schofield at Goldsboro. He also made known his intention of forcing Lee's right, and driving him to the alternative of starvation or cutting loose from Richmond. He was emphatic that a crisis impended, and his only apprehension was that Lee might not wait to catch the full effect of his intended blow. Sherman supplemented the views of his chief with the encouragement that he regarded his army as strong enough to fight both Lee and Johnston, provided Grant could come up in the rear within a day or two. He also pledged himself to be at Burksville in a fortnight, which point would cut off Lee's communication and force him into the open. Both Grant and Sherman agreed that one more bloody battle would have to be fought. Sherman supposed it would fall on him. Grant thought, that if Lee tarried for a few days it would necessarily fall on him. It turned out that Grant was right, for Five Forks settled the fate of Lee.

It was agrecd at this interview that Sherman should be ready to move from Goldsboro by April 10th, and that then

he should start for the Roanoke River, and thence either strike the Danville road or join Grant's forces. Grant's own movement to Lee's right had been fixed for March 29th. He was then confronting Lee's army of 70,000 effectives, with his own of 111,000, and it would necessarily take him some days to ascertain the effect of his intended move. This would give Sherman ample time to get ready, and hence the 10th of April was fixed for him. He had much to do in the way of reshaping his organization and replenishing his stores. He arrived at Goldsboro, from City Point, on March 30th, and at once went actively to work. His army assumed its old tripartite shape, prior to the Atlanta campaign, and now stood :—

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, GEN. O. O. HOWARD :

Fifteenth Corps	15,670 men.
Seventeenth Corps	13,164 "
Total	28,834 men.

This army constituted his right wing :.

ARMY OF GEORGIA, GEN. H. W. SLOCUM :

Fourteenth Corps	15,098 men.
Twentieth Corps	12,965 "
Total	28,063 men.

This army composed his left wing:

ARMY OF THE OHIO, GEN. J. M. SCHOFIELD :

Tenth Corps	12,099 men.
Twenty-third Corps	14,293 "
Total	26,392 men.

CAVALRY DIVISION, GEN. J. KILPATRICK :

Aggregate	5,659 men.

A grand total of 88,948 men, with 91 pieces of artillery. By March 5th, Sherman had things so well forward as to

warrant the publication of special field orders for the campaign. As they involve the entire scheme of operations on his part, they must find a place here:

For Corps Commanders and Chiefs of Staff:

The next grand objective is to place this army (with its full equipment) north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base for supplies at Norfolk, and at Winton or Murfreesboro on the Chowan, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac about Petersburg, and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible *en route*.

1. To accomplish this result the following general plan will be followed, or modified only by written orders from these headquarters, should events require a change:

(1.) On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed to be complete, and the outlying detachments will be called in or given directions to meet on the next march. All preparations will also be complete to place the railroad stock back of Kinston on the one road, and below the North-east Branch on the other.

(2.) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their lines of march, say about seven miles, and close up.

(3.) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be kept up at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according to the amount of resistance. All the columns will dress to the left (which is the exposed flank), and commanders will study always to find roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general left wheel, the wagons to be escorted to some place of security on the direct route of march. Foraging and other details may continue as heretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed, and foragers should not go in advance of the *advance guard*, but look more to our right rear for corn, bacon and meal.

2. The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding(

will aim straight for the railroad bridge near Smithfield; thence along up the Neuse River to the railroad bridge over Neuse River northeast of Raleigh (Powell's); thence to Warrenton, the general point of concentration.

The centre (Major-General Schofield commanding) will move to Whitley's Mill, ready to support the left until it is past Smithfield, when it will follow up (substantially) Little River to about Rolesville, ready at all times to move to the support of the left; after passing Tar River, to move to Warrenton.

The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), preceded by the cavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahunta, then swing across to Bulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to make junction with the other armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of the Neuse River, about Smithfield; thence, in case of no serious opposition on the left, will work up towards Earpsboro', Andrews, B—— and Warrenton.

The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding), leaving its encumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight for Weldon until the enemy is across Tar River and that bridge burned; then it will deflect toward Nashville and Warrenton, keeping up communication with general headquarters.

3. As soon as the army starts, the chief quartermaster and commissary will prepare a resupply of stores at some point on Pamlico or Albemarle Sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston or Winton and Murfreesboro', according to developments. As soon as they have satisfactory information that the army is north of the Roanoke, they will forthwith establish a depot at Winton, with a sub-depot at Murfreesboro'. Major-General Schofield will hold, as heretofore, Wilmington (with the bridge across Northern Branch as an outpost),

Newbern (and Kinston as its outpost), and will be prepared to hold Winton and Murfreesboro' as soon as the time arrives for that move. The navy has instructions from Admiral Porter to co-operate, and any commanding officer is authorized to call on the navy for assistance and co-operation, always in writing, setting forth the reasons, of which, necessarily the naval commander must be the judge.

4. The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, but may in person shift to either flank where his presence may be needed, leaving a staff officer to receive reports. He requires, absolutely, a report of each army or grand detachment each night, whether anything material has occurred or not, for often the absence of an enemy is a very important fact in military prognostication.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.

But now there happened an event which suddenly changed Sherman's entire movement. As already indicated, Grant was in the midst of that important and imposing move which was to try the strength of Lee's right. If this failed, Sheridan was to move upon the Danville and Southside railroad, and thence into North Carolina to join Sherman. This was expected to enclose both Lee and Johnston at the same time, and drive them to a common centre. If they attempted to unite in order to fall on Sherman, Grant could pursue, or *vice versa*. Respecting this move, Grant was most anxious, for he felt that if it should become known, the enemy would surely retreat. He was even convinced that without such move the crossing of the Roanoke by Sherman would be the signal for Lee to beat a retreat. Under no consideration did he wish Lee and Johnston to unite, notwithstanding Sherman's confidence in his ability to handle them both. The great difficulty would be to get them to stand, and without this a desultory war might be waged for another year. At

that very hour the Confederate Generals were known to be conferring respecting a junction.

It is not our purpose to follow this bold movement of Grant. Suffice it to say it was carried out according to original instructions, and amid manœuvres and battles which were hardly excelled for ingenuity and fierceness during the war. Grant was constantly in the field giving his personal supervision to all the details. He forced his lines westward to Dinwiddie; drew his right gradually after his left; fought the magnificent battle of Five Forks; forced Lee to shift to his right with his entire army; ordered the general assault on the entire Petersburg lines, which resulted in their capture; poured his troops over the Confederate entrenchments, capturing men and guns promiscuously; forced the flight of Davis and his cabinet from Richmond; drove on and captured the Confederate capital; doubled up Lee's left on his right, and sent him whirling toward the Appomattox goal, pursued, flanked, confronted.

These stirring and concluding events were sent by letter from Sunderland, Grant's headquarters, as soon as they occurred, April 3d, 1865. As Lee's only hope now seemed to be to make a westward escape and unite with Johnston, Grant was more than ever anxious regarding Sherman's movements, and after narrating the day's doings directed him to shape his operations in North Carolina so as to bear directly on his own. The intervening distance of 150 miles between the two Union armies now made no difference. In the event of Lee's escape the one would practically become a wing of the other, and the grand battle field would be shifted from Virginia to North Carolina, and from Richmond to Raleigh, or thereabouts. Said Grant: "If Lee goes beyond Danville you (Sherman) will have to take care of him with the force you have for awhile. Should he do so you will want to get on the railroad south of him, to hold it or



GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE.

destroy it, so that it will take him a long time to repair damages. Should he go to Lynchburg with his whole force and I get to Burksville there will be no special use in your going further into North Carolina. There is no contingency I can see, except my failure to take Burksville, that will make it necessary for you to move on to the Roanoke as proposed when you were here."

Here then were startling events and wise suggestions which changed the whole tenor of Sherman's previous orders. Anticipating the worst, to wit, the escape of Lee and his junction with Johnston, Sherman re-modeled his orders and prepared to move on the appointed day, April 10th, direct for Raleigh, so as to emperil the army of Johnston, known to be at Smithfield, and fully 35,000 strong. Johnston was well on his guard, and had strong forces of cavalry on his right and left, under Wheeler and Hampton, watching any movement Sherman might make. He replied to Grant's letter that he would move promptly on the 10th, and would be prepared to follow Johnston's army wherever it might go. And with his usual promptitude he was ready, moving in the direction of Smithfield by way of the Raleigh roads. He reached Smithfield on the 11th to find it abandoned by Johnston, who had beat a hasty retreat for Raleigh, burning bridges behind him. Sherman immediately began the restoration of bridges, and while at work on them, became the recipient of the welcome news that Lee had surrendered at Appomattox. He immediately incorporated the word into a special field order under date of April 12th, and promulgated it to his army as follows:

The general commanding announces to the army that he has official notice from General Grant that General Lee surrendered to him his entire army, on the 9th inst., at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia.

Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades in arms, toward whom we are marching!

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race is won, and our Government stands regenerated, after four long years of war.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

Grant had pushed his advantages so persistently, after succeeding in getting Lee out of his fortifications, as to bring him to terms at Appomattox Court-House, on April 9th 1865. This event is so momentous, and so much a part of Sherman's contributory endeavors as to be worthy of a place in his life. We therefore give a place to the conditions of surrender and to Badeau's narrative of the attendant incidents. In a spirit of humanity and in order to appease the pride of a really noble man, Grant had suggested by letter to Lee the propriety of stopping further effusion of blood. In response to this Lee asked for an interview. Grant consented, and the interview was appointed for the McLean house, at the village of Appomattox. Then says Badeau :—

"The two armies came together in a long valley at the foot of a ridge, and Appomattox was on a knoll between the lines, which could be seen for miles. The McLean house stood a little apart—a plain building with a verandah in front. Grant was met by Lee at the threshold. There was a narrow hall and a naked little parlor, containing a table and two or three chairs. Into this the generals entered, each at first accompanied only by a single aide-de-camp, but as many as twenty national officers shortly followed, among whom were Sheridan, Ord, and the members of Grant's own staff. No rebel entered the room but Lee and Colonel Marshall, who acted as his secretary.

"The two chiefs shook hands, and Lee at once began a conversation, for he appeared more unembarrassed than his vic-

tor. He, as well as his aide-de-camp, was elaborately dressed. Lee wore embroidered gauntlets and a burnished sword, the gift, it was said, of the state of Virginia, while the uniforms of Grant and those who accompanied him were soiled and worn; some had slept in their boots for days, and Grant when he started for Farmville two days before, had been riding around in camp without a sword. He had not since visited his own head-quarters, and was therefore at this moment without side-arms. The contrast was singular, and Colonel Marshall was asked how it came about that his chief and he were so fine, while the national officers had been unable to keep themselves free from the stains of battle and the road. He replied that Sheridan had come upon them suddenly a day or two before, and they were obliged to sacrifice their head-quarters train; and as they could save but one suit of clothes, each hurriedly selected the best that he had, and so it was that at this juncture Lee and his aide-de-camp were better dressed than the men who pursued them.

"Lee was tall, large in form, fine in person, handsome in feature, grave and dignified in bearing; if anything, a little too formal. There was a suggestion of effort in his deportment; something that showed he was determined to die gracefully; a hint of Cæsar muffling himself in his mantle. But apart from this there was nothing to criticise.

"Grant as usual was simple and composed, but with none of the grand air about him. No elation was visible in his manner or appearance. His voice was as calm as ever and his eye betrayed no emotion. He spoke and acted as plainly as if he were transacting an ordinary matter of business. No one would have suspected that he was about to receive the surrender of an army, or that one of the most terrible wars of modern times had been brought to a triumphant close by the quiet man without a sword who was conversing calmly, but

rather grimly, with the elaborate gentleman in grey and gold.

"The conversation at first related to the meeting of the two soldiers in earlier years in Mexico, when Grant had been a subaltern and Lee a staff officer of Scott. The rebel general, however, soon adverted to the object of the interview. 'I asked to see you, General Grant,' he said, 'to ascertain upon what terms you would receive the surrender of my army.' Grant replied that the officers and men must become prisoners of war, giving up of course all munitions, weapons and supplies, but that a parole would be accepted, binding them to go to their homes, and remain there until exchanged, or released by proper authority. Lee said that he had expected some such terms as these and made some other remark not exactly relevant. Whereupon Grant inquired: 'Do I understand, General Lee, that you accept these terms?' 'Yes,' said Lee; 'and if you will put them into writing, I will sign them.'

"Grant then sat down at the little table and wrote the following letter:

"APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE, VA., APRIL 9, 1865.

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This

will not embrace the side-arms of the officers nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

"While Grant was writing he chanced to look up at Lee, who sat nearly opposite, and at that moment noticed the glitter of his sword. The sight suggested an alteration in the terms, and he inserted the provision that officers should be allowed to retain their side-arms, horses and personal property. Lee had accepted Grant's conditions without this stipulation, and doubtless expected to surrender his sword. But this humiliation he and his gallant officers were spared. When the terms were written out, Grant handed the paper to his great antagonist, who put on his spectacles to read them. He was evidently touched by their general clemency, and especially by the interpolation which saved so much to the feelings of a soldier. He said at once that the conditions were magnanimous, and would have a very good effect upon his army.

"He next attempted to gain a little more. The horses of his cavalry and artillery, he said, were the property of the soldiers. Could these men be permitted to retain their animals? Grant said the terms would not allow this. Lee took the paper again, and, glancing over it, said: 'No. You are right. The terms do not allow it.' Whereupon Grant replied: 'I believe the war is now over, and that the surrender of this army will be followed soon by that of all the others; I know that the men, and indeed the whole South, are impoverished. I will not change the terms of the surrender, General Lee, but I will instruct my officers who receive the paroles to allow the cavalry and artillery men to

retain their horses and take them home to work their little farms.' Lee again expressed his acknowledgments, and said this kindness would have the best possible effect.

"He then wrote out his letter of surrender in these words:

"'HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

"'April 9, 1865.

"'GENERAL:—I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"'R. E. LEE, *General.*

"'*Lieutenant-general* U. S. GRANT.'

"While the conditions were being copied the various national officers were presented to Lee. He was collected and courteous, bowed to each, but offered none his hand. One—General Seth Williams—who had served closely with him in the old army, attempted to revive old memories, but Lee repelled the advances coldly. He was in no mood to remember ancient friendships, or to recall pleasantly his service in the army of which he was now a prisoner, or under that flag which he had betrayed.

"He had, however, another request to make. His men were starving; they had lived, he said, on two ears of corn a day for several days. Would Grant supply them with food? There was a train of cars at Lynchburg loaded with rations, which had come from Danville for his army. Would Grant allow these to be distributed among the prisoners? Grant, however, informed him that this train had been captured the day before by Sheridan. Thus, at the moment of his surrender, Lee was absolutely dependent for supplies upon his conqueror. Grant of course acquiesced in the request, and asked

how many rations Lee required. But the rebel general declared that he could not answer the question. He had no idea of his own strength. No return of a brigade had been made for several days. Besides those lost in battle, killed, captured, or wounded and left on the roadside, the men had been deserting and straggling by thousands. He could not tell what number he had left. All his public and private papers had been destroyed, to prevent their falling into the national hands. Grant finally inquired if twenty-five thousand rations would suffice; and Lee replied he thought that number would be enough. Twenty-five thousand, therefore, was Lee's estimate at Appomattox of the number he surrendered. Grant turned to the officer of the commissariat on his staff, and directed him to issue twenty-five thousand rations that night to the army of Northern Virginia. The order was obeyed, and before the rebels gave up their arms they were fed by their enemies.

"Lee also requested Grant to notify Meade of the surrender, so that no lives might be needlessly lost on that front; and, on account of the distance to Meade's head-quarters, two national officers were again dispatched with a rebel escort through the lines of the army of Northern Virginia, this time carrying the news of the surrender of that army.

"The formal papers were now signed; a few more words were exchanged by the men who had opposed each other so long; they again shook hands, and Lee went to the porch. The national officers followed and saluted him; and the military leader of the rebellion mounted his horse and rode off to his army, he and his soldiers prisoners of war.

"As the great rebel entered his own lines the men rushed up in crowds to their chief, breaking ranks, and struggling to touch his hand. Tears streamed down his cheeks as he said: 'Men, we have fought through the war together. I have

done the best I could for you.' They raised a few broken cheers for the leader whom they had followed in so many a fierce battle and arduous march; and the career of the army of North Virginia was ended.

"Grant also returned at once to his head-quarters' camp, now pitched almost at the front of Sheridan's command. As he approached the national lines the news had gone before him, and the firing of salutes began; but he sent at once to stop them. 'The war is over,' he said; 'the rebels are our countrymen again, and the best sign of rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the field.' But he had not yet reported the capitulation to the government, and dismounting by the road-side, he sat on a stone and called for paper and pencil. An aid-de-camp offered his order book, and at 4.30 P. M. on Sunday, the 9th of April, he announced the end of the rebellion in these words:

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, *Secretary of War, Washington:*

"General Lee surrendered the army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. "U. S. Grant, *Lieutenant-General.*"

Of his announcement of the fact of Lee's surrender in his special field order of April 12th, Sherman says:—

"Of course, this created a perfect *furore* of rejoicing, and we all regarded the war as over, for I knew well that General Johnston had no army with which to oppose mine. So that the only questions that remained were, would he surrender at Raleigh, or would he allow his army to disperse into guerrilla bands, to 'die in the last ditch,' and entail on his country an indefinite and prolonged military occupation and of consequent desolation? I knew well that Johnston's army could not be caught; the country was too open; and, without

wagons, the men could escape us, disperse and assemble again at some place agreed on, and thus the war might be prolonged indefinitely."

On April 15th Sherman entered Raleigh, which had been abandoned by the enemy, and instantly ordered his columns to push on in the direction of Charlotte and Salisbury. On the 14th he received a communication from General Johnston, which was said to have been dictated by Jefferson Davis, then a refugee, and living on a box car at Greensboro, to the following effect. It was dated April 13, 1865 :—

"The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed the relative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are willing to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and to communicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies of the United States, the request that he will take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war."

To this Sherman replied under date of April 14th, from Raleigh :—

"*General* J. E. JOHNSTON, *commanding Confederate Army.*

"GENERAL : I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to confer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column, to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the University, and expect that you will also maintain the present position of your forces until each has a notice of failure to agree.

"That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide

by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th instant, relative to our two armies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is in my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State.

"I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*"

On April 16th, Sherman received a dispatch from Johnston agreeing to meet him at a point midway between his own forces then at Hillsboro and Sherman's advance, then at Durham. As Sherman was entering the car to go to the appointed spot he received the deplorable news of the assassination of President Lincoln, on the night of the 14th. Though perturbed by the sad announcement he kept on his way, and after meeting Johnston, who was accompanied by Wade Hampton, he made it his first business to announce the assassination. Johnston was greatly distressed over the news, and gave expression to the sentiment that the event could not fail to be calamitous to the Confederacy.

The two generals then proceeded to discuss the object of the meeting. Sherman took the ground that since Lee had surrendered, Johnston could do the same with honor and propriety. He, however, refused to accept any terms addressed to the government of the United States by those who claimed to represent the civil power of the Confederacy. The matter resolved itself, therefore, into such agreement as the two generals, representing the respective armies, might conclude. Sherman was in doubt about Johnston's authority to speak

for the Confederate armies, and the interview was broken off till he could prove himself s sufficient mouthpiece.

On Sherman's return to Raleigh he issued the following field order to his army announcing the assassination of Lincoln, under date of April 17th:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, *April* 17, 1865.

The general commanding announces, with pain and sorrow, that on the evening of the 14th instant, at the theatre in Washington city, his Excellency, the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, was assassinated by one who uttered the State motto of Virginia. At the same time, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, while suffering from a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his own house, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposed fatally. It is believed, by persons capable of judging, that other high officers were designed to share the same fate. Thus it seems that our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare, begins to resort to the assassin's tools.

Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, for he knows that the great mass of the Confederate army would scorn to sanction such acts, but he believes it the legitimat econsequence of rebellion against rightful authority.

We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now be prepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and guerrillas; but woe unto the people who seek to expend their wild passions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result!

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

On the next day, April 18th, after consulting fully with his generals, and agreeing that some terms of surrender

ought to be concluded, he started for his second interview with Johnston, at the place of the former one. Johnston, meanwhile had summoned Breckinridge, Confederate Secretary of War, and Reagan, Postmaster General, and they had prepared terms which they thought would be satisfactory to the authorities they represented. When they presented them, Sherman objected to dealing with a member of the civic side of the Confederacy, but on Johnston's representation that Breckinridge was also a Major-general, and disposed to sink his office of Secretary of War in his military title, Sherman consented to hear his views. After discussion was exhausted Sherman sat down and wrote his views, which he said he would first present to President Johnson for approval, provided both armies would maintain the *status quo* till a reply could be received. Both Johnston and Beckinridge assented to Sherman's views and to the extensions of the truce. The truce did not effect Sherman's railroad building in his rear, and he took advantage of the time to complete his connections back to Raleigh.

We here reach another period in Sherman's career when he was subjected to severe criticism by the authorities at Washington, and when he ran counter to a very pronounced sentiment throughout the country. It is very difficult for a historian to reflect the exact situation, for it was complicated in the extreme and much clouded by the passions of the hour. Perhaps the best way to treat it is to let the documents bearing on it speak for themselves. This much, however, can be safely ventured in advance, that in all his acts relating to Johnston's surrender and throughout the entire controversy, it gave rise to, no reflection can be cast on Sherman's integrity ability or loyalty. He acted along the line of high and honorable conviction, and did what he conscientiously thought best for the country. Here is his announcement to Grant, or

Halleck, of his agreement with Johnston, together with a memorandum of its terms:

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C., *April* 18, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT,
or *Major-General* HALLECK, *Washington D.C.*:

GENERAL: I enclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at our conference, in the capacity of major-general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnston to carry out to their full extent the terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President to simply endorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion.

You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authority of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in such a manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands. On the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of suppressing guerrillas, which we could not expect themto do if we stripped them of all arms.

Both Generals Johnston and Breckenridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail. I know that all the men of substance South sincerely want

peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt that they will in future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States. The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders to leave Gen. Schofield here with the Tenth corps, and to march myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth and Twenty-third corps *via* Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick or Hagerstown, Maryland, there to be paid and mustered out.

The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed should be got home at work. I would like to be able to begin the march north by May 1st.

I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it is important to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well as our own.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General commanding.*

Memorandum, or Basis of Agreement, made this 18*th day of April, A. D.* 1865, *near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General William T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States in North Carolina, both present:*

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *statu quo* until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease

from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and federal authority; the number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordinance at Washington city, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and, in the meantime, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the several State governments, on their officers and legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

4. The re-establishment of all the Federal courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Excutive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

6. The executive authority of the government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

7. In general terms, the war to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge

ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major. General,*
Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina.
J. E. JOHNTSON, *General,*
Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina.

Grant promptly submitted Sherman's letter and memorandum of agreement with Johnston to the President, and immediately received the following from the Secretary of War:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, *April* 21, 1865.

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

GENERAL: The memorandum or basis agreed upon between General Sherman and General Johnston having been submitted to the President, they are disapproved. You will give notice of the disapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resume hostilities at the earliest moment.

The instructions given to you by the late President, Abraham Lincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegraph of that date, addressed to you, express substantially the views of President Andrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman. A copy is herewith appended.

The President desires that you proceed immediately to the head-quarters of Major-General Sherman, and direct operations against the enemy. Yours truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*

On the same date, he sent the response of the Secretary of War to Sherman, accompanied by the following letter:—

HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, D. C., *April* 21, 1865.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: The basis of agreement entered into between yourself and General J. E. Johnston, for the disbandment of



PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

the Southern army, and the extension of the authority of the general government over all the territory belonging to it, is received.

I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the President and Secretary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possibly be approved. My reason for these views I will give you at another time, in a more extended letter.

Your agreement touches upon questions of such vital importance that, as soon as read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War, notifying him of their receipt, and the importance of immediate action by the President; and suggested, in view of their importance, that the entire cabinet be called together, that all might give an expression of their opinions upon the matter. The result was a disapproval by the President of the basis laid down; a disapproval of the negotiations altogether—except for the surrender of the army commanded by General Johnston, and directions to me to notify you of this decision. I cannot do so better than by sending you the enclosed copy of a dispatch (penned by the late President, though signed by the Secretary of War) in answer to me, on sending a letter received from General Lee, proposing to meet me for the purpose of submitting the question of peace to a convention of officers.

Please notify General Johnston immediately on receipt of this and resume hostilities against his army at the earliest moment you can, acting in good faith.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

The War Department, in one of its official bulletins, which were published at the time, made the following public announcement:—

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *April* 22, 1865.

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from

General Sherman. An agreement for the suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been entered into on the 18th inst., by General Sherman, with the rebel General Johnston. Brigadier-General Breckenridge was present at the conference.

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every member of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructions given by the late President, in the following telegram which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself at the Capitol, on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had requested an interview or conference, to make an arrangement for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a letter to Davis and to the rebel congress. General Grant's telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant.

The following is President Lincoln's dispatch to Grant, which became the basis of the terms upon which Lee surrendered :—

WASHINGTON, *March* 3, 1865, 12 P. M.

"*Lieutenant-General* GRANT:

"The President directs me to say to you that he wishes

you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions.

"Meantime, you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWARD M. STANTON,
Secretary of War."

Meanwhile a second bulletin relating to the delicate subject appeared from the War Department. It ran as follows:—

The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from Salisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis to escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder from the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations.

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It is stated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specie taken south by Jeff Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with General Sherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston's negotiations look to this end."

After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for North Carolina, to direct operations against Johnson's army.

EDWARD M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

Simultaneously with the appearance of the above bulletin, the following reasons for rejecting Sherman's memorandum of agreement was issued to the public, not as constituting an official document, yet with the sanction of the authorities :—

1st. It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and on its face, shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrangement.

2d. It was a practical acknowledgment of the rebel government.

3rd. It undertook to re-establish rebel State governments, that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousand loyal lives and immense treasure, and placed arms and munitions of war in the hands of rebels at their respective capitals, which might be used, as soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue loyal States.

4th. By the restoration of rebel authority in these respective States, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery.

5th. It might furnish a ground of responsibility on the part of the Federal government to pay the rebel debt; and certainly subject loyal citizens of rebel States to debts contracted by rebels in the name of the State.

6th. It puts in dispute the existence of loyal State governments, and the new State of West Virginia, which had been recognized by every department of the United States government.

7th. It practically abolished confiscation laws, and released rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

8th. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition.

9th. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but relieved rebels from the presence of our victorious armies, and left them in a condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the United States government and subdue the loyal states, whenever their strength was recruited, and any opportunity should offer.

On April 24, 1865, General Grant arrived in Raleigh, where he met Sherman, who handed him the following letter:—

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, *April* 25, 1865.

"*Lieutenant-General* U. S. GRANT, *present:*

"GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of April 21st, with enclosures yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, as you must have observed that I held the military control so as to adapt it to any phase the case might assume.

"It is but just I should record the fact, that I made my terms with General Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you extended to the army of General Lee, at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th, and the seeming policy of our government, as evinced by the call of the Virginia legislature and Governor back to Richmond, under yours and President Lincoln's very eyes.

"It now appears this last act was done, without any consultation with you or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to a previous policy, well considered.

"I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our government, but would shun it as something not to my liking; but occasions do arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on military commanders not in immediate communication with the proper authority. It is probable that the

terms signed by General Johnston and myself were not clear enough on the point, well understood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to any parties outside the officers and men of the Confederate armies, which could easily have been remedied.

"No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of an antagonist was ever made without 'terms,' and these always define the military status of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the officers and men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so long as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence.

"I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition of the state governments in actual existence, but will merely state my conclusions, to await the solution of the future.

"Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment the so-called Confederate government, or makes us liable for its debts or acts.

"The laws and acts done by the several states during the period are void, because done without the oath prescribed by our Constitution of the United States, which is a 'condition precedent.'

"We have a right to use any sort of machinery to produce military results; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to use the civil governments in actual existence as a means to an end. I do believe we could and can use the present state governments lawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means to produce the object desired, viz.: entire and complete submission to the lawful authority of the United States.

"As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and can in no manner of way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as I can, I will use my influence that rebels shall

suffer all the personal punishment prescribed by the law, as also the civil liabilities arising from their past acts.

"What we now want is the new form of law by which common men may regain the positions of industry, so long disturbed by the war.

"I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse, and, instead of dealing with six or seven states, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson and others, who know not and care not for danger and its consequences.

"I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"*Major-General commanding.*"

As negotiations on the lines suggested by Sherman were now practically off, he prepared the two following messages to Johnston and submitted them to Grant for approval. On receiving his approval, they were sent to Johnston by courier.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C., *April* 24, 1865—6 A. M.

General JOHNSTON, *commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro:*

You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities agreed to between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this is received at your lines, under the first of the articles of agreement. W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

The second and most important message ran:—

"I have replies from Washington to my communication of April 18th. I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, and not to attempt civil negotiations. *I therefore demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given to General Lee at Appomattox, April 9th instant, purely and simply.*"

Not knowing what Johnston, who was evidently ably advised and coached by the members of the Confederate cabinet, might do under the radically changed circumstances, Sherman issued orders to his army to resume the pursuit of Johnston at the end of the forty-eight hours' truce. Gilmore at Hilton Head was notified to the same effect, and also Wilson, whose cavalry division was then at or near Macon.

On the next day Sherman sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War:

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, N. C., *April* 25, 1865.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War, Washington:*

DEAR SIR: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21st to General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on which General Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, on condition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in embracing in a military convention any civil matters; but, unfortunately, such is the nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, and I understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of the country demanded military success, and would warrant a little bending to policy.

When I had my conference with General Johnston, I had the public examples before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, and General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia legislature to assemble at Richmond.

I still believe the general government of the United States has made a mistake; but that is none of my business—mine is a different task; and I had flattered myself that, by four years of patient, unremitting, and successful labor, I deserved no reminder such as is contained in the last paragraph of

your letter to General Grant. You may assure the President that I heed his suggestion. I am, truly etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.

On this date, April 25, Sherman received word from Johnston to the effect that he would meet him at Bennett's house on the 26th. Grant advised Sherman to go and meet him and to propose the same terms as Lee had acceded to at Appomattox. Sherman went and found Johnston willing to sign the terms, which were then duly acknowledged and promulgated as follows:—

Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 26th day of April, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station, North Carolina, between General Joseph E. Johnston, Commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding the United States Army, in North Carolina.

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston's command shall cease.

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro' and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States army.

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the government of the United States, until properly released from this obligation.

The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the

United States authorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General,*
Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON, *General,*
Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina.

APPROVED:—U. S. GRANT, *Lieutenant-General.*

Immediate steps were taken to carry out the terms of the above agreement of surrender. This work devolved upon Schofield, while Sherman prepared to go to Savannah to prepare a base of supplies for Wilson, who was pushing his cavalry through Georgia. But on the eve of his departure he was made acquainted, through the newspapers, with the bulletin of the War Department and the ten reasons given for rejecting his first memorandum of agreement with Johnston. Its appearance in print highly incensed Sherman, and that especially since the War Department had failed to notify him in advance of the purpose of the Administration to limit all negotiations to purely military matters. Stung by the seeming unfairness of the publication and by the inuendoes it contained, Sherman sat down and wrote the following to Grant, under date of April 28th, 1865. It was sent to his Chief with the demand that it also be made public, so as to counteract the injurious effects of the War Department's bulletin:

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, *April* 28, 1865.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, *General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:*

GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the "New York *Times*" of the 24th, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the Secre-

tary of War, Hon. E. M. Stanton, which is grouped in such a way as to give the public very erroneous impressions. It embraces a copy of the basis of agreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, with comments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or three years hence, after the Government has experimented a little more in the machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of the vast country known as the "South."

In the mean time, however, I did think that my rank (if not past services) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of War would keep secret what was communicated for the use of none but the cabinet, until further inquiry could be made, instead of giving publicity to it along with documents which I never saw, and drawing therefrom inferences wide of the truth. I never saw or had furnished me a copy of President Lincoln's dispatch to you of the 3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey to me its substance, or any thing like it. On the contrary, I had seen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature, made in Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any other official hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculated to allay the fears of the people of the South, after the destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them without any government whatever.

We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simply impossible for our military power to reach all the masses of their unhappy country.

I confess I did not desire to drive General Johnston's army into bands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable only of infinite mischief. But you saw, on your arrival here, that I had my army so disposed that his escape was only possible in a disorganized shape; and as you did not choose to "direct military operations in this quarter," I

inferred that you were satisfied with the military situation; at all events, the instant I learned what was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I acted in such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johnston's whole army on the same terms which you had prescribed to General Lee's army, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power.

Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman were likely to result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe," is in deep error. General Stoneman was not at "Salisbury," but had gone back to "Statesville." Davis was between us, and therefore Stoneman was beyond him. By turning toward me he was approaching Davis, and, had he joined me as ordered, I would have had a mounted force greatly needed for Davis's capture, and for other purposes. Even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and as my official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in that regard.

As the editor of the *Times* has (it may be) logically and fairly drawn from this singular document the conclusion that I am insubordinate, I can only deny the intention.

I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though many and many a time have I risked my life, health and reputation in obeying orders, or even hints, to execute plans and purposes, not to my liking. It is not fair to hold from me the plans and policy of government (if any there be) and expect me to guess at them; for facts and events appear quite different from different standpoints. For four years I have been in camp dealing with soldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this

controversy, and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other conclusion. They will learn with pain and amazement that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting in common sense; that I, who for four years have labored day and night, winter and summer; who have brought an army of seventy thousand men in magnificent condition across a country hitherto deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted, on the day appointed, have brought discredit on our government! I do not wish to boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy of being consulted before publishing to the world a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then accompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to be let loose upon me. It is true that non-combatants, men who sleep in comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines, are better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a newspaper, hardly hear from our families, or stop long enough to draw our pay. I envy not the task of "reconstruction," and am delighted that the Secretary of War has relieved me of it.

As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of this army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived at a different conclusion, from that of the Secretary of War. I will therefore go on to execute your orders to the conclusion, and, when done, will with intense satisfaction leave to the civil authorities the execution of the task of which they seem so jealous. But, as an honest man and a soldier, I invite them to go back to Nashville, for they will see some things and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy. With sincere respect,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General commanding.

We conclude the chapter of incidents which clustered

around Johnson's surrender with an extract from Captain Badeau's Military History of Grant. He says :—"The country and posterity will doubtless always hold that Sherman erred in judgment at this crisis. But it was from the generous impulse of a soldier, who sees his enemy defeated and in his power, and would blush to strike a fallen foe. He doubtless also felt a noble ambition to avert any further misery from the land that had suffered so much, and to restore at once to a united country the long absent benefits of peace. He had the knowledge of Grant's clemency at Appomattox, and was aware of the charity which had animated Lincoln's great heart. Everything conspired to make him accede too readily to the specious propositions by means of which the wily Confederates sought still to secure all they had lost by war. The frank and outspoken soldier was no match in diplomatic art for those who had conspired to betray their country, and piloted the sinking cause of the rebellion through desperate and stormy years. He did not perceive the object of the skilful machinations which first suggested the presence of a cabinet officer, and then secured amnesty for the rebel government. He was looking so intently to the respite from war that the precautions of politicians and statesmen were neglected. But the mistake outside of his profession left no blot on his career as a soldier or reputation as a patriot, and never for one moment disturbed his relations with his chief and friend."

Sherman's own resentment was particularly intense at the time, and it required all of Grant's tact to prevent an open rupture between Sherman and Stanton. Indeed years passed before his sense of injustice was allayed. He wrote several private letters to Grant, in which he expressed his burning indignation at the Secretary of War. These letters were not made public till long years afterward, and then

only with Sherman's consent, and with his written endorsement upon them, in which he said the facts and his convictions remained the same, and that the only change a lapse of years had suggested was a less hasty and more cautious expressions of his thoughts.


Some years after the end of the rebellion, Sherman published a chapter on the "Military Lessons of the War" as a conclusion to his Memoirs. We make a few extracts from it, as a fitting close to that field career whence those lessons were drawn :

"That civil war, by reason of the existence of slavery, was apprehended by most of the leading statesmen of the half century preceding its outbreak, is a matter of notoriety. General Scott told me on my arrival at New York, as early as 1850, that the country was on the eve of civil war; and the Southern politicians openly asserted that it was their purpose to accept as a *casus belli* the election of General Fremont in 1856; but, fortunately or unfortunately, he was beaten by Mr. Buchanan, which simply postponed its occurrence for four years. Mr. Seward had also publicly declared that no government could possibly exist half slave and half free; yet the Government made no military preparation, and the Northern people generally paid no attention, took no warning of its coming, and would not realize its existence till Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries of artillery, handled by declared enemies, from the surrounding islands and from the city of Charleston.

"General Bragg, who certainly was a man of intelligence, and who, in early life, ridiculed a thousand times, in my hearing, the threats of the people of South Carolina to secede from the Federal Union, said to me in New Orleans, in February, 1861, that he was convinced that the feeling between the slave and free States had become so embittered that it was

better to part in peace; better to part anyhow; and, as a separation was inevitable, that the South should begin at once, because the possibility of a successful effort was yearly lessened by the rapid and increasing inequality between the two sections, from the fact that all the European immigrants were coming to the Northern States and Territories, and none to the Southern.

"The slave population in 1860 was near four millions, and the money value thereof not far from twenty-five hundred million dollars. Now, ignoring the moral side of the question, a cause that endangered so vast a moneyed interest was an adequate cause of anxiety and preparation, and the Northern leaders surely ought to have foreseen the danger and prepared for it. After the election of Mr. Lincoln in 1860, there was no concealment of the declaration and preparation for war in the South. In Louisiana, as I have related, men were openly enlisted, officers were appointed, and war was actually begun, in January, 1861. The forts at the mouth of the Mississippi were seized, and occupied by garrisons that hauled down the United States flag and hoisted that of the State. The United States Arsenal at Baton Rouge was captured by New Orleans militia, its garrison ignominiously sent off, and the contents of the arsenal distributed. These were as much acts of war as was the subsequent firing on Fort Sumter, yet no public notice was taken thereof; and when, months afteward, I came North, I found not one single sign of preparation. It was for this reason, somewhat, that the people of the South became convinced that those of the North were pusillanimous and cowardly, and the Southern leaders were thereby enabled to commit their people to the war, nominally in defense of their slave property. Up to the hour of the firing on Fort Sumter, in April, 1861, it does seem to me that our public men, our politicians, were blamable for not sounding the note of alarm.



GEN'L JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

"Then, when war was actually begun, it was by a call for seventy-five thousand "ninety-day" men, I suppose to fulfill Mr. Seward's prophecy that the war would last but ninety days.

"The earlier steps by our political government were extremely wavering and weak, for which an excuse can be found in the fact that many of the Southern representatives remained in Congress, sharing in the public councils and influencing legislation. But as soon as Mr. Lincoln was installed, there was no longer any reason why Congress and the cabinet should have hesitated. They should have measured the cause, provided the means, and left the Executive to apply the remedy.

"At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, viz., March 4, 1861, the Regular Army, by law, consisted of two regiments of dragoons, two regiments of cavalry, one regiment of mounted rifles, four regiments of artillery and ten regiments of infantry, admitting of an aggregate strength of thirteen thousand and twenty-four officers and men. On the subsequent 4th of May, the President, by his own orders (afterward sanctioned by Congress), added a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of artillery, and eight regiments of infantry, which, with the former army, admitted of a strength of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-three; but at no time during the war did the Regular Army attain a strength of twenty-five thousand men.

"To the new regiments of infantry was given an organization differing from any that had heretofore prevailed in this country—of three battalions of eight companies each; but at no time did more than one of these regiments attain its full standard; nor in the vast army of volunteers that was raised during the war were any of the regiments of infantry formed on the three battalion system, but these were universally

single battalions of ten companies: so that, on the reorganization of the Regular Army at the close of the war, Congress adopted the form of twelve companies for the regiments of cavalry and artillery, and that of ten companies for the infantry, which is the present standard.

"The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle; should have a full and perfect staff, and everything requisite for separate action, ready at all times to be detached and sent off for any nature of service. The general in command should have the rank of lieutenant-general, and should be, by experience and education, equal to anything in war. Habitually with us he was a major-general, specially selected and assigned to the command by an order of the President —constituting in fact a separate grade.

"The division is the unit of administration, and is the legitimate command of a major-general.

"The brigade is the next subdivison, and is commanded by a brigadier-general.

"The regiment is the family. The colonel, as the father, should have a personal acquaintance with every officer and man, and should instill a feeling of pride and affection for himself, so that his officers and men would naturally look to him for personal advice and instruction. In war the regiment should never be subdivided, but should always be maintained entire. In peace this is impossible.

"The company is the true unit of discipline, and the captain is the company. A good captain makes a good company, and he should have the power to reward as well as punish. The fact that soldiers would naturally like to have a good fellow for their captain is the best reason why he should be appointed by the colonel or by some superior authority, instead of being elected by the men.

"No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action;

and the power must come from above, not from below: the President usually delegates his power to the commander-in-chief, and he to the next, and so on down to the lowest actual commander of troops, however small the detachment. No matter how troops come together, when once united, the highest officer in rank is held responsible, and should be consequently armed with the fullest power of the Executive, subject only to law and existing orders.

"The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Point have in the past provided, and doubtless will in the future provide an ample supply of good officers for future wars; but should their numbers be insufficient, we can always safely rely on the great number of young men of education and force of character throughout the country, to supplement them. At the close of our civil war, lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals, as well as staff officers, were from civil life; but I cannot recall any of the most successful who did not express a regret that he had not received in early life instruction in the elementary principles of the art of war, instead of being forced to acquire this knowledge in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war.

But the real difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain an adequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost every system known to modern nations, all with more or less success—voluntary enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes—and I think that all officers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men who voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best, better than the conscript, and far better than the bought substitute.

"The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, in-

stead of being filled up at the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the best non-commissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the old experienced battallions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations. I believe with the volunteers this matter was left to the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept her regiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generally filled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that we estimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade.

"On a road, marching by the flank, it would be considered "good order" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps of thirty thousand men would extend six miles, but with the average trains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that it would draw out to ten miles. On a long and regular march the divisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, the leading division should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march at the rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a-half miles an hour, so as to reach camp by noon. Even then the rear divisions and trains will hardly reach camp much before night.

"The 'feeding' of an army is a matter of the most vital importance, and demands the earliest attention of the general intrusted with a campaign. To be strong, healthy and capable of the largest measure of physical effort, the soldier needs about three pounds gross of food per day, aud the horse or mule about twenty pounds. When a general first estimates the quantity of food and forage needed for an army of fifty or one hundred thousand men, he is apt to be dismayed, and here a good staff is indispensable, though the general cannot throw off on them the responsibility. He must give the subject his personal attention, for the army reposes in him alone,

and should never doubt the fact that their existence overrides in importance all other considerations.

"On long marches the artillery and wagon-trains should always have the right of way, and the troops should improvise roads to one side, unless forced to use a bridge in common, and all trains should have escorts to protect them, and to assist them in bad places. To this end, there is nothing like actual experience, only, unless the officers in command give the subject their personal attention, they will find their wagon-trains loaded down with tents, personal baggage, and even the arms and knapsacks of the escort. Each soldier should, if not actually 'sick or wounded,' carry his musket and equipments containing from forty to sixty rounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, and an extra pair of pants, socks and drawers, in the form of a scarf, worn from the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack, and in his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt and coffee.

"Where an army is near one of our many large navigable rivers, or has the safe use of a railway, it can usually be supplied with the full army ration, which is by far the best furnished to any army in America or Europe; but when it is compelled to operate away from such a base, and is dependent on its own train of wagons, the commanding officer must exercise a wise discretion in the selection of his stores. In my opinion there is no better food for man than beef-cattle driven on the hoof, issued liberally, with salt, bacon, and bread. Coffee has also become almost indispensable, though many substitutes were found for it, such as Indian-corn, roasted, ground, and boiled as coffee; the sweet-potato, and the seed of the okraplant prepared in the same way.

"The sick, wounded, and dead of an army are the subjects of the greatest possible anxiety, and add an immense amount

of labor to the well men. Each regiment in an active campaign should have a surgeon and two assistants always close at hand, and each brigade and division should have an experienced surgeon as a medical director. The great majority of wounds and of sickness should be treated by the regimental surgeon, on the ground, under the eye of the colonel. As few should be sent to the brigade or division hospital as possible, for the men always receive better care with their own regiment than with strangers, and as a rule the cure is more certain; but when men receive disabling wounds, or have sickness likely to become permanent, the sooner they go far to the rear the better for all. The tent or the shelter of a tree is a better hospital than a house, whose walls absorb fetid and poisonous emanations, and then give them back to the atmosphere. To men accustomed to the open air, who live on the plainest food, wounds seem to give less pain, and are attended with less danger to life than to ordinary soldiers in barracks.

"Wonnds which, in 1861, would have sent a man to the hospital for months, in 1865 were regarded as mere scratches, rather the subject of a joke than of sorrow. To new soldiers the sight of blood and death always has a sickening effect, but soon men become accustomed to it, and I have heard them exclaim on seeing a dead comrade borne to the rear, 'Well, Bill has turned up *his* toes to the daises.' Of course, during a skirmish or battle, armed men should *never* leave their ranks to attend a dead or wounded comrade—this should be seen to in advance by the colonel, who should designate his musicians or company cooks as hospital attendants, with a white rag on their arm to indicate their office. A wounded man should go himself (if able) to the surgeon near at hand, or, if he need help, he should receive *it* from one of the attendants and not a comrade. It is wonderful how soon the men accustom

themselves to these simple rules. In great battles these matters call for a more enlarged attention, and then it becomes the duty of the division general to see that proper stretchers and field-hospitals are ready for the wounded, and trenches are dug for the dead. There should be no real neglect of the dead, because it has a bad effect on the living; for each soldier values himself and comrade as highly as though he were living in a good house at home.

"The regimental chaplain, if any, usually attends the burials from the hospital, should make notes and communicate details to the captain of the company, and to the family at home. Of course it is usually impossible to mark the grave with names, dates, etc., and consequently the names of the 'unknown' in our national cemeteries equal about one-half of all the dead.

"Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manœuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken countries the 'defensive' had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground to their immediate front; whereas we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and withering fire. Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought individually in every possible style, more frequenty with the musket clubbed than with the

bayonet, and in some instances the men clinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together. Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not always take full advantage of a victory; the true reason was, that habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not realize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was already miles away and was again intrenched, having left a mere skirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to the new position.

"Our war was fought with the muzzle-loading rifle. Toward the close I had one brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech-loading 'Spencer's'; the cavalry generally had breech-loading carbines, 'Spencer's' and 'Sharp's,' both of which were good arms.

"The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in the art and practice of war will be to increase the amount of ammunition to be expended, and necessarily to be carried along; to still further 'thin out' the lines of attack, and to reduce battles to short, quick, decisive conflicts. It does not in the least affect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfect organization, drill and discipline. The companies and battalions will be more dispersed, and the men will be less under the immediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order of intelligence and courage on the part of the individual soldier will be an element of strength.

"When a regiment is deployed as skirmishers, and crosses an open field or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward from tree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good general alignment, it gives great confidence to the men themselves, for they always keep their eyes well to the right and left, and watch their comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or too long to a comfortable log, it often stops the line and defeats the whole object. Therefore, the more we improve the fire-arm the more will be the neces-

sity for good organization, good discipline and intelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer. There is, of course, such a thing as individual courage, which has a value in war, but familiarity with danger, experience in war and its common attendants, and personal habit, are equally valuable traits, and these are the qualities with which we usually have to deal in war.

"Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values or proportions of the several arms of service; infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineers. If any thing, the infantry has been increased in value. The danger of cavalry attempting to charge infantry armed with breech-loading rifles was fully illustrated at Sedan, and with us very frequently. So improbable has such a thing become that we have omitted the infantry-square from our recent tactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry, and as auxiliary to infantry, will always be valuable, while all great wars will, as heretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry. Artillery is more valuable with new and inexperienced troops than with veterans. In the early stages of the war the field-guns often bore the proportion of six to a thousand men; but toward the close of the war one gun, or at most two, to a thousand men, was deemed enough. Sieges, such as characterized the wars of the last century, are too slow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recently almost ignored them altogether, penetrated France between the forts, and left a superior force "in observation," to watch the garrison and accept its surrender when the greater events of the war ahead made further resistance useless: but earth-forts, and especially field-works, will hereafter play an important part in wars, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one in check for a *time*, and time is a most valuable element in all wars. It was one of Prof. Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful in war as the musket,

and to this I will add the axe. The habit of intrenching certainly does have the effect of making new troops timid. When a line of battle is once covered by a good parapet, made by the engineers or by the labor of the men themselves, it does require an effort to make them leave it in the face of danger; but when the enemy is intrenched, it becomes absolutely necessary to permit each brigade and division of the troops immediately opposed to throw up a corresponding trench for their own protection in case of a sudden sally.

"In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it is much easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time of peace. Crimes and breaches of discipline are much less frequent, and the necessity for courts-martial far less. The captain can usually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonel *should* always. The field-officers' court is the best form for war, viz., one of the field-officers—the lieutenant-colonel or major—can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonel should execute it. Of course, there are statutory offenses which demand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by the division or corps commander; but the presence of one of our regular civilian judge advocates in an army in the field would be a first-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief. Too many courts-martial in any command are evidence of poor discipline and inefficient officers.

"For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a large space of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, though habitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies, answer every purpose. I have little faith in the signal service by flags and torches, though we always used them; because, almost invariably when they were most needed, the view was cut off by intervening trees, or by mists and fogs. The value of the magnetic telegraph in war

cannot be exaggerated, as was illustrated by the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia and Georgia during 1864. Hardly a day intervened when General Grant did not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteen hundred miles away as the wires ran. So on the field a thin insulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to tree for six or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seen operators so skillful, that by cutting the wire they would receive a message with their tongues from a distant station.

"The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as much as, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign would simply have been impossible without the use of the railroads from Louisville to Nashville—one hundred and eighty-five miles—from Nashville to Chattanooga—one hundred and fifty-one miles—and from Chattanooga to Atlanta—one hundred and thirty-seven miles. Every mile of this 'single track' was so delicate, that one could in a minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usually carried along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strong guards and garrison at each important bridge or trestle—the destruction of which would have necessitated time for rebuilding. For the protection of a bridge, one or two log block-houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and a small infantry guard usually sufficed. The block-house had a small parapet and a ditch about it, and the roof was made shot-proof by earth piled on.

"For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre of action to another by the rear—the cases of the tranfer of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps—General Hooker, twenty-three thousand men—from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundred and ninty-two miles in seven days, in the fall of

1863; and that of the Army of the Ohio—Generald Schofield, fifteen thousand men—from the valley of the Tennessee to Washington, fourteen hundred miles in eleven days *en route* to North Carolina in January, 1865, are the best examples of which I have any knowledge, and reference to these is made in the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, dated November 22, 1865.

"Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually employed in supervising the construction of forts or field works of a nature more permanent than the lines used by the troops in motion, and in repairing roads and making bridges. I had several regiments of this kind that were most useful, but as a rule we used the infantry, or employed parties of freedmen, who worked on the trenches at night while the soldiers slept, and these in turn rested by day.

"For the passage of rivers, each army corps had a pontoon train, with a detachment of engineers, and, on reaching a river, the leading infantry division was charged with the labor of putting it down. Generally the single pontoon train could provide for nine hundred feet of bridge, which sufficed; but when the rivers were very wide, two such trains would be brought together, or the single train was supplemented by a trestle bridge or bridges made on crib work, out of timber found near the place. The pontoons in general use were skeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back and constitute a wagon body. In this same wagon were carried the cotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due proportion of the balks, chesses, and lashings. All the troops became very familiar with their mechanism and use, and we were rarely delayed by reason of a river, however broad.

"In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if any discoveries or improvements were made during our war,

or in any of the modern wars in Europe. These precautions vary with the nature of the country and the situation of each army. When advancing or retreating in line of battle, the usual skirmish-line constitutes the picket-line, and may have "reserves," but usually the main line of battle constitutes the reserve.

"For flank-guards and rear-guards, one or more companies should be detached under their own officers, instead of making up the guard by detailing men from the several companies.

"For regimental or camp guards, the details should be made according to existing army regulations; and all the guards should be posted early in the evening, so as to afford each sentinel or vedette a chance to study his ground before it becomes too dark.

In like manner as to the staff. The more intimately it comes into contact with the troops, the more useful and valuable it becomes. The almost entire separation of the staff from the line, as now practised by us, and hitherto by the French, has proved mischievous, and the great retinues of staff-officers with which some of our earlier generals began the war were simply ridiculous. A bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a small staff implies activity and concentration of purpose. The smallness of General Grant's staff throughout the civil war forms the best model for future imitation. So of tents, officers' furniture, etc., etc. In real war these should all be discarded, and an army is efficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of its *impedimenta.* Tents should be ommitted altogether, save one to a regiment for an office, and a few for the division hospital. Officers should be content with a tent fly, improvising poles and shelter out of bushes. The *tente d'abri,* or shelter-tent, car-

ried by the soldier himself, is all-sufficient. Officers should never seek for houses, but share the condition of their men.

"In this country, as in France, Congress controls the great questions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation and government of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leaving to the President to execute and apply these laws, especially the harder task of limiting the expenditure of public money to the amount of the annual appropriations. The executive power is further subdivided into seven great departments, and to the Secretary of War is confided the general care of the military establishment, and his powers are further subdivided into ten distinct and separate bureaus.

"The chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate orders of the Secretary of War, who, through them, in fact commands the army from "his office," but cannot do so "in the field"—an absurdity in military if not civil law.

"The subordinates of these staff corps and departments are selected and chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and too commonly construe themselves into the *elite*, as made of better clay than the common soldier. Thus they separate themselves more and more from their comrades of the line, and in process of time realize the condition of that old officer of artillery who thought the army would be a delightful place for a gentleman if it were not for the d——d soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the young lord in "Henry IV.," who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that 'but for those vile guns he would himself have been a soldier.' This is all wrong; utterly at variance with our democratic form of government and of universal experience; and now that the French, from whom we had copied the system, have utterly "proscribed" it, I hope that our Congress will follow suit. I admit, in the fullest force, the strength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to the military

in time of peace; that the army should be at all times subject to the direct control of Congress; and I assert that, from the formation of our government to the present day, the Regular Army has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority; but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so very small, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized and governed on true military principles, and that in time of peace we should preserve the "habits and usages of war," so that, when war does come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace, confusion and disorder of 1861.


"The commanding officers of divisions, departments and posts should have the amplest powers, not only to command their troops, but all the stores designed for their use, and the officers of the staff nscessary to administer them within the area of their command; and then with fairness they could be held to the most perfect responsibility. The President and Secretary of War can command the army quite as well through these generals as through the subordinate staff officers. Of course, the Secretary would, as now, distribute the funds according to the appropriation bills, and reserve to himself the absolute control and supervision of the larger arsenals and depots of supply. The error lies in the law, or in the judicial interpretation thereof, and no code of army regulations can be made that meets the case until Congress, like the French Corps Legislatif, utterly annihilates and 'proscribes' the old law and the system which has grown up under it.

"I believe that every general who has handled armies in battle must recall from his own experience the intensity of thought on some similar occasion, when by a single command he had given the finishing stroke to some complicated action; but to me recurs another thought that is worthy of record,

and may encourage others who are to follow us in our profession. I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but I feared that some calamity had happened at the front—apparent confusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead and maimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a general apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete—perfect order, men and horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketry clattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close, there reigned a general feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle. So also on the march, the head of a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternately halting and then rushing forward to close up the gap; and all sorts of rumors, especially the worst, float back to the rear. Old troops invariably deem it a special privilege to be in the front —to be at the 'head of column'—because experience has taught them that it is the easiest and most comfortable place, and danger only adds zest and stimulus to this fact.

"The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position or battery, under fire, without the privilege of returning it; or to guard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out of danger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corps which is too busy ahead to care for its own.

"To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution of some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war—a grim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory the strongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy's line; to break through with vehe-



GENERAL WM. T. SHERMAN. (1890.)

mence and thus lead to victory ; or to discover some key-point and hold it with tenacity ; or to do some other distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real cause of success. These all become matters that are never forgotten. Other great difficulties, experienced by every general, are to measure truly the thousand-and-one reports that come to him in the midst of conflict ; to preserve a clear and well-defined purpose at every instant of time, and to cause all efforts to converge to that end.

" To do these things he must know perfectly the strength and quality of each part of his own army, as well as that of his oponent, and must be where he can personally see and observe with his own eyes, and judge with his own mind. No man can properly command an army from the rear, he must be 'at its front ;" and when a detachment is made, the commander thereof should be informed of the object to be accomplished, and left as free as possible to execute it in his own way ; and when an army is divided up into several parts, the tuperior should always attend that one which he regrads as most important.

" Lastly, mail facilities should be kept up with an army if possible, that officers and men may receive and send letters to their friends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assistance to discipline. Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule, are mischievous. They are the world's gossips, pick up and retail the camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of some general, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than with his own corps or division. They are also tempted to prophesy events and state facts which, to an enemy reveal a purpose in time to guard against it. Moreover, they are always bound to see facts colored by the partisan or political character of their own patrons, and hus bri ng army officers into the political controversies of the

day, which are always mischievous and wrong. Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it is doubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his own safety. Time and moderation must bring a just solution to this modern difficulty."

CHAPTER XVI.

IN TIME OF PEACE.

It is unnecessary to mention here the long line of surrenders of Confederate forces which followed the surrender of Lee to Grant and of Johnston to Sherman, and ushered in the reign of peace. The aggregate of prisoners surrendered under the capitulation of Johnston embraces his army of 36,817 men, at Greensboro, N. C., and 52,453 scattered in Georgia and Florida—total, 89,270. On April 29th, Sherman started on his Savannah trip, and saw to the preparations for the arrival of Wilson's troopers. On May 2d, he began his return journey, and arrived at Fortress Monroe on May 8th, where he telegraphed to Grant for orders. His army had arrived at Manchester, on its northward march, and when orders came, they were to the effect that the march should be continued to Alexandria, Va. By May 20th, all of Sherman's army was in camp about Alexandria. On the next day he visited Washington and accepted an invitation to witness the grand and final review of the Army of the Potomac which had been appointed for May 23, 1865. The review of his own army was appointed for the next day, May 24th. It was a magnificent day, and punctually at 9 A. M., Sherman and his staff rode down Pennsylvania Avenue, followed by Logan at the head of the Fifteenth corps. When the grand reviewing stand was reached Sherman took his position by the side of the President, and witnessed the passage of his veterans for six hours and a half. His four corps, Fifteenth, Seven-

teenth, Twentieth and Fourteenth, sixty-five thousand strong, moved with the regularity of clock-work during all these hours, and concluded their two-thousand miles' march in the capital and amid the plaudits of the nation. Sherman was justly proud of the appearance of his men, and pronounced his army the best in existence.

After this fitting conclusion to his many and long campaigns, Sherman issued the following eloquent and characteristic order of dismissal to his troops, supplementing it with a tabular statement of their marches :—

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, WASHINGTON, D. C., *May* 30, 1865.

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and Georgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to your homes, and others will be retained in military service till further orders.

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civil world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty.

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate history, yet bound by one common cause—the union of our country, and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. There is no need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-Face Mountain and Buzzard-Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind.

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but dashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to the Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the

heats of summer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on a single road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christmas found us at Savannah.

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a march which, for peril, labor and results, will compare with any ever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks of the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles of Averysboro' and Bentonville, we once more came out of the wilderness, to meet our friends at Goldsboro. Even then we paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, again pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing for peace, instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold, had checked us; but when he, who had fought us hard and persistently, offered submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in his surrender.

How far the operations of this army contributed to the final overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done all that men could do has been admitted by those

in authority, and we have a right to join in the universla joy that fills our land because the war is *over*, and our government stands vindicated before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies and navy of the United States.

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind you that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and that the same work and discipline are equally important in the future. To such as go home, he will only say that our favored country is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil and productions, that every man may find a home and occupation suited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatience sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. You will be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to the temptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment.

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good citizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our country, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its old armor, and come forth to defend and maintain the government of our inheritance.

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,

L. M. DAYTON, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

General Sherman continued in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi for nearly a year after the close of the war with head-quarters at St. Louis. His duties were, of course, not arduous, yet they were at times, manifold and tantalizing, owing to the confusion of political and military matters.

On July 25th 1866 Lieutenant-General Grant was promoted to the grade of General of the Army, and Major-General Sherman was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, the place made vacant by Grant's promotion. He still con-

tinued to reside in St. Louis, in enjoyment of his honors, and amid a life of comparative freedom from harassing details of office.

In 1869, when Grant was elected President, the specially created rank of General was conferred on Sherman, who now moved his head-quarters to Washington, where he added the highest social distinction to his military fame, and developed to the fullest those traits which may be said to have rounded out and rendered unique his life in time of peace. The intellectual advantage that he had over his associates was in his readiness of expression. He was an easy and elegant writer upon almost any topic of the day. He was also a ready speaker. He had a directness of style and a blunt eloquence which always captivated an audience. He was so direct and so honest as to produce with the simplest phrases the profoundest impression. He was one of the most upright men. He was patriotic to the verge of passion. No one who has been in the public life in this country was ever more devoted to its highest and best interests. Upon this subject he was always eloquent. His character was noted for its strong quality of common sense. At the height of his popularity as a General of the Army he was never tempted for a moment by any of the flattering offers of the politicians to permit his great name to be used in politics. He would often say :—

"I am a soldier out and out. For that I am trained, and for that career I am fitted. I have to-day arrived at the climax of my ambition. I am General of the Army, and at its head. I desire nothing more. I do not propose to risk my name and fame in the field of partisan politics. I want to leave my reputation free from tarnish to my children."

From this resolution General Sherman never swerved. He was never more sorely tempted than during the period of the Chicago Convention which nominated Mr. Blaine. The politicians then came to him and said :

"With your name we can carry the convention."

The combination which came to the General was a strong one. It controlled certainly enough votes to have tempted any man with Presidential ambitions, but General Sherman said "No" from the first. The committee which called on him told him flatly and frankly that they should not consider his refusal, but that they should go ahead and use their own judgment. It was then that the General sat down and dictated that brusque letter which ex-Senator Henderson caused to be read to the convention, and which showed clearly to every one that no possible combination of circumstances could force General Sherman to accept a nomination. The general was hot-tempered. He despised petty technicalities. When in the War Department, the bureau people fretted him with the endless red tape, which of necessity came to him when he took charge of the great army machine. But while he was imperious and high-tempered, he was, withal, one of the kindest-hearted and most just of men. He would apologize for any hasty word with the earnest vigor of a manly man convicted of having made a mistake. He ran into controversy with the Secretary of War under Hayes, and when the President sustained the Secretary, Sherman asked for permission to move his headquarters to St. Louis. This permission was given him to the great despair of his staff officers. He packed up the whole establishment, and for the first time since the close of the war the headquarters of the army were in another place than at the Capital. After several years of exile in St. Louis, where he was unhappy and discontented, General Sherman was persuaded to bring back the headquarters of the army with him, but only after the offending Secretary of War, Mr. McCreary, had retired.

At the War Department he was a close worker. He had great energy and great decision of character. He could

transact business rapidly. He had keen intuitions and formed impressions as rapidly as a woman. He was a strange combination of iron self-control and passionate emotional capabilities. He rarely prepared himself for any speechmaking. Nearly all of his remarks were off hand, the ideas of which were suggested to him through the stimulus of the occasion. He was fond of attending Grand Army gatherings. At their meetings called camp-fires, he used to appear at his best. Surrounded by his old associates, he would recount in a most spirited and entertaining manner stories and experiences of his campaigns. He was a man of extreme simplicity of manners, thoroughly devoid of any pretence. He was in sympathetic touch with the plain people. He knew all parts of this country well. He was especially interested in the West and its development. His habits were good. He used liquor and tobacco, but always in moderation.

The General had a broad forehead, dark eyes deeply set, a large Roman nose, a face marked and seamed in its upper part, and hidden in the lower part by a short gray beard and mustache. He had a deep voice. He was fond of young people. He loved to go to the theatre. He had the reputation of being one of the most gallant men in the army. His gallantry, however, was kindly and commendable throughout his whole long life. His great name was never touched by scandal. He had a fatherly, kindly air, which made a welcome for him in every house in Washington.

In November, 1871, General Sherman obtained a leave of absence for twelve months, during which he made a trip to the old world, visiting the courts and capitals of Europe, and many of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. He was well received wherever he went, and became the subject of special honors among those who had learned to appreciate his genius as a soldier. The Khedive of Egypt showed his

admiration by a rich present to his daughter. He brought back a rare fund of information, which not only supplemented his former wide experience, but was frequently used to point his many after-dinner speeches, and as a relish to his charming anecdotes.

On his return from Europe he took up his residence temporarily in Washington, but soon went back to St. Louis with the intention of remaining there. But a slight misunderstanding with the authorities, relative to taxes or rents, was so magnified by the local and hostile newspapers that he determined to seek a more congenial atmosphere in which to spend the balance of his days. He courted peace more than ever, and obeyed his own predilection and a pressing family influence, in taking up his residence in New York, in 1886, where he continued to reside till his death, the centre of a gradually expanding host of friends and the most courted of all modern men at fetes, amusements, reunions, anniversaries and all social events.

A few months before attaining his sixty-fourth year, the legal date of retiracy, and at his own request, he retired from the active list as General, in order to make way for General Sheridan. His retiracy dated from November 1, 1883, and he was then entirely in private life. He had not accumulated much means, but as the full pay of his position—$13,000 a year and allowances—followed him into retirement, he had ample to live upon.

Upon Sherman's retirement from the active list, President Arthur issued an order in which he said: "The announcement of the severance from the command of the army of one who has been for so many years its distinguished chief can but awaken in the minds, not only of the army, but of the people of the United States, mingled emotions of regret and gratitude—regret at the withdrawal from active military ser-

vice of an officer, whose lofty sense of duty has been a model for all soldiers since he first entered the army in July, 1840; and gratitude, freshly awakened, for the services of incalculable value rendered by him in the war for the Union, which his great military genius and daring did so much to end. The President deems this a fitting occasion to give expression to the gratitude felt toward General Sherman by his fellow-citizens, and to hope that Providence may grant him many years of health and happiness in the relief from the active duties of his profession."

He received the title of LL.D. from Dartmouth, Yale, Harvard, Princeton, and other colleges, and sat as a member of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institute from 1871 to 1883.

Sherman's family relations were of the most amiable and devoted type, and this, notwithstanding the fact that much has been said of their religious discrepancies. He reared six children, four daughters and two sons, all of whom typed their father in regard for the domestic estate. In November, 1888, he lost his wife, which was a severe blow. At that time, as well as on the occasion of his own death, the obsequious and diminutive minded reporters injected the privacy of his religion into the publicity of his career, and, it is to be supposed, reaped the harvest of their sensationalism. There was really no mystery about this phase of his domestic life. There could be no mystery about any phase of a life like Sherman's. As to his son becoming a priest in the Catholic Church, he settled the matter once for all in an article in the *North American Review* of December, 1888: "I here record that my immediate family are Catholic; I am not, and cannot be. That is all the public has a right to know." They had no right to know this, but Sherman, in his usual frank way so willed it. And as to his own faith, what can the

world wish to learn more than in his reply to the question respecting his religion: "I believe in God Almighty; that is as far as I have got."

A man endowed and circumstanced as Sherman was, naturally entered upon serene old age with comfort and pleasure. He was hale at seventy, and young in spirit even when death entered its grim appearance. Age modified many of his views and softened the intensities of a lofty nature. Leisure comported with his later tastes and extended the opportunity for refreshing ancient memories and cultivating kindly surroundings. But leisure must not be construed as cessation. He was a worker still, but in the lines of choice, not compulsion. He surrounded himself with works of art and *virtu*. He delighted in life, especially young life. His delightful New York home contained paintings and photographs of his great battles, and of the distinguished actors in the war of the Rebellion. His library was hung with maps of his own drawing and of his generals, and these were a subject of constant reference, either for his own delectation or for the purpose of imparting answers to inquiries respecting his movements during the war. He was most methodical in his habits, rising at stated hours, and consuming the day amid surroundings which contributed to his mental and physical delight. A looker in upon the old General just before his fatal sickness thus describes the situation.

"General Sherman is quite gray now. Both his hair and beard are white. But he is still a very hard-working man. He lives very quietly with his family at his house on Seventy-first street, west of Central Park. He is as accessible as any man in New York, but he has a most direct and positive way of dealing with bores. It has been stated that the General is irascible, and so he is to persons who annoy him. To persons who have some real reason for calling upon him, he is always

courteous. A ring at the door-bell of the General's handsome brownstone residence, brings a pleasant-faced servant girl to answer the call.

"The old fighter is peculiar in one respect. The girl that opens his door for visitors never has to go and ask him if he is in. At the first she tells one that 'the General is in,' or he is not. That settles it. If he is in he will see you. If you are a bore, as a good many of his callers are, look out for squalls, and under any circumstances it is not well to be prolix. General Sherman likes one to get to the point at once. If the visitor is not able to do this he is likely to be interrupted.

"There is one sort of a caller who is always received with warmth, and that is one of General Sherman's old soldiers, or his 'boys,' as he calls them. Just how much assistance General Sherman gives to old and unfortunate soldiers it would be hard to say. No one but himself knows, and he won't tell. But these are among the more numerous of the visitors at his house. Besides them there are all sorts and conditions of callers at his house.

"General Sherman is methodical in his habits and in his work. He is an early riser. He eats an early and light breakfast, and afterward is to be seen in his library at the end of the hall on the parlor floor of his house. He has a comparatively large library, not entirely made up of military books either. He has always had a keen literary taste, and there are few men who are better posted on the literary and historical records of this and other lands."

Thus glided the hero through the hours of peace and retirement toward the inevitable end, which came all unexpected and too soon, considering his rugged physique and methodical habits. But disease and death are inexorable.

The office of the historian might well conclude here; but

there is that about our American life, our interchangeability of ideas, our intercommunication of thoughts, our wide friendships and personal minglings, our freedom of expression, our ready wit and anecdotal turn, which may really be of more service in the illustration of character than simple historic analysis. This light we now propose to turn on. If it is the light of generality, it is no less the light of impartiality. Wherein it fails in strict fact, it makes up in disinterestedness, and if so highly illuminative as to reveal flaws, it thereby but intensifies virtues. Nearly every advent of Sherman was the occasion of an anecdote or reminiscence. These grew more frequent when his mortal sickness was announced. His death awakened a still further spirit of recalling the past, and entering upon eulogistic mention. We throw these in as concluding etchings of a grand character, and without any attempt at plan.

General G. C. Kniffin, who served with Sherman in his Atlanta campaign narrates the following:—

There had been some brisk skirmishing with General Johnston's rear guard during the previous day, and an occasional ambulance passed up on its way to the hospital at Marietta. Belated supply trains, and groups of stragglers, disabled horses and broken-down wagons were scattered along the road.

Wishing to light my pipe and having no matches, I rode out into the woods, near the road, where I saw a fire. As I approached it I found two soldiers holding candles, the light of which fell upon a map spread upon the ground. Lying prone upon his breast, with his chin resting upon his left hand, and with the index finger of his right tracing the lines upon the map, was General Sherman.

I immediately alighted, and, touching him upon the shoulder, said:—

"General, do you know how far you are from headquarters? It is fully three miles."

He arose at once, and, accepting the offer of my horse, mounted him and rode away toward the front. Knowing the habits of the Chief, and that regaining possession of the animal depended upon keeping him in sight, I promptly dismounted my orderly and followed the General to headquarters. He had not been missed. There was nothing unusual in the occurrence. He had started out alone for a walk, and his stout legs had borne him three miles away. His mind filled with the great problem of the campaign, he had need to consult a map of the country, and, calling up two straggling soldiers, bade them light their candles, that he might then and there settle some doubt as to the trend of a mountain range, or the direction of a road or water course. This is not much of a story, but it may serve to show to people who never served under his leadership how readily he adapted the material at hand to immediate use.

A reminiscence by General Cyrus Bussey, Assistant Secretary of the Interior :—

"I first met General Sherman at Benton Barracks, Mo., in November, 1861. I had reported there with a full regiment of cavalry. During the siege of Vicksburg I was chief of cavalry, and served immediately under General Sherman's command. I saw much of him during the siege, and led the advance of his army in the campaign to Jackson against Joe Johnston's army immediately after the fall of Vicksburg. After the enemy was routed and driven out of the country my command occupied the rear, and General Sherman accompanied me both on the advance and on the return to our camps in the rear of Vicksburg. So I had an excellent opportunity of becoming intimately acquainted with him, and there I formed a great admiration for him as a man and a general.

"One circumstance I wish to mention. While waiting at Jackson after the retreat of Johnston, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi tendered to General Sherman and his staff a banquet, at which General Frank P. Blair proposed a toast to General Grant. General Sherman rose and said: 'I want to respond to that toast. I see that many newspapers of the country have credited me with originating the plan adopted by General Grant for the capture of Vicksburg. I want to say that I am not entitled to this credit. General Grant alone originated that plan and carried it to successful completion without the co-operation of any of his subordinate officers, and in the face of my protest as well as that of many of the officers.'

"Much more which he said convinced me and every other officer that he was as loyal to his chief as he was to his country. It caused us all to have implicit faith in him. While a rigid disciplinarian, I have witnessed on his part many kind acts toward private soldiers, who were frequently found disabled, straggling behind their commands. A conversation I had with General Sherman, in November, 1861, shows his insight into the magnitude of the struggle that was just beginning. General Sherman asked me how long I supposed the war would last. I answered, having in mind Mr. Seward's proclamation that ninety days would be sufficient, that it would require eighteen months. General Sherman replied:

"'The war will last between four and five years. All the volunteers now in the army, and all who can be induced to enlist, will serve their three years; those who survive will re-enlist as veteran volunteers, and then the Government will have to resort to the draft in order to raise enough men to restore the Union. We will have to abandon the great wagon trains now being supplied to regiments, and as far as

possible live off of the country. By this policy the South will become exhausted and we shall triumph.'

"The history of the next four years proves how true a prophecy Sherman uttered."

General Horatio King contributes the following reminiscence of character and history: General Sherman has felt of late years that his strength was too strongly taxed by the incessant social demands upon him. He never could refuse his old western associates, but I had some difficulty to persuade him that he had as many friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that he really belonged, not to a section of the Grand Army, but the whole army. But he almost always acceded to my request, but at Saratoga Springs, in 1887, he gave me a most laughable scoring for my persistence. I cannot do better than give the entire extract from his speech at the banquet. He said: "By the law of our land, which is the only king we worship (applause), I was turned out to grass (laughter), and I was told that I could spend the rest of my days in peace and retirement. I sought refuge in the city of St. Louis, where I have many, many friends, and which city I love very much. I found but little peace there. But I read, I think, in Dr. Johnson, that peace and quiet could only be had in a great city or in the forest—in Nature's wilderness. I therefore sought it in New York City. (Laughter.) I then read in Wilhelm Meister, by Goethe, that on the heights lies repose. I have chosen Cœur de Lion Lake in Idaho; and you don't know where it is. But a friend here, your secretary, Horatio C. King, initiates a new doctrine, that because I happen to be a survivor, I suppose of the fittest, I must fulfill all the offices of all my dead comrades; therefore, I must come to the reunion of the Army of the Potomac. I must go to West Point. I must go to Chicago. I must go to Detroit. I must go wherever an army band meets. be-

cause I am the only survivor. Where comes the peace? My friends, I come with a full heart, God knows. I love you all because you fought for the common flag. (Applause.) Some years ago there was a little captain in the army called Bonneville; he got peace and quiet. He asked for two years' leave of absence and got it; and he went out to the mountains where Salt Lake now is; nobody knew where it was then. That was about fifty years ago. Bonneville was a little fellow. God knows when he was born; I don't. It was before the age of man. He was aide-de-camp with Lafayette in 1824. He went off and caught beavers and otter, and fished, and the crows came and cleaned him out, and he kept out of the way for two years more. He was reported dead. He went to the adjutant-general and reported, but the adjutant says, 'Bonneville is dead.' He says, 'I am not dead.' 'Oh, yes,' said the adjutant, 'you are dead; you are as dead as a mackerel. Go away from here and don't disturb the record.' (Laughter.) Bonneville insisted that he was not dead, and he insisted upon going back on the army register so that he could get his pay. I fell in with Washington Irving, one of the sweetest men that ever lived and one of your citizens. (Applause.) He painted the tale of Bonneville so that his name will pass to history. God bless him and his memory—Washington Irving! Now I want your secretary, Horatio C. King, to just mark me dead (laughter) and I won't turn up; I won't bother him as my old friend Bonneville disturbed Jones. Let me alone, and I will have some peace the rest of my days."

His last appearance at the Army of the Potomac reunion was in Portland in July last, and I never saw him in better spirits. I had really executed a flank movement upon him, for I had half-promised him that if he would go to the Saratoga reunion I wouldn't urge him again. So I had quietly

run on to Portland, explained the situation to Mayor Melcher, and told him if they wanted to secure Sherman's presence the best way was to make him the guest of the city. This the Common Council immediately did. The very day the resolution passed that body I met the General at the meeting of the Loyal Legion at Delmonico's. His first greeting to me was: "King I'm not going; it's no use. I can't go. I am getting worn out." I laughingly replied: "Well, General, I promised you that I wouldn't ask you again, and I have kept it. But how in the world are you going to refuse the unanimous request of 35,000 people?" Well, he went and everything was provided for his comfort and convenience. Of course he was the central figure, and at the great meeting in the City Hall was called up as soon as General F. A. Walker had concluded his oration, which was a masterly recital of the grand review at Washington at the close of the war. Naturally, as Walker was addressing the Army of the Potomac, he confined his description to the review of that army with which he was connected. Sherman noted the omission of any reference to the review of the second day and touched upon it in his customary mixture of fun and criticism. He said: "Now, my friends, I have had a great deal of experience in my life, and I have learned since I have been upon this stage the grand review in Washington terminated when the Army of the Potomac passed. It reminds me of a story which General Taylor is said to have told once to an applicant in Washington who urged his claims on the ground of having been a hero of the first water at the battle of Buena Vista. General Taylor said that he had heard of so many things that had occurred there while he thought he was there himself, he had come to the conclusion that he was not there at all. I have heard so much of that review that I think I was there, and I think that review oc-

cupied two full days. The first day the Army of the Potomac had the floor and I was upon the stage at that time, as I am now, taking notes and observations that I might profit by them, for, if you remember, my young friend, and old friends, too, the Army of the West did not have a very fair standing in your eyes for discipline and order. You got your opinion of us from rebel soldiers, and we chased them 1,800 miles into your camp. And we found that even the authorities in Washington had not a very good opinion of our armies. They thought we were rather liable to disorder. Now I assure you, my friends, we were a better drilled army than you were. I ought to know, for I was their commanding general.

"Now, the intervals between divisions were too large and I kept my eye on them, and watched them all the while. But the worst mistake was that you Army of the Potomac men had two bands right opposite our reviewing stand; loaned you by the stay-at-homes in Washington. They were those pampered and well-fed bands that are taught to play the very latest operas. You men did not understand it, and did not keep step. A great many of your men turned their eyes around like country gawks to look at the big people on the stand. Those are little things. You know there are tricks in every trade, my friend, tricks in war as well as as in peace. While I was on the stand Meade came to me, and I said, 'Meade, I'm afraid my poor tatterdemalion corps will make a poor appearance to-morrow when contrasted with yours.' Meade said, 'Sherman, the people in Washington are now so well disposed to the army they will make all allowances, you needn't be afraid.'

"That evening I got a note from General Auger, saying that if I wanted those two magnificent bands I could have them. I said, 'Thank you, but I will stick to my old

bands,' and I sent word to my men, 'Be careful about your intervals and your tactics. Don't let your men be looking back over their shoulders. I will give you plenty of time to go to the Capitol and see everything afterward; but let them keep their eyes fifteen feet to the front and march by in the old customary way.' And they did so. When the review was over, the two constituted a thing of magnificent proportions. As to the patriotism within our hearts, and the principles that moved those great masses of men to a common purpose we need not speak, for history has done so, and the most eloquent tongues in the country have spoken of it, and nothing more can be said on that point. But on the simple question of tactics, instruction and discipline, we can take lessons to the very last days of our life."

General Meigs narrates that "The first time I met General Sherman was on the return of McDowell's army. I called on him at his headquarters across the river from Bull Run. Sherman at that time was in the prime of life, and the measure I then took of him has been fully justified. His nature was naturally genial and democratic, notwithstanding his West Point training.

"While we were talking, an enlisted man—an Irish soldier—approached, and in rich Irish brogue asked the General to put his finger in the muzzle of his gun to see that it was clean. Sherman tried to put him off, but the Irishman insisted; when, to get rid of him, Sherman complied, and laughingly remarked, 'Now go off and mind your business.'

Previous to the war he had served on the Cherokee Commission, and his experience at that time he afterward told me was valuable, as the Cherokee reservation was located in a large portion of the country through which he subsequently traveled with his army. Even while in Washington, he was continually exploring the country, and in a very short time

had its topography thoroughly mapped in his mind. I may say that there never was a great general—and Sherman certainly ranks among the greatest—who did not possess this invaluable faculty, which Marmont, in his treatise on the service of war, says enables a man not only to see what lies directly before him, but what lies far beyond the scope of his vision. Another valuable trait he possessed was that he reached his conclusions promptly, and then acted upon them. More than one general failed to achieve greatness in the Union army because he hesitated when he should have acted.

"General Sherman socially was one of the most charming of men. If he was brilliant on the field of battle, in the social circle he was the prince of entertainers. His manhood was symmetrical, his talents as a general of the first rank, and his fame immortal."

General Rosecrans says: "I recall a telegram received from General Sherman one November day in 1864, while I was in the Department of the Missouri. The telegram read, 'I start to-day for Atlanta, and will make Rome howl.'

"And he did it, too. I had known General Sherman since 1838, although I was not thrown much with him in service. In 1850 he was paying court to Miss Ewing, and after their engagement he came all the way to Newport to invite me to the wedding.

"I had always been a great admirer of General Sherman. His character as a man was one to command admiration. Of course, it is difficult to select for comment thereon any particular passage of a life that was so busy and so full of great deeds."

Says another Army officer:—

"General Sherman was, as everybody knows, a great diner-out. He loved company, and was a delightful companion at a banquet. During his life in Washington he was in great

demand, and was constantly receiving invitations to luncheons, dinners and receptions. One afternoon the General was dressed and ready to go out for a dinner, when he suddenly stopped and bowed his head in thought. Then, turning to Mrs. Sherman, he said: 'Emily, I have an invitation to dinner somewhere this afternoon, but for the life of me I cannot remember where it is.' 'Oh, we can soon remedy that,' said Mrs. Sherman. 'You stand at the front window until you see General Van Vliet coming down the street. Go out and join him, and you will get to the right place.'

"The General followed Mrs. Sherman's advice and reached the dinner."

Colonel Linn Hartranft, son of ex-Governor Hartranft, tells the following:—

"The Grand Army of the Republic held its annual encampment in Harrisburg in 1874. Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, and others, prominent in the army, were there. During the encampment, father, who was then Governor, gave a reception at the Executive Mansion, and the country people were invited to attend to see the great warriors. General Sherman was, of course, the central figure. He had a pleasant word for everybody, and particularly for the farmers. But I remember the feature of the reception was the delight the General took in kissing the pretty, rosy-cheeked country girls. By his cheerfulness and his wit he kept the entire company in good spirits."

General C. H. T. Collis said:

"General Sherman had a presentiment of his approaching end two weeks before he was taken ill at all. We met on our way to an affair at ex-Judge Dillon's house. I mentioned the approaching anniversary of General Grant's birthday, which occurs April 27th. 'I'll be dead and gone by that time,' said Sherman, earnestly, with a foreboding look in his

eye. I laughed at the remark, and tried to cheer him up, as he seemed a bit blue, but he only answered my jokes with a more serious manner, saying: 'I feel it coming. Sometimes when I get home from an entertainment or banquet, especially these wintry nights, I feel death reaching for me, as it were. I suppose I'll take cold some night and go to bed, never to rise again.' The words were prophetic."

The last birthday spent by General Sherman at Washington was that on which he became 63 years of age—February 8, 1883. In one year more he would have been retired by statute, but he anticipated the date by several months in closing his active connection with the army. Knowing of his purpose to do this, Colonel George B. Corkhill, then District Attorney, made the General's sixty-third birthday the occasion of tendering him an elaborate dinner, which was given at the host's apartment in the Portland. Twenty-nine gentlemen surrounded the table. The menu card of that occasion now forms an historic souvenir. It is six large leaves of cardboard tied in book form with bows of red, white and blue, and embellished on the outer leaves with a fine portrait of General Sherman and scenes from his march to the sea.

Inside the first leaf are these lines, printed in blue with a red line border to the page, as is the entire menu:—

Fill up the glass! We drink to-night
To the dark days of the nation.
We drink to days we can't forget,
Of camp and gun and ration.

Fill up! We drink to Sherman's years,
And we drink to the march he led us;
To the hard work done, and the victories won
When fortune illy served us.

We drink to twenty years ago,
When Sherman led our banner;
His mistresses were fortresses,

Here is a Sherman anecdote which has the double merit of being true and of having special significance as to the disposition of his body. About two years before his death, General Sherman asked Ex-Governor Cornell, then chairman of the Grant Memorial Committee, what were the prospects of he memorial. "It will be built, General," answered Cornell. "It will be a splendid mausoleum, and a place shall be reserved for you in it beside Grant." "No, no," responded Sherman, very decidedly. "No mausoleum for me. I want no such thing. When I die, give me a grave and a $75 tombstone, that's all."

General Sherman was a great admirer of the Grand Army of the Republic, and wherever veterans of the war gathered, reminiscences flowed fast and freely of the great commander's visits to the Grand army camp-fires, and of his tender regard and affection for the soldier boys. It has been truthfully said that General Sherman preferred a camp-fire with the rank and file of his men about him, to any other public gathering.

"You see, a camp-fire with his boys," says a war veteran, "was not a public affair to him. It was like a gathering at home. He was with his family, for he, in his great big heart, always called his soldiers his 'boys,' and every man who fought under him was proud to be one of his boys. That feeling of affection between him and his men always made the camp-fires which he attended a great treat."

At a meeting of the Loyal Legion in Philadelphia, General Patterson remarked in a reminiscent way that General Sherman for many years loathed the song "Marching Thro' Georgia."

"Did he manifest his dislike of it?"

"Often," said the General. "For a number of years, whenever he heard that song, he would express his hatred, for his feeling almost amounted to hatred, of the song. 'I do

wish they would stop singing that song. It makes me sick,' was his usual expression."

"Why did it affect him in that way?"

"It never meant anything to Sherman. In the first place he never regarded his march to the sea as a great achievement. He looked upon it as merely a pleasure tramp across a vast country. He had no opposing forces to contend with, and the march was merely a means to an end. Then this song was written after the war. It was never sung in the war, so there was nothing about it to make it appeal to the soldier's heart. There were no memories associated with it as there were with 'John Brown's Body.' Now, that is a song which the General loved, because of the memories which it awakened. He never tired of hearing the 'boys' singing 'John Brown's Body' at a camp-fire, and he would even join in the singing himself with great spirit."

When the above reminiscence appeared in print it was replied to by an old soldier at Hampton, Va., as follows:—

SIR:—In a recent issue of your paper I notice an article which tends to take from the old soldier one of his greatest enjoyments, and does the memory of General Sherman great injustice. The article was in regard to General Sherman's utter dislike for camp-fire songs. In the "Memoirs of General Sherman," Vol. II, he says: "When I read Byer's song, 'Sherman's March to the Sea,' I sent for him, and appointed him on my staff. When we reached Savannah I sent him to Washington as a bearer of dispatches."

"Again, on May 30, 1881, on board the steamer Ohio, No. 3, General Sherman requested the Future City Glee Club, of which the writer was a member, to sing "Sherman's March to the Sea," and expressed himself as highly delighted, and stated to several ladies and gentlemen that he would never forget the day Byers handed him that song at Columbia,

South Carolina. At a camp-fire of the Ransom Post, G. A. R., held at St. Louis, "Sherman's March to the Sea" was sung and was heartily applauded, and by no one more so than by "Uncle Billy." The members of the Department of the Potomac will bear me out in the statement that at all camp-fires General Sherman was the jolliest of the jolly, and dearly loved the old songs sung at our camp-fires. God bless the old hero. We shall never see his like again."

"I don't know," said an old army officer who was with Sherman from Atlanta to Savannah, "that I ever saw him angry but once. It was at a campfire before Richmond. He had just come in from his march from Raleigh and had received the Northern papers containing the bitter letters of Halleck and Stanton criticizing him for allowing Jeff Davis to get out of Richmond. When Sherman read these letters his indignation was furious. Afterward when he had calmed down he unbosomed himself in his free, frank style to his staff as follows: 'I went down to City Point with Grant and met the President. After we had concluded our council of war I said to the President: "Mr. President, what about Jeff Davis? Do you want him captured?" 'Now, General,' replied Lincoln. 'That reminds me of a story. Some years ago there was a temperance lecturer in Central Illinois. He had agreed to deliver a lecture in a village near Springfield. The night of the lecture he had to drive about five miles in a drenching rainstorm, and when he reached the inn which the village boasted he was wet to the skin. The hour set for his lecture was near. Some friends advised him in view of his condition to postpone it. He would not listen to the advice, but said the lecture must go on. 'Then you must take some stimulant, or you will make yourself ill.' 'Do you think I need a stimulant?' asked the temperance lecturer. 'You certainly do, and a strong one,' remarked a friend. 'Then

make me a hot lemonade,' said the shivering lecturer. 'A hot lemonade will do you no good, you want whiskey,' said his adviser. 'But you forget I am a temperance lecturer.' No, you forget your health is in danger,' was the reply. 'Well,' said the lecturer, as he cautiously surveyed his surroundings, 'I suppose if some whiskey were to get into that her lemonade without me seeing it, I would not be held responsible for it.' "'Now,' said Sherman, with considerable force, 'what inference was I to take from this story? I believe that President Lincoln did not care whether Jeff Davis was captured, and that I was carrying out his implicit wish in making no effort to prevent his escape.'"

Mrs. Janet Chase Hoyt, daughter of Chief Justice Chase, contributes the following account of her father's interview with Sherman, just after Johnston's surrender:—

"Shortly after Mr. Johnson's inauguration, Chief Justice Chase decided to visit the Southern States, including particularly his proposed circuit (as he had concluded to take Chief Justice Taney's court duties as his own). He wished also to see for himself the condition of the South, and to judge of the feeling and disposition of the people after the close of the war. In order to facilitate the plans, a revenue cutter was put at his disposal by the Secretary of the Treasury. I accompanied my father, and when we arrived at Beaufort, N. C., General Sherman was there, on board his vessel, detained by stress of weather. He asked Mr. Chase for an interview. He granted it, and took me along in a gig over to the General's vessel. The General was waiting for us eagerly at the gangway, and with hardly a greeting to the others, so anxious was he to 'have his say,' he took my father's arm and hurried him over to the cabin, while I followed, simply because I did not know where else to go. 'Now, Governor,' he said excitedly, using the old Ohio title, 'what does all this mean!' On his table

lay a whole file of Northern papers, full of criticisms and irritating comments on his arrangement with General Johnston. 'If Mr. Lincoln had lived I should never have been insulted in this fashion! We neither of us are the kind to kick an enemy after he is conquered,' he went on, becoming more and more excited. His face was red with indignation as he strode up and down the cabin like an enraged lion, stopping now and then to pound the table as he emphasized some point, and then resuming his hurried walk again.

"'Do you know what they call me here?' he said, bringing his fist down with a thump on the pile of papers, which sent them flying. 'They almost dub me a traitor because I have tried to bring peace into the country—I, who have brought a victorious army through the very heart of the South! I tell you, Governor, there are some things that hit a man hard! What do they know in Washington? How can they tell, shut up in their rooms and offices? The people here want peace, and, for Heaven's sake, let them have it! Do they want to keep on fighting there in Washington now that the war is over?'

My father tried to put in a calming word or two in the midst of this burst of fiery indignation: but he was too Saxon and generous himself not to sympathize with the General's position—"fight your enemy, and, after conquering let the reconciliation be prompt and without reservation," was the feeling of both men, and Mr. Chase later on was also, despite his life's record, judged hardly, and greatly misunderstood for almost identical causes.

"'I will tell you,' went on the General, 'just what Mr. Lincoln said to me when I asked him point blank if he wished me to capture Jeff Davis or let him escape, and you will see by this what his feeling about keeping up animosity was. 'Well,' said the President, 'I will tell you how I feel

about it. I knew an old temperance lecturer once who, according to his conviction, enjoined total abstinence and never touched liquor himself. Once after a long ride, in which he had been exposed to great cold and fatigue, he stopped at a friend's house for a cup of hot coffee. 'Let me put in just a drop of brandy,' said the host, 'it might save you an illness.' 'No,' said the teetotaler, 'I couldn't think of it—but,' he added rather softly, 'if you can put in a drop unbeknownst to me I might feel grateful.' Of course, General, we must oppose the escape of Jeff Davis; but if he could slip off unbeknownst it would not hurt the country.'

"'So you see,' went on the General, 'that is all I had to go by, and the only directions I received; the South may well rue the day when those fanatics murdered the President, for they killed their best friend.'

"'And so,' said General Sherman, after an interval of calm in which he had been telling Mr. Lincoln's story, rising from his seat, again flushing red with wrath and striding up and down again in his impetuosity and excitement; 'when I have no letter and try to follow out the spirit of my instructions this is what I get from Stanton and Halleck, and those fellows in Washington!'

"After awhile he remembered me, sitting in my corner. 'Why, child, I forgot you,' he said, in his kindly, beaming fashion; 'let me see what I can get for you,' but our boat had been waiting for a long while and the men had to get back to their dinner and we had to leave.

"I have seen General Sherman a number of times since then, but when I remember him it will always be as he appeared on that day—flushed with victory, wounded by too hasty judgment, eager for the best interests of the whole country, South as well as North; chafed and sore beyond all endurance, and proud beyond everything of his army and its

prowess. It is a very vital figure and lives in one's memory.

"Of course it was Mr. Lincoln's assassination that had so aroused public feeling just at this juncture. Johnston's letter to Sherman and their subsequent correspondence arranging a truce occurred on April 14-16, both leaders being in ignorance of the terrible calamity at Washington. General Sherman's manly spirit, which wished to 'let by-gones be by-gones,' would have undoubtedly been the sentiment of a generous country if it had not been for the terrible tragedy, which naturally aroused the vindicative spirit of the entire North. That the disastrous event was deplored almost unanimously in the South had received abundant evidence during this very journey, but the Northern people were slow to believe this, and the wanton and wicked act paralyzed good feeling toward the South for many a long year."

The General's fondness for kissing pretty girls has been the subject for stories innumerable. How that fondness, which may have been latent in his earlier career for all we know, developed with him into a fad is not generally known. Here are the facts as related by himself:

"Some time after Grant was elected President, I went to call on him at the White House. I had been struck with the number and speed of his horses, and with the delight it seemed to give him to be in their company. So I said to him, "General, fine horses seem to have become a fad with you."

"'Well, Sherman,' said he, 'we all must have our fads these days. It seems to be becoming the fashionable thing. I have all my life been intensely fond of good horseflesh. In my youth I hadn't the means to indulge this fancy. Later in life I had not the time. Now, when for the first time I have both the money and the leisure, I am indulging it and enjoying it to the full.'

"'Well, General,' said I, "I suppose I'll have to be getting a fad myself. I never have had one, and if I have one now I don't know it. Let me see, let me see; what shall it be? I have it! You may drive your fast horses, and I will kiss all the pretty girls. Ha! ha! that shall be my fad.'"

"My! how I hate to be photographed," the General exclaimed one day, "because in pictures by that process I always look stern; don't like to look stern. My mood is pleasant and friendly to all, though I have been told that, when I'm in a fight, I look like the very devil. That is because my nature is one that concentrates itself, heart and soul, fire and will, into one terrible focus. No half measures for me. I take after my mother in that."

To those who appreciated General Sherman's genial nature, it is superfluous to say that he regarded his extensive acquaintance with the "Ladies of the White House" with peculiar gratification. This he specially referred to on one occasion when he had been introduced to Mrs. Cleveland, then but a short time a bride. The General said:

"The other day when I was in Washington, I received a note from Mrs. Endicott, telling me that the President and Mrs. Cleveland were to dine at her house that evening, and begging me to join them. I wrote her a very polite reply; said I had two or three engagements I must keep, but if Mrs. Endicott would reserve me a place, I would slip in quietly and take up my dinner at the point at which I arrived.

"When I got there they were at table, and I found that the seat at Mr. Endicott's left had been reserved for me, Mrs. Cleveland being on his right. Well, we just shoved Endicott to one side, and railed in and had a good time. After a while the ladies left us, and then after a little we went into Endicott's room for a smoke. Then, about 11.30 we went up to the ladies. It was rather late, and very soon



PRESIDENT GRANT.

Mrs. Cleveland made a move to go, and of course several gentlemen surrounded her, helping her with her wraps, and said very quietly: 'General, I am very glad to have met you, and I want you to come and see me.' I smiled and said: 'You know that such an invitation is a command.' And she smiled back and said: 'When will you come? To-morrow? Shall we say 1 o'clock?' Well, I went, and she came in to meet me, plainly and simply dressed, and was just sweet and girlish—but bright!—and shrewd!

"She wanted to know all about the ladies that have presided in the White House. I have known 'em all since Jackson's time, and she made me tell her about them. I consider Harriet Lane, Buchanan's niece, the finest lady that ever did the honors of the White House, though she was cold and impassive; but her tact and suavity of manner were perfect. I believe Mrs. Cleveland has taken Harriet Lane for her model, and she is as clever and sweet a lady as Miss Lane was.

"The sweetest woman I ever met presiding there was Kitty Taylor, General Taylor's daughter, afterwards Mrs. Dr. Dandridge. But none of them was brighter and more beautiful than Mrs. Cleveland."

The following characteristic anecdote of General Grant was told, and illustrated with exquisite humor, by General Sherman at a little dinner:

"Grant and I were at Nashville, Tenn., after the battle of Chattanooga. Our quarters were in the same building.

"One day Grant came into the room that I used for an office. I was very busy, surrounded with papers, muster-rolls, plans, specifications, etc., etc. When I looked up from my work I saw he seemed a good deal bothered, and, after awhile, with his shoulders thrown up and his hands deep down in his trousers pockets, he said:

"'Look here, there are some men here from Galena.'

"'Well?' I said.

"Looking more uncomfortable every minute, he went on:

"'They've got a sword they want to give me,' and, looking over his shoulder, and jerking his thumb in the same direction, he added:

"'Will you come in?'

"He looked quite frightened at the idea of going to face them alone, so I put some weights on my several piles of papers to keep them from blowing around, and went into the next room, followed by Grant, who by this time looked as he might if he'd been going to be court-martialed. There was found the Mayor and some members of the Board of Councilmen of Galena. On a table in the middle of the room was a handsome rosewood box containing a magnificent gold-hilted sword with all the appointments equally splendid.

"The Mayor stepped forward and delivered what was evidently a carefully-prepared speech, setting forth that the citizens of Galena had sent him to present to General Grant the accompanying sword, not as a testimonial to his greatness as a soldier, but as a slight proof of their love and esteem for him as a man, and their pride in him as a fellow-citizen.

"After delivering the speech the Mayor produced a large parchment scroll, to which was attached by a long blue ribbon a red seal as big as a pancake and on which was inscribed a set of complimentary resolutions. These he proceeded to read to us, not omitting a single 'whereas' or 'hereunto.' And after finishing the reading he rolled it up and with great solemnity and ceremony handed it to Grant.

"Gen. Grant took it, looked ruefully at it and held it as if it burnt him. Mrs. Grant, who had been standing beside her husband, quietly took it from him, and there was dead

silence for several minutes. Then Grant, sinking his head lower on his chest and hunching his shoulders up higher and looking thoroughly miserable, began hunting in his pockets, diving first in one and then in another, and at last said: 'Gentlemen, I knew you were coming here to give me this sword, and so I prepared a short speech,' and with a look of relief he drew from his trousers pocket a crooked, crumpled piece of paper and handed it to the Mayor of Galena, adding, 'and, gentlemen, here it is!'

Youth and beauty General Sherman loved. One day he remarked, "Ah! how I envy the young their hopes and dreams and aspirations. I envy the beggar on the street if he is young—who can tell what lies before him. Yes, yes, I know, but there's no fun in looking back; it's an old story, you've heard it over and over again, but the future may hold all sorts of surprises. I went into my club the other night and a young fellow came over to me and said, 'General, I am very proud and happy to meet you; you've been a landmark to me all my life. I've read about you in history!' Lord! he looked at me with reverence and bowed down before me, and it was all I could do to be civil to him. Read about me in his history, indeed! as if I were Moses!"

At the time of the death of General Sheridan he was lamenting the rapid thinning of the ranks of his contemporaries and, shaking his head, said sadly: "There we go, one after another. Grant and Sheridan, and soon, I suppose, I shall join the procession. Well, that will be the last of the race—there will be no Generals left when I'm gone."

On one occasion, when visiting Mrs. Ewing, Gen. Sherman met four or five Presbyterian clergymen, and his patience was rather severely tried by their religious discussions, and what seemed to him their intolerant and one-sided views. One of them challenged him to offer any excuse for swearing, meet-

ing him with the clinching statemant that there should be no redemption for blasphemers.

"Were you," inquired the young soldier, "ever at sea in a heavy gale, with spars creaking and sails flapping, and the crew cowardly and incompetent?"

"No."

"Did you ever," he continued gravely, "try to drive a five-team ox-cart across the prairie?"

"No."

"Then," said Capt. Sherman, "you know nothing of the temptations to blasphemy—you know nothing about extenuating circumstances for blasphemy—you are not competent to judge!"

General Sherman was proud of tracing his powers of endurance to his mother, to whom he also frequently ascribed the heritage of other soldierly characteristics.

"She married very young," said the General—"her husband, who was not very much older, being a lawyer with hope and ambition for his patrimony, and all the world before him where to choose. He chose Ohio, leaving his young wife in Jersey City while he made a home for her in what was then a far country.

"Soon as he had made a home for her she went to him. She rode on horseback, with her young baby in her arms, from Jersey City to Ohio, the journey occupying twenty-three days! What would a New York bride say to such a journey as that? I'm afraid she'd want to wait until her husband had made money enough to have a railroad built for her."

"Curious," said the General one day, "to notice the difference in the families. I've got a brother out in Wisconsin—cashier in a bank—most methodical man that ever lived—eats and sleeps by rule. He couldn't live in one of these New York palaces. He lives in a nice frame house, and

has for twenty years and more come and gone from his office every day at precisely the same hour. The people in the town set their watches by him, and if he were five minutes late, there wouldn't be a correct timepiece within a mile. He has sat on one seat in his office and hung his coat on one peg for twenty years, and if anybody gets in before him and gets off a joke on him by using the peg, it sours his temper for the whole day."

Reminiscence of Ex-President Hayes :—

"General Sherman was once asked why he had always shown so little disposition to question General Grant's position or his judgment in military matters. The answer was: 'I could always plan a dozen different ways of accomplishing a military object, and Phil Sheridan would declare that he could fight any one of them out to victory; but neither of us could tell which was really the best plan. Then we would go to Grant, lay the whole of them before him, and he would tell us which plan was the best, and why; and then we could see it, too. Grant's place was where he was, at the head.' Ex-President Hayes forcibly alludes to the tender side of his character. "He knew what war was, and he expressed it in the most terrible words in the English language. 'War,' said he, 'is hell.' I suppose that he would unflinchingly and with little hesitation do the worst possible things that man can do. There was no fluttering, sinking or softening of the heart. He was able to do what the war required him to do, although it might be cruel; yet he was as tender as a woman. No manly man was ever more kind than he."

Reminiscence of Chauncey M. Depew :—

"He told me an interesting story about a prominent citizen of Savannah who came to his headquarters after he had captured that city. The gentleman was in great trepidation and informed the General that he had some valuable pictures in

his house. The General said they were entirely safe. He said he also had a collection of family plate of great intrinsic value, and on account of its associations, very precious to himself and family. The General told him he would put a guard about the house if necessary. Then, in a burst of frank confidence, produced by this generous response to his fears, he revealed to General Sherman that he had buried in his back-yard a large quantity of priceless Madeira, of the oldest and rarest vintages, and estimated to be worth over $40,000 before the war. The General responded at once: 'That is medicine, and confiscated to the hospital.' What the hospital did not need he distributed among the troops.

"I heard General Sherman once narrate a very striking battle incident. He had rallied his troops and led them to a charge which was everywhere successful. As he rode into the enemy's camp he saw a soldier lying on a barrow and an officer standing over him with an uplifted knife. He shouted to the officer not to strike, and spurred up to the group to discover that the men were both dead; the only solution being that the officer, who was a surgeon, was in the act of performing an operation, for the extraction of a bullet upon the soldier when the concussion of a cannon ball passing near them had killed them both, and they had stiffened in the attitude they occupied at the moment when their lives went out."

Tribute of General O. O. Howard "When I first knew General Sherman, he was as well formed as a model cadet at West Point or Annapolis. His head was more noticeable than the rest of his body. His high forehead, clear eye, with sandy hair and ruddy complexion, allied him at once to the Anglo-Saxon type. His step was strong and quick, and an energy of action marked him in a high degree, even up to his last sickness at seventy-one years of age."

"He once remarked that he preserved his health by simple

living, eating principally meat and bread, never trusting to condiments and dressings for an appetite. Though he attended many festivities and participated in hundreds of public dinners, yet he was always careful in his diet; he evidently had taken pains all his life to preserve a strong and vigorous body, which he might well do, building as he did upon a superb constitution, the inheritance of a grand parentage.

"As illustrating his powers of endurance, we now call to mind the bloody and prolonged work on the field of Shiloh; the almost unending toil and reconnoisances, marching, watching and fighting of Vicksburg; the rapid fall campaign, gathering his army in the Mississippi Valley and pushing it thence through a series of untold hardships and exposure on to Chattanooga; the struggle for the rocky, inaccessible heights at the north end of Missionary Ridge; the immediate day and night exposure and toil of a hundred miles to Knoxville and back; and, while others were resting, the return to Vicksburg, and the conducting of a winter campaign to Meridian, Miss., and back to Vicksburg Bluffs; the regathering of his hosts; the assuming of a new command near Chattanooga: the combining of the three armies, or parts of them, in front of Dalton; and the more than a hundred days' marching hither and thither, with battle after battle in close conjunction with his enterprising enemy, Joseph E. Johnston; his taking of Atlanta; his pursuit of Hood, who partially turned him back for another hundred miles; his march from Atlanta to Savannah, and his almost immediate march—a campaign much more trying, much harder of execution, and more prolonged — through the swamps of the Carolinas on to the final consummation at Bentonville. These works, of which he was the head, required on his part tremendous physical strength. No rail-

way coach, steamer, ambulance or easy carriage ever was used by him to relieve the physical work. Rough riding, and long continued, on the back of horse or mule, carried him through those remarkable days. Who connot see that he had a constitution, a development, a physical structure, full of health and unflagging energy.

"As to perception, so far as externals are concerned, I never knew an officer in the field who more quickly took in the topography of a country, and when once mastered it always remained in his mind as a precise and detailed mapping of the situation. In studies, whether you tried him on the subject of finance, mathematics, the camp and garrison equipage, or rations for an army, scientific studies, like geology and mineralogy, his observation was clear and keen. His perception of differences and contrasts never failed him. I hardly think that as a cadet at West Point, a business man in California, an instructor in Louisiana, an officer of the old army, a general of volunteers, or as the head of the regular establishment, or when aiding the projection of the Pacific Railway, any problem was ever presented to his ardent mind that was not sooner or later properly and completely solved, and generally, unless there was extraordinary detail, solved with unusual celerity.

"Once I was near Gen. Sherman at Atlanta. He had a great many plans for different objects and different bodies of troops, and which he was just then about to put into execution, when suddenly they were all interrupted by an unexpected flank movement of the Confederate General Hood. I found that he anticipated what was unexpected by others, and he said to me at once, 'I will wait. If Hood passes a certain point, I turn my whole army back upon him, except one corps, under Gen. Slocum, shall be left to hold Atlanta.'

"If we confine ourselves for a moment to the mental

application of this man, there is perhaps no better illustration of it than that given in Gen. Grant's phrase—'Sherman bones all day on his horse.' Yes, for hours on that Carolina campaign, I have noticed him with his horse going almost at will, diminishing or increasing his speed according to his fancy, while his master would lean his head forward and be silent for long periods of time, evidently intensely applying himself to some problem steadily held before his mental gaze.

"When we remark the organizing power, we can best test it by results. I do not think that Gen. Sherman, keen as he was in observation, always read men who were near at hand so well as Napoleon did; but his confidence in those that he chose, his strong personal magnetism and his ability to impart quickly and accurately his ideas, often in graphic form, illumined other minds, and lifted some men that would have been mediocre, into places of comparative success. No one excelled him in energizing those whom he chose to aid him.

"Perhaps the most remarkable quality of his mental make-up was his marvellous memory. Probably at the close of the war he could call 5,000 officers by name. He had learned rapidly from youth to manhood, and he appeared to have forgotten nothing that he had ever learned. His quartermaster, Easton, went to him for the solution of transportation problems as to a written authority. In ten minutes he would demonstrate to his Chief Commissary the number of rations that would support his different armies for a week or a month. He was apparently abreast of the great engineer, Granville M. Dodge, in train running, bridge building and railroad construction. He was a little ahead of the Confederate Hood in all his quick correspondence involving the laws of war and of rations, and whenever General Blair and myself came to him to decide between us upon some historical point awakened

by our proximity in the Carolinas to an old Revolutionary battlefield, Sherman had it at his tongue's end, and, whatever the difference, we happily bowed to his decision. This indicates fundamental acquirement and extraordinary memory.

"General Sherman manifested 'prophetic vision' early in his career. He saw the conflict before it came, and he measured its proportions and predicted what came to pass. It was that wonderful vividness in trumping up things to come, what would succeed and what would fail, and telling it with plainness, that caused the Cincinnati *Commercial* to call him crazy. It was a great shame; but when his prophecies began to be realized and prove themselves true, the minor prophets became like those of Baal and disappeared. Sherman triumphed over them, for he foretold the simple truth.

"His power of expression has always stood him well in hand. From the President to the humblest companion in arms who was associated with him, there has been joy and refreshment. Sometimes, as with almost all men who are frank and free in speech, he would doubtless say things that might better have been left unsaid. Many times newspaper correspondents who worried him by publishing what he wished to withhold, would meet him and receive rebuffs. But it should be remembered that during the war a leader like Sherman often received the most unspairing criticism, and his sensitive soul was stung to the quick, so that it was not wonderful that he became a little pugnacious and resentful. At such times he was often lashed into fever heat, so that it took time and will power to make abatement. Then for a time everybody about him realized that something was wrong. But these chafings were never frequent and never long continued. Combative, resentful to wrong, he was never unkind nor malicious.

"His countrymen will undoubtedly recall his exhibition of

feeling toward Halleck and Stanton and others who had any hand in attempts to humiliate him after the Johnston surrender. Sherman's high soul resented it all. Little things will often irritate a lion, but he is a lion still. I may say a word in regard to his judgment. Certainly it was good and sound whenever he took time for reflection upon matters submitted which required the exercise.

"Still, with so brilliant a mind, one so full of suggestions, I do not think that he could, like Grant, always call up the best word, nor like Thomas, settle down upon a given course, as altogether the wisest. He excelled in strategic combinations, in anticipating and controverting his enemies' projects. But I do not think that in the conduction of a battle, with its details and changes, his judgment was as good as that of Sheridan, Thomas or Grant.

"My memory reverts to operations about Atlanta, to the terrible field of the Kenesaw, and to the last operations at Bentonville, where, I think, Sheridan might have been more effective and successful in immediate results. But who can tell? All these men are the nation's children. In brilliant campaigns and great results surely Grant himself is not far ahead.

"But a word now with regard to Sherman's moral and spiritual make-up. I will simply say from a long and close observation of one who allowed me to be his friend, I do not think that General Sherman ever meditated the doing of a wrong thing. Whether he knew it or not, he owed much of his soul illumination to the presence and direction of the Infinite Spirit. How far he took the living and divine Helper into fellowship, no man can tell. While he abominated quackery and hypocrisy, he had great admiration of genuine great men.

"Loyalty to family, loyalty to society about him, loyalty to

duty and country, he quickly observed in another, and it was a quality of the mental characteristics of his own great soul."

A correspondent recalls an interview with Grant a short time before his death, in which Sherman was the subject of conversation, and Grant's striking language was:—"Sherman is not only a great soldier but a great man—one of the very greatest in our country's history. He is a many sided man—a writer and orator. As a general I know of no man I would put above him. Then his character is fine—so frank, sincere, outspoken genuine. I know what he was before Vicksburg. I set him to watching Johnston in my rear, and never had a moments anxiety when Sherman was there. I don't think he ever went to bed with his clothes off, or without visiting his pickets nightly during that campaign. His industry was prodigious. There is no man living for whose character I have a higher respect."

Sherman, in a recently published letter, thus describes his interview with President Lincoln, on board the Ocean Queen, at City Point, during his visit to the Army of the Potomac, March 27th, 1865. After telling how and where he found General Grant, General Sherman says:—

"We had quite a long and friendly talk, when he remarked that the President, Mr. Lincoln, was near by, on a steamer lying at the dock, and he proposed that we should call at once. We did so, and found Mr. Lincoln on board the Ocean Queen. We had met in the early part of the war, and he recognized me, and received me with a warmth of manner and expression that was most grateful. We then sat some time in the after cabin, and Mr. Lincoln made many inquiries about the events which attended the march from Savannah to Goldsboro, and seemed to enjoy the numerous stories about 'our bummers,' of which he had heard so much. When in lively conversation, his face brightened wonderfully; but if the conversation

flagged, his face assumed a sad and sorrowful expression. General Grant and I explained to him that my next move from Goldsboro would bring my army—increased to 80,000 men by Schofield's and Terry's reinforcements—in close communication with General Grant's army, then investing Lee in Richmond, and that, unless Lee could effect his escape and make junction with Johnston in North Carolina, he would soon be shut up in Richmond, with no possibility of supply, and would have to surrender.

"Mr. Lincoln was extremely interested in this view of the case, and when we explained that Lee's only chance was to escape, join Johnston and, being then between me in North Carolina and Grant in Virginia, he could choose which to fight. Mr. Lincoln seemed unusually impressed with this, but General Grant explained that at the very moment of our conversation General Sheridan was passing his cavalry across the James' River from the north to the south; that he would with this cavalry so extend his left below Petersburg as to reach the South Shore Road, and that if Lee should 'let go' his fortified lines, he, Grant, would follow him so close that he could not possibly fall on me alone in North Carolina. I, in like manner, expressed the fullest confidence that my army in North Carolina was willing to cope with Lee and Johnston combined till Grant could come up, but we both agreed that one more bloody battle was likely to occur before the close of the war.

"Mr. Lincoln repeatedly inquired as to General Schofield's ability in my absence, and seemed anxious that I should return to North Carolina, and more than once exclaimed: 'Must more blood be shed? Cannot this last bloody battle be avoided?' We explained that we had to presume that General Lee was a real general; that he must see that Johnston alone was no barrier to my progress; and that, if my

army of 80,000 veterans should reach Burkesville, he in Richmond was lost, and that we were forced to believe he would not wait that inevitable conclusion, but make one more desperate effort. I think we were with Mr. Lincoln an hour or more, and then returned to General Grant's quarters, where Mrs. Grant had prepared for us some coffee or tea. During this meal Mrs. Grant inquired if we had seen Mrs. Lincoln. I answered 'No; I did not know she was on board.' 'Now,' said Mrs. Grant, 'you are a pretty pair,' etc., and went on to explain that we had been guilty of a piece of unpardonable rudeness. But the General said: 'Never mind, we will repeat the visit to-morrow, and can then see Mrs. Lincoln.'"

The two following letters exemplify Sherman's patriotic spirit. They were originally strictly confidential communications addressed to President Johnson at a time when he was in conflict with his Secretary of War, Stanton, and when he (Stanton) was, in fact, under suspension. The veil of confidence was not lifted till after Sherman's death, when all the parties interested had passed away. Johnson had determined to establish an Eastern Military Department, with Sherman at the head, who was also to act as Secretary of War *ad interim*. This project, whose ultimate design was the substitution of Stanton by another pending the settlement of the dispute then existing between Johnson and Stanton, drew forth the letters from Sherman, the first of which ran:—

"'Confidential.)

"'Library Room, War Department.

"'Washington, D. C., Jan. 31, 1868.

"'To the President:—

"'My personal preferences, as expressed, were to be allowed to return to St. Louis, resume my present command, because my command was important, large, and suited to my

rank and inclination, and, because my family was well provided for there in house, facilities of schools, living and agreeable society; while on the other hand, Washington was for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable, especially because it is the political capital of the country, and the focus of intrigue, gossip and slander.

"Your personal preferences were, as expressed, to make a new department East, adequates to my rank, with head-quarters at Washington, and to assign me to its command; to remove my family here, and to avail myself of its schools; to remove Mr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me discharge the duties.

"To effect this removal two modes were indicated; to simply cause him to quit the War Office building, and notify the Treasury Department and the army staff departments no longer to respect him as Secretary of War, or to remove him and submit my name to the Senate for confirmation.

"'Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise by saying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have not even seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery or General Grant since I was with you.

"'It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organization of the Government, that the second officer of the army should be at the second important command, and remote from general headquarters. To bring me to Washington would put three heads to our army—yourself, General Grant and myself—and we would be more than human if we were not to differ. In my judgment it would ruin the army, and would be fatal to one or two of us.

"'This state of things that centered here defeated every army that had its head hero from 1861 to 1865, and would have overwhelmed General Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not been fortified by a strong reputation,

already hard earned, and because no one then living coveted the place. Whereas, in the West we made progress from the start, because there was no political capital, nor enough to poison our mind and kindle into life that craving, itching for fame which has killed more good men than bullets.

"'I have been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughter, when the howls of people reached him after Shiloh; when messengers were speeding to and from his army to Washington, bearing slanders to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga, when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules to satisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the 'forlorn hope,' to command the Army of the Potomac, so often defeated; and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he has been in Washington and been compelled to read himself a 'sneak' and 'deceiver,' based on reports of four of the Cabinet, and apparently with your knowledge. If this political atmosphere can disturb the equanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will be the result with one so careless and so outspoken as I am?

"'Therefore, with my consent, Washington never!

"'With great respect, yours truly,

(Signed) W. T. SHERMAN,
Lieutenant-General.

The second letter relating to the same subject was sent to the President through General Grant. The President did not understand Sherman's caution in this respect, and clung to the idea that he (Sherman) would prefer Washington to St. Louis. The letter read:—

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSOURI,
"ST. LOUIS, MO., February 14, 1868.

"*To the Presedent:*—

"*Dear Sir:*—It is hard for me to conceive you would



GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN.

purposely do me an unkindness, unless under the pressure of public duty or because you don't believe me sincere.

"I was in hopes since my letter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded to pass over that purpose of yours, expressed more than once in conversation, to organize a new command for me in the East, with headquarters in Washington; but a telegram from General Grant of yesterday says that 'the order was issued ordering you (me) to Atlantic division,' and the newspapers of that morning contained the same information, with the addition that I had been named as 'brevet general.'

"I have telegraphed to my own brother in the Senate to oppose my confirmation on the grounds that the two higher grades in the army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust you will conceive my motives aright.

"If I could see my way clear to maintain my family I should not hesitate a moment to resign my present commission, and seek some business wherein I would be free from these unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me, spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them, but necessity ties my hands, and I must submit with the best grace I can till I make other arrangements.

"In Washington are already the headqnarters of a dapartment and of the army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can render any military service there. Any staff officer, with rank of major, could assuredly fill any gap left between these two military officers; and by being placed in Washington, I will be universally construed as a rival to the General in Chief, a position damaging to me in the highest degree.

"Our relations have always been most confidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud of difficulty should arise between us, my sense of personal dignity and duty

would leave me no alternative but resignation. For this I am not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it as rapidly as possble, that when the time does come (as it surely will if this plan is carried into effect), I may act promptly.

"Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a full revocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at New York, or any point you may name, within the new military division other than Washington. This privilege is generally granted to all military commanders, and I see no good reason why I, too, may not ask for it, and this simple concession, involving no public interest, will much soften the blow, which right or wrong I construe as one of the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered with adversity. With great respect, yours truly,

(Signed) W. T. SHERMAN."

General Sherman was counted by that numerous and ingenious class known as newspaper correspondents as a hard man to interview. In early times they had been his worst enemies, but he had lived down their aspersions and outlived the terms of their natural lives—at least, the lives of most of them. A new generation has sprung up capable of appreciating him, and disposed to be kindly. They are a knowing set, and not always accurate, yet in their way they help to elucidate character; if not by rational analysis, at least by sketches of peculiarities.

As an illustration of Sherman's remarkable memory, one of these correspondents narrates the following:

"General Sherman had a wonderful memory. This was illustrated by an incident that occurred in Philadelphia three years ago. He was visiting his daughter, and while sitting at the open window smoking one midsummer night he saw the policeman pass, and as the patrolman halted for a moment the General was noticed to give him a keen glance and utter an exclamation.

"The next evening he told some one that when the policeman on the beat passed again to say that he wanted to speak to him. When the officer entered he straightened up and and gave General Sherman the regular military salute.

"'Ah, ha,' said the General. 'I thought so. Now, where was it I saw you before? Do you know me?'

"'Oh, yes,' said the bearded patrolman. 'I knew you when you were a lieutenant. I was your drummer in California.'

"'Ha, ha, I thought so; and wait a bit. So you were that little drummer boy, and your name—your name's Hutchinson.'

"Sure enough, the General of the United States army, who had seen thousands of drummers, had recognized in a passing policeman the drummer boy who was with his company in the Mexican war.

Another, writing from New York, says: "At any great theatrical entertainment in New York, especially on first nights, he usually occupied a box, and it was the custom for the leading actor and actress to be introduced to him. Early in his residence in that city the orchestra would play 'Hail to the Chief' when he entered his box, and the audience would cheer him; but he soon wearied of what he called 'that flummery,' and in recent years it was discontinued by his own wish.

"He has not been free from controversies in the days of peace. Not long before the death of Jefferson Davis he had a momorable one with that veteran spitfire over Davis' relations to the founding of the Confederacy, and on several other occasions he has become involved in personal disputations. In these wordy battles he showed his irascibility of temper when aroused, but otherwise his nature was thoroughly genial. In New York he has been considered a raconteur and man-

about-town in the best sense of the word, ranking with Chauncey M. Depew and General Horace Porter. His association with his friends and comrades has always been exceedingly cordial. In May, 1888, when he presided for the last time at a dinner of the Loyal Legion, he declined a re-election to the position of commander, and when he arose at 2 o'clock in the morning to say good-bye an almost death-like stillness prevailed."

TWO MARCHES.

("*Sherman is dying.*" *February* 14, 1891).

When the wild war strife was fiercest
  And brave hearts at home grew faint,
When every man was a hero,
  And every woman a saint,
When our land with graves was holy—
  The slain must sleep where they fell,
And the shots fired in their honor
  Must avenge their death as well—
When each thought was a consecration,
  Each new drawn breath a prayer,
And the moaning heart of the nation
  Sought a leader to do and dare.

Then one warrior, wisdom-thoughted,
  Discerned how the only way
To reclaim our erring brothers
  In cruelest kindness lay,
And the scourging march led onward
  By Ohio's noble son,
Ceased not till the sea before him
  Told his hard, right task was done.
No word from his columns reached us:
  In strained uncertainty,
We murmured a prayer: "God help him,
  As he marches to the sea!"

Once more, though the Southern roses
Bloom fragrant through peace-filled air,
Ascends from his anxious country
That selfsame fervent prayer.
By viewless hosts attended,
Slow, solemn-paced, silently,
His last march he is taking,
To the shores of the Unknown Sea,
But we fear not, though come no tidings
O'er the pathway already trod,
For a heart to its country loyal
Will be loyal, too, to its God.

And the tale of his great death-victory
Will be told to his soldiers true,
To his friends gone home before him,
The army of boys in blue.
We know not the life beyond us,
The thoughts in freed souls that rise,
Nor what of the dear world-mem'ries
Survive in the happy skies,
But I think a great shout of welcome
Will rend the celestial dome,
When they see from the hills of heaven
Their old commander come:
And swelling the strain of triumph
By glad angels borne along,
The blue and the gray intermingled
Will join in the greeting song.
And our union on earth unbroken,
A symbol to them shall be,
Of their union with peace eternal
And love everlastingly.

MARY LISBETH MACARTNEY.

CHAPTER XVII.

DEATH AND THE GRAVE.

With the death of Sherman the title of "General" completely disappears from our military system.

It has been held by three men only. It was created in 1866 by act of Congress, and conferred upon Grant. Sherman then succeeded Grant as Lieutenant-General, and when the latter took his seat as President in March, 1869, the former became General of the Army.

In 1884 Sherman was put on the retired list with the title which he held to the time of his death In the active service the office by provision of law became vacant, and the title extinct, Sheridan being commander of the army with the rank of Lieutenant-General.

In 1888, just before Sheridan's death, the rank of Lieutenant-General was abolished, and that of General revived, with the understanding that Sheridan should be made General, and the express provision that the title should continue only during his life.

Since that time the head of the army has been a Major-General.

General Sherman's illness was of little more than a week's duration. Following a taste, natural and cultivated, which he loved to gratify, the General attended the performance of "Poor Jonathan," at the Casino, on Wednesday night, February 4. It was, in fact, a special performance. Invitations had been sent to the military officers of the city, and General Sherman occupied one of the proscenium boxes with a party of friends. He seemed

to be in the best of health and spirits, and gave every evidence of keen enjoyment of the opera.

He returned to his home immediately after the performance, and, although the weather was clear and cold, in some way the General caught a severe cold. Its first effects were noticed on the following morning. His condition, however, did not prevent his attendance at the wedding of Miss Shepard on that afternoon. He coughed a little and complained of the cold while in the church. On Friday morning his condition had become more uncomfortable, but excited no alarm. His throat, however, had become affected in the mean time, and he was obliged to give up a dinner with Lawrence Barrett that evening at the Union League Club. When he began to show signs of facial erysipelas, accompanied by fever, he felt some anxiety, and sent for Dr. Alexander, who had been his family physician for a number of years. On Sunday the disease began to get a firm hold upon the old warrior. His face and neck became much swollen and inflamed, and conversation became difficult and painful. His condition was such that Dr. Alexander sent for Dr. Janeway for the purpose of holding a consultation. The General was then confined to his bed, and it was found that the ordinary treatment applied in cases of erysipelas would not answer the purpose; in part owing to the General's advanced age.

His physician, Dr. C. T. Alexander, gives the following history of his fatal illness:—

"The General caught cold Wednesday a week ago, February 4th, 1891. The next day he attended a wedding against the urgent advice of the members of his family. On Friday I was called in and found the General suffering from a cold and a sore throat. On

Saturday he felt so much better that he wanted to keep an appointment he had made for that day. On my advice, however, he desisted, and spent the day playing cards, I believe, with his family. Erysipelas set in on Sunday. He was flighty that day, and on Monday he became delirious. The erysipelas spread over his face, and the lymphatic glands in his neck became swollen. I applied treatment for the erysipelas. Wednesday came and there was no change for the better, but General Sherman slightly rallied on Thursday morning. His rally was not such to insure even faint hope of the Generals recovery, and I so informed Surgeon General Moore at Washington. Friday was the turning point for the patient. The erysipelas had almost completely disappeared, but the attack had left the General very much weakened. His old complaint, bronchial trouble and asthma, I think, killed General Sherman. In his weakened condition he was unable to throw off the mucus which gathered on his lungs. The mucus accumulated, and the General was slowly strangled to death.

"I think he suffered greatly. There was always the quick respiration, the gasp for breath, but he bore everything without a murmur, and no one could have been more heroic.

"Since Tuesday we had practically abandoned all hope of General Sherman's recovery."

Lieutenant Fitch, authorized the following account of scenes at the death bed of the General :—

"General Sherman lay in bed from Friday morning until he died at 1.50 P. M. February 14th without speaking a word. He made the attempt to do so several times, but was unable to utter a sound other than a hoarse gasp.

He apparently recognized those about him by a look of the eye. His tongue was swollen and his jaws were stiff some hours before he died.

Signs of death were noticed half an hour before he died, in the icy coldness of the finger tips. This coldness gradually extended to his hands and arms. He was unconscious for the last two hours he was alive. At the bedside were his son, P. T. Sherman; his daughters Rachel and Lizzie; Lieutenant and Mrs. Fitch, Lieutenant and Mrs. Thackara, Senator John Sherman, Dr. Alexander and General Thomas Ewing. The two daughters remained kneeling, one at each side of the bed during the last hour of the life of their father. Neither priest nor clergyman was present; neither was any sent for. The General did not suffer any pain for the last two days.

All night long he lay in bed with his head high, but toward morning he worked his head down until at last he lay perfectly flat. Death came so quietly that those at the bedside did not realize that the General was dead until Dr. Alexander said "All is over." Death came with one long sigh.

Suffocation, due to the lungs filling with mucus, was the cause.

Immediately after his death Generals Howard and Slocum, who were on General Sherman's staff, were sent for. Some two weeks before, the General had made known his wishes as to his burial. He particularly requested that his body should not lie in state anywhere.

He also requested that the funeral be a strictly military one. He said he did not care particularly for any military observances in New York, but that he did want a military burial in St. Louis, which would be participa-

ted in by his old comrades in arms. He also requested that the funeral rites be not in conformity with any particular form of religion. He wanted a soldier's burial.

The body was embalmed and laid out in the room in which he died. The features were natural, with the exception of a slight swelling on the right jaw and under both eyes. The eyes were closed and his arms folded across his breast.

Under the starry folds of the flag he loved so well the honored form of the dead chieftain lay at rest.

It was a rest well earned. Ripe in his years and full sheathed in his honors, the rancors of the past faded out by the kindly hand of time and the comradeship and friendship of men whom he had once waged fierce but honest warfare with. He had lived a life plethoric with the best blessings that attend humanity, and died honored and mourned by the millions of the united nation.

An unstained name, a deathless fame, a vault into the great unknown after a silent and heroic battle with disease that added to the lustre of his renown, who could die more happily than William Tecumseh Sherman, the man who, with prophetic eye, saw death coming afar off, and blanched not at the dreadful apparition? Let drums be muffled and flags float low, but let the hearts of the American people rejoice that they can claim such men as he, last, but not least, of the war's great triumvirate.

A formal announcement of the General's death was sent to President Harrison, Vice-President Morton, Secretary of War Proctor, Secretary of State Blaine, Secretary Noble and General Schofield.

The wires flashed the sorrowful intelligence over the country, and to Europe. Flags fell to half-mast on all the capitols, national buildings, and in the commercial

centres. Thousands of private residences on the wealthy avenues of New York, thousands of humble tenements in the squalid streets, added their colors to the symbolic grief. Across the street from the plain four-storied house in which the General died, two silken banners bordered with crape hung down. On the house itself the sombre drapings of the doorbell were the only tokens that this was the place toward which the nation's eyes were turned. A sorrow-stricken nation showed the depth of its loss by resolutions of condolence, by touching eulogiums, by telegraphic sympathy. Admiral Porter had passed away but a day before, and Secretary Windom had preceded him to the spirit land by but a few days, both loved and respected in the highest degree, and yet there were deeper depths in the national heart to be moved by the passing of the martial chieftain. Old soldiers crowded the streets about his home, and begged for a last look at their general's pallid face. The Grand Army Posts everywhere met in solemn session, and made tearful minute of their grief. It would be impossible here to record the many expressions of sorrow called forth by the sad event. A few samples must suffice for the whole.

GENERAL SHERMAN DIED,

FEBRUARY 14, 1891, AT 1.50 P. M.

He is not dead! To-night he sits among
The warriors in Valhalla. At their board
About his seat the mightiest captains throng;
For him song rises. The strong wines are poured.
Cæsar doth welcome him. Great Frederick's head
Bows in his honor. Gustav, he the bold,
Gives him iron hand-clasp. Stately in their tread,
The two great Dukes, great England's greatest two,
Recount their Ramilies and Waterloo.
And the fierce Corsican his impatience chains,

Hearkening the story of his vast campaigns.
Yea, and without the armies, fires are lit—
The fires of all our armies. Glad their cheer.
Ghost bugles blow and shadowy guidons flit
By troop and squadron, as the soldiers hear
That to their camp, 'neath Heaven's highest dome,
The last of their Commanders Three comes home.
He is not dead! Nay, he doth more than live.
He finds companionship earth can no longer give.

"P. T. Sherman, New York:—The members of the Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis deeply deplore the death of your distinguished father, the gallant soldier, the renowned general, and eminent citizen, and extend to the family their warmest sympathy in the irreparable loss sustained, not only by the home circle, but by the whole nation.

Boston.—Announcement of General Sherman's death was generally made to the citizens by the tolling of the fire-alarm bells. The flags on State, Municipal, and Federal buildings was ordered at half mast.

Cincinnati.—Upon receipt of the news of General Sherman's death, the bells in the fire tower of the city hall began tolling and continued for fifteen minutes. Flags at the city and Government buildings, patrol, and engine houses were at once lowered to half mast.

"Hotel Metropole, New York, February 14.—To Mr and the Misses Sherman:—Let me express to you my profound sympathy in your great sorrow, which is shared by one who recalls in a quarter of a century of friendship such continual acts of kindness as cannot be forgotten. I suffer with so many others a deep personal loss in General Sherman's death. "Lawrence Barrett."

Detroit, Michigan, February, 14.—To the Misses Sherman:—Our already overburdened hearts throb with the

great sorrow that overwhelms and darkens your home. "Lights Out" on earth is "Reveille" to the dear general in heaven, where so many of his old command await him.

R. A. Alger.

One of the despatches was received by the family with great feeling. It was from General Sherman's foe of the Atlanta campaign, who himself had just passed his 82d birthday:—

"WASHINGTON, February, 14.—To the Misses Sherman:—Intelligence of General Sherman's death grieves me much. I sympathize deeply with you in your great bereavement.—J. E. Johnston."

"To the Hon. John Sherman:—Convey to your brother's bereaved family our tenderest sympathy. A very great man has gone.—James G. Blaine."

To Miss Rachel Sherman:—The nation mourns and sympathizes with you all in your great sorrow. Your illustrious father's death is to Mrs. Morton, our children, and myself the loss of a personal friend to whom we were devotedly attached.—Levi P. Morton."

"To the Hon. John Sherman:—Please accept for yourself and all the members of the family, sympathy in the bereavement you suffer in the loss of the General Commander, who was my dearest friend.—J. M. Schofield."

"To P. T. Sherman:—In this hour of affliction you have my deepest sympathy. The memory of General Sherman will be forever cherished by the American people as one of their most valued possessions.—B. F. Tracy."

"To the Misses Sherman:—The death of my old Commander causes deep sorrow to myself and household. Our sympathies are with his family in their great affliction.—John M. Harlan."

"To Hon. John Sherman:—Permit me to express to you, and through you to the family of General Sherman, my deep sorrow at the loss of my old commander, comrade, and friend. No words will express my grief at this irreparable loss. I can only join with his family and his country in mourning one of our nation's greatest leaders and strongest defenders in war and in peace.—J. M. Rusk."

"To Hon. John Sherman:—The heartfelt sympathy of myself and Mrs. Noble goes forth to the family of dear General Sherman and to you. Our countrymen mourn one of ours and the world's greatest heroes; but yours is the deeper grief for the loss of the father, brother, friend. Heaven bless you all.—John W. Noble."

Rev. DeWitt Talmage paid the following tribute:—"The century had no grander soul to surrender into the eternities than the one just passed away from us. Frank, honest, brilliant, gallant, patriotic, William T. Sherman. I thank God that I even knew that I ever felt the hearty grasp of his right hand, and had the friendship of his great, big heart.

"I have no part in the question which is being agitated as to whether he was a Catholic or a Protestant. I heard his confession of faith on a memorable occasion and under peculiar circumstances. In New York, at the New England dinner three years ago, I sat with him four hours. He on one side and the immortal Henry W. Grady on the other. When in conversation he expressed to me his respect for the religion embraced by his wife, and his own faith in God and his confidence in the future. Simple as a child, brave as a lion, sympathetic as a woman, firm as a rock, wrathful as a tempest when aroused against a great wrong, lovely as a June morning among his friends."

"CHICAGO, February 14.—Miss Rachel Sherman:—Our sincere sympathy is with you all.—Melville W. Fuller."

"CHICAGO, February 14—Miss Sherman:—Deep and heartfelt sympathy for the irreparable loss both to you and to America. H. M. Stanley."

The Archbishop of St. Louis wired:—

"ST. LOUIS, February 14.—To Mr. P. T. Sherman:—Accept my heartfelt sympathy with yourself and sisters. Peter R. Kendrick."

"CHICAGO, February 14.—To P. T. Sherman:—I am shocked and distressed. When I saw your father three weeks ago he was cheerful and well. During and since the war he was my faithful friend. His sorrowing children have my profound sympathy.—W. O. Gresham."

"CLEVELAND, Ohio, February 14.—To the Hon. John Sherman.—We mourn with the family and kindred of General Sherman. He was beloved by me and my family with the warmest personal affection. I expect to reach the Fifth Avenue Hotel Monday.—R. B. Hayes."

On the afternoon of February 14th, the President sent the following message to Congress:—

The death of Wm. Tecumseh Sherman, which took place to-day, at his residence in the city of New York, at 1 o'clock and 50 minutes P. M, is an event that will bring sorrow to the heart of every patriotic citizen. No living American was so loved and venerated as he. To look upon his face, to hear his name, was to have one's love of country intensified. He served his country, not for fame, not out of a sense of professional duty, but for love of the flag and of the beneficent civil institutions of which it was the emblem.

He was an ideal soldier and shared to the fullest the *esprit du corps* of the army, but he cherished the civil

institutions organized under the Constitution, and was only a soldier that these might be perpetuated in undiminished usefulness and honor. He was not an imitator. A profound student of military science and precedent, he drew from them principles and suggestions, and so adapted them to novel conditions that his campaigns will continue to be the profitable study of the military profession throughout the world. His genial nature made him comrade to every soldier of the great Union army. No presence was so welcome and inspiring at the camp fire or commandery as his. His career was complete; his honors were full. He had received from the Government the highest rank known to our military establishment, and from the people unstinted gratitude and love.

No word of mine can add to his fame. His death has followed in startling quickness that of the Admiral of the Navy, and it is a sadly notable incident that when the department under which he served shall have put on the usual emblem of mourning, four of the Eight Executive Departments will be simultaneously draped in black, and one has but to-day removed the crape from its walls. BENJAMIN HARRISON.

Executive Mansion, Feb. 14, 1891.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS.

It is my painful duty to announce to the country that General William Tecumseh Sherman died this day at 1 o'clock and 50 minutes P. M., at his residence, in the city of New York. The Secretary of War will cause the highest military honors to be paid to the memory of this distinguished officer. The national flag will be floated at half-mast over all public buildings until after the burial, and the public business will be suspended in the Executive

Departments of the city of Washington, and in the city where the interment takes place, on the day of the funeral and in all places where public expression is given to the national sorrow, during such hours as will enable every officer and employer to participate therein with their fellow-citizens. BENJAMIN HARRISON.

Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Feb. 14, 1891.

The following is the President's message to the family of General Sherman:—

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, D. C., Feb. 14, 1891.—To Hon. John Sherman, New York:—I loved and venerated General Sherman, and would stand very near to the more deeply afflicted members of his family in this hour of bereavement. It will be as if there were one dead in every loyal household in the land. I suggest the body be borne through Washington and lie in state for one day in the rotunda of the Capitol. Please advise me of any arrangements made. BENJAMIN HARRISON.

The Acting Secretary of War promptly issued a general order to the army announcing the death of General Sherman. It included the President's message to Congress and the executive order issued by him to the executive departments, and closed as follows:—

The Major-General commanding will issue the necessary orders to the army.

It is ordered that the War Department be draped in mourning for the period of thirty days, and that all business be suspended therein on the day of the funeral.

L. A. GRANT,
Acting Secretary of War.

This was accompanied by another order issued by Adjutant-General Kelton, by command of Major-General Schofield, as follows:—

On the day of the funeral the troops at every military post will be paraded and this order read to them, after which all labors for the day will cease. The national flag will be displayed at half-mast from the time of the receipt of this order until the close of the funeral. On the day of the funeral a salute of seventeen guns will be fired at half-hour intervals, commencing at 8 o'clock A. M. The officers of the army will wear the usual badges of mourning, and the colors of the several regiments and battalions will be draped in mourning for a period of six months.

The day and hour of the funeral will be communicated to Department Commanders by telegraph, and by them to their subordinate commanders. Other necessary orders will be issued hereafter relative to the appropriate funeral services.

There was a full attendance in the Senate of the United States when the President's touching and appropriate message was read. Senator Hawley arose in his place and offered the following:—

Resolved, That the Senate receives with profound sorrow the announcement of the death of William Tecumseh Sherman, late General of the Armies of the United States.

Resolved, That the Senate renews its acknowledgment of the inestimable services which he rendered to his country in the days of its extreme peril, laments the great loss which the country has sustained, and deeply sympathizes with his family in its bereavement.

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be forwarded to the family of the deceased.

Mr. Hawley said:—

Mr. President: At this hour the Senate, the Congress,

and the people of the United States are one family. What we have been daily expecting has happened—General Sherman has received and obeyed his last order. He was a great soldier, by the judgment of the great soldiers of the world. In time of peace he has been a great citizen, glowing and abounding with love of country and of all humanity. His glorious soul appeared in every look, gesture and word.

The history of our country is rich in soldiers who have set examples of simple soldiery, obedience to the civil law and of self-abnegation. Washington, Grant, Sheridan, and Sherman lead the list. Sherman was the last of the illustrious trio who were, by universal consent, the foremost figures in the armies of the Union in the late war. Among the precious traditions to pass into our history for the admiration of the old and the instruction of the young, was their friendship, their most harmonious cooperation without a shadow of ambition or pride. When General Grant was called to Washington to take command of the armies of the Union, his great heart did not forget the men who stood by him.

Here Mr. Hawley read the letter from Grant to Sherman (written at that time) expressing thanks to him and McPherson as the men, above all others, to whom he owed his success; and Sherman's letter in reply, saying that General Grant did himself injustice and them too much honor. Mr. Hawley closed his remarks (his voice frequently giving way from grief and emotion) by reading the following pages from Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress: -

After this it was noised about that Mr. Valiant—for truth was taken with a summons. When he understood it he called for his friends and told them of it. Then, said he, "I am going to my Fathers; and though with

great difficulty I got hither, yet now I do not repent me of all the trouble I have been at to arrive where I am. My sword I give to him that shall succeed me in my pilgrimage, and my courage and skill to him that can get them. My marks and scars I carry with me, to be a witness for me that I have fought His battles who will now be a rewarder." When the day that he must go hence was come many accompanied him to the river side into which as he went he said: "Death, where is thy sting?" and as he went down deeper he said: "Grave, where is thy victory?" So he passed over and all the trumpets sounded for him on the other side.

He was followed by Senator Morgan, of Alabama, who remarked:—

On this occasion of national solemnity I would lead the thoughts and sympathies of the American Senate back to those days in our history when General Sherman was, by a choice greatly honorable to his nature, a citizen of the State of Louisiana, and presided over a college for the instruction of Southern youths in the arts of war and the arts of peace. These were not worse days than some we have seen during the last half of this century. In those days, notwithstanding the then conditions of the South in view of its institutions, inherited from the older States of the East, every American was as welcome in Louisiana and the South as he was elsewhere in the Union. We are gradually and surely returning to that cordial state of feeling which was unhappily interrupted by the civil war.

Our fathers taught us that it was the highest patriotism to defend the Constitution of the country. But they had left within its body guarantees of an institution that the

will of the majority finally determined should no longer exist, and which put the conscience of the people to the severest test. Looking back now to the beginning of this century, and to the conflict of opinion, and of material interests engendered by those guarantees, we can see that they never could have been stricken out of the organic law except by a conflict of arms. The conflict came, as it was bound to come, and Americans became enemies, as they were bound to be, in the settlement of issues that involved so much money, such radical political results, and the pride of a great and illustrious race of people. The power rested with the victors at the close of the conflict, but not all the honors of the desperate warfare. Indeed, the survivors are now winning honors, enriched with justice and magnanimity, not less worthy than those won on the battle-fields in their labors to restore the country to its former feeling of fraternal regard and to unity of sentiment and action, and to promote its welfare. The fidelity of the great general who has just departed in the ripeness of age and with a history marked by devotion to his flag was the true and simple faith of an American to his convictions of duty. We differed with him and contested campaigns and battle-fields with him; but we welcomed the history of the great soldier as the proud inheritance of our country. We do this as cordially and as sincerely as we gave him welcome in the South, as one of our people, when our sons were confided to his care in a relation that, next to paternity, had its influence upon the young men of the country.

The great military leaders on both sides of our civil war are rapidly marching across the border to a land where history and truth and justice must decide upon

every man's career. When they meet there they will be happy to find that the honor of human actions is not always measured by their wisdom, but by the motives in which they had their origin. I cherish the proud belief that the heroes of the civil war will find that, measured by this standard, none of them on either side were delinquent, and they will be happy in an association that will never end, and will never be disturbed by any evil thought, jealously or distrust. When a line so narrow divides us from those high courts in which our actions are to be judged by their motives, and when so many millions now living, and increasing millions to follow, are to be affected by the wisdom of our enactments, we will do well to give up this day to reflection upon our duties and in sympathy with this great country to dedicate the day to his memory. In such a retrospect we shall find an admonition that an American Senate should meet on this side of the fatal line of death as the American generals meet on the other side to render justice to each other and to make our beloved country as happy comparatively as we should wish the great beyond to be to those great spirits.

Senator Manderson, of Nebraska, said:—That as the hours of the last two or three days passed away he had not had the heart to make the preparation for the event which all feared and dreaded, as might seem to be meet and appropriate. He had been afraid to prepare anything that might be in the nature of a post-mortem tribute. It seemed like a surrender to the enemy. The death of General Sherman came, although one might have been prepared for it, as the unexpected. It was a day of mourning and grief. Here, at the Capitol of the Nation, lay the body of the great Admiral, the Chief of

the Navy, and in New York was being prepared for the last sad rites the corpse of the greatest military genius which the nation had produced. General Sherman had been not only great as a military leader, but he had been great as a civilian. Who was there that had heard him tell of the events of his wonderful career who had not been filled with admiration and respect for his abilities? It seemed to him that General Sherman was perhaps the only man in the North who, in the early days of the war, seemed to appreciate what the terrible conflict meant. It was recollected how it was said in 1861 that he must be insane to make the suggestion which he made. These suggestions were so starting to the country that he (Mr. Manderson) did not wonder that men doubted General Sherman's sanity. Like men of great genius, he seemed to have lived in that debatable ground existing between the line of perfect sanity and insanity.

After a review of General Sherman's military career, opening at Shiloh and closing at Atlanta, Mr. Manderson read General Sherman's letter to the Mayor and Common Council of Atlanta, beginning:—

"We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America."

In conclusion Mr. Manderson said:—

General Sherman was as estimable as a citizen and as fully appreciated the duties of a civilian as he was admirable as a soldier. But this strife, which we have watched for the past few days, has ceased.

The conflict has ended. The nation has witnessed it. Sixty millions of people have stood in silence watching for the supreme result. Death, ever victorious, is again a victor. A great conqueror is himself conquered. Our

Captain lies dead. The pale lips sayeth to the sunken eye: "Where is thy kindly glance? and where is thy winning smile?"

Senator Edmunds said:—"I have not the time to recall reminiscences of General Sherman. He has so long been the cynosure of all eyes that anything I may say in regard to his character as a man and soldier would, I fear, be mere repetition. I knew him personally. He was a man of kindly feelings, generous instincts and had all the elements of greatness. This is in brief my estimate of him. In a social sense he was exceedingly entertaining, and he possessed more warmth of character than his brusque manner at times indicated. It is not necessary for me to dwell upon his military genius, for it is conceded that he stands in the front rank of generals.

"His lofty courage, patriotism and devotion to duty ought and will no doubt be an inspiration to the youth of America. The lesson of his life can never be too well learned by the generations that are to come after him. He was a typical American, and to my mind that is the highest glory to which any man may attain."

Senator Davis said that he could hardly trust himself to speak. He had been a soldier under General Sherman, and had received acts of kindness from him when he was a subaltern. As the years had gone by, and the widening avenues of life had opened up ways of promotion, that acquaintance had ripened into friendship, and, he might say, into intimacy. He had first seen General Sherman at the siege of Vicksburg, twenty-eight years ago, when he was the very incarnation of war; but to-day that spirit had taken up its rest in the everlasting tabernacle of death. It was fit that the clangor of the great city should be hushed in silence, and that the functions of government should be suspended

while the soul of the great commander was passing to Him who gives and Him who takes away. No more were heard the thunders of the captains, and the shouting. The soul of the great warrior had passed, and was standing in judgment before Him who was the God of Battles, and was also the God of Love.

Mr. Pierce, as one of the soldiers who had served under General Sherman in the Army of the Tennessee, gave some reminiscences of the war and paid a glowing eulogy to his old commander.

Senator Evarts said that the afflicting intelligence of the death of General Sherman had touched the Senate with the deepest sensibilities; that that grief was not a private grief; nor was it limited by any narrower bounds than those of the whole country. The affections of the people toward its honorable and honored men did not always find a warm effusion, because circumstances might not have brought the personal career, the personal traits, the personal affectionate disposition of great men to the close and general observation of the people at large. But of General Sherman no such observation could be truly made. Whatever of affection and of grief Senators might feel, was felt, perhaps, more intensely in the hearts of the whole people. Observers of his death, as they had been of his life, General Sherman had been yesterday the most celebrated living American. He was now added to that longer and more illustrious list of the celebrated men of the country for the hundred years of national life.

One star differed from another star in glory, but yet all of those stars had a glory to which nothing could be added by eulogy, and from which nothing could be taken away by detraction. They shone in their own effulgence, and borrowed no light from honor or respect. It had been said

already that General Sherman was the last of the great commanders. If those who had passed out of life still watched over and took interest in what transpired in this world (and no one doubted it), what great shades must have surrounded the death-bed of General Sherman! And who could imagine a greater death-bed for a great life than that which had been watched over in a neighboring city during the week¡ It had been reserved for him (Mr. Evarts), at the declining hour of the day, as a Senator from the State which General Sherman had honored by his late residence, and in which he had died, to move, out of respect to his memory, that the Senate do now adjourn.

In the National House of Representatives, the Speaker announced the message of the President relating to the death of General Sherman. It was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, which promptly reported as follows:—

Resolved, That the House of Representatives has heard with profound sorrow of the death of William Tucumseh Sherman, the last of the Generals of the Armies of the United States.

Resolved, That we mourn him as the greatest soldier remaining to the Republic, and the last of the illustrious trio of generals who commanded the Armies of the United States, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, who shed imperishable glory upon American arms and were the idolized leaders of the Union Army.

Resolved, That we hereby record the high appreciation in which the American people hold the character and services of General Sherman as one of the greatest soldiers of his generation, as one of the grandest patriots that our country has produced, and a noble man in the broadest and fullest meaning of the word. We mingle our grief

with that of the nation mourning the departure of her great son, and of the battle-scarred veterans whom he led to victory and to peace, and we especially tender our sympathy and condolence to those who were bound to him by ties of blood and strong personal affection.

Resolved, That the Speaker appoint a committee of nine members of the House to attend the funeral of the late general as representatives of this body.

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be forwarded by the Clerk of the House to the family of General Sherman.

Mr. Cutcheon said that after the touching tribute rendered to General Sherman by the Chief Executive there was little left to say. The last of the great trio of generals had left us, and his death marks an epoch in the history of the Republic. It admonished us that the period so prolific of great men was receding into history. In his opinion General Sherman was the greatest strategist that the war had produced.

Mr. Grosvenor, of Ohio, added his tribute to the character and ability of the dead General. There was no man, he said, so beloved by the soldier as was General Sherman. Sherman was above all other men the idol of the old soldiers. There had passed away from earth to the reward of the just (and if there was no reward for Sherman on the other shore he would doubt the whole system—and he did not) the greatest character, who a few days ago had been alive, connected with the Rebellion on either side.

Mr. Outhwaite, of Ohio; Mr. Henderson, of Illinois; Mr. Cogswell of Massachusetts; Mr. Wheeler, of Alabama, and Mr. Williams, of Ohio, spoke in a similar strain, and then the resolutions were unanimously adopted.

In accordance therewith, the Speaker appointed the fol-

lowing committee: Messrs. Cutcheon, Spinola, Cogswell, Cummings, Grosvenor, Kinsey, Tarsney, Henderson, of Illinois, and Outhwaite.

In the Senate, Vice-President Morton appointed this committee to attend the funeral: Messrs. Evarts, Hawley, Manderson, Price, Cockrell, and Walthall.

The cabinet officers, and the people in general, about the capital, paid glowing tributes to the last of the great triumvirate of the Civil war. Said General Sickels:—

Millions of people have been praying earnestly that the old warrior might recover, and I had hoped that his great vitality and will-power might have pulled him through. Could he have known how the popular heart throbbed with his, how much of sympathy there was for him, it would have soothed his last moments on earth. What of him as a soldier? The whole world can answer that question As to his greatness as a leader, I can add no tribute that would brighten the record. The name of Sherman will always be prominent in the military annals and American history.

Senator Reagan, who was the Postmaster-General of Jefferson Davis' Confederate Cabinet, said:—

I knew him well, and esteemed him very highly, both as a man and as a general. He was a very able military leader and a good friend. Personally, I did not know him prior to the war, but I knew of him. His brother and I were in the House when William Tecumseh was in California, and his brother frequently read some of his very interesting letters to me. I regret the General's death exceedingly. Such men are not numerous.

Said Senator Cockrell:—

General Sherman and I heard of each other for a long time before we became personally acquainted. We worried

each other a good deal during the war, and were often in close proximity, but we never got near enough to clasp hands until I came to the Senate. Since that time General Sherman and I have been warm friends. You know he lived in St. Louis for quite a while, and he frequently referred to himself as my constituent. Our relations were of the most pleasant character, and I regret his death with all sincerity. We were conscientious enemies and warm friends.

Secretary Blaine said that he could remember General Sherman personally from the time he graduated at West Point fifty years ago, when he was himself a school boy of 10 years. "For more than thirty years," continues Mr. Blaine, " by reasons of family connections, I had known him very intimately. Of his many and great qualities on his public side I do not care to speak. General Sherman's military history is part, and a large part, of the proudest annals of the nation. He did not grow less in the intimacy of private life or by the fireside in his own home. He had the kindest of hearts and the most chivalric devotion to those he loved. He was one of the warmest friends to those for whom he professed friendship. He was frank, just and, magnanimous. He spoke and wrote with a freedom that almost seemed reckless and oftentimes was misunderstood, as when he wrote his own memoirs. His death seemed premature. Seeing him very often, I had discovered no decay in the acuteness of his senses except in a slight loss of hearing. I saw him last Summer at Bar Harbor for a considerable period, and his brightness of talk and his enjoyment of life, especially with the young, seemed as natural and marked as ever, but at the same time I had in some way gained the impression in talking with him that he had no expectations of a long life."

Secretary Noble said: I feel a great personal grief at

the loss of General Sherman, my friend for many years. I was born in Lancaster, where he was. His father was my father's friend, and while I retain for him the admiration that all Americans and the whole world must, I feel that one has gone from me by whose approval my personal action in life has been greatly influenced. I served under him in the war and had been honored by his friendship and personal intercourse, both in St. Louis, New York, and Washington since. His military achievements in the service of the Republic are a part of the history of our country, but great as his talents as a commander were, they were equaled by the beautiful trait of his character that made him the instructive companion, the genial friend, and wise counselor that he was. He was as tender and kind in private life as he was great and successful in war. His literary tact was most wonderful, and his memory not only of events and facts, but even of figures and statistics, was unfailing. His love for his comrades in arms was like that of a father for his children. His love embraced all our people. Among the first events in my official life here was a visit from General Sherman, voluntarily made in behalf of General Joseph Johnston, of whom he spoke in the highest terms. He was ready to support any man when friendly to the Government, as he was uncompromising to all its enemies. He was as grand a patriot as ever lived, and I believe his services, speeches, and example will have a happy influence upon our country through its history."

Postmaster-General Wanamaker said: "I had nearly ten years personal acquaintanceship with General Sherman, but even a much shorter time would have drawn me to him closely. He has never seemed to me like an old man, and always waked up in me all the boy that was in me. I was never where he was, that I could get near to him, that we

did not put our arms around each other. The ring of his words and ways showed that he was made of pure gold. No man that I ever knew combined in such a degree the courage of a lion, the loving gentleness of a woman, and the simplicity of a child. The sunset of his career has been as gorgeous and beautiful as the glory of his great campaign."

Attorney-General Miller said: "In General Sherman's death the world has lost the first of its military men. At least there is no one surviving at all comparable to him unless it be the great German marshal, Von Moltke. He was not only a great soldier, but he was wise in all public affairs. One thing especially struck me in the great centennial review in New York. There he stood by the side of the President. No matter what else might be claiming his attention, did he ever fail to take off his hat and salute the flag. He might let the men pass without recognition, but never the flag."

At a family meeting held on the afternoon of the 16th, it was agreed to deny the many requests for opportunity to do honors to the dead chieftain, which had come in from all the leading cities on the route to St. Louis. The body of the deceased was dressed in full uniform and placed in a casket swathed with silken flags. It bore on a silver plate the following plain inscription: "William Tecumseh Sherman, born February 8th, 1820. Died February 14th, 1891." The casket was then placed in the parlor of his home, under charge of a military guard from Governor's Island. In obedience to the General's wishes, there was to be no lying in state of his body, and no public view of his remains. Only a few of those who had been intimate with him were permitted to enter their parlor and take a last look at the face of the dead one.

The New York Commandery of the Loyal Legion met on the 16th, at 202 Broadway, and resolved:—

"In common with the entire country we lament the loss of a great military chieftain whose loyal spirit rightly placed the love of county higher than all earthly obligations, and who was individually a distinct and glorious element in the triumphant stauggle of that country for its own survival and for the rights of man.

"As once his fellow soldiers we mourn universally for the dead commander, whose great heart made us all his own and made his own virtues seem to us like personal benefactions.

"As members of this military order we deplore the loss of a companion whose honors added to the value of those ties which his fellowship helped to endear, and whose frequent and cordial visits to the New York Commandery will be cherished in our memories as so many occasions to be often and affectionately recalled.

"To his children and relatives, to whom his great renown, his honors, and his tenderness do but enhance their loss, we tender all that sympathy may, and by that a place in our regard henceforth may be accepted by them as a little heritage from him."

Touching eulogies were delivered by Generals Howard, Slocum, Swayne, Carleton and others.

Meanwhile the newspaper press of the country was giving editorial estimate of General Sherman's character and measurement of the national loss in his death. The consensus was universal that no death had removed a more exalted commander nor a higher type of American citizen. However analyzed his character shone with a resplendence that marked it for exalted and imperishable history. A few of these analyses must answer for all.

The New York *Tribune* wrote:—

"A nation mourns the last of the three great captains who, side by side, achieved imperishable fame by leading to crowning victory the armies that saved their country from destruction and its enemies from ruin. By the death of Sherman America loses an illustrious general, one of the foremost of its citizens, a gentleman without reproach, a man among men, and a patriot among patriots.

"The survivor of a generation of great men, his was a figure unique in many respects. The popularity that in all times so many men have stooped to court, often perhaps without stooping low enough to achieve, his rugged but translucent nature disdained yet won easily, and securely kept without so much as an effort. Grant, though universally regarded not more for his incomparable deeds than for the steadfastness of his character, and though twice rewarded with the highest honor in the power of his countrymen to bestow, never really awakened the highest enthusiasm of soldiers and citizens; while Sherman, in all the armies while the War lasted, and among all the people since, had only to let his familiar form be seen to carry away the hearts of all men as Sheridan carried away those of his immediate followers. As the years passed not only did the early asperities of his high-strung nervous temperament disappear or lose their jagged edges, but his very character seemed to soften and grow richer and more mellow, like some rare fruit ripening under the frosts of winter. He mixed more and more with his old soldiers and with the people, young and old, drew nearer to them, understood them better, and was better understood by them. Like John Quincy Adams, for example, he began to talk freely at an age when

most reserved men become taciturn, but unlike men of the classic type, his speech was gentle as well as golden.

"In almost every large gathering of late years his indefatigable social zeal caused him to be looked for, and always as a welcome presence and an honored guest. Not since Polonius counselled Laertes has any son received from any father advice sounder, sager or more sympathetic than that contained in the few short, quaint, characteristic sentences he was wont to address off hand to those he loved to call his "boys," at annual reunions like those of the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Tennessee and the Loyal Legion. If the inevitable strains of "Marching Through Georgia" disturbed his serenity and eclipsed the gayety of his evenings out, he bore the ordeal with fortitude; it pleased the "boys," and nothing they cared for ever failed to excite his liveliest interest. A good father, a good husband, a good son, a pure man, a soldier without vices, no less than a strategist well nigh beyond comparison, his death removes a historic landmark. The grief that is felt to-day will be less bitter for the remembrance that no private default ever dimmed the lustre of his public career.

"Alert, quick, untiring, taking small thought of glory and none of fine feathers or idle parade, but doing all things for the sake of duty and his country, Sherman may well stand for the type and model of the American soldier at his best. Some of his highest qualities were indeed, so strongly marked as to rise into defects. Thus in his early career as a general he lost for a time the confidence of his superiors by seeing too far and too clearly into the future. At Vicksburg he saw both side with such distinctness, and had so keen a perception, of the ruin he would have wrought had he commanded the

Confederate forces, that he was led to protest, at the outset, against the plan of the remarkable campaign that opened the Mississippi and proved the making of Grant.

"As a tactician Sherman was not always above criticism; witness Chickasaw Bluffs, Tunnel Hill, and Bloody Kenesaw. But as a master of strategy, whether in principle or, harder still, in practice, he has had no equal on this continent, nor during the seventy years of his lifetime has he had his superior anywhere, unless in Von Moltke. In this and in Sherman's daily and hourly control of every one of the numberless and troublesome details on which depend the movement and even the very life of an army, lay the secret of his success. From first to last he was his own chief of staff. No army ever had a better. Thus it was that the dramatic march from Atlanta to the Sea was made possible; yet this was far from being his greatest work, for then he was unopposed, whereas his movement from Chattanooga into the heart of Georgia was one long trial of skill and strength with Johnston at his best—a leader only inferior, if inferior, to Lee himself—at the head of an army second only to Lee's.

The Philadelphia *Press* said:—"The last great figure in the greatest war of our history disappears with General W. T. Sherman. In the great cycle of war which began with the Crimea and ended with the treaty of San Stefano, which for a quarter of a century kept the civilized world aflame, and in which every great nation played its part and paid its reckoning—in which our own great struggle fell between the war which created Italy and the wars which welded Germany and left Russia foiled—but two figures were left while Sherman lived, and but one now that he is gone—Von Moltke. To us the old man who died so lately, with such years as no military hero has ever had in our

history, and such honors as but two others beside him have won, stands as the best loved leader of the war, a man flawless in the regard he won and held from soldier, army, and nation. To the wider world, as to history, he is one of that mighty group whom the wars of a quarter of a century raised to war's higher level and fame's highest lists.

He knew his trade. No man better. For 40 years in peace he failed in all to which he put his hand—an average cadet, a dissatisfied, disheartened officer, an unskilful speculator, a poor lawyer, at the last the head of a local military school. Through it all he was a man who rooted nowhere, who won neither pelf nor position, and who rolled uneasily about along all the unsettled frontier from Louisiana to Oregon, finding nowhere the place that wanted him or that he wanted.

The war came. He was 41 before the first gun was fired. The first year he was discredited. The second he was distrusted. In the last two he rose to a rank not a score of men in history equal. At a step he took his place among the great captains of all time. One single campaign which began at Nashville and ended at Goldsboro—which lasted for a year, unmarred by defeat and unsullied by retreat, in which more than one corps doubled the longest marches of history, and an army of 60,000 men was launched through space like a new planet swinging in its appointed round, unchecked and unhurried—created, completed, and crowned his reputation. It found him a man whom Grant trusted; it left him a man all the world knew, an actor on its greater stage, a familiar figure for all time to come.

Twenty-five years after he had held his last great review of the army—of which he justly and proudly said in his memoirs, "it was the most magnificent army in existence," —it is not easy to realize how slowly he grew on his coun-

try, now long he struggled for recognition, through how many weary months he was misconceived and misappreciated. The strongest, sheer, sharp, intellectual force enlisted in the service of his country, he gauged the struggle from the start, and he alone. He implored an earlier call for troops. He protested at the small size of the first levy. He refused to enter Kentucky until a force was gathered such as marched to victory six months later, and lost his command for his plain speech. Every prediction for which he was deemed insane was fulfilled to the letter. Every demand that he made for men and supplies was met thrice over before early victory was won, and the later triumphs of the war, which he ruled, and on which he rode to deathless fame, followed his prescient prediction. From Atlanta to the sea he scored his great march on his maps months before it began, and victory followed his pencil-line as his pencil followed the ruler he laid across Georgia.

The glories which kindle about such fame blind men to the marvelous powers which took a bond of Fate by providing for every fateful risk. Of his two great peers, Grant leaves on all who know his great story the impression of resistless force which crushed all obstacles and Sheridan the conviction of powers second to none in the annals of war, which surmounted all barriers with the swift, sudden overleap of genius. Sherman was the finished soldier in profession and practice, who knew all, foresaw all, and worked out the problems of war to the final mate. He knew maps, topography, roads, country, and all the endless details which are the success or failure of a great march as no man ever before mastered them. It was said of him in sober earnestness that if the maps of the continent were lost he could draw them again, county by county. From the abortive assault on Vicksburg, in which he manfully bore the

blame of others, to his last operations in North Carolina, his eye was studying and scrutinizing and his hand correcting the duplicate maps he was dealing to his commanders.

The details of war were all his. He knew and tells how a rail should be twisted in destroying a railroad, and how the line could be quickest rebuilt and best used in war. From rifle-pit up, all the work and detail of defence had his patient study, and no form of formation, manœuvre, or march in assault or attack escaped him. His campaigns and memoirs teem with military comment and suggestion. He showed at every page that joy and pride in every detail of his great task which have always and everywhere been the work of the true soldier, who is always both born and made.

This marvelous mastery in the arts of war, in which he ranks even with the great commanders of any age and soldiers of any staff, service, or training, was accompanied by supreme command of the art of war. Twice in the operations about Vicksburg he retreated from defeat with the skill only great commanders show. The series of operations by which Atlanta was occupied were models for an advance in superior force along a single line of railroad. The march to the sea was one of those great strokes of genius which add a new chapter to the art of war, and change the possibilities of all future invasions. For centuries no civilized commander had before dared what all savage leaders have always attempted, an unsupported march in which an army is its own base.

He had great advantages. So had others. He came late. So did others. Others fought battles and won them, carried campaigns to victory, and proved their power to end both campaigns and the enemy at a blow. But no other man in the closing year of the war so combined and con-

noted the factors of the situation, and worked out the problem to such triumphant success. The great march, which popular enthusiasm has hung with all the greenest laurels of the struggle, was the easiest of the greater operations of the war, and was the easiest because of the skill which guided every operation to Atlanta, the prescient care which had prepared for it, and the wondrous and marvelous judgment which divined the plans of his opponent, and decided the nice instant, neither too quick nor too late, when his great army should be launched across Georgia.

These things history will love to record, and it will love also to remember of this great soldier that through twenty-five years of peace he deepened the devotion, the pride, and the tender love of a great people in a great soldier. No ambition ever warped his splendid purpose, and no temptation ever swayed him. From all the pitfalls of life, high honor and a high devotion to the nobler ideals of a soldier's life saved him. American as Lincoln, he was passionately loved like the great President, and he lived to know the overmastering, embracing love of a great people. For years, it is pleasant to know and remember, now that he is dead and cold, he never walked a street, sat in a theatre, rose at a dinner, or entered a crowded room—and how often he did all—that he did not feel and tingle to feel that to all Americans he was the one man whom all his land and people rejoiced to love. Republics are held now and then to be awkward in their honors and chilly in their gratitude; but here, at least, great hero and great people met, each equal to the duty of each. He saved his land in war, and in peace his land loved him. More no mortal can ask, and this William Tecumseh Sherman had. With the laurels of war, history will twine for him the tender blue forget-me-not of a people's tender love.

From New York *World*:—The heroic but unequal struggle of General Sherman with the final conquerer of all men has ended. The brave soldier who has faced death without fear on a hundred battlefields, and who resisted the final attack with characteristic grim determination, succumbed at last.

General Sherman was the last of the great leaders of the war of the Rebellion. In some respects he was the most popular soldier of his day. In every fibre of his character he was an American. His genius was of that quick and ready kind that characterizes his countrymen, and his simplicity and straightforwardness appealed strongly to the democratic mind and heart.

In the early days of the War he was thought by slower and more conservative men to be erratic. His brilliancy dazzled them. They could not grasp his large conceptions. His plans and his talk were far above the heads of the plodders. He saw the vastness of the undertaking, the immensity of the task with which he and his fellow-soldiers were charged. Men shook their heads, when he proclaimed his opinions, but when he faced Joe Johnston he played the game of grand strategy with the skill and coolness of the scientific soldier that he was.

In peace he was a simple, undemonstrative, patriotic citizen. He wore his military honors modestly. He never reached after the civic crown. He was one of the most charming and interesting men of his time. He never shrank from expressing his opinion, and if he seemed to seek controversy it was to vindicate the truth.

His death removes a familiar and much-loved figure. His memory will linger as long as military genius, rugged honesty and high patriotism hold their place in the world.

The New York *Herald* said :— Sad tidings these, that

General William Tecumseh Sherman has for the first time been forced to surrender.

His strategy has heretofore been that of attack, but on this occasion the first blow was delivered by the enemy. He resisted with such vigor as old age provides, made a brave fight against the odds of Death, yielded to the only foe of mortality who never lost a battle and now "sleeps in fame."

But death has bestowed upon him a double mortality. He will live forever in the "mansions not made with hands" and live forever in the hearts of a grateful people. His name is written on this lower firmament—together with those of Grant and Sheridan, his comrades on the field—in "tracings of eternal light," and his place in the Hereafter is assured by the fact that the jewel, honor, which he has worn on his breast for the space of two generations has never lost its lustre.

Sherman's rank in the long list of historic soldiers may be safely left to the future. For the present, discussion must give way to eulogy. We lift no curious eyes to discover the height of his greatness, have no desire to compare him with any but himself, and are satisfied with the tender memories which cluster about the house of mourning. He will be numbered with the nation's most illustrious dead, to be honored as a leader of our hosts on the perilous field, a defender of the people's cause, a valiant contributor to that great victory which made republics stronger and thrones weaker. For the present, therefore, we leave the task of criticism to the indifferent or the stranger, and speak only in the whisper of sorrow and confidence.

Sherman was in many respects a unique character. He was a man of simple manners, a product of our peculiar institutions, as pure minded and honest as Coriolanus. He

was blunt, brusque and wore his heart upon his sleeve. Had there been no war he might have found no opportunity—would have kept the even tenor of his way along the ordinary level, as a merchant or the president of a military academy. But when the nation trembled for its fate he gravitated to leadership with the irrepressible impulse of commanding ability. His sword was forged in fire and tempered in blood. He rose from Lieutenant to General by hard service in front of the enemy. Without ambition except to save the country, always master of the position to which he was assigned, he disdained to ask preferment and waited for preferment to seek for him. We have had many brave soldiers, but few of whom it may be said, as we are proud to say of Sherman, that "There are no tricks in plain and simple faith."

He was pre-eminently a fighter, the man for the time. In his judgment war is always war and should be conducted without "dangerous lenity." With every fibre he believed in the righteousness of our cause, and when the first rumblings of secession was heard in the Louisiana sky, he wrote to Governor Moore :—On no earthly account will I do any act or think any thought hostile to the old government of the United States."

When in the field, therefore, he smote with all the might of arm and conscience, dreamed of nothing except to rout the enemy at any cost and if possible to exterminate him. To his soldiers he said: "Put your shields before your hearts and fight with hearts more proof than shields." He never followed, was always at the front, a hard rider, a hard fighter, not reckless but bold. His army loved him as his army loved Napoleon, but the Corsican looked with "soaring insolence" upon a throne as his reward, while Sherman refused everything which politics would have gladly

offered, saying with Marcius:—"I cannot make my heart consent to take a bribe to pay my sword."

With Sherman we lose the last of that historic group in which he stood by the side of Lincoln, Grant and Sheridan. If it be true that the dead may by some subtle metempsychosis become the inspiration of the living; the memory of these four will keep the fires of patriotism alive and help our children's children to make the future of the Republic as glorious as its past.

The pulpit, too, intoned the universal sentiment, and among its many striking eulogies we find that of Rev. Duncan MacGregor, D. D., Pastor of Broad St., Baptist Church, Philadelphia, delivered in a sermon to Post No. 2, G. A. R., the text being "Tribute to whom tribute is due." "One of the most brilliant and summitless military forms of the age has fallen He had grown so tall that in his fall he threw a shadow over all lands and across the thresholds of all nations, and as it swept through the Christian civilizations of earth, enthroned powers reversed their sceptres, lifted their crowns and bowed in reverence. Fallen,—a form so great—he divides his compartments and his martial shroud in the halls of death with Joshua, Cyrus, Constantine, Pompey, Hannibal, Cromwell, Wellington, Napoleon, Washington and Grant. He was so historic that in the flight of a thousand years to come the angel of history, dropping her weary wings and resting on the battlements of time, and looking backward, will find the genius of W. T. Sherman shining as the brightest light in the military galaxy of the nineteenth century. His sword help to cut a channel through the black Alps, where liberty might find a pass. So manly was he that above the highest sweep of his ambition could be seen that rare picture of a full-fledged manhood, poised serenely above all

rivalry. He was so patriotic that the pattern of his patriotism will hang in the archives of the military and chivalric world, unchallenged by the ghost of the past or the angel of the future. And, be it remembered in the centuries to come, he never used his gallant blade to hew a stairway to rank, office or fame. His is the purest patriotism found in the annals of warriors. He was ready to halt, and unharness and crawl down by the wayside and stoop and place his hand under the blood-matted head of a comrade, lift him up, tear a piece of lining from his own coat, wipe off the blood and tie up the wound. At the same time he knew no safe, secluded spot in all this Union land where treason might make a den. Not a foot of ground, by the permission of his army, between the laky chain of the North and the ocean wall of the South, or between the golden gates of the West and the sea-sprinkled rocks of the East, could treason find to squat on and make her rendezvous. He had a tender, brotherly regard for his fellow-man, whether clad in the gray or the blue. He hated treason, and hunted her in her iron dens and breastwork caverns. He knocked at her garrisons till the whole world heard his raps. He pried open the abutments of her forts till the whole world felt the pressure of his levers. He was death on treason; winged, tireless, relentless on her trail.

"The picture of manhood that Sherman exhibited was a man among men, as a soldier among soldiers, as a fellow among fellows, as an officer among officers, as a rival among rivals, as envied and not envying, as hated and not hating, as slandered and not slandering, as abused and not abusing, as sought and not seeking, as glorified and not glorying. Sherman's cranium was the house where worked the mightiest energy of the war—a silent, relentless,

potent energy. The Government will put him in bronze and marble and make the mould the most perfect blossom in some city garden, but the spirit of Sherman will walk with progress and liberty along the shining avenues of the ages, when bronze and marble have crumbled to dust."

While the illustrious dead lay in his coffin, the letters of condolence and tributes of respect continued to pour in upon the family from at home and abroad. Those from the Old World, came from statesmen and soldiers alike. We make record of a few.

"The Princ of Wales condoles with the American nation on the loss of so distinguished an officer as General Sherman."

Count Von Moltke's condolence was accompanied by the following:—"Calm and deliberate while considering dicisive measures, unerring in carrying them into execution, General Sherman stood brilliantly to the front as a strategist. His march to the sea is a standard to be followed."

Dom Pedro, Ex-Emperor of Brazil, cabled regrets from Cannes, and added:—"I most highly estimate General Sherman's military genius. I consider him as the hero to whom is due the great Union of the United States, by the victory obtained in consequence of his great military march. I had the satisfaction of making his valuable acquaintance during my voyage to your country, and of knowing him as a perfect man and an obliging friend."

Lord Wolseley:—"I join the people of the United States in their regret at General Sherman's death, for his loss is not confined to America, but is shared by all military people."

It was the characteristic request of General Sherman that when his time came to die his body should not be permitted to lie in state for the general public to gaze upon. For sev-

eral days this modest wish was wholly respected by those who had the sole power to act in the matter; but so great was the manifest desire of the people to pay a humble tribute of respect to the dead soldier and eminent citizen, that on the day before the funeral the door was thrown open, and for seven hours a steady stream of men, women and children passed silently and sorrowfully by, taking a last look at the face of the last of the great Generals of the Union Army in the civil war. An observer might have noted many suggestive things as the procession wended its way during the long hours. It was composed of all classes, with preference for none. The rich and the poor followed each other. Men of national renown and kings in the business world stepped closely behind the humblest workers. Little children were led by veterans who followed Sherman in his wonderful march. Young soldiers and soldiers in embryo from the Military Academy were there to receive fresh inspiration for the performace of the duties that might come to them in the distant future. Professional men and laborers kept step together—all simply Americans, glad of the privilege of the hour, one to which they could look back with profound gratitude. So it would have been, if opportunity had offered, in every great city, every town, every hamlet of all this broad land.

WHOM WE MAY MOURN.

And thus to live!—And thus to die!
Dead hero,—Sherman, would that I
Might, from the patterns of thy life.
Learn how to conquer in the strife
The rough world wages 'gainst all men
From birth, until they're "born again,"
Thy walk thro' life, as all men know,
Was steady, sturdy—pure as snow;

Armies of men rejoiced to be
With Sherman, "Marching to the Sea."
A mighty nation wept with joy
O'er victories of her *soldier boy*,
And would have given thee, warrior grand,
The greatest gift within the land;
But thou—more modest, e'en, than brave,
Desired naught save a soldier's grave.
Peacemaker, thou: and God hath said
Such "shall be blessed" and comforted,"
Ergo, we mourn, but do not weep;
Sleep with thy God, in comfort sleep.
Men grown great thro' labors grand,
Are jewels polish'd by th' master's hand;
And thou, dead hero of renown,
Art jewel worthy any crown.

On February 17th, the official programme for General Sherman's funeral was announced by Generals Slocum and Howard from their headquarters on Governor's Island.

It provided as follows: The regulation escort, under command of Colonel Loomis L. Langdon, First Artillery, will consist of one regiment, as infantry, to be composed of a battalion of U. S. Marines, four companies of U. S. engineers and six companies (foot batteries) of artillery, of a batalion of light artillery from the army, and the National Guard of New York and two troops of cavalry from the National Guard of New York.

The remains to be received by the escort at the late residence of the General, No. 75 West Seventy-first street, at 2 o'clock P. M. on Thursday, February the 19th. The body to be borne on a caisson, preceded by the following named pall-bearers in carriages: Major General J. M. Schofield, Major General O. O. Howard, Rear Admiral D. L. Braine, Rear Admiral J. A. Greer, Professor H. L. Kendrick. General Joseph E. Johnson, Major General H. W. Slocum,

Major General D. E. Sickles, Major General G. M. Dodge. Major General J. M. Corse, Major General Wagner Swayne, Major General Stewart L, Woodford.

These pall-bearers to accompany the remains as far as the train at Jersey City.

Six sergeants detailed as bearers will proceed to St. Louis. The special escort of honor from the Grand Army, Lafayette Post, to form on the right and left of the caisson. The order of column, following the family and relatives, to be as follows:

1. The President and Vice President of the United States.

2. The members of the Cabinet.

3, The Ex-Presidents of the United States.

4. Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives.

5. The Governor of the State and the Mayor of the City of New York.

These officials to follow the family and relatives as representative mourners.

6. The Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States and officers of the Army and Navy.

7. The Grand Army of the Republic.

8. The Corps of Cadets, United States Military Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins commanding.

9. The National Guard, under Brigadier General Louis Fitzgerald.

10. Delegations and representatives from veterans, Sons of Veterans and other organizations, unassigned, under charge of General David Morrison.

The line of march to be as follows:

Eight avenue to Fifty-ninth street, east side of circle; Broadway to Fifty-seventh street, to Fifth avenue, to

Washington Square, where the column, excepting the regulation military escort, will be dismissed.

The escort to continue its march by Waverly place to to Macdougal street, to King street, to Hudson street, to Watts street, at corner of Canal, through Watts street to junction with West street.

Veteran organizations not moving with column, to form across Watts street, to the ferry landing, foot of Desbrosses street. The carriages in the procession to be restricted to the pall-bearers, family and relatives and invited officials. The column to be commanded by Major General O. O. Howard. U. S. A. Major General Daniel Butterfield is designated as senior aide to the General commanding, and as Marshal.

The following aids are announced: General Horace Porter, to accompany the President of the United States; General George D. Ruggles, Assistant Adjutant General, to accompany the Vice President of the United States; Gen. M. D. Leggett, to accompany the Cabinet; Hon. Joshua Choate, to accompany ex-President Hayes; Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, to accompany ex-President Cleveland; General Floyd Clarkson, in charge of Grand Army; General Robert Nugent, formerly of General Sherman's Regiment, to take charge of Veterans at Desbrosses street; General Daniel Morrison, 79th Veterans, in charge of Veteran organizations in column other than Grand Army. Mr. Killian Van Rensselaer, to accompany carriages of relatives; Major General H. A. Barnum. to accompany the Superintendent of the Military Academy; Colonel Finley Anderson, Mr. Loyall Farragut, Captain H. P. Kingsbury, Sixth Cavalry; Captain A. M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry; First Lieutenant R. H. Patterson, First Artillery; First Lieutenant L. A. Craig, Sixty Cavalry; First Lieutenant, Guy Howard, Aide-de-Camp; First Lieutenant, Harry C. Benson, Fourth Cav-

alry; First Lieutenant, David Price, First Artillery; First Lieutenant, Charles G. Treat, Aide-de-Camp, Fifth Artillery; First Lieutenant, W. W. Forsyth, Sixth Cavalry; Second Lieutenant, Samuel Rodman, Jr., First Artillery; Additional Second Lieutenant, Colden L H. Ruggles, First Artillery.

The churches of New York, city are requested to have their bells tolled at half-minute intervals during the movement of the column, from 2 until 4 P. M., and the churches of Jersey City are requested to toll their bells in like manner, from 5 to 6 P. M., on Thursday.

On Thurday, February 19th, the obsequies began in accordance with the programme laid down. But once before had the city seen a greater funeral pageant, and that was when General Grant was borne to his tomb in Riverside Park. Twenty thousand men followed the remains of General Sherman as they were carried through the streets, decorated with emblems of mourning, and thronged with mourners eager to participate in the last honors to the hero of the "March to the Sea."

The day was well nigh perfect, and from first to last no serious accident, no untoward incident, detracted from the beauty and impressiveness of the pageant. The bright sunshine, which made the metal helmets of soldiers glitter as they marched and sent the light flashing from swords and guns, relieved the sombreness of the funeral cavalcade, and gave the procession the appearance of bravery which befitted a great soldier's funeral. Everything seemed suited to the occassion and to the man, and nature and the Nation joined in doing honor to the great Union captain.

The broken family circle had been augmented by the timely arrival from abroad of the General's son, Rev. T. E. Sherman, and now they gathered about the taper-lit coffin for

a quiet service. Prayers were held, "Rest in the Lord" was sung, and then after a last long, sad look, the coffin lid was screwed down for the last time, and the imprisoned dust was ready for the pageant.

The first official move toward the formation of the procession was at 1. 58. General Howard came out on the front steps of the General's residence and ordered the caisson, which had been withrawn, to come up. At that instant a cavalry squad of the Sixth Cavalry formed to the left of the house in the middle of the street. The caisson came up in front of the house at exactly 2 o'clock. Generals Howard, Slocum, Johnston and other military dignitaries formed two lines on the walk and made a passageway to the caisson. As the pall-bearers left the house, an army band out toward Central Park began playing a funeral march.

The six sergeants, under the command of Lieutenant Rodman, appeared in the door-way, bearing on their shoulders the casket of the General. Slowly they bore their burden to the awaiting funeral carriage. All heads were then bared, and silence reigned from one end of the street to the other. This was at 2 P. M. A marching order was given, and the caisson moved out toward Eighth avenue. The private carriage of General Butterfield was then driven to the door, and Generals Schofield, Howard, Slocum and Schofield's aide entered. The pall-bearers were then seated in their respective carriages in quick succession. When the coaches containing the pall-bearers had driven away from the door, Lafayette Post marched up to the caisson, one-half of the command taking a position on one side of the caisson and the balance on the other side.

The members of the family then entered their carriages and the friends, Governors, Senators and other notables, followed in the order previously announced in the programme.

The procession at 2. 45 had moved down Eighth avenue for some distance, but the movement was very slow. Out on the side streets were hundreds of carriages waiting for a place in the immense procession.

Thousands of people lined either side of Eighth avenue as far down as the eye could reach, when the funeral cortege moved out of Seventy-first street in the following order:

Platoon of mounted police, commanded by Sergeant Revelle.

Major General Daniel Butterfield, senior aide to General O. O. Howard.

Staff of ten officers.

Mounted band of First Cavalry.

Escort of Honor, under command of Colonel Loomis L. Langdon, First Artillery, U. S. A.—One regiment, composed of troop A, N. G. S. N. Y., Capt. Roe; Light Battery K, U. S. A. Capt. John W. Dillenbeck; Second Battery, First Brigade, N. G. S. N. Y., Capt. Wilson; First Battery, N. G. S. N. Y., Capt. Wendell; Battery A, U. S. A., Capt. E Van A. Andruss; Battery G, U. S. A., Lieut. John T. Hunneycutt.

Marine Band.

Battalion United States Marines, Major Huntington; four companies United States Engineers, Lieut.-Col. King.

Pall-bearers, in carriages.

Lafayette Guard, Gen. Egbert L. Viele.

CAISSION BEARING BODY.

The mourning charger.

Killian Van Rensselaer, accompanying carriages of family and relatives.

President Harrison, Vice-President Morton and members of the Cabinet, in Carriages.

Ex-Presidents Hayes and Cleveland, in carriages.

Committee of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, in carriages.

Lieut.-Gov. Jones and Mayor Grant, in carriages.

Gov. Pattison, of Pennsylvania, and staff.

Loyal Legion, under Gen. Carlton.

Carriages containing Committee of the Legislature.

Vice-Commander Creamer, of Maryland, commanding Grand Army of the Republic.

Vice-Commander's staff.

Gen. Floyd Clarkson, Commander Department of New York, and Staff.

Comrade George Chapell, Chief Marshal New York Memorial Committee, and staff.

Sub-divisions of the G. A. R., comprising Posts Nos. 8, 13, 24, 29, 32, 38, 42, 44.

Group of tattered flags.

Posts Nos. 58, 62, 67, 69. 75, 77, 79, 80, 96, 100, 103, 113, 128, 135, 136, 143, 182. 186, 233, 234, 255, 259, 264, 307, 313, 330, 394, 192, 402.

Group of tattered flags.

Posts Nos. 408, 427, 436, 452, 458, 459, 516, 520, 552, 557, 559, 567, 577, 578, 600, 607, 638, 3, 10, 16, 84, 148, 149, 197, 207, 231, 286, 327, 355, 399, 443, 499, 500, 534, 614, 620, 636, 11, 21, 35, 89, 122, 152, 161, 189, 206, 362, 435, 623, 50, 283, 365, 368, 451, 527, 544, 560, 628, 112, 163, 524, 60, 95, 117, 120. 144, 170, 378, 466, 496, 509, 590.

Brooklyn Division, G. A. R.

Department of Connecticut, G. A. R., Comrade Henry N. Fauton, Commanding.

Department of New Jersey, G. A. R., Comrade J. R. Mullikin, Commanding.

Corps of Cadets, United States Military Academy, Lieut.-Colonel Hawkins.

Colonel Hawkins's staff.

Brig.-Gen. Louis Fitzgerald, commanding First Brigade National Guard of the State of New York, and staff.

Sixty-ninth Regiment, Col. James Cavanagh.

Eighth Regiment, Col. Geo. D. Scott.

Ninth Regiment, Col. William Seward Jr.

Twenty-second Regiment, Col. John T. Camp.

Seventy-first Regiment, Col. Frederick Kopper.

Seventh Regiment, Col. Daniel Appleton.

Twelfth Regiment, Col. Herman Dowd.

Veteran organizations, Gen. H. E. Tremain, Commandant, and staff.

Old Guard, Major McLean.

Officers representing Connecticut Militia (in carriages.)

Ex-Confederate Veterans (in carriages.)

Seventy-ninth Regiment, Highlanders.

Seventy-third Regiment, New York Veterans (New York Fire Zouaves), Col. Theodore H. Ruhle.

Seventh Regiment, New York Veterans, Lieut E G. Arthur.

Fourtheenth Regiment, Brooklyn Veterans, Gen. E. B. Towles.

Sixty-Ninth Regiment, New York Veterans, Col. T. M. Canton

Phil. H. Sheridan Command No. 1 of United States Regular Army and Navy Veterans, under W. E. Morris.

Delegation of the Union League Club.

New York Division, Sons of Veterans, sixteen camps, Col. W. H. Wyker.

Berkeley Military School Battalion of Cadets, Capt. Townsend Morgan.

Columbia Military School Battalion of Cadets, Capt. J. B. Dudley.

Hebrew Orphan Asylum Cadet Band.

Hebrew Orphan Asylum Battalion of Cadets, Maj. Cohen.

Peekskill Military Academy Cadets, Capt. John M. Tilden.

Bernard School Cadets, Capt. T. C. McDonald.

Riverside Military Academy, Principal Bisbee, commanding.

Confederate Veterans, Camp of City of New York.

Representatives of the Chamber of Commerce (in carriages.)

Representatives of the New York Historical Society (in carriages.)

Squad of Police.

The whole line of the long route was thronged on sidewalks, on house steps and in every window, with reverent spectators who stood in silence with bare heads as the body of the dead General was borne past them. The route was lined with 1700 policeman, and the most perfect order was maintained. As the procession moved slowly along, the church bells began to toll, and along the whole route the mournful sound of the bells continued as it wended its way to its destination. There were many funeral dirges played, but none struck with keener force on the listening ears than "Marching Through Georgia," played in half time, as arranged for the occasion by P. S. Gilmore.

At 4:57, the funeral procession reached Desbrosses Street Ferry.

At 5:22 o'clock the ferry boat started across the river, the masts carrying flags at half mast and the ferry-bells tolling. The Presidential party and members of the Sherman family left their coaches and took seats in the ladies' cabin, while the guards of honor and United States officers sought the other cabin. The outside of the boat was

painted black. The trip across occupied ten minutes.

The funeral train left Jersey City for its far western desi nation at precisely 12 minutes to 7 o'clock.

It seemed as if all the residents of Jersey City had gathered at the station of the Pennsylvania Railroad and along the tracks, to pay their last respects to one of the country's greatest Generals. They stood for several hours before the time set for the departure of the train, patiently waiting for the funeral cortege to arrive from New York. The train was made up of eight cars. The first was a composite car, and was intended solely for the conveyance of the remains. Next were the sleeping cars "Liverpool" and "Danville." Then the dining room car No. 704. The sleeping cars "Obigo" and "Cadi" came next; then President Robert's private car, which was for the use of the family of the dead General and, last, Vice President Thomson's private car for the use of President Harrison and the members of the Cabinet. All of the cars were draped in mourning. The interior of the composite car was entirely covered with black cloth, and on the floor was a handsome carpet. In the centre stood a catafalque, on which the casket, covered with a silk flag, rested. By the side of the casket, on a stand, was placed the saddle, bridle, boots and other riding equipments of the dead soldier.

As the train neared Trenton, N. J., the sound of cannon, fired as a farewell salute to the great commander, was heard. The train slowed up as it passed the depot, where a great throng was gathered, and the strains of a band playing the hymn "Nearer My God To Thee," greeted the ears of the travelers.

Arrangements had been made at Philadelphia by a number of the Grand Army of the Republic posts to fire a salute as the train arrived at the city station, and it was not un-



HEAD OF THE PROCESSION COMING DOWN BROADWAY, NEW YORK.



THE CATAFALQUE PASSING FIFTY-SEVENTH STREET AND BROADWAY, NEW YORK.

til late in the day that the officers of the posts learned that the the train would pass around the city.

Hurried notices were despatched to the posts, and about one hundred and fifty representatives of different posts assembled at Germantown Junction station, in the northern part of the city, and presented dress front as the train sped by the station at 9:10 P. M. A few hundred citizens also awaited the arrival of the train, and all reverently raised their hats as it passed the station. A mile or so beyond Germantown Junction, at Mantua, the train stopped to change engines and to detach Vice President Thomson's private car containing President Harrison and party, which was taken on to Washington.

And so, at all the railroad towns in Pennsylvania, assembled veterans, Grand Army men and citizens, paid honors to the dead as the solemn train moved by.

At Edgewood the train stopped long enough for three of Lieutenant Fitch's children, grandchildren of General Sherman, to get on. A Grand Army post of veterans was drawn up in line on the platform, standing with bared heads in the pouring rain until the train moved away.

As the funeral train neared Pittsburg, and the road crossings became more numerous, group after group of people were to be seen, standing there unmindful of the rain, only intent on honoring, in their humble way, the remains, of the hero of "The March to the Sea."

A touching scene was witnessed at Steubenville, where the veterans of Stanton Post, G. A. R., were drawn up in line on the depot platform. They were all old men, many of them cripples, and as they marched by the car containing the remains of him who had shared their trials and dangers in war, more than half of them were crying like children.

At Dennison, a large crowd was gathered at the station, and the comrades of Welch Post, No. 422, G. A. R., of Uhrichsville, Ohio, were there also to pay a final tribute to the remains of their former commander. The door of the funeral car was opened and they were allowed to take a look at the casket. After a short stop here, the train resumed its westward journey, passing many small way stations where were gathered the residents of the place and generally several old soldiers. At some of these small towns the local band was at the depot, and played a dirge as the train passed.

At Newcomerstown, all the public school children stood in a line at the street crossing, with heads uncovered and carrying small flags edged with black. As the train passed by they could be heard singing, "Nearer My God To Thee." A Grand Army Post and a company of Sons of Veterans were also at the depot to do honor to the departed soldier.

General Howard said that the members of the family were very much touched by the manifestations of respect and love for General Sherman on the part of the Grand Army men all along the route.

At Coshocton over 500 school children stood in one line on the street running parallel with the track while the train passed through the place. The church and fire bells of the town were tolled also. A similar demonstration was made at Trinway and Newark, at which last place Lemert Post, G. A. R., had about 100 men in line on the platform, and their fife and drum corps played "In the Sweet Bye and Bye" as the train came to a stop. The doors of the car in which the body was were opened and the veterans took a look at the casket. The entire trip from Pittsburg to this point had been interspersed with

demonstrations of sorrow at the death of a universally beloved soldier and citizen, by all classes of the people. The family of General Sherman themselves became, as the day passed and these signs of sorrow multiplied, more and more impressed with the great love the people bore for their lost one.

The train made an hour's stop at Indianapolis. Fully 15,000 people followed the parade of 2,000 soldiers and civilians down to the station, where they awaited its arrival. As it went slowly by, the thousands of people stood with uncovered heads.

St. Louis was now about to receive back the body of one of her adopted and most illustrious citizens. By 6.30 o'clock on the morning of February 21st, the Union Depot was thronged with people, awaiting the arrival of the funeral train. As the morning advanced the crowd became larger, and each train, as it entered the depot, deposited load after load of human freight, which added to the throng until the depot became almost impassable.

It was within a few minutes of 8.30 o'clock when the firing of a gun by Battery A of the St. Louis Artillery, which was stationed at the east of the depot, announced that the funeral train was on the other side of the bridge. The train was brought over the bridge to the Union Depot by two Vandalia locomotives draped in mourning, and was shunted on to a special track. Meanwhile a seventeen-gun salute was fired by the battery at ten-second intervals. When the train had come to a standstill, it was boarded by a deputation of old comrades of Ransom Post, G. A. R., under the command of Commander H. L. Ripley, and which, after relieving the guard, received the body and mounted guard. Meanwhile the occupants of the cars were waited upon by a committee of citizens, twenty-five in number, who ex-

tended the freedom of the city, and expressed a desire to do anything that would contribute to their comfort and convenience. Shortly after the arrival of the train the participants in the various divisions of the parade, military, fraternal and civic, who had been pouring into the city on all trains from daybreak, began to form, the cavalry and artillery of the first division taking possession of several blocks contiguous to Twelfth and Pine Sts., and the other division forming on the streets running east and west of Eleventh and Twelfth, for a distance of considerably over a mile.

General Sherman's desire that the obsequies should be of a military character was obeyed to the most extreme particular. But at the same time it was found impossible to draw a line that would prohibit the great mass of the people of the city from paying a last tribute of respect to his memory. So, something almost without precedent in a strictly military funeral, two civic divisions were added to the procession and formed not the least impressive feature of the occasion.

A few minutes before 11 o'clock the caisson—one that had been specially brought from Fort Leavenworth—drawn by four coal-black horses, was drawn up in front of the main entrance to the station and, amid the roar of artillery, the coffin was borne from the train by eight members of Ransom Post and placed on the carriage. Its head was draped with the Stars and Stripes, its feet with the Union Jack that had covered the caisson that had borne the bodies of General Joseph Hooker and General George H. Thomas. Under escort of the infantry, the caisson was then driven to the point at which it was to take its place in the parade, while the relatives and other members of the funeral party were assisted to carriages, which followed the caisson at a distance of a few blocks. General Merritt gave the signal,

there was a double salute of artillery and, at 11.15, tne head of the column began to move west on Pine street. Chief of Police Harrigan, with a body of policemen, led the way. Then came Brigadier-General Merritt, chief marshal, and staff, followed by Brevet Brigadier-General Forsythe, in command of the military escort. This was composed of Troops B, D, E, G, J and K, of the 7th Cavalry. Next to the caisson itself, these troops, fresh from the scenes of the Indian troubles, attracted the greatest attention. Immediately in the rear came Batteries F, of the 2d Artillery, and A, of the 4th, under the command of Major Edward H. Williston, and companies from the 7th, 10th, 12th, 13th and 14th Infantry, commanded by Edward F. Townsend. Behind the infantry came the caisson. On either side of the caisson, as well as before and behind, forming a complete square, marched twenty-four members of the Ransom Grand Army Post. The caisson was followed by a number of local clergy of all denominations in carriages, and after them came the pall-bearers that had accompanied the body from New York, and the honorary pall-bearers selected in St. Louis. Close behind these were the surviving members of the personal staff of the dead General. Then in carriages followed the family and the New York party, while the Army Committee—Generals Schofield, Miles, Slocum, Andrews, Howard and Randolph, Lieutenant Kinsbury, Captain Andrews and Captain Barrett—brought up the rear. There were 1,000 troops in the division, with the band, and 290 cavalry horses.

There was a slight break before this in the second division, which was composed of commanderies and army societies, and headed by ex-President Rutherford B. Hayes, as commander-in-chief, and staff. The Illinois contingent of the Grand Army, headed by Department Commander Destin

and staff, had the right of line in the third division, and were followed by G. A. R. delegations from many States, and Sons of Veterans, led by Colonel J. Rassieur. The fourth division was commanded by Governor D. R. Francis, and was headed by the National Guard troops from St. Louis, Carthage and Kansas City, and the cadets of the State University of Columbia. About 4,000 State troops and 900 regulars made up the first half of the division. The second half was led by Chief Justice Thomas H. Sherwood and his associates of the State Supreme Court. The fifth division was strong in numbers and representative in character. It was commanded by Major Charles C. Rainwater, and consisted of civic societies, mercantile, historical and quasi-military organizations. Two hundred members of the Ex-Confederate Association of Missouri, wearing mourning badges and crape armlets, marched behind the chief of staff. They wore their old Confederate uniforms and attracted general attention. In the sixth and last division were the city officials, headed by Mayor Noonan, the Merchants' and Mechanics' exchanges, and citizens in carriages.

And so the procession slowly wended its way to Calvary. The route—west on Pine to Grand avenue, thence north to Florissant avenue, thence west to the cemetery—was fully five and a half miles long. Minute guns were fired by the battery; church bells were tolled as the caisson passed by, and the bands alternated dirges and the old familiar "Marching Through Georgia" to slow time. It was nearly 2 o'clock when the head of the procession reached Cavalry.

An immense crowd had already passed through, but a large force of police had kept open the route to the grave. The veterans of the 13th lifted the coffin from the caisson, and with slow and measured tread, they bore it to the grave.

The services at the grave were of the simplest character and were conducted by Rev. Thomas Ewing Sherman. All assembled at the grave, standing with uncovered heads. As the casket was being lowered, the regimental band played Pleyel's hymn. Father Sherman read the Catholic service, one of the selections being "I am the Resurrection and the Life," offered a fervent prayer, and the services were at an end. As the services progressed, many about the grave were visibly affected, and when the flags surrounding the casket were removed the sounds of low sobbing were heard. At 3 o'clock the closing of the grave took place, and the buglers of the Seventh Cavalry sounded "taps," "lights out." Salutes were fired by the Thirteenth Infantry, followed by three salvos of artillery, which was stationed some distance to the east. Wreaths and branches of evergreens were then placed upon the grave by loving hands. The funeral party and troops returned to the station, and the many thousands of citzens dispersed to their homes.

Thus was laid to rest by the side of his wife and two sons, one of whom was his "soldier boy," General William Tecumseh Sherman.

One of the first acts of the family of General Sherman on their return from the funeral at St. Louis, was to express in the following letter to the public the appreciation of the honors paid to the nation's dead. The letter is as follows:—

No. 75 West Seventy-First Street,
NEW YORK, February 23, 1891.

"It is fitting that some public acknowledgment should be made by the family of General Sherman of the very many heartfelt tokens of sympathy which they have received in their bereavement. We can only say that such universal and such evidently profound sorrow, manifested, as it has been,

in a thousand ways, sustains and comforts us in our desolation. The entire nation, by its generous expression of condolence, has lightened the burden of our grief and helped us to bear our irreparable loss. The friends of the family are asked to accept this slight token of our grateful appreciation, in lieu of any more direct personal communication, which, while it would be more gratifying to us, we have not now the strength or courage to offer to each and all.

In behalf of the family,

"THOMAS E. SHERMAN."

One of the last acts of the gallant old General—who already had a monument more enduring than granite, in the affections of his countrymen—was to prescribe the monument he wished over his grave, and provide for its payment. On this he wanted no epitaph except his name and the simple inscription,

TRUE AND HONEST.

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